STATE JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
CASE STUDIES OF MONTANA, NORTH CAROLINA,
WASHINGTON, AND WISCONSIN

By John D. Echeverria*

Introduction and Overview ............................................................ 364
I. Montana ...................................................................................... 372
   A. Montanans’ Right to a Clean and Healthful Environment ....... 372
   B. The Montana Judicial Electoral Process ............................... 378
   C. Judicial Rulings Affecting the Judicial Electoral Process ....... 380
   D. The Ideological Struggle for Control of the Supreme Court ... 386
   E. The 2012 Election ................................................................. 387
   F. The 2014 Appointment ......................................................... 392
   G. The 2014 Election ................................................................. 392
II. North Carolina ........................................................................... 398
   A. The Dan River Ash Waste Spill ............................................. 398
   B. The North Carolina Judicial Electoral Process ..................... 402
   C. North Carolina Environmental Case Law ......................... 405
   D. Judicial Elections and State Politics .................................... 411
   E. The 2012 Election ................................................................. 414
   F. The 2014 Election ................................................................. 417
III. Washington ............................................................................. 422
   A. The Environmentalists’ Success Story ................................. 422
   C. Environmental Law in the Supreme Court ....................... 425
   D. Modern Judicial Elections in Washington ....................... 427
   E. The 2006 Election ................................................................. 435
   F. The 2008 Election ................................................................. 441
   G. The 2010 Elections ............................................................... 443
   H. The 2012 Election ............................................................... 452

* The author is a Professor of Law at Vermont Law School. He received a J.D. degree from Yale Law School in 1981. He would like to gratefully acknowledge the help and support of the Piper Fund on this research project.
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

This article presents case studies of the judicial electoral process and its implications for environmental legal protections in four states: Montana, North Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin. Academics and other researchers have documented the growing partisan competition and increasingly high levels of expenditures in state judicial elections.¹ Prior research has also documented the efforts by various special interests to influence the ideological complexion of the state courts by supporting or opposing specific candidates for judicial office.² This article builds upon this prior work by attempting to determine whether successful efforts to change the personnel sitting on specific state courts have influenced subsequent rulings by these courts in cases, involving environmental law questions.

The importance of the state courts in the development of environmental law, standing alone, makes it worthwhile to study how the outcomes of elections to the States’ highest courts may affect the content of environmental law. The federal courts and the United States Supreme Court in particular, play a more visible role than the state courts in the development of environmental law. But state courts play an important role in the development of environmental law, by virtue of the breadth of their jurisdiction in cases involving environmental issues, the States’ adoption of pollution control and other environmental laws that parallel similar federal


². See, e.g., G. Alan Tarr, Rethinking the Selection of State Supreme Court Justices, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1445, 1458–59 (2003); see also Lawrence Baum, Judicial Elections and Judicial Independence: The Voters’ Perspective, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 32–34 (2003) (noting that the interest groups involved are those with economic stakes in court decisions).
statutes, and the States’ exercise of extensive environmental law enforcement responsibilities delegated to them by the federal government.3

In addition, environmental law rulings by the elected state courts are worthy of attention because various special interests have invested substantial resources in state judicial elections for the explicit purpose of affecting the outcomes of environmental law cases before these courts.4 The natural question raised by this political activity is whether the effort has been worthwhile, as measured by actual changes in case outcomes. As I have described in a prior article, starting in the mid-1990s, advocacy groups and consulting firms financed by Charles and David Koch initiated a nationwide effort to change the direction of state environmental law (and law on other topics) by organizing political efforts to elect conservative candidates to the state courts.5 Around the same time, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce created its Institute for Legal Reform, which seeks to promote the election of business friendly judges to the state courts,6 and business groups in individual states mounted similar efforts.7 These business groups and their conservative allies publicly justified these initiatives as necessary, from their perspective, to respond to prior efforts by trial lawyers to secure the election of judges sympathetic to personal injury claims.8 However, the conservative counter-offensive has plainly been broader and more intense than anything that came before.9 The Kochs and allied groups focused on state judicial elections in part because they have traditionally been “sleepy,” “low-key” contests in which relatively modest investments in campaign contributions and independent advocacy yield significant political rewards.10

The States vary in their approaches to selecting judges to their highest courts and some states do not rely on elections at all. In twelve states, judges are appointed (and reappointed) to office for life or for some defined

4. Id. at 223.
5. Id. at 231–34.
7. Id. at 255, 290.
8. Id. at 226.
In six states judges are elected in partisan elections, and in fifteen states they are elected in nonpartisan elections. In the remaining seventeen states, judges are selected through some form of appointment process and then face “retention” elections following their appointment.

This research focuses only on Montana, North Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin. Each of these states uses either a partisan or nominally nonpartisan method for selecting judges for their high courts. The study was confined to states with direct partisan or nonpartisan elections on the premise that these states were the most likely to have experienced the kind of vigorously contested judicial elections that might produce identifiable changes in the ideological direction of their courts’ decision-making. These four states were selected after a survey of a larger number of candidate states, based on their geographic distribution and the likelihood that they would reflect varying levels of success by industry opponents of environmental regulations, on the one hand, and environmental advocates, on the other, in the judicial electoral process. The results in these four states are not necessarily representative of the consequences of judicial elections for environmental law in all states with elected supreme courts. Nonetheless, this sample of states appears to be instructive and provides a foundation for potential future research.

One methodological challenge in conducting this research has been determining how to define the scope of the environmental case law to be examined for the purpose of evaluating whether the outcomes of judicial elections influence a state’s environmental legal protections. Environmental law, especially at the state level, is a wide-ranging field. It can be defined to include not only cases involving traditional pollution control and natural resource issues, but also cases involving state and local land use regulation, water resource management, consumer protection, and public health and safety measures. To make matters more complicated, state court cases not directly involving an environmental dispute may produce rulings with important environmental law implications. Cases involving standing to sue or claims of constitutional takings represent two obvious examples. To narrow the universe of potentially relevant cases to a manageable core, I generally relied on the West keynote system to identify the cases in each state that generated an “environmental law” headnote over a ten- to fifteen-year period.

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
year period. This approach unquestionably misses important environmental law cases. But the selected cases are likely to be reasonably representative of a state court’s general tendencies in environmental law. A more intensive effort involving examination of a larger number of state cases would yield more robust results.

Another complicating factor is that the scope of the states’ high court jurisdictions varies from state to state. The Montana Supreme Court hears appeals as of right from the District Courts and other inferior courts, and therefore lacks discretion to choose the appeals it wishes to hear. By contrast, the Supreme Courts in North Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin each exercise appellate jurisdiction that is at least in part discretionary. This difference between the jurisdictions of the states’ high courts may confound the analysis in ways that are hard to discern. It is possible that if a court tends to rule in favor of environmental advocates it will tend to disproportionately grant leave to appeal in cases in which environmental advocates present compelling arguments for reversing lower court decisions. On the other hand, it is possible that if a court tends to rule in favor of opponents of environmental regulation it will tend to disproportionately grant leave to appeal in cases in which opponents of regulation present compelling arguments for reversal. Unfortunately, the data and analysis conducted as part of this research project provide no useful insights into this potentially important issue.

In brief, the major state-by-state conclusions of this study are as follows:

Montana’s Supreme Court has long distinguished itself from other state courts by demonstrating a special interest and sympathy for the goals of environmental law, a stance consistent with and arguably mandated by the State’s virtually unique recognition of a constitutional right to “a clean and

---

16. Unfortunately for my purposes, West Publishing is not very forthcoming in describing the parameters used by classifiers to assign different headnotes to specific categories in the Westlaw keynote system. The Key Number link on the WestlawNext home page provides only the most basic information: “West attorney editors have read, summarized and classified case law by topic and subtopics that represent specific points of law. Each specific point of law is assigned a unique number, called a Key Number.” Key Number Information, WESTLAWNEXT, http://www.westlawnext.com (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). See also Robin Gemandt, The Westlaw Editorial Process for Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Part 4 (Key Numbers), LEGAL SOLUTIONS BLOG (Sept. 20, 2012), http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/legal-research/the-westlaw-editorial-process-for-patient-protection-affordable-care-act-part-4-key-numbers/#sthash.nH59R7L7.dpuf (describing the work of West keynote “classifiers”).


In recent years, however, environmental advocates have suffered some notable losses before the Supreme Court. For example, the Court declined to apply the Montana Environmental Policy Act to a major lease of state lands for coal mining, and in another case the court declined to apply the “strict scrutiny” mandated by the constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations. Even when the environmentalist side has prevailed in recent years, for example in an important stream access case, the Court has split sharply along ideological lines. This change in results and atmosphere can be explained, at least in part, by the results of recent judicial elections. In 2012, the Montana Growth Network, led by a Montana Tea Party activist and funded by a handful of wealthy but anonymous donors, helped secure the election of conservative Laurie McKinnon by running harsh attack ads directed at both of McKinnon’s liberal opponents. In 2014, a long-time incumbent, who had generally voted to uphold environmental protections, was challenged by a hard-right ideologue whose election could have swung the Court further to the right. In sum, conservative forces have made considerable progress and are continuing in their efforts to change the direction of environmental law in Montana by changing the personnel on the Supreme Court.

The North Carolina Supreme Court has become a virtual sinkhole for environmental law. Over the last 15 years, in every instance in which the Court has reviewed a major environmental law issue, the Court has sided with the anti-environmental protection side of the dispute. Throughout this period, the Court (which is nominally nonpartisan) has been dominated by conservative justices generally aligned with the Republican Party. In 2012, in a hard fought contest for control of the Court, Republican Paul

---

19. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
21. Bitterroot River Protective Ass’n, Inc. v. Bitterroot Conservation Dist., 198 P.3d 219, 242 (Mont. 2008) (observing that the District Court’s “definition of ‘natural’ was too narrow and inconsistent with the purposes of [the Stream Access Law]”).
24. Id.
Newby narrowly prevailed over Democrat Sam Ervin IV. Independent expenditures in support of Newby outpaced those in support on Ervin by a margin of eight to one; with Newby’s support coming from Americans for Prosperity (a recipient of Koch brothers funding), Justice for All NC (funded by the Republican State Leadership Committee), and the North Carolina Judicial Coalition (with major funding from the NC Chamber of Commerce and the parent company of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco). In 2014, the three Democrats on the Court faced stiff challenges for reelection. Robin Hudson, today the sole consistent dissenter from the Court’s pattern of weakening environmental protections, survived a bitterly contested primary challenge. In that race, Justice for All NC ran a television ad attacking Hudson for being “soft on child molesters.” In the 2014 general election, Justice Hudson and the two other Democratic candidates all prevailed in their races. Nonetheless, the situation in North Carolina remains bleak for environmental advocates.

Washington State offers an apparently rare example of a state in which the voters have selected a centrist-to-liberal Supreme Court and soundly rejected a bid by segments of the business community and their ideological allies to turn the Court in a conservative direction. Over the last 14 years, the outcomes of the Court’s decisions in environmental cases have split equally between the pro- and anti-environmental sides of the dispute, which is the result one would logically expect if the Court were deciding cases on

27. Stern, supra note 23.
the merits without any particular ideological predisposition. In 2006, following the election of two very conservative justices who consistently voted against environmental protections, business interests and property rights advocates pushed for the election of three additional conservative justices. As a result of a determined and well-funded (if still out-matched) effort by environmental advocates, labor unions, and other liberal groups, voters rejected all three of these right-leaning candidates. In 2010, Justice Richard Sanders, dubbed the Court’s “property rights justice,” after serving 15 years on the Court, was ousted from his seat by a liberal opponent. In 2012, Sanders failed in a bid to regain a seat on the Court in a race to fill a vacancy. Following this recent tumult, Washington judicial elections have lost their sharp partisan edge and environmental advocates in Washington are assured (at least for the time being) of a reasonable shot at having their cases fairly resolved on the merits.

Wisconsin also illustrates the effect of partisanship on judicial decision making, despite the nominally nonpartisan process for electing justices to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. An examination of major environmental law cases decided between 2000 and 2013 shows that, almost without exception, justices associated with the Republican Party voted on the anti-environmental protection side while justices associated with the Democratic Party consistently voted on the pro-environmental side. In addition, as partisan control of the Court swung back and forth over this period, the outcomes of the environmental cases before the Court also changed, with environmental advocates almost always winning while the Democrats were in control and almost always losing while the Republicans were in control. In keeping with the “purple” character of the Wisconsin judiciary, recent elections to the Wisconsin Supreme Court have been very partisan and very expensive. Since 2007, there have been millions of dollars in independent expenditures supporting and attacking candidates for seats on the Court. In 2007, Joanne Kloppenburg, a long-time environmental attorney with the Attorney General’s Office, failed in a bid to unseat Justice David Prosser by a scant 7,000 votes; Prosser benefited from a $2.2 million independent expenditure.
expenditure campaign, with half of this amount provided by the “Koch-
backed Americans for Prosperity.” The ideology of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, and its environmental jurisprudence, will apparently
continue to be contested at the ballot box for the foreseeable future.

Even though this sampling of state judicial politics is limited, it is
possible to offer some general conclusions. First, as common sense might
suggest, the identities of the persons elected to the state supreme courts
have a significant influence on the character and direction of a state’s
environmental law jurisprudence. Some state courts issue decisions that
tend to support the goals of environmental law and other state courts issue
decisions that tend to undermine them. The ideological orientation shared
by a majority of the justices on a state high court significantly influences
the direction in which the case law is heading in that state.

Second, voters across the country appear anxious to support candidates
who will rule fairly and in accordance with the law. At the same time, they
tend to reject candidates whom they perceive as extremist in either
direction. But sober and objective judging is a relative abstraction and
voters have little basis for making discerning judgments about whether
judges are actually centrist in their decision making, much less making such
judgments about candidates for judicial office. As a result, negative
campaigning, both by candidates themselves and by independent
expenditure groups, plays an outsize role in judicial elections. Those
candidates who adopt an explicitly ideological posture, such as Richard
Sanders of Washington State, tend to pay the price at the polls. By the
same token, “environmentalist” candidates have not fared well in judicial
elections either. As a result, most judicial candidates claim—sometimes
legitimately, sometimes not—that they embrace centrist positions. For
better or for worse, many judicial elections largely involve efforts to rebut
such claims of moderation.

Finally, supporters of judicial candidates appear to do themselves no
favors by suggesting that their favored candidate will produce particular
outcomes once elected to the judiciary. While such appeals may motivate
some voters to vote for a candidate, they appear as likely to induce voters to
vote for the opposing candidate, and will generally alienate voters who seek
to elect a judge without a political agenda. Washington Conservation

---

34. Susan Grigsby, How to Pick the Right Judge on November 4, DAILY KOS (Nov. 2,
2014, 2:00 PM), http://m.dailykos.com/story/2014/11/02/1340407/-How-to-pick-the-right-judge-on-
November-4.

35. Steve Miletich, Justice Richard Sanders, As Usual, Draws Fire From Two Election
Opponents, SEATTLE TIMES (July 30, 2010), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2012475245_6supremecourt29m.html.
Voters appears to have adopted an effective approach by explicitly “not demand[ing] that judicial candidates have a particular ideological inclination,” and instead committing to endorse “those candidates that are fully committed to a fair and impartial judiciary, thereby ensuring that our friends and allies will receive a fair shot when arguing environmental cases before our appellate courts.”

I. MONTANA

A. Montanans’ Right to a Clean and Healthful Environment

In the arena of environmental law Montana stands apart from most other states because of its constitutional provisions recognizing a right to a “clean and healthful environment.” Historically, the Montana Supreme Court has been willing to invest these constitutional provisions with genuine meaning, a practice justified by Montanans’ decision to include these provisions in their Constitution in the first place. Thus, when it came to the development of its environmental jurisprudence, Montana outpaced most other states. Numerous Montana Supreme Court decisions interpreted and applied the constitutional provisions to provide Montanans a level of legal environmental protection beyond that provided in other states. Even in cases not specifically implicating the constitutional provisions, their inclusion in the Montana Constitution encouraged the Court to approach environmental law issues with sympathy for the goals of environmental law.

In recent years, however, arguably due in part to changes in the composition of the Court, as well as the political advocacy surrounding the judicial selection process, the Court has become somewhat more ambivalent and circumspect in its approach to environmental law. Current and future contests for seats on the Supreme Court have the potential to begin to reverse the Court’s environmentally protective jurisprudence.

The preamble to the Montana Constitution displays an extraordinary appreciation for the value of Montana’s natural resources: “We the people


37. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3; art. IX. See also Sylvia Ewald, State Court Adjudication of Environmental Rights: Lessons from the Adjudication of the Right to Education and the Right to Welfare, 36 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 413, 420–21 (2011) (describing the half dozen other states with constitutions establishing environmental rights).

38. The highest courts of most other states with constitutional rights to environmental protection have followed a more timid path in developing their environmental rights jurisprudence. See Ewald, supra note 37, at 426–38 (discussing the varying judicial interpretations given by states’ constitutional environmental rights provisions).
of Montana grateful to God for the quiet beauty of our state, the grandeur of our mountains, the vastness of our rolling plains, and desiring to improve the quality of life, equality of opportunity and to secure the blessings of liberty for this and future generations do ordain and establish this constitution.”

But the truly remarkable parts of the Constitution, as revised in 1972, are the provisions that give operational meaning to these sentiments. Article II, section 3 declares, under the heading of “[i]nalienable rights,” that “[a]ll persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights,” including “the right to a clean and healthful environment.”

An entire article of the Constitution, Article IX, is devoted to “[e]nvironment and [n]atural [r]esources,” and includes the statement that, “[t]he state and each person shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and future generations.”

While the Supreme Court was initially slow to recognize the significance of these provisions, in 1999, in Montana Environmental Information Center v. Department of Environmental Quality (“M.E.I.C.”), the Court held unanimously that the guarantee of a clean and healthful environment represented a “fundamental right” under the Montana Constitution, on a par with freedom of speech or freedom of religion. The Court ruled in light of this provision that a trial court had erred in rejecting an environmental group’s challenge to the issuance of discharge permits for a proposed mine without complying with the State’s “anti-degradation” policy. The Court explained that the Department of Environmental Quality’s (“DEQ’s”) grant of an exemption from the anti-degradation policy could be upheld only if it furthered a compelling governmental interest, was closely tailored to effectuate that interest, and represented the least environmentally destructive method to achieve the state’s goal.

In 2001, in Cape-France Enterprises v. Estate of Peed, the Court extended the ruling in M.E.I.C. by holding that the constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment includes the right to a clean and healthful environment in a private property. 

---

39. MONT. CONST. pmbl.
40. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
41. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
42. Kadillak v. Anaconda Co., 602 P.2d 147, 154 (Mont. 1979) (ruling that State Board of Land Commissioners was not required under the Montana Environmental Policy Act (“MEPA”) to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement prior to issuing an operating permit under the Hardrock Mining Act, given that the act included a strict 60-day deadline for acting on an application for a permit, which precluded compliance with MEPA, and rejecting the argument that the result should be different in Montana based on the constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment); see generally Jack Tuholske, The Legislature Shall Make No Law . . . Abridging Montanans’ Constitutional Rights to a Clean and Healthful Environment, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 311, 313–15 (2007) (discussing the history of judicial implementation of the Montana right to a clean and healthful environment).
43. 988 P.2d 1236, 1246 (Mont. 1999).
44. Id. at 1249.
45. Id. at 1246.
clean and healthy environment applied not only to the government, but to private parties as well. After a landowner signed a land-sale contract, the DEQ informed the owner of potential groundwater pollution under the land, the need to do water testing before the land could be sold, and the risk of liability for pumping in connection with water testing. In these circumstances, the Court ruled, the constitutional right to a clean and healthy environment entitled the landowner to rescind the contract.

The following year, in *Hagener v. Wallace*, the Court upheld the authority of the Department of Fish, Wildlife & Parks to sue to block the transfer of 500 game-farm elk to the Crow Indian Reservation in order to protect the native elk population. The Court observed that “the statutes at issue in this case are not mere technicalities or unreasonable obstacles to private enterprise,” but rather, “are essential to ensure the health and safety of Montana’s natural wildlife population,” and “reflect the theory underlying environmental protection that being proactive rather than reactive is necessary to ensure that future generations enjoy both a healthy environment and the wildlife it supports.”

In 2010, in the most recent environmental-side win involving Montana’s constitutionally-based environmental rights, the Court ruled in *State ex rel. Department of Environmental Quality v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company*, that in view of the right to a clean and healthy environment it was appropriate to interpret the State Comprehensive Environmental Cleanup and Responsibility Act (“CECRA”) more broadly than the parallel federal superfund law. The United States Supreme Court had determined that the federal superfund law did not support the theory of “arranger” liability, but the Montana Supreme Court ruled that it was still appropriate to apply arranger liability theory under state law. Citing the constitutional right to a clean and healthy environment, the Court stated

---

46. 29 P.3d 1011, 1017 (Mont. 2001).
47.  Id. at 1021.
48.  Id. at 1017.
49.  47 P.3d 847, 854 (Mont. 2002).
50.  Id.
51.  The Montana Supreme Court did not invariably rule in favor of a broad reading of the constitutional right to a clean and healthy environment. Merlin Meyers Revocable Trust v. Yellowstone Cnty., 53 P.3d 1268 (Mont. 2002) (ruling that county commissioners could not properly invoke the right to a clean and healthful environment to justify barring sand and gravel operations in nonresidential zoning districts in violation of state statute); *See also* Sunburst Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 165 P.3d 1079 (Mont. 2007) (ruling that landowner could recover damages for groundwater contamination due to refinery operation on a common law tort theory, but pretermitting issue of whether a constitutional tort claim could be brought under Article II, section 3 of the Montana Constitution).
52.  246 P.3d 1037 (Mont. 2010).
53.  Id. at 1044.
that, “[a] broad scope of arranger liability best serves CECRA’s stated purpose to protect the public health and welfare of all Montana citizens against the dangers arising from releases of hazardous or deleterious substances.”

In other environmental cases the Montana Supreme Court has also generally supported environmental protection policies, either favoring environmental groups and citizens in cases against the government, or favoring the government in cases against resource industries and polluters. Thus, the court generally has adopted an expansive reading of the Montana Environmental Policy Act (Montana’s “little NEPA”). The Court has also: upheld municipal bans on smoking in video gaming establishments; reversed DEQ air-quality permits because they authorized too much pollution; upheld the authority of the Montana Petroleum Tank Release Compensation Board to sue the owner of a petroleum tank for reimbursement of the costs of cleaning up an oil spill; enforced pollution limits on water produced by coal-bed methane extraction; allowed environmental groups to expand their administrative complaints in proceedings challenging permit decisions; overturned local land use approvals on the ground that they provided inadequate protection for the environment; and ruled that DEQ’s issuance of a storm water discharge

54. Id. at 1046.
55. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Mont. Dep’t of Transp., 994 P.2d 676 (Mont. 2000) (holding that the Department of Transportation violated the Montana Environmental Policy Act by failing to prepare a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for an interstate highway interchange project); see also Friends of the Wild Swan v. Dep’t of Natural Res. & Conservation, 6 P.3d 972, 978 (Mont. 2000) (holding the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation’s Environmental Impact Statement on proposed timber sale was inadequate).
57. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 112 P.3d 964 (Mont. 2005) (reversing District Court decision upholding Board of Environmental Review order approving decision by Department of Environmental Quality to issue air quality permit for power plant).
60. Citizens Awareness Network v. Mont. Bd. of Envtl. Review, 227 P.3d 583, 589–90 (Mont. 2010) (abrogating two prior decisions and ruling that the Board of Environmental Review erred in refusing to allow an environmental group challenging the issuance of an air permit for a power plant to amend its administrative complaint).
61. Headapohl v. Missoula City-Cnty. Bd. of Health, 260 P.3d 139, 143 (Mont. 2011) (reversing District Court ruling that construction activity was carried out in accord with municipal health
permit to a mining company was arbitrary and capricious because the stream receiving the discharge was an “area of unique ecological significance.”62

However, in the last several years, environmental advocates have suffered several important losses in the Supreme Court, suggesting a shift in attitudes on the Court toward environmental cases. In 2008, in *Clark Fork Coalition v. Montana Department of Environmental Quality*, the Court rejected the argument that the “strict scrutiny” normally called for by the constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment should apply in the context of addressing whether an environmental agency properly interpreted its own regulations.63 Instead, the Court applied the deferential standard of review that other courts normally apply to agency interpretations of their own rules in the absence of constitutionally protected environmental rights.64

In 2011, the Court issued an important ruling limiting the procedural rights of a county under Montana’s little NEPA in connection with a proposed electric transmission line.65 Reversing a District Court decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the county was not entitled to an injunction against the release of a draft environmental impact statement, rejecting the argument that the agency had failed to conduct necessary consultations with the county.66

In 2012, the Court issued two decisions adverse to environmental plaintiffs. In *Montana Wildlife Federation v. Montana Board of Oil & Gas Conservation*, the Court rejected wildlife groups’ argument that the board had not complied with the Montana Environmental Policy Act before issuing several dozen permits for gas wells that would allegedly harm habitat for the greater sage grouse, a candidate for the federal threatened and endangered species list.67 Specifically, the Court ruled that the environmental assessments prepared for each well were appropriately tiered

---

63. 197 P.3d 482 (Mont. 2008).
64. *Id.* While this ruling placed an important new limit on the scope of the constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment, the Court still ruled for the plaintiffs because, even applying a deferential standard of review, the Court ruled that the agency adopted an arbitrary reading of its regulations by concluding that an anti-degradation analysis was not required in connection with the review of a proposed mine. *Id.*
66. *Id.* at 722.
to two Environmental Impact Statements (“EISs”) prepared many years earlier; the environmental assessments adequately considered cumulative environmental impacts; and plaintiffs failed to make a sufficient showing of cumulative environmental impact to demonstrate the need for a programmatic EIS covering all of the wells.68

Also in 2012, in Northern Plains Resource Council, Inc. v. Montana Board of Land Commissioners, the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a statute exempting decisions by the State Land Board to lease state lands for coal mining purposes from the Montana Environmental Policy Act as long as development of the leased land was subject to “further permitting.” 69 Plaintiffs claimed that this exemption violated the constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment, but the Court rejected the argument.70 The Court ruled that the leasing decision did not directly implicate the constitutional right insofar as the state preserved the power to conduct environmental reviews and compel compliance with environmental laws at later stages of the development process.71 Therefore, the court reasoned, the constitutionality of the statute was subject to review under a rational basis standard of review and, under that standard, withstood the constitutional challenge.72 In reaching this result the Court arguably overlooked the point that once the state enters into leasing arrangements and makes budget plans based on the anticipated receipt of millions of dollars in coal royalties, state regulators will be hard pressed to impose meaningful environmental limits on future coal operations.

Finally, even when the environmental side of the case has prevailed in recent years, such as in a controversial stream access case, the Court’s decision-making process appears to have become more conflicted than in years past. In the 2014 decision in Public Lands Access Association, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Madison County, the Court, in a rather technical five to two ruling, with an opinion for the court by Justice Michael Wheat, upheld a claim by the public to a right based on prescription to gain access to a stream from a public roadway passing over the stream.73 In dissent, Justice Laurie McKinnon described the majority opinion as “ignoring a century of precedent,” 74 and Justice Jim Rice described it as “a sweeping departure from established law.”75

68. Id. at 891.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 175.
72. Id.
74. Id. at 68.
75. Id. at 69.
One can only draw so many conclusions from a review of the limited number of environmental decisions issued by the Montana Supreme Court. Even in the period immediately following adoption of the constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment, the environmental side did not prevail on every argument presented to the Supreme Court. In addition, the court has continued to award environmentalists victories in certain cases in recent years. Moreover, each case involves distinct factual and legal issues that have their own strengths and weaknesses. Yet, there is an unmistakable trend in the direction of the Court’s decision-making on environmental issues over the last 15 years. Environmentalists are more likely to receive a cold shoulder from the Court today than they were a decade ago. Several members of the current Court appear, based on their voting records, to be openly hostile to the goal of environmental protection. The willingness of interest groups opposed to stringent environmental protections to vigorously attack candidates for seats on the court based on their environmental views, and to promote candidates who are perceived as less likely to support strong environmental protections, has likely had a chilling effect on the Court as a whole in terms of its willingness to develop the state’s environmental jurisprudence.

Before examining in detail how the recent battles over judicial selection in Montana have affected the make-up of the Montana Supreme Court and the court’s environmental law decision-making, it will be useful to review, in detail, the selection process for the Montana high court.

B. The Montana Judicial Electoral Process

The Montana Supreme Court consists of a Chief Justice and six Associate Justices. Each justice serves for a term of 8 years. In its 1972 constitutional revisions, Montana adopted a unique system of judicial selection under which the justices are either appointed to the Supreme Court by the Governor or elected by popular vote. Each of the justices, regardless of the method of appointment, serves on a statewide basis.
If a justice retires during his or her term, creating a vacancy on the Court, the Governor is authorized to appoint a new justice to fill the vacant seat, subject to Senate confirmation. The Governor must select a candidate from a slate identified by a Judicial Nominations Commission, which must send the Governor between three and five names for his or her consideration. The Commission is composed of seven members: four lay members from different geographical areas of the state appointed by the Governor; two attorneys appointed by the Supreme Court; and one district judge elected by the state’s district judges.

At the next general election following a justice’s appointment, if the appointee wishes to remain on the court, his or her name is placed on the ballot. If other candidates file for the seat, there is a contested election. If no other candidate files, voters have the opportunity to cast a yes or no vote on whether to retain the appointed justice.

When a justice retires at the end of his or her term, the open seat is filled through a popular election rather than by appointment. At the end of an elected justice’s term, if the justice wishes to serve for another term, other candidates can file against the justice seeking re-election. If the justice is running unopposed, voters again have the opportunity to cast a yes or no vote on whether to retain the justice.

One aspect of the selection process that has been a matter of recent controversy is whether justices should continue to be selected on a statewide basis. In 2011, the Montana legislature passed Senate Bill 268, authorizing submission of a referendum to the voters to change the law so that the justices would be selected to serve in one of seven separate districts across the state. Critics of the measure contended that this district approach would tend to make justices beholden to parochial interests, and that it represented a thinly disguised effort to “gerrymander” the Court for political purposes.

82. MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 8, cl. 1.
83. MONT. CODE ANN. §3-1-1011 (2014).
84. Id. §3-1-1010.
85. Id. §3-1-1001.
86. MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 8, cl. 2.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
In 2012, in *Reichert v. State of Montana* the Supreme Court enjoined submission of the referendum to the voters on the ground that it would modify the constitutionally prescribed procedure for the selection of justices. The Court ruled that Article VII, section 9 of the Constitution prescribes three qualifications for a seat on the Supreme Court, “no more, no less,” and therefore, the referendum improperly attempted to change the constitution by adding an additional qualification for a seat without going through the mandatory process for amending the constitution. As a result of this decision, the districting plan can only proceed if the proponents of the idea can overcome the substantial hurdle of securing an amendment to the constitution. So far, there has been no serious effort to proceed with the idea of establishing judicial districts through a constitutional amendment.

C. Judicial Rulings Affecting the Judicial Electoral Process

The rules governing state judicial elections and state judges have been significantly affected by several recent United States Supreme Court decisions, and these rulings necessarily affected the Montana Supreme Court. However, in the last few years there have also been several cases directly involving the Montana Supreme Court that have the potential to dramatically influence Montana’s judicial electoral politics. The history of these litigations illustrate the point that those seeking to influence environmental law in Montana by altering the composition of the Montana Supreme Court have sought to accomplish their goal not only by seeking to influence the outcomes of contests for specific seats on the court but also by engaging in litigation designed to alter the rules governing the judicial electoral system as a whole.

In one case, the United States Supreme Court, following the reasoning of its controversial 2010 ruling in *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission*, struck down a Montana statute barring corporations from...
making political expenditures on behalf of or opposing candidates for public office. The case was brought by American Tradition Partnership, which describes itself on its website as an anti-environmental, pro-property rights organization:

American Tradition Partnership (ATP) is a no-compromise grassroots organization dedicated to fighting the radical environmentalist agenda. We support responsible development of natural resources and rational land use and management policies. Only together can we protect access, private property rights, and affordable energy for all Americans!

American Tradition Partnership, formerly known as Western Tradition Partnership, has been the target of widely publicized allegations that it engaged in election activities inconsistent with its section 501(c)(4) non-profit status. Whether or not American Tradition Partnership crossed some legal boundary, it is apparent that one of the group’s goals has been to influence, directly or indirectly, the composition and direction of the Montana Supreme Court.

In the aftermath of *Citizens United*, which invalidated a federal prohibition on corporate contributions to candidates for federal office, many observers questioned whether Montana’s century-old Corrupt Practices Act, barring corporate contributions to or expenditures in elections, was vulnerable to attack. However, the Montana Supreme Court, in a five to two decision, rejected the argument of American Tradition Partnership that the Montana statute violated the freedom of speech provisions of the United States and Montana Constitutions. Distinguishing the United States Supreme Court decision in *Citizens United*, the Montana Court ruled that the ban on corporate contributions met the high bar for defeating a free speech challenge based on Montana’s especially lurid history of political corruption.

Focusing on the judicial electoral process, the Montana Court explained that one of the reasons the restriction on corporate contributions should

---

100. See Frontline: Big Sky, Big Money (PBS television broadcast Oct. 30, 2012), http://video.pbs.org/video/2298090584/ (discussing allegations that the Western Trade Partnership had participated in campaign activities, prohibited by its 501(c)(4) status).
103. Id. at 5–13.
survive constitutional challenge was that the state “has a compelling interest in protecting and preserving its system of elected judges.” The court said:

The people of the State of Montana have a continuing and compelling interest in, and a constitutional right to, an independent, fair and impartial judiciary. The State has a concomitant interest in preserving the appearance of judicial propriety and independence so as to maintain the public’s trust and confidence. In the present case, the free speech rights of the corporations are no more important than the due process rights of litigants in Montana courts to a fair and independent judiciary, and both are constitutionally protected. The Bill of Rights does not assign priorities as among the rights it guarantees.

The court also expressed concern that the Montana judicial electoral process “would be particularly vulnerable to large levels of independent spending” because the level of campaign spending in state judicial races had traditionally been so modest in Montana.

Justice Nelson, in dissent, argued with regret that the Court had no choice but to follow the precedent set in *Citizens United*. He also expressed concern that “judicial elections will become little better than the corporate bidding wars that elections for partisan offices have already become.” He suggested that, “Montana’s voters may—and probably should—amend the Montana Constitution to implement a merit system for selecting judges.”

The United States Supreme Court, in a brief *per curiam* ruling, reversed, observing that there was “no serious doubt” that “the holding in *Citizens United* applies to the Montana state law” and that “Montana’s arguments in support of the judgment below either were already rejected in *Citizens United*, or fail to meaningfully distinguish that case.” Four members of the Supreme Court dissented from this ruling, referencing their dissent from the five to four ruling in *Citizens United* two years earlier.

American Tradition Partnership’s victory in the Supreme Court arguably brings the State of Montana full circle in its effort to regulate the

---

104. *Id.* at 11–12.
105. *Id.* at 12 (citing Neb. Press Assoc. v. Stuart, 428 U.S. 539 (1976)).
106. *Id.*
108. *Id.* at 34.
109. *Id.*
111. *Id.* at 2491–92.
role of natural resource industries in state politics. At the turn of the twentieth century, Montana’s political and judicial systems had been thoroughly corrupted by large moneyed interests. William Clark, who amassed a fortune from mining operations in Butte, famously bribed the Montana Senate in order to obtain a seat in the United States Senate. In general, business interests used their power to achieve “accomplishment of legislation and the execution of laws favorable to the absentee stockholders of the large corporations and inimical to the economic interests of the wage earning and farming classes who constitute[d] by far the larger percentage of the population in Montana.” Public concern about corporate domination of the political and legal systems led to adoption of the Corrupt Practices Act in 1912 by voter initiative. Now, 100 years later, American Tradition Partnership, a modern day advocate for Montana’s natural resource industries, has succeeded in overturning the ban on corporate involvement in elections. Of course, 100 years ago the public concerns about the activities of mining firms and other corporations were somewhat different. Today, environmental injuries have become much more prominent in the mix of public concerns. But, even as the issues have evolved, the basic contest for power between natural resource companies and the general public has remained the same. The United States Supreme Court’s decision threatens to restore Montana’s natural resource industries to the level of power and influence over the Montana electoral process that Montanans found so objectionable 100 years ago.

In another important case, Saunders County v. Bullock, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently overturned Montana’s system of nonpartisan judicial elections, in place since the 1930s, by striking down a ban on political party endorsements of judicial candidates as a violation of the First Amendment. A county Republican Party organization sought to endorse two judicial candidates and to make expenditures to publicize those endorsements. The plaintiff filed suit seeking a declaration that the law was unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement, because it barred the activities it sought to

---

113. *Id.* at 8.
114. *Id.* at 9 (quoting HELEN FISK SANDERS, HISTORY OF MONTANA, Vol. 1, 429–30 (Lewis Pub. Co. 1913)).
115. *Id.* at 11.
116. Sanders Cnty. Republican Cent. Comm. v. Bullock, 698 F.3d 741, 745 (9th Cir. 2012); *see also* Sanders Cnty. Republican Cent. Comm. v. Bullock, 717 F.3d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 2013) (clarifying in a subsequent appeal that the Court struck down the provisions of the statute prohibiting endorsements and expenditures by a political party in a judicial election, but did not reach the issue of the constitutionality of the provision prohibiting political party contributions to a judicial candidate).
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the state law “on its face” restricted speech and therefore was subject to strict scrutiny, requiring a demonstration that the restriction furthered a compelling governmental interest and was “narrowly tailored” to achieve its objective. The court acknowledged that the state’s goal of maintaining a fair and independent judiciary represented a compelling state interest. But it rejected the argument that preventing party endorsement of candidates was necessary to achieve that objective. The court said the state had offered no evidence to support that argument and that the argument was contradicted by the fact that some other states that elect their judges permit endorsements and in some instances even require party nominations of the candidates for judicial office. The court also ruled that the state had not adopted a “narrowly tailored” solution to the challenge of maintaining a fair and independent court because the state could have adopted a system of appointing rather than electing judges. The United States Supreme Court declined Montana’s request that it review the Ninth Circuit decision.

Judge Mary Schroeder filed a vigorous dissent, describing the decision as “a big step backwards for the state of Montana” and as, “the first opinion to hold that even though a state has chosen a nonpartisan judicial election process, political parties have a right to endorse candidates.” She also described the ruling as an unwarranted extension of prior decisions that “will encourage a judiciary dependent upon political alliances.” She criticized the majority’s least restrictive means analysis by pointing out the extreme difficulty states have encountered in attempting to reform long-established judicial selection procedures.

Together, these two decisions have the potential to change the landscape for judicial elections in Montana. Following the elimination of restrictions on corporate expenditures supporting (or opposing) particular candidates, natural resource industries and other businesses subject to environmental regulation can support candidates they hope will improve their bottom line by not strictly enforcing environmental laws. Businesses and industries can also invest in advertising and other election activity to
help defeat judges and judicial candidates who may be less helpful to business interests. Party endorsements of judicial candidates may increase the risk that judges will feel beholden to advance the policy objectives of the particular party supporting them. Given the Republican Party’s relatively strong pro-business and anti-regulation stance, justices supported by the Republican Party might be less sympathetic to environmental protection laws. Conversely, justices supported by the Democratic Party might be more sympathetic to environmental protection laws. More generally, party endorsements and expenditures are likely to make the Court more polarized because in the future individual judges will be more readily identifiable as Democratic or Republican judges.

At the same time, it is also possible that the Sanders County decision will not have a major effect on the character of judicial election in Montana, at least in the near term. The Ninth Circuit ruling empowers political parties to endorse candidates for positions as judicial officials and to spend money publicizing an endorsement. Of course the decision does not compel political parties to exercise this option, and the strong tradition on nonpartisan elections to the Supreme Court appears to be deterring the major political parties from speaking out in judicial elections in overly partisan fashion. The 2012 Montana Democratic Party’s Platform “Judiciary Plank” addressed judicial selection as follows: “We support a free and independent judiciary. The judiciary should not be influenced by or concerned with any personal prejudice, political or religious dogma, or personal agenda. We oppose political party endorsements of judicial candidates.” Consistent with this position, the website that supported the reelection of Mike Wheat, widely regarded as having Democratic Party leanings, contained no indication that the candidate had been endorsed by the Democratic Party. Nor was there any indication on the now discontinued website of Justice Jim Rice—widely regarded as a justice with Republican leanings—that he was running as a Republican. Nor did Rice’s name appear on the Montana Republican Party website, also now discontinued. Nonetheless, in the absence of overt political party endorsements, party affiliation has sometimes become an element of a candidate’s public appeal for election to the Supreme Court.

129. See http://www.jimriceforjustice.com/ (site discontinued as of the date of this publication).
130. See http://www.mtgop.org/ (site discontinued as of the date of this publication).
D. The Ideological Struggle for Control of the Supreme Court

The balance of this section describes the present—and potentially more virulent future—ideological contest over the composition of the Montana Supreme Court and the scope and content of the state’s environmental legal protections. While environmental law is by no means the only issue driving these recent contests, it appears to have been the single most important issue in state judicial races, as evidenced in a number of different ways as discussed below.

Despite the seriousness and importance of the current ideological contest over the Montana Supreme Court, the state’s highest court has traditionally been blessed with an absence of obvious acrimonious political divisions. A unanimous court decided the landmark *M.E.I.C.*, case. Since then, the court has issued other unanimous rulings in the environmental arena, sometimes ruling in favor of environmental advocates, and sometimes ruling against them. Some individual justices have voted in ways that might be regarded as counter to type. Former Justice Brian Morris has solid conservative legal credentials, including a clerkship with former United States Supreme Court Justice William Rehnquist, but was hardly anti-environmental in his voting pattern, even to the point of joining in dissent in one environmental law case in which the majority ruled against the “pro-environment” side. Justice Nelson was a strong supporter on environmental protections, but was equally strong-minded in support of private property rights.

The current Montana Supreme Court can fairly be described as moderate in orientation. Three of the current justices were appointed to

---

131. *Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr.*, 988 P.2d at 1236 (holding that the right to a clean and healthful environment was a fundamental right guaranteed by the state constitution).

132. See, e.g., *Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality v. Burlington N. Santa Fe*, 246 P.3d 1037 (Mont. 2010) (ruling unanimously that BNSF was liable for environmental contamination under the CECRA).

133. *See N. Plains Res. Council, Inc.*, 288 P.3d at 170 (holding that a state’s lease of mineral interests was not a major government action requiring an environmental impact statement).

134. See *N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality*, 234 P.3d 51, 52 (Mont. 2010) (Morris, J. delivering the opinion of the court holding that the Clean Water Act required states to use pre-discharge treatment standards when issuing permits to discharge ground water).


The current moderation of the court may be explained in part by the fact that the most recent appointees have been made by Governors from both parties. The moderation of the court may also be explained, in part, by the fact that the Judicial Nominations Commission, which is designed to be representative of diverse viewpoints, must nominate all appointed justices.

But recent electoral contests for seats on the Montana Supreme Court have marked a new departure in terms of partisanship and the level of financial expenditures in judicial races.

**E. The 2012 Election**

In 2012, Laurie McKinnon was elected to fill a vacancy on the court created by the retirement of long-time Justice James Nelson, beating out two other contestants for the seat, Elizabeth Best and Ed Sheehy. Before her election to the high court, McKinnon served for eight years as a District Court judge, which made her an appealing candidate for the Supreme Court. Prior to becoming a judge she worked as a county prosecutor and was engaged in private law practice. Nothing in her official resume identified her as a likely combatant in ideological warfare over the future direction of the Montana Supreme Court, on environmental law or any other issue. She was perceived as the clear conservative choice because she was endorsed by the Montana Chamber of Commerce and the Montana Farm Bureau and, as discussed below, was the beneficiary of a major independent expenditure campaign organized by a Montana Tea Party leader.

Losing candidate Ed Sheehy was an attorney with the Montana Office of the Public Defender, and prior to that engaged in the private practice of

---

139. Id.
140. See id. (stating Jim Rice was appointed by Republican Governor Judy Martz; Mike Wheat was appointed by Democratic Governor Brian Schweitzer; and Jim Shea was appointed by Democratic Governor Steve Bullock).
142. Id.
law in Helena, Montana.\textsuperscript{144} In the Office of the State Public Defender, he served as a regional defender in Missoula and later in a statewide unit representing defendants accused of major crimes, such as homicide.\textsuperscript{145} He served as a law clerk on the Montana Supreme Court in 1978,\textsuperscript{146} and his uncle, John Sheehy, was a justice on the Montana Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{147} He received the endorsement of the Montana AFL-CIO.\textsuperscript{148}

The other losing candidate, Elizabeth Best, practiced law in a small private firm for many years, and had been appointed to various statewide legal committees indicative of a positive reputation in Montana legal circles.\textsuperscript{149} According to her campaign website she received endorsements from, among other groups, Montana Conservation Voters, the Montana Education Association, and the Montana Federation of Teachers.\textsuperscript{150} In a notable environmental case, Best served as co-counsel for a group of children on a petition filed with the Montana Supreme Court asking the court to recognize that the State of Montana holds the atmosphere in trust for present and future generations and that the State has an affirmative duty to act to protect the trust from the adverse effects of greenhouse gas emissions.\textsuperscript{151} This petition, filed in May 2011, was part of a nationwide legal campaign to use the public trust doctrine to persuade the courts to become engaged in combatting climate change.\textsuperscript{152}

The three candidates split the vote in the 2012 primary, with Sheehy receiving 67,682 (34.3%) of the votes, McKinnon 66,278 (33.6%), and Best


\textsuperscript{145} Id.


\textsuperscript{149} About Beth, ELIZABETH BEST FOR MONT. SUPREME COURT, http://bestformontana.org/about-beth (site discontinued as of the date of this publication).

\textsuperscript{150} Endorsements, ELIZABETH BEST FOR MONT. SUPREME COURT, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20140909011711/http://bestformontana.org/endorsements/ (original site discontinued as of the date of this publication).


\textsuperscript{152} Legal Action, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, http://ourchildrenstrust.org (last visited Jan. 21, 2015) (discussing the nationwide campaign to use the public trust doctrine to combat climate change).
In the general election, which pitted the two highest vote getters against each other, McKinnon received 255,461 votes (58.1%) and Sheehy received 184,135 (41.9%).

The most notable feature of the 2012 election contest was an aggressive, well-funded independent expenditure campaign supporting McKinnon and opposing the other two candidates. Montana Growth Network, an advocacy group organized by Jason Priest—a controversial state senator affiliated with the Montana Tea Party—orchestrated the effort. Because Montana Growth Network was organized as a non-profit under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, it was not required to disclose the identity of its donors and did not do so. It is clear, however, that expenditures by the group in the 2012 race dwarfed those of the candidates themselves. McKinnon and Sheehy reportedly spent about $65,000 and $75,000 in the 2012 judicial race, respectively, including expenditures in both the primary and general elections. By contrast, Montana Growth Network apparently spent about ten times these amounts to support McKinnon’s election (McKinnon denounced the independent expenditure effort on her behalf, asserting that, “negative advertising has no place in a nonpartisan race”). The group’s 2012 tax return indicates that it expended over $829,000 on advocacy efforts in 2012, including $690,000 on “mailings and advertising” related to “judicial fairness, energy and the...
environment, taxes and the economy and healthcare." The precise amount it spent on the 2012 Montana Supreme Court race is impossible to know because most of its advertising represented so-called "issue advocacy;" accordingly, the majority of the group’s expenditures were exempt from public reporting requirements. Montana Growth Network reported spending $42,000 on one mailing that explicitly advocated the election of McKinnon and the defeat of Sheehy and Best. This explicitly acknowledged political expenditure probably represented only a small fraction of what the organization spent to influence the judicial race in 2012 through more indirect issue education.

The advertising by Montana Growth Network was hard hitting, especially in contrast with the anodyne public statements of the candidates themselves in support of their candidacies. A Montana Growth Network mailer expressing opposition to Elizabeth Best’s candidacy contained the headline, “Environmentalist, Global Warming Lawsuit,” and stated: “Sued the State of Montana on behalf of children of the future in an attempt to seize control of the state’s atmosphere. Best wanted to place our atmosphere under gov’t control to stop global warming.” Another mailer attacked candidate Ed Sheehy for defending, in his capacity as a public defender, a client charged with murder whom the Montana Growth Network dubbed “the Christmas Day Killer.” The mailer asserted that Sheehy “asked the Court to strike down Montana’s death penalty as unconstitutional.” Sheehy responded angrily to the charge contending


165. Id.

166. Id.
that he was simply “doing his job” as a public defender. According to press accounts, Sheehy blamed the mailer and similarly themed radio ads for his defeat in the 2012 election.168

Arguably the most alarming feature of this attack advocacy was that the identity of the persons backing Montana Growth Network was hidden from public view. Jason Priest, identified as Executive Director, President, and Treasurer of the group, was strongly identified with conservative political causes, but the major financial backers of Montana Growth Network remain hidden. In 2012, the year in which Montana Growth Network invested so heavily in electing Laurie McKinnon to the Supreme Court, the organization recorded contributions of $906,000. None of the donors’ identities are public. The only public information available is the magnitude of contribution made by major donors (but not their identities) as reported on the group’s 2012 tax return. Over 90% of the individual contributions to Montana Growth Network in 2012 were in amounts of $10,000 or more. Four of the donations were in the six figures and the largest contribution was $200,000. These large contributions have given rise to inevitable speculation that the Koch brothers, who have a long record of investing their vast resources to influence state judicial elections, may have played a role in the 2012 Montana races. Apparently, none of the Kochs’ critics knows if that is really the case.

Also in 2012, in a much quieter election, incumbent Brian Morris won a retention election with 328,601 out of 419,105 (78.4%) votes cast. Initially Hertha Lund, a private property rights advocate, launched a campaign against Morris. She withdrew from the race in April, two


168. Id.


170. Id.

171. Id.

172. Id.

173. Id.


months before the June primary. Justice Morris has since resigned from the court to take a seat on the federal District Court in Montana.

F. The 2014 Appointment

On May 5, 2014, Governor Steve Bullock appointed Jim Shea to fill the vacancy on the court created by the resignation of Justice Morris. Bullock selected Shea from among four finalists forwarded to him by the Judicial Nomination Commission. Shea had been appointed state Workman’s Compensation Judge by Democratic Governor Brian Schweitzer in 2005, and Governor Schweitzer reappointed him to that position in 2011. Shea faces Senate confirmation to the Supreme Court in 2015 and then will have the opportunity to run to retain the seat in 2016. Prior to his appointment, Shea had been gearing up to be a candidate for election to the Supreme Court, as evidenced by the development of a campaign website. But, Morris’s confirmation by the United States Senate was so delayed that the election for this seat could not be included on the 2014 ballot.

G. The 2014 Election

In 2014, two incumbent members of the court, Jim Rice and Michael Wheat, ran for election to the Court. Michael Wheat faced a challenge from Lawrence VanDyke, the former Montana Solicitor General. Jim Rice faced a challenge from W. David Herbert. Justice Rice previously served as a Republican state representative and Justice Wheat had served as a Democratic State Senator. Montana Conservation Voters endorsed Mike

---

176. Id. Lund cited the Supreme Court decision blocking the voter initiative that would have provided for election of Supreme Court justices by district, rather than on a statewide basis, as the reason for pulling out of the race. She said she was prepared to run an election race in one district, but not statewide. Id.


180. Johnson, supra note 178.


182. Johnson, supra note 178.
Wheat for reelection, but apparently took no position in the race between Rice and Herbert. 183

Mike Wheat was appointed to the Supreme Court in 2009 by Democratic Governor Brian Schweitzer and sought re-election to the Court. 184 His campaign website, now discontinued, included the usual dry recitation of professional accomplishments, including references to a successful career as a private attorney and service as a member of the Montana Senate. 185 While widely perceived to be a Democrat, Wheat’s website included no indication of party affiliation. 186 Interestingly, the website alluded to only two substantive legal issues, both relating to the environment. First, the website described Wheat as a “defender” of “Montana’s Constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment.” 187 Second, it described him as a “guardian of laws protecting public access to Montana’s rivers, streams, hunting and recreational areas.” 188 The latter statement was an unmistakable reference to Justice Wheat’s authorship of the opinion for the Court in the controversial five to two decision favoring a public claim to fishing access. 189

The contest for the seat occupied by Justice Wheat was turned upside down on April 25, 2014, when District Court Judge Mike Menahan issued an order declaring that Lawrence Van Dyke was ineligible to run for a seat as a justice in the 2014 election. 190 The lawsuit was brought by five delegates to the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention 191 which led to the adoption of the current constitutional provision stating that candidates

for the Supreme Court must be “admitted to the practice of law” in the state for at least five years prior to joining the Court. VanDyke was admitted to practice in Montana in 2005, nine years prior to the election, but he placed his bar membership in inactive status from 2007 to 2012 while practicing law in another state. He resumed active status in early 2013, but by the time of the November 2014 election, he would only have been an active member of the bar for three years and three months. Thus, according to Judge Menahan’s ruling, VanDyke was ineligible for election to a seat on the Supreme Court.

VanDyke filed an appeal and on July 22, 2014 the Supreme Court, by a vote of four to three, reversed Judge Menahan’s order and declared that VanDyke was eligible to pursue election to the Supreme Court. Justice Wheat along with two other members of the Court recused themselves, with the result that three of the judges resolving the case were District Court judges. The case ultimately turned on a narrow dispute over how to interpret the pertinent language of the Constitution. Justice Baker wrote the opinion for the majority concluding that VanDyke was “admitted” to the practice of law from 2005, even though, due to his inactive status, he had not been eligible to actually practice law in Montana. Justice Cotter, in dissent, argued that since the Constitution authorizes the Supreme Court to govern the practice of law in the state, and the Court delegated that authority to the State Bar, and the State Bar prohibits a lawyer on inactive status from practicing law, VanDyke was not “admitted to the practice of law” for the requisite period.

While VanDyke adopted a studiously nonpartisan stance on his campaign website, his brief career biography read like a playbook for success in conservative legal circles. In 2012, Tim Fox, the newly elected Republican Attorney General, appointed VanDyke as Solicitor General of Montana. This appointment, along with his subsequent election to the Supreme Court, underscored his commitment to conservative legal principles. His ability to navigate the complex legal landscape of Montana’s judiciary, combined with his dedication to nonpartisanship, made him a strong contender for the state’s highest court.

---

192. MONT. CONST. art VII, § 9(1) (“A citizen of the United States who has resided in the state two years immediately before taking office is eligible to the office of supreme court justice or district court judge if admitted to the practice of law in Montana for at least five years prior to the date of appointment or election.”).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 215.
197. VanDyke, 332 P.3d at 216.
198. Id. at 223–24 (Cotter, J. dissenting).
Montana.\footnote{200} Before taking that position, VanDyke served as Assistant Solicitor General in the Office of the Republican Texas Attorney General, Greg Abbott.\footnote{201} Since his graduation from Harvard Law School, he had been an active member of the Federalist Society,\footnote{202} the leading national advocate of conservative legal causes, and was listed on the group’s website as a member of the Executive Committee of the Society’s Religious Liberties Practice Group.\footnote{203} He served as law clerk to Judge Janice Rogers Brown,\footnote{204} a staunchly conservative, pro-property rights judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C Circuit.\footnote{205} Immediately after completing his clerkship he went to work for a national corporate law firm, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, first in Washington, D.C. and later in Texas.\footnote{206}

VanDyke was a lightning rod for public criticism, based in part on a book review he wrote while a student at Harvard Law School suggesting that requiring the teaching of “intelligent design” in public schools did not violate the Establishment Clause.\footnote{207} In another student piece published in 2004, focusing on whether homosexual relationships should receive constitutional protection, he lauded a bishop for advocating the view that homosexuals “can leave the homosexual lifestyle,” opined that the evidence

\begin{flushleft}
\footnotetext{201}{MONT. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATT’Y GEN. TIM FOX, https://doj.mt.gov/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).}
\footnotetext{204}{Lawrence VanDyke, LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/pub/lawrence-vandyke/6/b3/aa7 (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).}
\footnotetext{205}{Editorial, Reject Justice Brown, WASH. POST (June 7, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/06/AR2005060601734.html ("President Bush has nominated a judge to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit who has been more open about her enthusiasm for judicial adventurism than any nominee of either party in a long time. But Janice Rogers Brown’s activism comes from the right, not the left; the rights she would write into the Constitution are economic, not social.").}
\end{flushleft}
he had seen “provide[d] ample reason for concern that same-sex marriage will hurt families, and consequentially children and society,” and indicated that it was “absurd” to deny that recognition of gay marriage “may impinge on religious freedom.” Not surprisingly perhaps, when Tim Fox picked VanDyke for Solicitor General, a conservative journal extolled the appointment.

During his brief stint as Montana Solicitor General, VanDyke spent “a significant amount of his time” promoting a conservative legal agenda in different courts around the country. He led an effort by a group of conservative attorneys general to persuade the United States Supreme Court to revisit Roe v. Wade and allow Arizona greater latitude in restricting access to abortions. On multiple occasions, VanDyke recommended to Attorney General Fox that Montana join amicus briefs opposing efforts in other states to control the sales of semi-automatic rifles or handguns. He also supported joining in briefs defending bans on same-sex marriage, and the constitutional right of a commercial photographer to refuse to work for a same sex couple in violation of a state anti-discrimination law.

VanDyke dismissed all of this work as that of an “advocate,” and asserted that “simply because I worked on a specific case or made a specific recommendation obviously can’t be taken as representative of my personal views.” But, as the state’s Solicitor General, VanDyke had considerable discretion over what issues to bring to the attention of the Attorney General and over how to allocate his limited time. His choices in his most recent job about what issues to focus on told a good deal about what constitutional questions VanDyke personally deemed important and worthy of attention.

209. Carrie Severino, Congratulations to Elbert Lin and Lawrence VanDyke, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/337777/congratulations-elbert-lin-and-lawrence-vandyke-carrie-severino (“While conservatives may not be excited about the president’s bevy of new cabinet picks, they can celebrate the great solicitor general picks by two newly elected state attorneys general.”).
213. Id.
214. Id.
Noticeably absent from this litany of cases is any environmental law case. However, based on his thorough-going conservative viewpoint, it seems unlikely that he would have much if any enthusiasm for enforcing Montanans’ right to “a clean and healthful environment.”

Justice Jim Rice was appointed to the Court by Republican Governor Judy Martz, and was elected to a full eight-year term on the Court in 2006. The only notable substantive statement on the website is the following:

The ultimate duty of the courts is to protect the individual liberties and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution. I believe we have entered an era of increased government involvement in the lives of citizens at all levels, and that our courts will need to be increasingly vigilant in protecting individual liberties in the years ahead.

This statement can fairly be read as code for the fact that Justice Rice is a proponent of private property rights, a viewpoint consistent with his votes in property rights cases that have come before the court. Rice’s website also includes a link to an article describing the popular Montana Supreme Court decision to overturn a District Court judge’s ruling imposing a one-month sentence on a teacher convicted of raping a student.

David Herbert, Justice Rice’s opponent, presented a less than clear-cut ideological choice. One of Herbert’s primary issues was jury independence, otherwise known as jury nullification. According to this theory, jurors should be recognized as having the power to disregard the instructions on the law they receive from a judge and render a verdict based on their own conception of justice. In seeming contradiction to this stance, Herbert’s campaign website also criticizes judges who disregard the Constitution, singling out for criticism Chief Justice John Marshall’s decision in Marbury v. Madison, generally regarded as one of the cornerstones of the American

---

215. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
217. http://www.jimriceforjustice.com/ (site discontinued as of the date of this publication).
218. Kafka, 201 P.3d at 33–70 (Nelson, J., dissenting; Rice, J., concurring with dissent); see also Buhmann v. State of Montana, 201 P.3d 70, 95 (Mont. 2008) (Rice, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
system of constitutional government. Herbert ran unsuccessful races in Wyoming as a Libertarian Party candidate for the United States Senate in 1996 and for the United States House in 2008. In the first race, he received 5,289 votes, and in the latter, he received 187 votes. He moved to Montana in 2008. A licensed podiatrist, Herbert attended law school in the mid-1980s. All in all, he presented only a very mild threat to Justice Rice's re-election bid.

In the end, both incumbents prevailed. Justice Wheat beat challenger Lawrence VanDyke by a margin of 59% to 41%, and Justice Rice prevailed by a margin of 78% to 22%. Thus, the results of this election left the ideological balance on the Supreme Court unchanged, but with the promise of additional hard-fought contests for control of the Court to come.

II. NORTH CAROLINA

A. The Dan River Ash Waste Spill

On Sunday, February 2, 2014, a security guard patrolling Duke Energy’s retired electric generating station in Eden, North Carolina noticed that a pond containing coal ash waste was unusually low. Company officials determined that a pipe running beneath the pond had broken and that ash waste was flowing through the pipe into the adjacent Dan River. Despite frantic efforts by hundreds of company and government employees...
to contain the spill, an estimated 35 million gallons of water containing
tens of thousands of tons of coal ash dumped into the river.

Coal ash waste is a dark, dense mixture containing arsenic, selenium
and other pollutants known to be hazardous to public health. As a result
of the spill, ash waste ended up coating 70 miles of the Dan River and
produced elevated pollution levels downstream from the plant. The North
Carolina Department of Health issued a media advisory urging the public to
avoid contact with the river or eating fish caught in the river. The United
States Environmental Protection Agency reported no downstream violations
of drinking water standards, but monitoring continues and the study of the
long-term ecological effects is just beginning. The spill at the Dan River
plant raised concerns about similar problems at other larger ash waste
facilities where, in the words of one environmental advocate, a similar
event “would make the Dan River spill look like a mere prelude to a truly
national disaster.” Duke Energy has publicly apologized for the spill and
has made an open-ended financial commitment to clean up the river.

The spill has had widespread legal and political repercussions. The
disaster led to the launch of a United States Department of Justice criminal
investigation of the state agency charged with overseeing the Dan River
waste pond.238 The spill also produced hurried efforts by the administration of Governor Pat McCrory to back pedal on previous plans to go easy on Duke Energy on past environmental violations,239 and led to the initiation of new state environmental enforcement proceedings against the company.240 The North Carolina legislature debated whether the Dan River spill called for a comprehensive legislative solution to the problems created by ash waste ponds.241 The political and policy fallout from the Dan River disaster will unquestionably be long lasting.

The Dan River disaster also highlighted the importance of the judiciary in environmental law enforcement in North Carolina, and in particular, the role the Supreme Court may play in resolving legal disputes relating to the disaster. One particularly important case involves a dispute about the state’s responsibility for dealing with groundwater pollution caused by coal ash waste ponds.242 About a year before the Dan River disaster, a coalition of environmental groups represented by the Southern Environmental Law Center filed a petition with the North Carolina Environmental Management Commission asking the Commission to define the clean-up responsibilities of plant operators with ash waste ponds.243 All told, there are 14 operating or retired Duke Energy power plants in the state with coal ash waste ponds.244 Pollution monitoring has disclosed excessive levels of pollutants in the groundwater adjacent to all of these fourteen plants.245

In their petition, the environmental groups contended that Duke Energy has a responsibility to take “immediate action to eliminate sources of contamination” once there is evidence that waste ponds are causing

244. Id.
245. Id.
groundwater contamination in violation of water quality standards. According to the environmental groups, state regulations properly interpreted the mandate that plant operators act immediately to eliminate a waste pond that is producing the pollution, which would probably entail removing all of the waste that had accumulated and placing it in a different, safer location. In an order issued on December 18, 2012, the Commission rejected the petitioners’ interpretation of the regulations. Instead, the Commission declared that evidence of groundwater contaminants merely triggers an obligation, following a “reasonable schedule,” for plant operators to prepare “site assessments” and develop “corrective action plans,” which might eventually lead to clean-up efforts.

The environmental groups went to court to challenge the Commission’s ruling. In a 17-page order issued on March 6, 2014, about a month after the Dan River disaster, Superior Court Judge Paul Ridgeway sided with the environmental groups and ruled that the operators did have a duty to take “immediate action” to correct the pollution problems. However, the judge did not rule entirely for the environmental groups. Siding with the Commission on one issue, the judge ruled that the operators only had a responsibility to take immediate action if groundwater pollution had been detected within the “compliance boundary” surrounding the waste facility. The petitioners’ argument raises complex technical issues about the proper interpretation of the groundwater regulations. It suffices for present purposes to observe that Judge Ridgeway, while acknowledging the judiciary’s duty to defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations, concluded that in this instance it was “plainly erroneous and inconsistent with the regulation” for the Commission to read the regulation “to require or permit anything other than ‘immediate action to eliminate the source or sources of contamination.’”

The following month, Duke Power and the Commission each filed appeals from Judge Ridgeway’s order to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. Not surprisingly, environmentalists cried foul, criticizing state


249. Id. at 16–17.

250. Id. at 16.

251. Id. at 13.

officials, who had vowed to address the problem of ash waste ponds, for seeking to block the single most important legal proceeding designed to do just that.\(^{253}\) Depending upon the outcome of the appeal, the losing side might well try to take the case to the North Carolina Supreme Court, which would have the final say on what the regulations do or do not require. Enforcement of these regulations is not the only means available to force operators of coal plants to avoid polluting North Carolina’s waters. For example, the North Carolina Legislature debated various measures to address the coal ash problem in the aftermath of the Dan River spill. The fact remains that these groundwater regulations provide a crucial legal handle to address this serious environmental hazard and, at the end of the day, the North Carolina Supreme Court will decide what the regulations actually require and whether and how they will be enforced.

The North Carolina Supreme Court may also have the opportunity to address the Dan River disaster in other ways. Following the disaster, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources initiated enforcement actions in state court based on violations at the Dan River plant as well as at other electric generating plants in the state with ash waste ponds.\(^ {254}\) The Environmental Protection Agency and environmental groups both intervened in these proceedings.\(^ {255}\) Ultimately, these cases may also end in front of the Supreme Court, which will have the opportunity to decide whether Duke Power is held accountable for its legal violations and the harms it has caused to the public’s resources.

In sum, the Dan River disaster provides a useful, if tragic, demonstration of how the North Carolina Supreme Court, and the identity of the justices who sit on the court, will determine how much the law protects citizens of North Carolina from environmental harms.

**B. The North Carolina Judicial Electoral Process**

The North Carolina Supreme Court consists of a Chief Justice and six Associate Justices.\(^ {256}\) The justices are selected through statewide elections for eight-year terms.\(^ {257}\) In the event of a vacancy on the court due to

\(^{253}\) Biesecker, supra note 252 (quoting D.J. Gerken, a lawyer for the Southern Environmental Law Center, stating “We’re disappointed that this administration remains so determined to delay through litigation rather than move forward to stop ongoing pollution of North Carolina’s rivers, lakes and groundwater”).

\(^{254}\) Henderson, supra note 240.

\(^{255}\) Id.

\(^{256}\) N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 6.

\(^{257}\) Id. § 16.
retirement or death, the governor can appoint a new justice to fill the
vacancy.258

In 2002, North Carolina enacted the Judicial Campaign Reform Act,
putting in place a nonpartisan election system for seats on the Supreme
Court (as well as the Court of Appeals).259 While advocates of judicial
selection reform generally applaud nonpartisan elections,260 Republican
commentators argue that the Democrat-controlled legislature approved the
change from partisan to nonpartisan elections out of concern that, due to the
changing political complexion of North Carolina, partisan elections had
begun to work to the disadvantage of Democrats running for judicial
seats.261 The Act also created a system of public financing of statewide
judicial candidate elections, the first of its kind in the nation.262 The funds
to support the public financing of elections came from a taxpayer check-off
on tax returns, lawyer fees, and private donations.263 Candidates who
qualified for public support received $250,000 to finance their campaigns,
in exchange for a commitment to limit how much they could raise and
spend on their own campaigns.264

In 2013, following the 2010 Republican takeover of both houses of the
North Carolina legislature, and the election of a Republican, Pat McCrory,
as Governor, the state enacted new legislation charting a different course on
judicial elections.265 The legislation, dubbed the “monster elections bill” by
its critics, eliminated public financing of elections, and increased the
amount that any individual donor could contribute to a judicial candidate to
$5,000.266 The legislation also removed limits on the amount individuals

258. Id. § 19.
259. An Act to Establish a Nonpartisan Method of Electing Supreme Court Justices and
260. The Challenges of Judicial Elections Research, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y,
https://www.ajs.org/judicature-journal/editorial/the-challenges-of-judicial-elections-research/ (last
261. See, e.g., John Davis, NC Supreme Court: 4 of 7 Seats Up in 2014; Rule #5: Lose the
Courts, Lose the War, JOHN DAVIS CONSULTING (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.johndavisconsulting.com/2013/02/10/nc-supreme-court-4-of-7-seats-up-in-2014-rule-5-lose-the-courts-lose-the-war/ (explaining that Democrats acted to “stop the era of Republican dominance”).
262. An Act to Establish a Nonpartisan Method of Electing Supreme Court Justices and
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Jeremy P. Jacobs, Conservatives, After Dismantling Public Financing System, Set
Sights on N.C. Judiciary, ENV’T. & ENERGY DAILY (June 17, 2014),
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060001412.
266. Chris Kromm, Pope Jumps Into Spending Arms Race for NC Judges, INST. FOR S.
could donate to independent organizations supporting particular candidates.\footnote{267. Id.}

Notwithstanding the nominally nonpartisan nature of the Court (since 2002), each of the current justices on the court is widely and openly recognized as a member of one or the other major political party. Currently, the Court has four Republican members including Justices Robert Holt Edmunds, Jr., Barbara Jackson, Mark Martin, and Paul Newby.\footnote{268. Sharon McCloskey, Recount Confirms Beasley Win in Supreme Court Race, PROGRESSIVE PULSE (Nov. 25, 2014), http://pulse.ncpolicywatch.org/2014/11/25/recount-confirms-beasley-win-in-supreme-court-race/; Id.} The Court has three Democrats, including Chief Justice Sarah Parker and Associate Justices Cheri Beasley and Robin Hudson.\footnote{269. Id.}

As in other states, judicial elections in North Carolina were at one time relatively low-key and inexpensive. In accord with the traditional Democratic Party control of North Carolina government as a whole the state Supreme Court was dominated by Democrats for many years. The partisan composition of the Supreme Court began to change as North Carolina changed from a firmly blue state to a purple state. From Reconstruction through 1964, the Democratic candidates for the presidency beat their Republican opponents in every election; since 1964, the Democratic candidates have prevailed only twice.\footnote{270. Dave Leip, United States Presidential Election Results, USELECTIONATLAS.ORG http://www.uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).} Political change has been slower in elections for state offices. Democrats have held the Governor’s seat with only a few interruptions since Reconstruction, but elected a Republican in 2012. In 2010, both houses of the legislature swung Republican for the first time since Reconstruction. Republican domination of both executive and legislative branches marks a significant ideological shift in North Carolina. In accord with this trend, the Supreme Court also became increasingly Republican; as of 2002—the date of enactment of the Judicial Campaign Reform Act—five of seven justices were reportedly Republicans.\footnote{271. Davis, supra note 261.}

In this larger political context, the current, close partisan divide on the North Carolina Supreme Court is something of an anomaly. Chief Justice Parker, who decided to retire after reaching the mandatory retirement age, was first elected to the court in 1992. Since North Carolina held partisan judicial elections at that time, she was initially elected as a Democrat. Robin Hudson was elected to the court in 2006, in a nonpartisan context, and ran for reelection in 2014. The third Democratic Justice, Cheri Beasley,
was appointed to office in 2012, by Democratic Governor Perdue to replace retiring Justice Patricia Timmons-Goodson. Beasley faced her first reelection contest in 2014. Thus, all three Democratic seats were up for grabs in the 2014 election cycle. Though they maintained their minority status, Democrats could have been swept from the Supreme Court.

Justice Hudson’s election to the court in 2006 involved the first significant appearance by independent groups seeking to influence the outcome of judicial elections in North Carolina. According to one Republican partisan, the recent flood of money into North Carolina judicial races, mostly supporting Republican candidates, can be traced to the Hudson race, and in a sense, “blamed” on her.272 According to this account, Hudson and her Republican opponent were in a tight contest until FairJudges.net, a Democratic-leaning independent expenditure campaign, appeared on the scene and effectively doubled the amount of money Robin Hudson had raised for her campaign.273 But for this infusion of outside financing, according to this account, Justice Hudson would not have been elected to the Supreme Court.274

C. North Carolina Environmental Case Law

The North Carolina Supreme Court has compiled an extraordinary record of hostility to legal claims seeking to defend or advance protection for North Carolina’s environment. Over the last 15 years the Court has issued a total of seven environmental law decisions, and in every case the Court has come down on the side favoring less environmental protection.275 These cases have arisen in different factual settings, including disputes between neighbors in which one landowner claims a neighbor has taken some action on his land that allegedly harmed the owner’s property, challenges by industry representatives about allegedly excessive government regulations, and complaints by environmental groups about regulations that are allegedly too lax.276 Regardless of the precise form of

272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
276. Id.
the litigation, however, the result is always the same: environmental protections are the loser before the North Carolina Supreme Court.277

These striking data do not, of course, tell the whole story of environmental law in North Carolina. Many legal and regulatory disputes are resolved in North Carolina without resort to the courts at all. Even among the disputes that turn into full-blown litigation, the cases can be resolved at the trial level or on appeal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals without ever involving the Supreme Court. Generally speaking, the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction is limited to cases in which a constitutional issue has been raised, there was a dissent in the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court chooses to exercise its discretion to review a case.278 Thus, the paucity of environmental decisions by the Supreme Court may reflect not merely hostility to environmental law but a lack of interest in the issue. Finally, many environmental disputes give rise to federal legal claims, which can be pursued in federal court rather than state court.

Nonetheless, the North Carolina Supreme Court’s record of hostility to environmental protection claims is striking. The following is a thumbnail sketch of the seven major environmental law decisions issued by the Supreme Court since the year 2000:

- **Applewood Properties, LLC v. New South Properties, LLC**: ruling that landowners lacked standing under the Sedimentation Pollution Control Act to sue for relief based on flooding of their property with mud, water, and other debris caused by construction activity on a neighboring property, resting on the theory that the Act authorizes a private civil suit only when state or local officials have already formally cited a landowner for violating the Act;279 two dissenting justices argued that the majority improperly vested government officials with a gatekeeper authority “nowhere found or implied” in the Act.280

- **Hensley v. N.C. Department of Environment & Natural Resources**: holding that a developer was entitled to a variance from the provisions of the Sedimentation

---

277. Id.
279. Applewood Props., LLC, 742 S.E.2d at 777.
280. Id. at 781. (Edmunds, J., dissenting joined by Hudson, J.).
Pollution Control Act protecting trout streams in order to clear the vegetation from thousands of feet along a stream to build a golf course; reasoning that the development would produce only “minimal and temporary” pollution of the stream with sediment;\(^{281}\) a dissenting justice argued that the Act was intended to establish a permanent green buffer alongside the streams, and that a variance could only be issued for temporary construction activity in the buffer area that would produce minimal adverse effects.\(^{282}\)

- **Holly Ridge Associates, LLC v. N.C. Department of Environment & Natural Resources:** holding that neither a shellfish growers association nor an environmental group were entitled to intervene in a case brought by a developer seeking to contest civil penalties imposed for violations of the Sedimentation Pollution Control Act that allegedly harmed shellfish beds; ruling that neither proposed intervenor had a “direct interest” in the proceedings, notwithstanding the fact that the groups had members who used the shellfish grounds at issue and the developer was claiming to be exempt from the Act’s erosion control requirements.\(^{283}\)

- **MW Clearing & Grading, Inc., v. N.C. Department of Environment & Natural Resources:** in a *per curiam* order adopting the dissenting opinion of a judge of the Court of Appeals, the Court reversed an assessment of a $36,000 penalty for violations of a state open burning regulation; the Court ruled that the Department exceeded its statutory authority by treating the company’s use of nine open burning piles within 1,000 feet of the nearest residence as nine separate legal violations, rather than a single violation, for purposes of the $10,000 statutory limit on civil penalties for violations of the state’s air pollution control regulation.\(^{284}\)

---

\(^{281}\) *Hensley*, 698 S.E.2d at 41 (internal quotations omitted).

\(^{282}\) *Id.* at 295–97 (Hudson, J., dissenting).

\(^{283}\) *Holly Ridge Assoc., LLC*, 648 S.E.2d at 830.

\(^{284}\) *MW Clearing & Grading, Inc.*, 628 S.E.2d at 379.
• *Murphy Family Farms v. N.C. Department of Environment & Natural Resources:* in another *per curiam* decision adopting the opinion of a dissenting Court of Appeals judge, the Court held that a waste spill by the operator of a hog production facility represented one violation of state water quality standards, rather than eight separate violations, for the purpose of calculating civil penalties.285

• *N.C. Forestry Association v. N.C. Department of Environment & Natural Resources:* ruling that the forestry association had standing to challenge a modification of a water quality “general permit” to require those building new or expanded wood chip mills to obtain individual discharge permits; reasoning that (1) the association had standing as an “aggrieved person” within the meaning of the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act, and (2) the agency was involved in a “licensing” activity subject to challenge in a “contested case.”286

• *Craig v. County of Chatham:* concluding that county ordinances “regulating swine farms” and establishing “zoning” controls on swine farms, as well as a set of swine farm “operations rules” adopted by the county board of health, were all preempted by a comprehensive set of state statutory measures governing swine farms which impliedly precluded duplicative and conflicting local regulations.287

The point is not that all of these rulings—based on some objective standard—were decided incorrectly, though a strong case can certainly be made that several of the decisions were decided incorrectly.288 Rather, the point is that, even with this limited sample size, it is apparent that the North

---

288. For example, in *Murphy Family Farms*, the Court embraced a dissenting opinion of a Court of Appeals judge who said that a hog producer should be held liable for one, rather than eight, violations of state water standards based on the conclusion that word “or” in a statute should be interpreted to mean “and.” 605 S.E.2d at 636. In *Craig v. County of Chatham*, the Supreme Court ruled that a state hog farming statute preempted a local health ordinance not withstanding a state law expressly conferring on local boards of health the power to “adopt a more stringent rule in an area regulated by the Commission for Health Services or the Environmental Management Commission where, in the opinion of the local board of health, a more stringent rule is required to protect the public health.” 565 S.E.2d 172 at 176.
Carolina Supreme Court is more likely to rule against environmental protections than in favor of environmental protections simply because the case involves the environment. The probability that the Court would come down on the anti-environmental side of every one of these disputes over 15 years was one in 128—long odds, indeed.\textsuperscript{289}

To find a clear win for the environmental side in an environmental law case before the North Carolina Supreme Court one has to go back over 15 years to the case of \textit{In the Matter of Before the North Carolina Pesticide Board}, rejecting a legal challenge to the revocation of an aerial pesticide applicator’s license for violating various North Carolina regulations.\textsuperscript{290} The Court ruled that there was substantial evidence to support the board’s determination that the violations were sufficiently serious to support license revocation, that the board properly interpreted its regulations, and that the regulations violated neither the Due Process Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause.\textsuperscript{291}

A few years earlier, in 1994, the Court issued an important ruling in \textit{Empire Power Company v. N.C. Department of Environment}, upholding the right of citizens to go to court to protect themselves from polluters contributing to unhealthy air quality conditions.\textsuperscript{292} Reversing a ruling by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that the owner of land adjacent to the site of a proposed electric generating plant who alleged that the plant would cause injury to the health of his family, to the value of his property,

\begin{flushright}
289. This bleak survey of environmental law decisions in North Carolina is alleviated by several relatively recent cases involving administrative law and standing issues that reached favorable outcomes from an environmental advocate’s standpoint. In \textit{Board of Pharmacy v. The Rules Review Commission}, the Supreme Court ruled that Pharmacy Board had the statutory authority to issue regulations governing pharmacists’ working hours and conditions and that the North Carolina Rules Review Commission had erred in rejecting the regulations. 637 S.E.2d 515 (N.C. 2006). The Southern Environmental Law Center filed an \textit{amicus} brief urging the Supreme Court to uphold the Board’s rulemaking authority. In \textit{State Employees Association of North Carolina, Inc. v. State of North Carolina}, the Supreme Court, reversing a decision by the Court of Appeals, rejected the conclusion that an association of state employees lacked standing to challenge an executive order issued by the Governor directing that contributions to employee retirement funds be used to cover a state budget shortfall, allegedly in violation of the constitution. 580 S.E.2d 693 (N.C. 2003). The Court of Appeals ruled that the plaintiff lacked standing on the theory that an association has standing only if each and every member of the association would have standing to sue individually. \textit{Id.} The Supreme Court adopted the position of the dissenting Court of Appeals judge who contended that it is sufficient to establish associational standing to show that some of the association members would have had standing to sue. State Employees Ass’n v. North Carolina, 573 S.E.2d 525, 533 (N.C. App. 2002). The Southern Environmental Law Center filed an \textit{amicus} brief on behalf of itself and numerous other groups in \textit{State Employees}, the outcome of which had important implications for environmental litigation. 573 S.E.2d at 693.


291. \textit{Id.} at 178.

\end{flushright}
and the quality of life in his home and community, was a “person aggrieved” within the meaning of the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act. Therefore, the court ruled, the plaintiff was entitled to initiate an administrative proceeding to challenge the Department’s issuance of an air pollution control permit to Duke Energy pursuant to the North Carolina Air Pollution Control Act.

Importantly, however, the rare pro-environment precedent set in Empire Power is itself now under attack, and the current Supreme Court may well have an opportunity to reaffirm or jettison the holding in Empire Power. In a controversy quite similar to Empire Power, property owners and environmental groups are challenging the state’s issuance of an air quality permit for a new cement manufacturing facility and limestone quarry in New Hanover County, North Carolina. In a ruling issued in September 2013, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), at the urging of the State Division of Air Quality, arrived at the novel conclusion that, in order for a person to proceed with a challenge to an air permit, the person not only has to be a “aggrieved” within the meaning of Empire Power, but also has to be “substantially prejudiced” by the permitting action. The ALJ’s ruling was recently upheld by the North Carolina Environmental Management Commission. This new standard apparently would require a quantitative demonstration of how much additional pollution will be produced by the legal violation and what specific injuries will result from the violation. This standard would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for environmental advocates to meet, and would put them in the position of having to make a more specific factual showing of environmental injury than the State itself would have to make in setting permit limits in the first place. The plaintiffs have filed an appeal in Superior Court, and the case may eventually make its way to the Supreme Court, which will have the opportunity to reject this novel ruling and reaffirm Empire Power, or uphold the Environmental Management Commission and gut Empire Power.

293. Id. at 783.
294. Id.
297. See id. (affirming the decision of the ALJ in the administrative proceeding below).
The North Carolina Supreme Court clearly has not been hospitable to environmental law claims. The data make it hard to avoid the conclusion that a majority of the Court has shared an antipathy to the goals of environmental law. Recent and upcoming elections may make the situation even worse from an environmental law standpoint.

D. Judicial Elections and State Politics

With the 2012 and 2014 election cycles, North Carolina’s judicial elections reached a new level in terms of the magnitude of campaign expenditures, negativity of political advertising, and raw partisanship.\textsuperscript{299} Publicly, environmental law has not been front and center as an issue in these judicial elections, though the outcomes of the elections in both years will surely have important implications for the strength of North Carolina’s environmental protections.

The most important issue at the heart of the recent elections has been whether the Court would retain a Republican majority, and possibly a strong Republican majority, when it resolves the constitutionality of the legislative redistricting plan based on the 2010 census.\textsuperscript{300} North Carolina has a long history of bitter redistricting litigation.\textsuperscript{301} When the Democrats developed a redistricting plan based on the 2000 census that helped their party, Republicans successfully challenged the plan in the North Carolina Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{302} The redistricting plan adopted in the aftermath of the Supreme Court decision striking down the 2000 plan was more favorable to the Republicans than the previous plan, and helped set the stage for the Republicans’ takeover of both houses of the legislature in the 2010 elections.\textsuperscript{303}

The Republicans’ success in gaining control of the legislature in 2010 gave the Republicans an historic opportunity to use the redistricting process based on the 2010 census to cement their political gains. The success of this

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{300} Davis, \textit{supra} note 261.
\item \textsuperscript{301} For example, the constitutionality of the redistricting plan based on the 1990 census was evaluated in three major United States Supreme Court decisions. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999) (discussing North Carolina’s redistricting as a constitutional example of political gerrymandering); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 901–02 (1996) (discussing whether North Carolina’s redistricting after the 1990 census violated the Fourteenth Amendment as deliberate segregation); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633–34 (1993) (discussing a potentially unconstitutional “racial gerrymander” in North Carolina following the 1990 census).
\item \textsuperscript{302} Stephenson v. Bartlett, 562 S.E.2d 377, 398 (N.C. 2002) (ruling that the 2000 redistricting plan violated the “whole-county provisions” of the state constitution).
\item \textsuperscript{303} Davis, \textit{supra} note 261.
\end{itemize}
strategy ultimately will depend, however, on whether or not the Republicans suffer the same fate with their 2010 redistricting plan that the Democrats suffered with their 2000 redistricting plan—invalidation of the plan by the Supreme Court. 304

Following release of the 2010 census data, Republicans seized the opportunity offered by their new majorities to develop a redistricting plan that heavily favored Republican candidates. 305 In the 2012 elections, which were based on the Republicans’ redrawn election districts, the Republicans gained strong majorities in both legislatures: after the 2010 elections Republicans held a 68–52 advantage in the House of Representatives and a 21–19 advantage in the Senate, but after the 2012 election the Republican advantage in the House had grown to 77–43 and in the Senate to 23–17.306 With the election of Republican Pat McCrory as Governor in 2012, Republican control of North Carolina government was complete—except possibly on the Supreme Court.

In November 2011, Democrats, the National Association for Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”), other advocacy groups, and various voters challenged the redistricting plan under federal and state law, principally asserting that the new districts illegally clustered African-American voters in order to reduce their overall electoral power in the state.307 In a ruling handed down on July 5, 2013, a three-judge state-court panel rejected the challenges to the district plan.308 The plaintiffs appealed this ruling to the Supreme Court, 309 and the Court heard oral argument on January 6, 2014.310 On December 18, 2014, shortly after the 2014 elections,
the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court ruling along predictable partisan lines, with Justices Beasley and Hudson dissenting.\footnote{Dickson v. Rucho, 766 S.E.2d 238 (N.C. 2014).}

While the fate of the 2010 redistricting plan was the single most important issue for advocates on each side of recent judicial elections, it was by no means the only important issue at stake. The new Republican majority in both houses has moved swiftly to adopt legislation advancing a series of conservative policy positions. In September 2011, the legislature adopted a measure referring to the voters a proposed constitutional amendment defining marriage as a union between one man and one woman,\footnote{Anti-gay Marriage Amendment Heads to N.C. Ballot Without Public Input, WASH. INDEP. (Sept. 13, 2011, 1:35 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20140901094526/https://washingtonindependent.com/111611/anti-gay-marriage-amendment-heads-to-n-c-ballot-without-public-input} which the voters approved in May 2012.\footnote{North Carolina Passes Same-Sex Marriage Ban, CNN (May 11, 2012, 11:04 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/08/politics/north-carolina-marriage/} The Republican-controlled legislature cut jobless benefits, repealed a tax credit that supplemented the wages of low-income persons, and voted against expanding Medicaid pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.\footnote{In North Carolina, Unimpeded GOP Drives State Hard to the Right, WASH. POST (May 25, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/in-north-carolina-unimpeded-gop-drives-state-hard-to-the-right/2013/05/25/a9e9ced2-c371-11e2-914f-a7aba60512a7_story.html} In June 2013, the legislature passed—and Governor McCrory signed—a measure repealing the Racial Justice Act, which gave African-American inmates on death row an opportunity to challenge their sentence on the ground that it was the result of discrimination.\footnote{Matt Smith, ‘Racial Justice Act’ Repealed in North Carolina, CNN (June 21, 2013, 3:48 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/20/justice/north-carolina-death-penalty/} The legislators also passed sweeping changes in voting rules, requiring voters to present government-issued photo identification at the polls, shortening the early voting period from 17 to ten days, eliminating same day registration, as well as eliminating pre-registration for 16- and 17-year-old voters who will be 18 on Election Day.\footnote{Aaron Blake, North Carolina Governor Signs Extensive Voter ID Law, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/08/12/north-carolina-governor-signs-extensive-voter-id-law/} In addition, the legislature adopted a new “Opportunity Scholarships Program,” providing $10 million in state funds to finance vouchers worth up to $4,200 for families to use to send their children to private schools.\footnote{Lindsay Wagner, School Vouchers Come to North Carolina, NC POLICY WATCH (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2013/09/04/school-vouchers-come-to-north-carolina/} Finally, the legislators passed legislation
weakening the job security of public school teachers.\textsuperscript{318} Almost all of these measures have led to legal challenges, many filed in state court.\textsuperscript{319} The cases filed in state court may eventually end up before the Supreme Court. Thus, in a very direct sense, the Republicans’ ability to sustain their victories on various conservative policy causes depends upon the inclinations of the Supreme Court, and hence the elections for seats on the Court.

\textit{E. The 2012 Election}

This political and policy background helps explain the ferociousness of the 2012 judicial election in which Paul Newby, the Republican incumbent, faced a challenge from Democrat Sam Ervin IV. With the Court split four to three in favor of the Republicans, the outcome of this election determined whether Democrats or Republicans would control the Court going forward. After a hard fought contest, Newby prevailed, receiving 51.9\% of the vote to Ervin’s 48.1\%.\textsuperscript{320}

Newby was initially elected in 2004, and was seeking a second term in office. Widely identified as a Republican and a supporter of conservative causes, Newby generated public controversy shortly after joining the Court by attending a public rally in support of a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriages.\textsuperscript{321} Ervin was a prominent North Carolina lawyer, judge on the Court of Appeals, and a grandson of the famous chairman of the Senate Watergate Committee of the same name.\textsuperscript{322}

The total spending in the Newby-Ervin race exceeded $3.5 million, easily making it the most expensive race for a seat on the Supreme Court in


\textsuperscript{320} 2012 N.C. Official Results, supra note 25.


North Carolina history. The vast majority of the money spent in the 2012 race, over $2.8 million, was in the form of independent expenditures. Almost all of these independent funds were spent in support of Paul Newby, mostly to pay for television advertising, including $1,944,919 by the North Carolina Judicial Coalition, $175,517.83 by Justice for All NC, and $250,000 by Americans for Prosperity (a group reportedly affiliated with the Koch brothers), for a total of more than $2.5 million in independent expenditures in support of Newby’s reelection. On the other hand, the independent expenditures in support of Ervin, mostly from a group representing public school teachers, North Carolina Citizens for Protecting Our Schools, totaled only $331,446.93. The NC League of Conservation Voters spent a meager $4,237 to support Judge Ervin. The candidates raised $170,000 in direct support for their campaigns, and public campaign spending totaled $480,000 (this was the last year in which state financing was available).

Corporations with an interest in legal and regulatory policies were prominent among the direct and indirect funders of the campaign efforts.

---

323. Jacobs, supra note 265 (stating that in 2012 “$3.5 million was spent on a single state Supreme Court race that featured nasty attack ads, including more than $2.8 million from outside groups”); see also ALICIA BANNON ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2011–12 (Laurie Kinney & Peter Hardin eds., 2013), available at http://newpoliticsreport.org/content/uploads/JAS-NewPolitics2012-Online.pdf (providing a comprehensive report on the 2012 elections, and estimating the total amount spent in the 2012 race was almost $4.5 million). Almost all of the discrepancy between these two estimates is explained by divergent estimates of the amounts the North Carolina Judicial Coalition spent on the race. Id. (stating that the coalition “spent an estimated $2.9 million in TV advertisements”).


325. Id.


329. Campaign Expenditures: Sam Ervin, INST. FOR S. STUDIES, FOLLOWNCMONEY.ORG, http://www.followncmoney.org/node/27904%3Am%20Ervin%3Afield_date_expenditure_value%5Bvalue%5D%5BYear%5D=2012 (last updated Feb. 26, 2015, 5:37 PM).


supporting Newby’s reelection.332 Funders of the North Carolina Judicial Coalition included the NC Chamber of Commerce and the parent company of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco.333 However, the single biggest donor to the North Carolina Judicial Coalition was Justice for All NC, which itself received most of its funding from the Republican State Leadership Committee (“RSLC”),334 a Washington, D.C.-based national political organization focused on providing funding for conservative candidates in state races across the country.335 The Committee, in turn, received funding from various North Carolina corporations, including the major tobacco companies, Duke Energy, and others.336 This gave rise to the inference that these North Carolina entities were using the RSLC as a conduit to influence the North Carolina Supreme Court race while making the expenditures as invisible as possible.337 According to one account, Justice for All NC invested a grand total of $1.7 million on the Newby-Ervin race, of which $1.2 million, or 68%, came from the RSLC.338

Most of the money poured into the 2012 election was spent on television advertising.339 The most widely discussed ad featuring a folksy banjo player and a pack of hounds chasing a criminal with a jingle featuring such lines as Paul Newby “he’s got the criminals on the run” and “he’ll take them down one by one.”340 Apart from the fact that the ad does not relate to the economic interests of the corporations mostly financing it, the ad depicts the judge in a law enforcement role far removed from his actual responsibilities. A controversial attack ad directed at Judge Ervin asked rhetorically whether “we can trust Sam Ervin to be a fair judge,” and then

---

333. Id.
334. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.; see also Alan Suderman & Ben Wieder, Secret Money Is Now Swaying State Judicial Elections, MOTHER JONES (June 13, 2013, 5:40 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/06/state-supreme-court-election-spending (“The U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform gave $3.5 million to the RSLC in 2012, making it the largest single donor to the national Republican group last year.”).
sought to tie Ervin to controversial former Governor Mike Easley and to utility rate hikes during Ervin’s tenure on the State Utilities Commission.\textsuperscript{341} Ervin decried the ad as the first attack ad in a North Carolina judicial race,\textsuperscript{342} and some contend that Ervin—who was slightly ahead in the polls prior to Election Day—lost the election because of this negative ad.\textsuperscript{343}

\textit{F. The 2014 Election}

The 2014 race was the first modern judicial election in which there was no public financing of the candidates’ campaigns—and no limits on the amounts that candidates could raise to support their campaigns.\textsuperscript{344} In addition, independent expenditures designed to influence the outcome of the elections likely matched or exceeded the level of independent expenditures in 2012.\textsuperscript{345}

The 2014 election involved four separate contests for seats on the Supreme Court. Because three of the four contested seats were held by Democrats and represented the only seats on the Court held by Democrats—and it was a foregone conclusion that Republicans would win one of these contests—the Republicans faced no danger of losing their four to three majority on the Court. On the other hand, the Democrats faced the potential prospect of seeing their position on the Court weakened.

Incumbent Republican Associate Justice Mark Martin ran for the Chief Justice’s seat being vacated as a result of the retirement of longtime Chief Justice Sarah Parker.\textsuperscript{346} Martin’s opponent, Ola M. Lewis, was another Republican.\textsuperscript{347} Because Parker is a Democrat, the outcome of the Martin-Lewis race necessarily produced a Republican win, ensuring that the Republicans retained their current four to three advantage. The race to fill the seat being vacated by Justice Martin pitted Republican Court of Appeals

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{341} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{342} See Suderman & Wieder, supra note 338.
  \item \textsuperscript{343} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{345} Sharon McCloskey, \textit{Kicking Off the State Supreme Court Elections}, INST. FOR S. STUDIES (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2014/02/05/kicking-off-the-state-supreme-court-elections/ (“Records set . . . [in 2012] are likely to be shattered in 2014 . . . as more candidates are running for more races and as more outside groups find the path to influencing the outcomes of those races eased by recent election law changes.”).
\end{itemize}
Judge Robert N. Hunter, Jr. against Democrat Court of Appeals Judge Sam J. Ervin IV, who lost his 2012 bid to unseat Justice Newby. In the third contest, Republican attorney Mike Robinson challenged incumbent Democrat Justice Cheri Beasley, who was appointed to fill a vacancy on the Court by former Governor Bev Perdue. And, based on the results of the May 2014 primary, the final contest pitted trial judge Eric Levinson against incumbent Associate Justice Robin Hudson, a Democrat seeking a second term on the Court.

Unlike the other candidates, who faced only one opponent in the general election in November, Justice Hudson had two Republican opponents—Eric Levinson and Jeanette Doran—and therefore, had to participate in a three-way primary contest in May 2014. Given the flood of outside advertising opposing Hudson and supporting the other candidates, there was a serious question whether Hudson would be “primaried out” and not have an opportunity to compete in the general election. Eric Levinson is a Superior Court Judge in Mecklenburg County and was formerly a Judge on the Court of Appeals and a local prosecutor. The third candidate, Jeanette Doran, is the chair of the North Carolina Division of Employment Security Board of Review and served for eight years as a staff person for the North Carolina Institute for Constitutional Law, an advocacy group promoting “limited government” supported by North Carolina’s leading funder of conservative causes, Art Pope. In the end, Hudson and Levinson were the top vote-getters in the primary and faced off in the general elections in November; in the primary election, Hudson received 42.6% of the vote, Levinson 36.6%, and Doran 20.9%.

---

348. Candidates, supra note 346.
349. Id.
350. Id.
As in 2012, the 2014 election primary was dominated by television advertising, though with an increasingly negative flavor. The most controversial ad, sponsored by Justice for All NC, attacked Justice Hudson for being “soft on child molesters.”  

The text of the ad read as follows:

We want judges to protect us. When child molesters sued to stop electronic monitoring care centers, Supreme Court Justice Robin Hudson sided with the predators. Hudson cited a child molester’s right to privacy and took the side of the convicted molesters. Justice Robin Hudson: Not tough on child molesters, not fair to victims.

A political commentator described the ad as “perhaps the most despicable political advertisement ever aired in the state,” and a group of former justices called it “disgusting.”

The ad referred to Justice Hudson’s dissenting opinion, supported by two other justices, in the controversial case of *North Carolina v. Bowditch*. The case involved the constitutionality of a new state requirement that probationers convicted of sex offenses involving children submit to a continuous satellite-based monitoring program. Participants in the program are required to wear a transmitter on their ankles and wear a miniature tracking device around their shoulder or at their waistline on a belt. Several probationers objected to the requirement, imposed after their conviction and sentencing, as a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court majority rejected the argument, reasoning that the legislature’s purpose in adopting the program was to “create a civil, regulatory scheme to protect citizens of our state from the threat posed by the recidivist tendencies of convicted sex offenders,” and that the program had neither a punitive purpose nor effect. Justice Hudson, in dissent, argued that, in view of the paucity of evidence that the program was actually effective in protecting children from predators, the program was

---

357. Jacobs, supra note 265.
360. Eckholm, supra note 352.
362. Id. at 2.
363. Id. at 4.
364. Id. at 2.
365. Id. at 12–13.
punitive in effect and could not be implemented in accord with the Constitution.366

The ad attacking Justice Hudson’s dissent is obviously objectionable because it grossly oversimplifies the legal issue in the case and fails to acknowledge the importance of the constitutional protection against Ex Post Facto laws. It also reflects disrespect for the Court by ignoring its authority and responsibility to safeguard the constitutional rights of disfavored minorities.367 From a judicial electoral perspective, the ad is remarkable because it has so little to do with the types of concerns actually motivating the corporations that helped to finance the ad. Being soft on sex offenders apparently plays better with the electorate than criticizing judges for being too tough on insurance companies or polluters.

Justice for All NC sponsored the Hudson attack ad,368 spending over $700,000 to have it appear on television almost 1,200 times leading up to the election.369 As in 2012, the RSLC was the primary source of funding for Justice for All NC, contributing $900,000 to the PAC in the months prior to the primary.370 As discussed, the RSLC received major contributions from large North Carolina corporations with important financial stakes in issues that may come before the Supreme Court. The tobacco companies Reynolds American and the Lorillard Tobacco Co. have been the RSLC’s biggest donors from North Carolina, contributing more than $2 million since 2011.371 Duke Energy, which faces potentially serious environmental liabilities and is also involved in other matters that may come before the Supreme Court, has contributed $235,000 since 2011.372

Complementing the attack ad sponsored by Justice for All NC and funded by national Republicans, the independent expenditure arm of the Chamber, NC Chamber IE, ran positive ads during the primary supporting Doran and Levinson.373 All told, the chamber reportedly spent $345,000 on

366. Id. at 21.
367. Cf. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”).
369. See Jacobs, supra note 265 (“According to an analysis by the progressive Institute for Southern Studies, Justice for All NC spent almost $800,000 airing the attack ad, which ran nearly 1,200 times in the two weeks before the primary.”).
370. Eckholm, supra note 352 (noting that the RSLC contributed a total of $900,000 to Justice for All NC).
372. Id.
373. Binker, supra note 344.
this effort.\footnote{374} Funding to support the chamber effort came from various major corporations. According to one account “seven companies—Blue Cross Blue Shield of North Carolina, Captive-Aire Systems, Charlotte Pipe and Foundry Co., Glen Raven, Koch Industries, Reynolds American and Waste Industries—gave a total of $320,000 to the chamber’s independent expenditure PAC in 2014.”\footnote{375} Some of these companies, including Koch Industries, are also contributors to the RSLC.\footnote{376} By the time the primary was over, the candidates and independent groups had spent well over a million dollars, setting the table for a more ferocious contest in the general election.

An undisclosed subtext of the attacks on Justice Hudson is that she is the single justice on the present Court who has distinguished herself by voting in favor of environmental protections in the cases that have come before her. For example, in \textit{Applewood Properties, LLC v. New South Properties, LLC},\footnote{377} in which the Court ruled that property owners could not proceed against their neighbor for flooding their property with mud, water and other debris, Justice Hudson joined with another justice in dissent, arguing that the Court had erected an unwarranted obstacle to proceeding with a lawsuit under the Sedimentation Pollution Control Act.\footnote{378} In another case, \textit{Hensley v. NC Department of Environment & Natural Resources},\footnote{379} in which the Court (in an opinion by Justice Newby) ruled that a developer was entitled to build a golf course without preserving green buffers on the border of a trout stream, Justice Hudson filed a dissent.\footnote{380} She argued that “the trout water protection provisions were advanced by ‘legislators from the western part of the state, where such waters are located, in order to provide enhanced protection for such waters,’ and that the Court ‘majority has turned those protections upside down by its decision today.’”\footnote{381} Given the current and likely future makeup of the Court, Justice Hudson would be unlikely to sway the Court in many environmental cases, but at least she can serve as a counterweight to the other justices on the Court who appear to have less sympathy for environmental protections.
In the November general election, the Democratic candidates swept the table, albeit by a narrow margin. Sam Ervin beat Robert Hunter by a margin of 53% to 47%; Justice Hudson beat challenger Eric Levinson 52% to 48%; and Justice Beasley prevailed over Mike Robinson 50.11% to 49.89%. Thus, the election left the court with a four to three partisan split, setting up the state for future vigorous contests for control of the Court.

III. WASHINGTON

A. The Environmentalists’ Success Story

Washington State provides a rare example of environmental advocates banding together with various allies to defeat a concerted effort by a segment of the business community and its supporters to change the ideological make up of a state supreme court in order to make it more supportive of an anti-regulatory agenda. Beginning in the mid-2000’s, portions of the business community invested significant resources and energy in an effort to gain a majority on the Washington Supreme Court. That effort was roundly defeated. In addition, with the passage of time, the two most extreme right-leaning members on the Court were replaced; one as a result of retirement due to illness and another due to a defeat at the polls. As a result, Washington State has recently swung from a conservative court to a centrist to left-leaning court, on environmental law as well as other issues. The Court’s recent decisions in environmental law cases demonstrate considerable balance, with equal numbers of decisions coming down on the pro-environmental protection side and on the anti-environmental protection side, which is what one would expect if the Court were deciding cases based on the merits of the legal arguments without any predisposition to favor or disfavor environmental protection.

The relative success of Washington environmental advocates in maintaining a balanced Supreme Court is attributable to a number of factors. One important explanation is the strength and sophistication of

384. Id.
Washington Conservation Voters, which has invested considerable time and money in Supreme Court races while maintaining a firm public posture favoring fair and impartial courts rather than an environmentalist agenda. At the same time, Washington environmental advocates have benefited from flawed opponents, particularly Justice Richard Sanders, a strident libertarian who consistently voted against environmental protection measures in the cases that came before him. In 2010, Washington voters took the rare step of removing Sanders, an incumbent, from his seat on the Court, largely because of his irresponsible professional behavior and some allegedly racist public comments, rather than his views on environmental issues. Last but not least, environmental advocates in Washington State have benefited in recent years from a succession of Democratic Governors who had the opportunity to appoint left-leaning Democrats to fill vacancies on the Supreme Court, conferring the advantage of incumbency on these candidates when they ran for reelection.

In the context of a nationwide pattern in which the state judicial electoral process has generally been harmful to the cause of environmental protection, Washington State stands apart as a significant and instructive exception.

B. The Washington Judicial Electoral Process

The Washington Supreme Court consists of nine justices. The justices are elected for six-year terms, in nonpartisan, statewide elections. Each justice is required to retire by the end of the calendar year in which he or she attains the age of 75. In the event of a vacancy on the Court, the Governor appoints a justice to fill the vacancy, and the appointee holds the office until the next general election; if the appointee is elected at the next general election, she or he holds the seat to which he or she was appointed.
for the remainder of the unexpired term.\textsuperscript{393} Accordingly, at each general election in even-numbered years a minimum of three Supreme Court justices potentially face a contested election.\textsuperscript{394}

As in many other states, reformers in Washington State have sought for many years to increase the transparency of, and reduce the influence of special interests in, state judicial elections. In 1996, the so-called “Walsh Commission” issued a report with a series of recommendations designed to provide voters with more information about judicial candidates, increase judicial accountability, and insulate judicial candidates from political pressures.\textsuperscript{395} One proposal, that went nowhere, was that judges should be appointed and then stand for retention, rather than be selected through contested elections.\textsuperscript{396} One achievement of these reform efforts was the State’s establishment in 2006 of a $1,900 per election cap on contributions to candidates for seats on the Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{397}

Another achievement of these reform efforts was the creation in 2006 of VotingforJudges.org, a nonpartisan website designed to provide comprehensive information to voters on candidates for judicial office.\textsuperscript{398}

In summer 2004, a coalition of Washington State bar associations and good government groups was formed to improve Washington’s judicial selection process. This led to a summit conference in late 2005, at which Rep. Shay Schual-Berke suggested the concept of a website that would provide voters with more complete and impartial information about judicial candidates.\textsuperscript{399}

Implementation of the effort was led by John Ruhl, then President of the King County Bar Association in Seattle; Paul Fjelstad, a lawyer and the site’s web designer; and Charlie Wiggins, an attorney associated with the American Adjudicature Society, who was subsequently elected to a seat on the Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{400}

\textsuperscript{393} Id. § 3.
\textsuperscript{394} WASH. REV. CODE § 2.04.100 (2010).
\textsuperscript{396} David Postman, Voters Face Big Increase in High-Court Candidates, SEATTLE TIMES (April 18, 1998, 12:00 AM), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19980418&slug=2767185.
\textsuperscript{399} Id.
\textsuperscript{400} Id.
C. Environmental Law in the Supreme Court

At least as measured in terms of case outcomes, the Washington Supreme Court is a remarkably balanced court on environmental law issues. Using the Westlaw Keynote system, I reviewed 24 cases decided between 2000 and 2014 identified as “environmental law” cases. Of these 24 cases, 20 had either a discernably pro-environmental protection outcome or a discernably anti-environmental protection outcome. And of these 20 cases, exactly ten fell on the pro-environmental protection side of the ledger\(^{401}\) and ten fell on the anti-environmental protection side.\(^{402}\) Most of the justices have, on different occasions, voted for different outcomes depending on the facts and circumstances of different cases. While this sample size is admittedly limited, these data suggest that the Court as a whole is not driven by any clear ideological agenda on environmental law in one direction or another.

There is no obvious trend in the Supreme Court decision-making in environmental law based on my review of the Court’s environmental cases over this 14-year period. The Court reached pro-environmental protection and anti-environmental protection results in different cases through the period. If there is any trend to discern, it may be in the direction of growing sympathy and support for environmental protections over the course of this period. At the beginning of the period studied, the Court issued four decisions of which only one supported the environmental protection measure at issue. At the end of this period, the Court issued four decisions of which only one had an anti-environmental result.

However, within this larger pattern, the environmental jurisprudence of former Justice Richard Sanders stands out. Over the period studied, in the

---

\(^{401}\) See, e.g., Ellensburg Cement Prod., Inc. v. Kittitas Cnty., 179 Wash.2d 737 (Wash. 2014); Cedar River Water & Sewer Dist. v. King Cnty., 178 Wash.2d 763 (Wash. 2013); Lemire v. Dep’t of Ecology, 178 Wash.2d 227 (Wash. 2013); Am. Legion Post No. 149 v. Dep’t of Health, 164 Wash.2d 570 (Wash. 2008); Tesoro Refining & Mktg. Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 164 Wash.2d 310 (Wash. 2008); Ferry Cnty. v. Concerned Friends of Ferry Cnty., 155 Wash.2d 824 (Wash. 2005); Tiffany Family Trust Co. v. City of Kent, 155 Wash.2d 225 (Wash. 2005); Hickle v. Whitney Farms, Inc., 148 Wash.2d 911 (Wash. 2003); Pub. Utility Dist. No. 1 of Pend Oreille Cnty. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 146 Wash.2d 778 (Wash. 2002); Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 142 Wash.2d 68 (Wash. 2000) (reaching pro-environmental protection results).

years while he served on the Court, Justice Sanders had an opportunity to cast a vote in 16 environmental cases with a discernably pro-environmental or anti-environmental outcome. In every one of these cases, Justice Sanders voted against the environment. In every case (ten in all) in which the Court majority ruled against the environmental protection measure at issue, Justice Sanders joined the majority. In every case (six in all) in which the Court voted to uphold the environmental protection measure, Justice Sanders wrote or joined in a dissent.

So far as I can determine, no other current or recent former justice on the Washington Supreme Court has had a starkly ideological voting pattern in environmental cases. The only justice who seemingly comes close is former Justice Phillip Talmadge, although his tenure on the court during the sample period was so limited that it is hard to draw firm conclusions. In three of the environmental cases he helped resolve, he joined the Court majority in a pro-environmental ruling, and filed dissents (solitary dissents, at that) in two cases reaching anti-environmental cases. But Justice Talmadge falls short of Justice Sanders’s standard of doctrinaire consistency because he joined in one majority opinion reaching an anti-environmental outcome.

Another issue that has divided the Washington Supreme Court is private property rights, specifically, whether government regulations or other government actions constitute takings of private property under either the United States or Washington Constitutions. As discussed below, property rights have been the most prominent environment-related issue in the contests for seats on the Washington Supreme Court over the last decade. In addition, property rights have also been the focus of two initiatives presented to the voters in 1995 and 2006.403 Especially in view of the importance of the issue politically, the Washington Supreme Court has had relatively few occasions to address the “takings” question, particularly in the context of land use and environmental regulations. In the few cases before the Court potentially raising takings issues, the Court has generally avoided addressing the issue directly, with either Justice Sanders or Justice Jim Johnson (or both) arguing that the Court should address the merits of the claim and find a violation of private property rights.404

404. *See* Lemire v. Dep’t of Ecology, 309 P.3d 395, 403–04 (Wash. 2013) (holding an administrative order requiring land owner to take steps to curb pollution of a creek did not effect a taking); *id.* at 404 (Johnson, J., dissenting); *see also* Asarco Inc. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 43 P.3d 471 (Wash. 2002) (rejecting takings challenges to retroactive imposition of liability under state toxics cleanup law on ripeness grounds); *id.* at 477–80 (Sanders, J., dissenting). *But see* Dickgieser v. State, 105 P.3d 36 (Wash. 2005) (reversing grant of summary judgment to state on claim that state took private
D. Modern Judicial Elections in Washington

As of 2004, the Washington Supreme Court was sharply divided along ideological lines, with a strong and growing “property rights” wing that was skeptical if not outright hostile to environmental regulation. Traditionally relatively quiet affairs, judicial elections in Washington State had begun to become expensive and contentious. But the electoral contests that led up to 2004 were but a prelude to the far more costly and contentious contests that were to follow in which ideological control of the Court was at stake. Following the elections of 2006 (in which the property rights candidates lost across the board) the surprising defeat of conservative Richard Sanders in 2010, and the several appointments to fill vacancies on the Court by a succession of Democratic Governors, the Court has now come under the overwhelming control of moderates and liberals. At the same time, races for the Washington Supreme Court have reverted to relatively quiet, humdrum affairs—at least for the time being.

To set the stage for discussion of the battles for ideological control of the Washington Supreme Court from 2006 to 2012, it is useful to describe the makeup of the Court as of 2004. The Chief Justice at the time was the moderately conservative Gerry Alexander, who served on the Court from 1994 until he reached the mandatory retirement age of 75 in 2011. His judicial career began less than ten years after graduating from law school, when Republican governor Daniel J. Evans appointed him to the Superior Court. After graduating from law school, Alexander practiced with the firm Parr, Baker, Alexander, and Cordes in Olympia. See Gerry Alexander, JUDGEPEDEA.ORG, http://judgepedia.org/Gerry_Alexander (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); Transcript of Speech before Washington Republicans, SEATTLE TIMES, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=14&ved=0CIEBEBYwDQ&url=http%3A%2F%2Fseattletimes.com%2Fnews%2Flocal%2Fpolitics%2Ftranscripts.doc&ei=suzuU5GaC7LsAT6qYHYAw (last visited Jan. 20, 2014). His colleagues selected him to serve as the

property by conducting logging operation on state-owned lands that resulted in flooding of plaintiffs’ neighboring land).

405. See generally DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2004 (Jesse Rutledge, ed. 2004) (discussing the rise in television advertisements and cost of a campaign in Washington along with other states in 2004).


408. Gerry Alexander, supra note 407.
Court’s Chief Justice from 2001 to 2010, when Barbara Madsen succeeded him as Chief.\textsuperscript{409} In sum, Alexander was the quintessential judge’s judge.

As of 2004, the longest serving justice on the Court was Charles Johnson who, remarkably enough, remains a member of the Court today.\textsuperscript{410} Elected to the Supreme Court at the relatively young age of 39, Johnson’s election has generally been attributed to the fact that he had a more appealing name than the incumbent he unseated, the Chief Justice Keith Callow.\textsuperscript{411} More generally, Johnson’s surprising election became a kind of cautionary tale in the national debate over judicial elections, and spurred efforts in Washington State to improve voter education about candidates for judicial office.\textsuperscript{412} Despite this inauspicious start to his career on the Supreme Court, Justice Johnson has had a successful tenure on the Court and in 2014 was seeking election to a fifth term against only token opposition.\textsuperscript{413}

Barbara Madsen, the future Chief Justice, was elected to the Court in 1992. After graduating from law school, Madsen worked as a public defender, as a staff attorney with the Seattle City Attorney’s Office, and then special prosecutor.\textsuperscript{414} In 1988, Madsen received an appointment to the Seattle Municipal Court, and was elected to the Washington Supreme Court in 1992, making her the third woman to serve on the Court.\textsuperscript{415} She was reelected to the Court, each time over slight opposition, in 1998, 2004, and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{410} Associate Chief Justice Charles W. Johnson, \textit{WASH. COURTS}, https://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_trial_courts/supreme/bios/?fa=sbios.display_file&fileID=johnson (last visited Jan. 21, 2015).
\item \textsuperscript{411} Robb London, \textit{LAW: For Want of Recognition, Chief Justice Is Ousted}, \textit{N.Y. TIMES} (Sept. 28, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/28/us/law-for-want-of-recognition-chief-justice-is-ousted.html (“Informal polls and interviews with voters after the election suggested that many voters did not recognize the Chief Justice’s name on the ballot, while Mr. Johnson benefited from the presence in the state of at least three well-known Charles Johnsons.”).
\item \textsuperscript{412} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{415} \textit{Id.}
\end{itemize}
2010. She was elected Chief Justice by the other members of the Court on November 5, 2009, and continues to serve in that capacity.416

The fourth and most colorful member of the Court as of 2004, was Richard Sanders, an avowed libertarian and property rights advocate. Sanders, whose particular specialty prior to joining the bench was land use law, was described by one journalist as having a “list of clients . . . [that] read[s] like a roll call of the right’s modern grievances: Property owners hampered by land-use laws. Affirmative-action opponents. Gun-rights fundamentalists. Parents battling state social workers.”417

He joined the Court in 1996, pulling off an unexpected win over incumbent Roselle Pekelis.418 He was subsequently re-elected for two additional six-year terms in 1998 and 2004 and then defeated in 2010.419

Pekelis had been appointed to the Supreme Court in April 1995, after previously serving as a judge on the King County Superior Court and the Washington Court of Appeals.420 Sanders ran what one columnist called a “boorishly partisan” campaign by emphasizing the fact that Pekelis had been appointed to the Court by unpopular Democratic Governor Mike Lowry, who was then serving out his single term as the State’s chief executive.421 Sanders also highlighted his advocacy of private property rights, leading environmentalist critics to describe him as “the first property-rights justice.”422 Sanders prevailed over Pekelis 54% to 46%.423

In the same year that Washington voters elected property rights advocate Richard Sanders to the Supreme Court, they also rejected Measure 48, a property rights measure that was vigorously opposed by

418. Id.
421. Terry Tang, Judicial Roulette: Is This Any Way To Pick A Judge?, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 10, 1995, 12:00 AM), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19951110&slug=2151700.
422. Simon, supra note 417.
423. Supreme Court Justice is Ousted, LEWISTON MORNING TRIB., Nov. 8, 1995, at A7.
environmentalists and many other interest groups. If it had passed, the measure would have subjected the government to financial liability for adopting and enforcing land use measures that did not rise to the level of compensable takings under either the state or federal Constitution. Prior to his election, Sanders was a board member of the Northwest Legal Foundation, which drafted Measure 48, and a consultant to the Building Industry Association of Washington, a major supporter of the measure. Sanders testified before the Washington legislature in support of the measure. The measure failed with a vote of 544,788 for and 796,869 against. Tom McCabe, a building industry advocate, was quoted as saying that Sanders’s election to the Court “takes some of the sting” out of the defeat of Measure 48: “We never concerned ourselves with Supreme Court races before . . . But this was an anomaly, like having a homebuilder run for governor.”

In 1998, Sanders was reelected to a full-term over Greg Canova, a criminal prosecutor who served as the head of the criminal division within the Washington Attorney General’s Office. In keeping with his professional background, Canova criticized Sanders’s application of his libertarian philosophy in the context of law and order issues, focusing on Sanders’s opposition to a voter-approved “three-strikes, you’re out” measure and his advocacy of citizens’ rights to forcibly resist arrest.

---

425. Id.
426. Simon, supra note 417.
427. Tang, supra note 421.
429. Simon, supra note 417.
431. Id.
Sanders easily prevailed in the primary election, 64% to 36%, avoiding a contest in the general election.\textsuperscript{432}

In 2004, Sanders faced five opponents for reelection. In the primary election, he received 31% of the vote, with Terry Sebring coming in second with 19% of the vote.\textsuperscript{433} In the general election, Sanders and Sebring faced off, with Sanders prevailing, 61% to 39%.\textsuperscript{434} Sebring, an Assistant Attorney General, as well as a former Superior Court Judge, again focused on Sanders’s record in criminal cases, arguing that “the purpose of criminal law is accountability. . . It’s not all about the individual rights of the defendant. The public has rights, too.”\textsuperscript{435} Despite the strong support he received from prosecutors and victims’ groups, Sebring’s challenge to Sanders failed in much the same fashion as Canova’s.\textsuperscript{436}

Justice Bobby Bridge was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1999 by Democratic Governor Gary Locke, and prevailed in the following general election in 2000 and again in 2002.\textsuperscript{437} Before being appointed to the high court, Bridge served for ten years as Superior Court Judge in King County, and prior to that was a partner in a Seattle law firm.\textsuperscript{438} In an embarrassing incident in February 2003, Justice Bridge was arrested for a hit and run accident and for drunk driving after she hit a parked car near her home and attempted to flee the scene while intoxicated; her blood alcohol level was later tested at 0.219 and 0.227.\textsuperscript{439} In 2007, Justice Bridge resigned from the Court to become Founding President/CEO of the Seattle-based Center for Children & Youth Justice, a non-profit group advocating for juvenile justice and child welfare.\textsuperscript{440} Governor Christine Gregoire appointed Debra Stephens to replace Bridge in January 2008.

Tom Chambers was elected to the Court in 2000.\textsuperscript{441} He pursued a long and successful private legal career, primarily as a plaintiff-side torts


\textsuperscript{433} Id.

\textsuperscript{434} Id.

\textsuperscript{435} Maureen O’Hagan, Numerous Candidates Vying for High Court, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 9, 2004), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2002030798_judges09m.html.

\textsuperscript{436} Elections Search Results, supra note 432.

\textsuperscript{437} Staff Members, CTR. FOR CHILDREN & YOUTH JUSTICE, http://www.ccyj.org/WhoWeAre/staff/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2015).

\textsuperscript{438} Id.


\textsuperscript{440} State Justice Bobby Bridge Stepping Down, SEATTLE TIMES (June 1, 2007), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2003731035_webbridge01m.html.

litigator before joining the court. In 1989, he was awarded the Trial Lawyer of the Year Award by the Washington State Trial Lawyers Association. Chambers was a self-described champion of the “little guy,” a posture that sometimes led him to side with other justices who arrived at the same position based on a libertarian philosophy.

Susan Owens was elected to a seat on the Supreme Court in 2000. Prior to her election, she served for almost 20 years as a District Court Judge in western Clallam County as well as Chief Judge in several tribal courts. She gained some notoriety for writing the Court’s majority opinion in the case of *Barrett v. Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc.*, addressing the liability of a tavern for an accident caused by an inebriated customer. In the opinion she authored, the Court ruled that a tavern owner could be held liable for serving alcohol to a customer who caused a car crash if the customer was “apparently,” even if not “obviously,” intoxicated. In a dissent, Judge Richard Sanders said: “The majority goes where no court has gone before.”

Mary Fairhurst, the second most recent addition to the Court as of 2004, was elected in 2002, winning a razor-thin, 50.12% to 49.88%, contest over Jim Johnson. As discussed below, Jim Johnson, a libertarian in the mold of Richard Sanders, succeeded in winning a seat on the Court two years later. Fairhurst started her legal career by serving as law clerk for two different justices on the Washington Supreme Court. She then worked in a variety of positions in the Washington Attorney General’s office before being elected to the Supreme Court.

---

443. Justice Tom Chambers, supra note 440.
444. Lewis Kamb, supra note 441.
446. Id.
449. *Lucky Seven Saloon*, 96 P.3d at 390.
450. Id. at 396 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
453. Id.
backing for her campaign from Indian tribes, public employee unions, and Washington Conservation Voters. Indian tribes and Washington Conservation Voters also spent significant sums to oppose Johnson’s election.

Fairhurst’s opponent in 2002, James Johnson, made a striking contrast with Fairhurst. Johnson spent 20 years as an Assistant Attorney General in the Washington Attorney General’s Office, serving as the head of the Fish and Wildlife Division and later as Counsel for the Environment. This made him one of the few modern candidates for a seat on the Supreme Court with expertise in environmental law. However, this background hardly endeared him to environmentalists or other progressive groups. Under Republican Attorney General Slade Gorton, Johnson took the lead in a number of the State’s legal battles with Indian tribes, and continued to oppose Indian tribes when he went into the private practice of law. For example, he represented private property owners trying to block tribes’ access to fishing grounds.

As a result, “Johnson’s legal work . . . branded him, among some, as anti-Indian, and prompted tribal groups to support his opponent.” Environmentalists also opposed Johnson, “pointing out that he’s representing a group of builders, Realtors, farmers and cattlemen that is challenging the listing of salmon as an endangered species.” Indian Tribes, public employee unions, and Washington Conservation Voters invested in television advertising calling Johnson “too extreme for the Supreme Court.” On the other hand, Johnson received major financial support “from groups that often oppose tougher environmental restrictions. Washington homebuilder groups . . . contributed $160,000 [in 2002]—more than any of the three other Supreme Court candidates . . . raised in total.”

455. Lynda Mapes, Tribes Jointly Opposing High-Court Candidate, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 25, 2002, 12:00 AM), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20021025&slug=tribes25m (stating Washington Conservation Voters “chipped in $20,000” to finance a negative television campaign targeting Johnson).
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. Mapes, supra note 455.
In 2004, in his second attempt to gain a seat on the Supreme Court, Johnson won a race for an open seat on the Court created by the retirement of Justice Faith Ireland, prevailing over Mary Kay Becker by a margin 52% to 48%.462 Becker was a judge on the Court of Appeals and a former Democratic legislator representing Bellingham.463 Her campaign adopted the strategy of arguing that she was not an extreme ideologue, unlike her opponent Jim Johnson.464 “We are supposed to stay above public clamor . . . We’re supposed to stay on an even keel,” she stated in an interview.465 This approach obviously was not successful in this instance. According to one calculation, Johnson won the race with the help of contributions from the Building Industry Association of Washington that exceeded the total raised by Mary Kay Becker from all her contributors.466 All told, Becker raised just $157,000, while Johnson raised $539,000.467

Johnson quickly established himself as being on a par with, if not even more extreme, than Richard Sanders in terms of libertarian zeal. At one point he publicly declared, “I’m without a doubt conservative, libertarian conservative.”468 Like Justice Sanders, Justice Johnson used his election to the Court to champion the rights of private property owners, and usually sided with businesses against either the government or the general public.469 As a further indication of his ideological orientation, when Johnson left the Court in 2012, he accepted a position as a senior fellow with the Freedom Foundation, an Olympia-based nonprofit “think and action tank” that “promot[es] free markets, limited government and greater transparency.”470

465. Id.
466. See Ralph Thomas, Interest Groups Targeting State Supreme Court Races, SEATTLE TIMES (May 23, 2006), http://seattletimes.com/html/politics/2003012582_court23m.html (analyzing the effect of interest groups’, such as the Building Industry Association of Washington, on elections and the size of their contributions).
469. Id.
E. The 2006 Election

Based on the preceding description of the composition of the Court it is apparent that the Court had a relatively balanced conservative to centrist orientation in ideological terms after the 2004 election. Justice Sanders and James Johnson anchored the extreme right-wing of the Court. Chief Justice Alexander and Justice Chambers, though far less ideological, were relatively conservative and joined with Sanders and Johnson in some environmental cases. Because the remaining justices could reasonably be described as centrist, the ideological leanings of the Supreme Court were still sufficiently balanced that Sanders and Johnson were not in the majority in every environmental law case. But with the 2004 re-election of Richard Sanders for a second full term and the election of his ideological companion Jim Johnson, business interests, property rights advocates and their allies saw the next general election, in 2006, as a promising opportunity to decisively shift the balance of the Court in a conservative direction.

As the 2006 elections approached, three incumbents prepared to seek election to another full term on the Court: Chief Judge Gerry Alexander, Tom Chambers, and Susan Owens. While, as discussed, all three were regarded as conservative or centrist, the possibility of replacing all three justices with hard right candidates in the mold of Sanders and Johnson was a temptation too great to resist. The incumbents’ opponents, if they had all been elected, certainly would have moved the Court in a far more conservative direction.

The first clear indication that the 2006 judicial races would be different was the announcement of the formation of Washington State’s first independent political action committee focused on judicial races, Constitutional Law PAC. While ostensibly centrist in orientation, the group had a distinctly Republican and right-wing cast. Former Republican Attorney General and Senator Slade Gorton was the PAC’s chairman. The board also included former state GOP chairmen and candidates for governor, as well as other “veterans of political and legal fights favoring property rights and opposing government regulation and taxation.” The Building Industry Association of Washington (“BIAW”), which contributed to James Johnson’s 2002 and 2004 races, provided significant financial


support for the new PAC.\textsuperscript{474} In the familiar language used by Republicans and their allies to support right-leaning judicial candidates, the new PAC’s website declared that it “exists to support candidates who believe in judicial restraint, and deference to the state Constitution as written.”\textsuperscript{475}

Significantly, another ostensibly centrist but clearly left-leaning political action committee, FairPac (later renamed Citizens to Uphold the Constitution) was formed to oppose Constitutional Law PAC.\textsuperscript{476} This second PAC received financial support from various liberal organizations, including labor unions, pro-choice organizations, the state trial lawyers’ association, and Washington Conservation Voters.\textsuperscript{477}

Ron Ward, a member of Citizens to Uphold the Constitution and a past president of the Washington State Bar Association, framed the terms of the debate between these warring PACs in an editorial published in one of the State’s leading newspapers.\textsuperscript{478} In response to the criticism that the Supreme Court showed a “lack of judicial restraint,” he said that the Court had been “a model of impartiality and a clear example of what democracy needs and requires to remain vibrant.”\textsuperscript{479} He continued:

\begin{quote}
So what is the real agenda here? To replace impartial appellate judges with hand-picked candidates who can be counted on to support BIAW’s agenda to undermine growth-management and land-use laws and to prioritize the deregulation of our state’s building industry over protecting our public health and natural resources. Its plan to dismantle these protections in the courts is less costly than a legislative strategy, which would require a far greater investment in state Senate and House campaigns, and stealthier, given that many voters feel they don’t have enough information to cast votes at the judicial ballot level.\textsuperscript{480}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{474} BIAW Hoping to Pack State Supreme Court with Handpicked Candidates this Fall, supra note 467; see also Robin Parkinson, Independent Spending in Washington, 2006-2010, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN ST. POLIS. (June 21, 2012), http://classic.followthemoney.org//press/ReportView.phtml?r=461 (“The Building Industry Association of Washington (BIAW), which seeks to limit regulation of the building industry, was the largest spender [in 2004 elections in Washington State], focusing $1.3 million primarily on state supreme court races.”).

\textsuperscript{475} Modie, supra note 471.

\textsuperscript{476} BIAW Hoping to Pack State Supreme Court with Handpicked Candidates this Fall, supra note 467.

\textsuperscript{477} Neil Modie, supra note 472.


\textsuperscript{479} Id.

\textsuperscript{480} Id.
\end{footnotes}
He vowed that Citizens to Uphold the Constitution would “help hold BIAW and Constitutional Law PAC accountable to the people” and “focus on educating and turning out voters to support independent judicial candidates.”481

Ultimately, three very conservative candidates emerged to challenge the incumbents seeking reelection. Chief Judge Gerry Alexander was challenged by John Groen, a leading private property rights litigator in Washington State.482 He began his legal career with the Pacific Legal Foundation (“PLF”), a public interest law firm focused on private property rights protection based in California, and remained a member of the organization’s board of directors.483 He helped start the Pacific Northwest office of PLF, and also served for many years as a member of the Legal Trust Committee for the BIAW.484 In 1996, he left PLF to start a private law firm and work on land use issues related to government regulation of private property.485 In his race for a seat on the Supreme Court, he received the explicit endorsement of the Republican Party, contrary to the traditionally nonpartisan character of judicial races in Washington State. At least in recent history, no other candidate for a seat on the Supreme Court has brought such a clear, pointed advocacy agenda to a Supreme Court campaign. During a debate with Chief Justice Alexander he asserted that “the bottom line is that the current majority of the court has . . . repeatedly demonstrate[d] a willingness, to legislate from the bench and to disregard constitutional rights, especially private property rights.”486

In the second race in 2004, Justice Susan Owens faced a challenge from Stephen Johnson, an attorney in private practice throughout his career who emphasized the claim in his campaign materials that he would be “an independent voice for property rights,” and that he “would uphold the Washington Constitution’s strong Property Rights provisions.”487 Johnson served as a Republican leader in the Washington State Senate, where he

481. Id.
484. Id.
485. Id.
served for 12 years before running for a seat on the Supreme Court. He served at various times as the Majority Floor Leader, the Deputy Republican Leader, and the party’s senior member on the Judiciary Committee. Johnson’s campaign was “backed by the building industry, major business groups and social conservatives.” By contrast, Owens “won numerous endorsements from labor unions, environmentalists, gay-rights groups and Democratic Party organizations.” During the campaign, Owens was “criticized by builders and business groups for siding with government agencies in key public-disclosure and property-rights cases.” Johnson, on the other hand, got “low marks from environmentalists and labor unions,” while Owens was endorsed by Washington Conservation Voters.

In the third race, Jeanette Burrage challenged Justice Tom Chambers. Burrage had served on the board of Citizens to Save Puget Sound, which fought successfully to block a new sewer outlet into Puget Sound, giving her at least a patina of an environmentalist credential. But her most notable credential was that she served as Executive Director of the Northwest Legal Foundation “a firm dedicated to protecting the rights of people when government has overstepped its authority,” suggesting her sympathy with the libertarian leanings of the other candidates. According to her campaign materials in the Supreme Court race, she believes “our government is based on stable fundamental principles, such as protection of property rights and freedom for individual citizens.” During a brief stint as a Superior Court Judge, she gained notoriety for telling two female attorneys to wear skirts to court, an action that earned her the label “the skirt judge.”

The 2006 race involved unprecedented levels of campaign spending for seats on the Supreme Court and by the new political action committees.

---

490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id.
495. Id.
496. Nancy Bartley, ‘Skirt Judge’ Adds Sizzle to Appeals-Court Primary, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 4, 2002, 12:00 AM), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20020904&slug=appeals04m0.
Candidate expenditures totaled $1,770,821.\(^{497}\) Two of the candidates seeking to unseat incumbents raised the largest amounts, with John Groen reporting expenditures of $443,607 and Stephen Johnson spending $354,115.\(^{498}\) Each of the incumbents also spent considerable but slightly smaller sums to defend their seats, including $340,446 by Thomas Chambers, $318,708 by Susan Owens, and $271,547 by Gerry Alexander. Jeanette Burrage, the third challenger, expended a relatively paltry $42,397.\(^{499}\)

But these figures paled in comparison with the “independent” expenditures by the political action committees, which spent nearly twice as much on the races as the candidates themselves, “turn[ing] the nonpartisan judgeships into partisan battlegrounds over gay rights, property rights and business liability.”\(^{500}\) The total independent expenditures in the 2006 judicial races were $2,517,593.\(^{501}\) Reported indirect expenditures targeted each of the six major candidates.\(^{502}\) In every race, more was spent to support the election of the challenger than on behalf of the incumbent, with the pro-Groen forces outspending the pro-Alexander forces nearly 4 to 1; the pro-Johnson forces outspending the pro-Owens forces nearly 2 to 1; and the pro-Burrage forces only outspending the pro-Chambers forces by a modest amount.\(^{503}\) The lion’s share of these expenditures was used to finance television advertising. The political action groups paid for all of the television advertising related to the Supreme Court elections in 2004.\(^{504}\) The BIAW (largely through the Constitutional Law PAC), Citizens to Uphold the Constitution, and the Washington Chapter of Americans Tired of Lawsuit Abuse were among the leaders in making these independent expenditures.\(^{505}\)

---


\(^{498}\) Id.

\(^{499}\) Id.


\(^{501}\) *Showing Contributions to State Supreme Court Candidates in Elections in Washington in 2006*, supra note 497; *But see* Parkinson, supra note 474 (providing a figure of $2,607,374).

\(^{502}\) Parkinson, supra note 474.

\(^{503}\) Id.

\(^{504}\) Parkinson, supra note 474.

\(^{505}\) Id. (“Citizens to Uphold the Constitution . . . was active in all three state supreme court races, independently spending a total of $646,757 in support of all three incumbents’ successful bids for reelection, and in opposition to their challengers. Three donors alone provided almost half of the committee’s funds used to make these expenditures, each giving $100,000 or more: the Puyallup Tribe of Indians, the Tulalip Tribes of Washington, and the Washington State Council of Service Employees.”); The Washington Chapter of Americans Tired of Lawsuit Abuse reportedly spent
By far the largest independent expenditures were made in the Groen-Alexander contest, with $771,485 spent in support of Groen’s candidacy and $298,863 spent in opposition to his candidacy; on the other hand, $39,281 was spent in support of retaining Chief Justice Alexander, and a whopping $476,592 was spent opposing him.506 In the Johnson-Owen contest, $395,515 was spent in support of Johnson’s candidacy with $118,933 spent in opposition; on the other side, $147,590 was spent in support of Owen’s candidacy with $110,525 spent in opposition.507 Finally, in the Burrage-Chambers race, $57,716 was spent in support of Burrage and $38,495 in opposition to her; on the other side, $39,172 was spent in support of Chambers and $43,848 against.508

Despite the fact that the challengers and their supporters outspent the incumbents and their supporters by a considerable margin, the incumbents swept the field.509 Chief Justice Alexander beat off Groen’s challenge in a head-to-head contest in the primary by a margin of 54% to 46%, meaning that Alexander was reelected in the general election without opposition. Susan Owens, after prevailing over several primary opponents (but without capturing a majority of the vote), faced Stephen Johnson in the general election and beat him by a margin of 60% to 40%.510 Tom Chambers beat opponent Jeanette Burrage in the primary by a margin of 60% to 40%, with the result that he appeared unopposed on the general election ballot.511

---

506. Data from Money in State Politics, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN ST. POLS. (on file); But see Parkinson, supra note 474 (indicating that $843,485 was spent in support of Groen’s candidacy and $39,180 was spent in support of retaining Chief Justice Alexander).

507. Data from Money in State Politics, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN ST. POLS. (on file); But see Parkinson, supra note 474 (indicating that in the Johnson-Owen contest, $395,515 was spent in support of Johnson’s candidacy with $118,933 spent in opposition, and that $147,590 was spent in support of Owens’ candidacy).


510. Id.

511. See id.
F. The 2008 Election

Following the expensive and contentious 2006 elections, the 2008 Supreme Court elections were relatively low-key. Prior to the election, in January 2008, Democratic Governor Christine Gregoire appointed Debra Stephens to the Court.\(^{512}\) Stephens replaced Justice Bobby Bridge who retired before the end of her term to become the head of a nonprofit organization (and possibly to avoid a bruising reelection battle in the wake of her hit and run and drunk driving arrest). Stephens’s appointment maintained the gender balance on the Court and she became the first Justice in several years from eastern Washington.\(^{513}\) She had only scant judicial experience, having been appointed by Gregoire to the Court of Appeals a year earlier.\(^{514}\) Prior to becoming a judge, Stephens was an accomplished attorney, specializing in appellate work.\(^{515}\) She worked for over a decade with the Amicus Curiae Program of the Washington State Trial Lawyers Association (renamed the Washington Association for Justice), marking her as an antagonist of corporations and their allies seeking to limit the scope of tort liability.\(^{516}\) “GOP critics from outside her hometown [of Spokane] groused about Stephens having given Gregoire a $100 campaign donation and especially about her involvement with the trial lawyers’ organization, known to be influential in Democratic politics.” \(^{517}\) Republican Slade Gorton, in a statement released by the right-leaning Justice for Washington Foundation, said that the selection of Stephens was “a disappointment as the appointee represents an extreme position within the legal profession. A more moderate appointment would have been preferable.”\(^{518}\)

In the 2008 elections, no opponent emerged to challenge Justice Stephens’s bid for a full six-year term, which succeeded automatically.\(^{519}\) The other two races that year, in which incumbents Mary Fairhurst and


\(^{513}\) Id.


\(^{515}\) Debra Stephens, VOTINGFORJUDGES.ORG, http://votingforjudges.org/08gen/supreme/7ds.html (last updated Nov. 4, 2008).


\(^{517}\) Id.

\(^{518}\) Id.

\(^{519}\) See General Election Results, WASH. SEC’Y OF ST., (Nov. 4, 2008), http://results.vote.wa.gov/results/20081104/Judicial-All.html (displaying that Stephens received 100% of the votes).
Charles Johnson were both reelected to new terms, were almost equally unexciting. In both races, the incumbents beat back primary challengers with more than 50% of the vote, meaning that they ran unopposed in the general election. Justice Fairhurst prevailed 61% to 39%, besting Michael J. Bond in the primary; and Justice Johnson received 59% of the vote in the primary, beating James Beecher (30%) and Frank Vuillet (10%).

Fairhurst’s opponent, Michael Bond is an experienced military lawyer and private attorney working with a small Seattle law firm. He ran on a libertarian platform, saying “[m]y fundamental philosophy is that the role of the court is to protect the people from the power of government and vested interests,” and criticized Justice Fairhurst for “tramp[ing] on our constitutional rights, overruling property rights, reducing privacy rights, and censoring free speech.”

In the second race, James Beecher, an experienced private litigator, took a quite different tack, arguing for modernization of the courts and not so subtly suggesting that Justice Johnson, then seeking his fourth term, had overstayed his welcome. He asserted:

[The Court rules] need to be modernized to make pretrial procedures more efficient and to provide for the economies of electronic technology. After 18 years it is time to elect a Justice who actually has had broad, first hand trial experience—someone with knowledge of present day litigation practices across Washington.

Candidate Frank Vuillet brought less compelling credentials to the race. One paper urged the retention of Johnson, observing that “Frank Vulliet, of
Mercer Island, appears to be winding down a long legal career; during three recent winters, he worked part time in a bike and ski shop.  

In terms of campaign financing, the 2008 election was a bargain basement affair. Each of the incumbents only amassed small war chests, and the challengers raised very little money, with Michael Bond leading the pack with $28,155. There were no expenditures by independent political action committees in 2008, in contrast with the millions spent two years before.

G. The 2010 Elections

The 2010 campaign represented a new ratcheting back up of contentious and expensive campaigning, but this time with the progressive side taking the offensive, and achieving a major victory with the defeat of Richard Sanders, by then a 15-year veteran on the Court.

The first of the races in 2010 was a complete non-event, with popular Chief Justice Barbara Madsen running for reelection unopposed. In the second race, conservative Jim Johnson prevailed over a single challenger in the primary, Stan Rumbaugh, by a margin of 62% to 38%, but not for lack of a serious effort by left-leaning groups to unseat him. Rumbaugh was at the time an attorney with a relatively small law firm in Tacoma, Washington, specializing in workers’ compensation and plaintiff tort claims. (Following his loss in the Supreme Court race, Rumbaugh was elected to the Superior Court.) He served on the boards of the Washington State Trial Lawyers Association, Planned Parenthood Northwest, the Tacoma Housing Authority; he also donated widely to Democrat candidates, and said he likely would have voted to approve gay

---


526. Fairhurst raised $191,990, Stephens raised $101,350, and Johnson raised $85,114. Data from Money in State Politics, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN ST. POL. (on file).


530. Sclair, supra note 529.
marriage. Promising “a more centrist and somewhat progressive evaluation of the law,” Rumbaugh asserted that Washington State could not “afford 6 more years with a deeply ideological voice.”

Like in Johnson’s first race for a seat on the Supreme Court, money poured into the race, but on a lesser scale, and in a fashion heavily weighted towards his opponents. As a result of the statutory cap on individual campaign contributions adopted in 2004, Johnson was handicapped in his ability to do direct fundraising, raising only $142,134, only slightly more than the $137,890 raised by Rumbaugh. Even more significantly, conservative political action groups decided to sit out the 2010 race entirely. A spokeswoman for BIAW was quoted during the campaign as being generally supportive of Johnson’s reelection, but also observing that the nearly $1,000,000 BIAW spent in 2006 “didn’t keep [Groen] from losing to the incumbent Alexander.” “I don’t think money buys votes by any stretch,” she said. The left felt no similar hesitation about spending money on this race. Citizens to Uphold the Constitution and Fuse Washington, which describes itself as “the state’s largest progressive organization,” collectively spent $256,115 opposing Johnson’s reelection. Some of these funds paid for ads depicting Johnson as a small cut out figure inside a business-suit pocket, illustrating these groups’ view of Johnson as the agent of the business community.

Ultimately, just as one-sided expenditures (from the right) had failed to dislodge incumbents in 2006, so too one-sided expenditures (from the left) failed to dislodge Johnson in 2010—perhaps illustrating the simple point that, everything else being equal, voters err heavily in the direction of retaining incumbents. However, assuming this represents an accurate general rule the surprising upset of Richard Sanders in 2010 illustrates that there is an exception to every rule.

534. La Corte, supra note 529.
535. Id.
537. La Corte, supra note 529.
In the third, and most significant race of 2010, attorney Charlie Wiggins pulled out an unexpected win over Richard Sanders, prevailing by a margin of 50.34% to 49.66% in the November general outcome. Justice Sanders served a total of 15 years on the Supreme Court and was elected or re-elected (always by reasonably healthy margins) on three separate occasions. Moreover, as discussed, it seems apparent that incumbency is a major advantage in a judicial election. Thus, the mystery presented by Justice Sanders’s defeat in 2010 is why, after 15 years, the voters turned on him and rejected him. Certainly, Justice Sanders authored a number of controversial opinions (both for Court majorities and in dissent) in such areas as criminal justice and property rights. But these opinions were entirely consistent with his longstanding libertarian platform and therefore could not have come as a surprise to the voters. One explanation for Sanders’s defeat undoubtedly lies with Charlie Wiggins, who, from all appearances, ran a sober and responsible campaign for a seat on the Supreme Court.

But the most significant factor appears to be the accumulation—over Justice Sanders’s long career—of a series of actions and statements that ultimately branded him as an intemperate and intolerant individual. The basic issue of Justice Sanders’s character, rather than his legal views, appears to have been his undoing. On the day he was first sworn into office, January 26, 1996, Sanders attended and spoke at the Washington State March for Life at the State Capitol in Olympia. He offered brief remarks:

I want to give all of you my best wishes in this celebration of human life. Nothing is, nor should be, more fundamental in our legal system than the preservation and protection of innocent human life. By coincidence, or perhaps by providence, my formal induction to the Washington State Supreme Court occurred about an hour ago. I owe my election to many of the people who are here today and I’m here to say thank you very much and good luck. Our mutual pursuit of justice requires a lifetime of dedication and courage.

538. 2010 General Results, supra note 528.
541. Michelle Malkin, Pro-Life State Court Justices Have Free-Speech Right, Too, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 10, 1996, 12:00 AM), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19961210&slug=2364143.
On May 12, 1997, the Commission on Judicial Misconduct issued a “reprimand” to Justice Sanders, stating “[b]y his presence, his act of carrying the pro-life symbol (a red rose), and his statements, he aligned himself with a particular organization involved in pursuing a political agenda. Respondent gave the appearance that he, a Justice of the Washington State Supreme Court, supported the agenda advocated by March for Life.” On review, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Sanders’s statement at the rally did “not clearly and convincingly lead to the conclusion that the words and actions call into question the integrity and impartiality of the judge.” Thus, no penalty was imposed, but the Supreme Court’s resolution of the case was hardly a ringing endorsement of the propriety of Sanders’s action.

On November 20, 2008, while United States Attorney General Michael Mukasey was giving a speech at the annual Federalist Society gathering at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., Sanders stood up and yelled at him, “Tyrant. You are a tyrant.” Justice Sanders later acknowledged what had occurred: “I stood up, and said, ‘tyrant,’ and then left the meeting. No one else said anything. I believe we must speak our conscience in moments that demand it, even if we are but one voice.” Justice Sanders explained that the reason for his outburst was Mukasey’s defense of “the Bush Administration’s counter-terrorism policies—its detainment practices at Guantanamo Bay, its interpretation of the Geneva Convention’s reach.”

What made the incident particularly infamous was that after Sanders left the room and Mukasey continued his speech, Mukasey suddenly collapsed, though there was no obvious connection between Sanders’s outburst and Mukasey’s fainting spell.

On January 15, 2009, Sanders wrote the opinion for the Court in Yousoufian v. Office of the King County Executive, holding that a lower court had not assessed a high enough fine on King County for violating the Public Records Act. A few months later King County asked the Court to rehear the case, asserting that Sanders had an improper conflict when he

53. Id.
57. Id.
authored the opinion because he had a similar lawsuit pending against Thurston County. Sanders denied wrongdoing, pointing out that he would not financially benefit from any fines imposed in the Thurston County case. Thomas Fitzpatrick, an expert on judicial ethics, observed, “He’s not a party or related to a party in the case. To me, this is the kind of situation where [a judge] may want to think long and hard about it. But I don’t think it’s a violation of the canons.” Subsequently, Justice Sanders recused himself from any further involvement in the matter and the Supreme Court agreed to rehear the case.

In 2003, Sanders visited a commitment center for sexually violent predators and asked questions of inmates who were litigants or potential litigants about issues in a case then pending before the Supreme Court. In response to a complaint, the Commission on Judicial Conduct concluded that Sanders’s visit violated the Code of Judicial Conduct by creating an appearance of partiality as a result of ex parte conduct. On October 16, 2006, the Washington Supreme Court agreed and upheld the recommended sanction of “admonishment.”

Last but not least, in October 2010, at a judicial meeting to address fair treatment for minorities in the courts, Justice Sanders responded to an argument that minorities were disproportionally represented in the prison population due to racial discrimination by arguing that minorities were overrepresented in prison because they commit more crimes: “Certain minority groups are ‘disproportionally represented in prison because they have a crime problem.’” Whether the remark was intended to dispute the idea that discrimination explains why minorities are disproportionally represented in prison, or reflected the view that minorities have a predisposition to criminality, the comment drew a negative reaction from

---

549. Mike Carter, King County Asks State High Court to Void Records Ruling, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 2, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2008969420_sanders02m.html.
551. Carter, supra note 549.
552. Yousoufian, 229 P.3d at 743.
554. Id.
others in attendance and generated considerable controversy. Justice James Johnson reportedly agreed with Sanders’s remarks about incarceration rates, and also referred disparagingly to “poverty pimps” an apparent reference to lawyers who provide legal services for the poor. As discussed below, this incident, probably more than any other, explains why Sanders failed in his reelection bid.

Sanders faced two opponents in the 2010 primary, Charlie Wiggins and Brian Chushcoff. Wiggins was an experienced litigator, primarily handling appellate matters, both civil and criminal. He served as president of the Washington Chapter of the American Judicature Society, a national organization that worked “to protect the integrity of the American justice system.” In that capacity, he had worked with others to establish the website VotingForJudges.org in order to better educate voters about judicial candidates. Wiggins was appointed to fill a vacancy on the Court of Appeals in the mid-1990s, but lost a special election less than a year later and returned to private practice. The other candidate, Bryan Chushcoff, was (and is) a Superior Court Judge in Pierce County, and has served as Presiding Judge in that court since 2009 Before joining the judiciary he spent nearly two decades as a practicing attorney.

In his campaign, Wiggins charged that Sanders “failed to uphold ethical standards” and that he “side[d] too often with criminals and disciplined lawyers.” In support of the first charge, he cited the Court’s disciplinary sanction against Sanders for ex parte contacts and his participation in the Yousoufian case. He also cited figures which he said showed that, in rulings which divided the Court, Sanders voted in favor of criminal defendants more than 94% of the time and voted 90% of the time in favor of no penalty or lighter discipline for attorneys sanctioned by the court. In response, Sanders called Wiggins a “character assassin” and

557. Id.
559. Id.
561. Steve Miletich, Justice Richard Sanders, as Usual, Draws Fire from Two Election Opponents, SEATTLE TIMES (July 28, 2010), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2012475245_supremecourt29m.html.
563. Miletich, supra note 561.
564. Id.
565. Id.
accused him of using “misleading statistics.”

Chushcoff chimed in on the criticism of Sanders, saying, “I do think he makes calls on the basis of personal policy preferences,” and believes “government is rarely right about anything.”

In terms of campaign expenditures, this was a relatively low-key race, as compared to the 2006 elections or even the Johnson-Rumbaugh contest in 2010. Charlie Wiggins spent $301,223 in direct expenditures on his campaign, and Sanders’s direct expenditures were almost the same, $295,185. Independent expenditures were almost completely absent from the campaign: there were no independent expenditures targeting Sanders, either pro or con; and only $33,027 was spent in support of Wiggins’s campaign. Brian Chushcoff, who eschewed fundraising altogether, spent a grand total of $1,592.

In the August 17th, primary, Sanders received 47.16% of the vote, Wiggins received 40.39% of the vote, and Chushcoff received 12.45% of the vote. Because no candidate secured more than 50% of the vote in the primary, the contest for the seat had to be resolved in the general election in a runoff between Sanders and Wiggins. Though Sanders obviously would have preferred to regain his seat in the primary, he had won the primary and had reason to be reasonably confident going into the general election. Such confidence turned out to be misplaced.

The most dramatic, and arguably consequential, event in the race was the decision by the state’s largest newspaper, The Seattle Times, one month prior to the general election, to reverse its endorsement of Sanders in the aftermath of his remarks about race and criminality described above. On August 4, 2010, in advance of the primary, the paper had published an editorial recommending the reelection of Richard Sanders to the Supreme Court. While acknowledging that Wiggins was “fully qualified to be on the court,” the paper nonetheless endorsed Sanders, stating that “[t]he court’s most fundamental job is to push back against the other two branches

566. Id.
567. Id.
568. Data from Money in State Politics, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN ST. POL. (on file).
570. Miletich, supra note 561.
571. Id.
572. 2010 Primary Results, supra note 529.
of government—the executive and the legislative—when they step on the rights of the people. No member of the court does that more consistently, and with greater gusto, than Sanders."

But on October 24, 2010, a few days after Sanders made his controversial remarks about race, The Seattle Times rescinded its prior endorsement of Sanders and endorsed Wiggins instead. The editorial accused Sanders (and Johnson) of “inflam[ing] racial tensions” by stating that “African Americans are overrepresented in the state prison system because they commit more crimes.” Observing that “Sanders’s latest remarks fall upon a trash heap of [prior] cringe-worthy conduct,” the paper’s editors said they were taking “the unusual step of withdrawing its endorsement of Sanders,” and throwing their support behind Wiggins, “who was a close call in our primary endorsement.” As harmful as it was for Sanders not to have The Seattle Times’ endorsement, the paper’s unusual step of rescinding its prior endorsement was undoubtedly even more harmful politically. Moreover, The Seattle Times’ reversal of position served to reinforce Wiggins’s consistent campaign message about Sanders’s intemperate behavior, and he criticized Sanders’s comments about race at the judicial meeting as “‘amazing’ and ‘naïve.’”

Another apparently potent issue working against Sanders’s reelection bid was that he failed to follow his professed libertarian ideals when it came to gay marriage, opening him to the charge of being a hypocrite. In a controversial five to four ruling in 2006, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Washington Defense of Marriage Act insofar as it prohibited same sex marriage. Justice Sanders was a decisive member of the five-justice majority, joining in a concurring opinion authored by James Johnson. One critic, Hugh Spitzer, an adjunct professor at the University
of Washington School of Law, and a supporter of Wiggins, remarked “Richard Sanders often can’t make up his mind as to whether he is a libertarian or a conservative.” 583 The Stranger, Seattle’s alternative newspaper, ran a lengthy piece a month before the general election, entitled “High Court Hypocrite,” castigating Sanders for not following through on his libertarian ideals in the context of gay marriage.584

In one of the stranger turns in this judicial race, former Justice Phil Talmadge, a frequent antagonist of Sanders on property rights and other issues while they were on the Court, endorsed Sanders for reelection over Wiggins. 585 “I don’t think we’d want a Supreme Court of nine Richard Sanders,” he said, “but it’s healthy to have someone there who will be very careful on actions by government, and that is why I have endorsed him.” 586

In the end, Sanders lost the closest judicial election in Washington State in memory. In addition, he was the first sitting justice to be knocked off since he defeated appointed-incumbent Rosselle Pekelis. The last prior elected-incumbent justice to be defeated was former Chief Justice Keith Callow who lost to Charles Johnson in 1990. 587 Wiggins undoubtedly adopted a wise strategy by highlighting Sanders’s ethical lapses and other missteps. Sanders was almost certainly correct in asserting that the Seattle Times editorial page was responsible for his defeat. He argued that the newspaper unfairly portrayed him as believing African Americans are more prone to commit crimes saying, “[t]his cost me the election.” 588 In addition, Eli Sanders, the author of the Stranger piece on Sanders’s hypocrisy, was


584. Sanders, supra note 573. This piece also leveled the more specific charge that in signing onto Justice Johnson’s opinion Sanders embraced the view that gay couples should be denied marriage equality because they have “more sexual partners” and because other courts have found that monogamy is “the bedrock upon which our culture is built,” while Sanders himself was twice divorced and at the time of his reelection contest had “multiple simultaneous girlfriends.” Id.

585. Id.

586. Mapes, supra note 583.


588. Steve Miletich, Wiggins Finally Prevails in State Supreme Court Race, Unseating Sanders, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 12, 2010, 4:14 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2013420236_supremecourt13m.html; Richard B. Sanders, Justice Sanders Explains His Comments About Race and Criminality, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 2, 2010, 3:42 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2013580631_guest03sanders.html (“[T]he reporter allowed the impression that I believe African Americans are inclined to commit crimes because of their race. As if there is a criminality gene in African Americans! Of course I never said that and I don’t believe it.”).
probably entitled to his own self-congratulatory post, claiming that his article might have cost Sanders the election as well.589

The defeat of Richard Sanders in 2010 was a very significant event in terms of the development of environmental law in Washington State because it removed not only a single anti-environmental vote from the Court, but a strident libertarian advocate who consistently challenged environmental laws. As it turned out, the defeat of Justice Sanders was only the first shoe to drop in terms of the elimination of the extreme right wing from the Washington Supreme Court.

H. The 2012 Election

In 2012, Justice Susan Owens ran for reelection for a third term on the Court. In the second race, Justice Steve Gonzalez ran for election for the first time. Governor Christine Gregoire, making her second appointment to the Court, had appointed Gonzalez to the Court in November 2011, to fill the seat of Justice Gerry Alexander, who was forced to retire prior to end of his six-year term due to the mandatory retirement age.590 The third contest was for an open seat created by the retirement of Tom Chambers and involved a failed effort by former Justice Richard Sanders to regain the seat he had lost two years earlier.591

Susan Owens faced two competitors in the primary, Douglas McQuaid and Scott Stafne. Neither presented a significant challenge. McQuaid is a longtime private practitioner based in Seattle, and ran for office on the basis that his “long and varied legal career” made him “the best qualified candidate to hold the position of Supreme Court Justice; he declined to solicit donations or endorsements “from any organization with a special interest.” Stafne was another long-time private attorney with particular expertise in maritime and marine resources law. He represented fishermen and fish processing companies on issues relating to the Magnuson Fishery

589. Eli Sanders, How Richard B. Sanders Lost It, SLOG.THESTRANGER.COM (Nov. 10, 2010), http://slog.thestranger.com/slog/archives/2010/11/10/how-justice-richard-b-sanders-lost-it (asserting that Justice Sanders’s gay marriage ruling was a big issue in liberal, gay-friendly King County, where more than 58% of voters backed Wiggins).


Conservation and Management Act.593 Neither McQuaid nor Stafne made a significant effort. According to the *Seattle Times*, “Neither has been attending candidate interviews and, the last we checked, neither had raised a nickel, which says something about how seriously they take a statewide campaign for the high court.”594 In the end, Owens easily prevailed in the primary (with 63%), over McQuaid (24%) and Stafne (13%), avoiding the need for a general election contest.595

In the second race, in the primary, Steve Gonzalez bested Bruce O. Danielson, 60% to 40%, again avoiding the need for a general election contest.596 Before being appointed to the Supreme Court, Gonzalez served as a judge on the Superior Court in King County.597 Prior to that, he worked on terrorism prosecutions as an Assistant United States Attorney, on domestic violence issues as an Assistant City Attorney, and as an associate with a private law firm.598 The other justices and most of the rest of the legal establishment broadly endorsed him.599

Gonzalez’s opponent was Bruce Danielson, a longtime private practitioner from Kitsap County who ran a very low-key campaign and raised no money to support his candidacy.600 Danielson had no significant endorsements and apparently little in his background to suggest that he was qualified to sit on the Supreme Court, leading the head of the Kitsap County Bar Association to go so far as to say that Danielson has “zero qualifications to be on the bench.”601 In addition, Gonzalez’s campaign expended $332,888 in support of his candidacy, while Danielson made no expenditures in support of his candidacy.602 Despite this apparent disparity

596. Id.
598. Id.
599. Id.
601. Eli Sanders, Bruce Danielson Can’t Really Explain how he got Over 276,000 Votes Last Night (But he says I’m “Ill Informed or Malicious” for Asking), STRANGER.COM (Aug. 8, 2012), http://slog.thestranger.com/slog/archives/2012/08/08/bruce-danielson-cant-really-explain-how-he-got-over-276000-votes-last-night-but-he-says-im-ill-informed-or-malicious-for-asking.
602. Data from Money in State Politics, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN ST. POL. (on file).
in qualifications and expenditures, Danielson received 40% of the vote statewide, and he prevailed in numerous counties in eastern Washington, leading to widespread speculation that racist attitudes depressed the Gonzalez vote total.603 A rigorous academic analysis of the election results by a University of Washington political science professor supported this surmise.604

In the third and most hotly contested race in 2012, former Justice Sanders faced off against Sheryl Gordon McCloud, Bruce Hilyer, and John Landenburg in the primary. Sanders sought to capitalize on his widespread name recognition based on his prior service on the Court, and hoped to put the effect of The Seattle Times’s about face behind him. Significantly, outgoing incumbent Tom Chambers endorsed him.605 But Sanders stuck to his libertarian message. He explained that when he was on the Court:

At every turn I was faced with the claim that the government is somehow special and we should presume it is right even when it is violating private rights. I never bought it. That’s why I have been endorsed by the Association of Washington Business, the Realtors, the Farm Bureau, and the Washington State Libertarian and Republican Parties along with thousands of citizens throughout Washington.606

Sheryl Gordon McCloud was a very experienced appellate attorney, specializing in criminal defense work.607 Like Sanders, she emphasized her commitment to individual constitutional rights, observing that some of her clients were the beneficiaries of unpopular Sanders opinions favoring criminal defendants.608 Apart from that overlap, McCloud presented a more liberal profile, emphasizing her own personal history as a union member

603.  Id.
605.  Richard Sanders, VOTINGFORJUDGES.ORG, http://www.votingforjudges.org/12gen/supreme/9rs.html (“Why has Justice Tom Chambers endorsed Richard Sanders to take his seat on the Court? Because he knows Richard is a person of unquestioned integrity, devoted to protecting the rights of all citizens.”).
and highlighting her endorsement by the King County Democratic Central Committee and NARAL Pro-Choice Washington.609

Bruce Hilyer was appointed a Superior Court Judge for King County by Democratic Governor Locke, and served as Presiding Judge from 2008 to 2010.610 Prior to that he was a deputy prosecutor in King County and served as counsel to Seattle’s long-time major Charles Royer.611 According to his campaign website, between 1985 and 2000 he was in private practice representing “individuals and small businesses in civil, environmental, and health care cases.”612 He also served on the board of directors of the Washington Environmental Council and as chair of the Washington State Parks and Recreation Commission.613 Based on these credentials, it was perhaps inevitable that Hilyer would be the environmentalists’ first choice for this seat on the Supreme Court.

The fourth candidate in this race was John W. Ladenburg, who had a lengthy record of service as an attorney in private practice as well as in the public sector, including as elected Pierce County Prosecutor, elected Pierce County Executive, Chair of the Regional Council of Governments, Tacoma City Councilmember, and Chair of the Puget Sound Economic Development Board.614 He presented himself as “the only candidate who started out as a storefront lawyer representing working class people.”615 He also said he was “the only candidate with an environmentalist record, successfully chairing Sound Transit and instituting numerous environmental programs as County Executive.”616 He ran unsuccessfully for Attorney General in 2008 and was considering another run at that position when he decided to run for the Supreme Court.617

In the money race, Richard Sanders led the way by a modest amount, with expenditures of $338,661.618 Sheryl McCloud followed with $229,178, 618
Bruce Hilyer with $200,311, and John Ladenburg $83,919. The only independent expenditures targeted at this race were $5,420, spent in support of McCloud’s candidacy. As in 2010, there were no expenditures targeting Sanders, either pro or con. In the primary, Sheryl Gordon McCloud received 29% of the vote, Richard Sanders 28%, Bruce Hilyer 27%, and John W. Ladenburg 15.1%, setting up a general election matchup between McCloud and Sanders. In the general election, McCloud received 55.24% of the vote and Sanders received 44.76%. Sanders, it is fair to say, had receded into Washington voters’ rear view mirror. The (permanent) replacement of Alexander with Gonzalez and the replacement of Chambers with McCloud represented modest, but still, significant moves for the Court in a left-leaning direction on most legal issues.

I. The 2014 Election

The 2014 Supreme Court election reflected the complete collapse of effort by the business community and its ideological allies to influence the direction of the Supreme Court. On March 17, 2014, prior to the completion of his term, Jim Johnson announced his resignation from the Court, citing personal health issues. On May 1, Governor Jay Inslee appointed Mary Yu to fill the vacancy created by Johnson’s departure. Prior to joining the Supreme Court, Yu spent 14 years on the King County Superior Court, and had previously served as Deputy Chief of Staff to King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng as well as a Deputy in the Criminal and Civil Divisions.
Before attending law school, Justice Yu worked in the Peace and Justice Office for the Catholic Archdiocese of Chicago. Her appointment to the Court was especially notable because she was the first openly gay individual and the first Asian-American appointed to the Washington Supreme Court. Yu faced the voters in 2014, and if elected, would serve out the remaining two years of Johnson’s unexpired term. Johnson commented on her appointment, “I retain my concern . . . that this court still is not balanced and does not represent all the people of the state. And I’m not sure that this is a positive step.”

As a result of Johnson’s resignation and Yu’s appointment, four incumbent justices sought reelection in 2014. In addition to Yu, Justices Charles Johnson, Mary Fairhurst, and Debra Stephens all sought reelection. These judicial races were the sleepiest in modern Washington history. Justice Fairhurst and Justice Yu had no challengers, so they appeared without opposition on the November ballot. One candidate filed against Justice Charles Johnson, and another against Justice Debra Stephens, and these contests were resolved in the November general election. Charles Johnson faced a challenge from Eddie Yoon, a relatively low profile private practitioner in Pierce County who teaches part time at a university in Korea. Stephens’s opponent was John (“Zamboni”) Scannell, who had been disbarred from the practice of law in Washington State and was best known as the former driver of the Zamboni ice-making machine at the Thunderbirds hockey games at the Seattle Center. There was speculation that a voter petition might be filed in an effort to remove him from the ballot.

In the end, the 2014 election results were entirely predictable. Justices Fairhurst and Yu were reelected and elected, respectively, without

627. Id.
631. Id.
634. Id.
opposition. Justice Johnson defeated Eddie Yoon 73% to 27%, and Justice Stephens defeated John Scannell 78% to 22%.

J. Environmental Protections as a Factor in Judicial Elections

Washington Conservation Voters ("WCV") appears to have distinguished itself nationally among state conservation voter organizations in taking an especially active and effective role in promoting the election of justices who are sympathetic, or at least not antagonistic, to environmental protection objectives and, equally important, in defeating candidates (and one sitting justice) who were antagonistic to environmental goals.

WCV took a concertedly centrist approach on judicial elections. Rather than promote or oppose candidates based on their likely ability to "deliver votes" in important environmental cases, it publicly promoted justices who would be fair and impartial. In a typical endorsement for a judicial candidate, WCV stated:

Judges render decisions that have significant impact on environmental policy. In our endorsement process, we do not demand that judicial candidates have a particular ideological inclination. Washington Conservation Voters endorses those candidates that are fully committed to a fair and impartial judiciary, thereby ensuring that our friends and allies will receive a fair shot when arguing environmental cases before our appellate courts.

Even if WCV may be assumed to favor candidates who, in general and over the long run, would support environmental protection efforts, WCV’s moderate message probably resonated more with voters than the stridently ideological message of certain candidates, especially those with a libertarian agenda.

WCV also invested money in the judicial electoral races, though the exact amounts are impossible to document from the publicly available data. According to press reports, WCV threw its financial support behind Mary Fairhurst in her 2002 contest against Jim Johnson. In addition, press accounts indicate that WCV was a contributor to Citizens to Uphold the

636. Id.
638. King County Rules Again in Statewide Tally, CHRONICLE (Nov. 22, 2002), http://www.chronline.com/editorial/article_905d5a6-468a-5297-8ff1-ee5db7db5498.html.
Constitution (originally FairPAC), the left-left independent expenditure organization formed to help defeat the property rights candidates in the 2006 election. In addition, during the Sanders-Wiggins race in 2010, WCV hosted an event to help Wiggins raise funds to support his election bid.

WCV also has taken an active role in endorsing candidates for election to the Supreme Court for at least a decade. In 2002, WCV endorsed Fairhurst in her race against libertarian Jim Johnson. In 2004, when Johnson ran again for a seat on the Supreme Court, WCV endorsed his opponent Mary Kay Becker. In the first contest, WCV ended up on the winning side, but failed in its second bid to keep Johnson off the Court. In 2006, WCV endorsed all of the incumbents (Justices Alexander, Chambers, and Owens) in their contests against out-spoken private property rights advocates. On its website, WCV lists as one its most significant organizational achievements that it, “Beat back the Building Industry Association of Washington’s candidates in the race for the State Supreme Court.” In 2008, a relatively low-key election year for the Supreme Court, WCV again endorsed all of the incumbents (Justices Fairhurst, Johnson, and Stephens), all of whom were reelected. In 2010, WCV endorsed Charlie Wiggins in his successful bid to unseat Justice Sanders, and also endorsed Stan Rumbaugh, who failed in his effort to unseat Justice Jim Johnson.

In 2012, WCV initially endorsed Bruce Hilyer in the primary election for the seat on the Court being vacated by retiring Justice Chambers.

---


641. Mapes, supra note 455.


646. Endorsed: Judge Bruce Hilyer for Washington Supreme Court (Position 9), WASH. CONSERVATION VOTERS, http://wcvoters.org/campaigns-elections/endorsements/2012-
After Cheryl Gordon McCloud and Richard Sanders emerged as the two top vote getters in the primary, WCV endorsed McCloud in the general election.\[647\] Also in 2012, WCV endorsed Steve Gonzalez and Susan Owens, both of whom won their races.\[648\]

WCV apparently did not bother to endorse candidates in the 2014 judicial races.

IV. WISCONSIN

A. The Thomas and Ferdon Cases

A pair of Wisconsin Supreme Court decisions, each decided by a razor-thin margin, issued on successive days in July 2005, set in motion the forces that have led to the current extreme politicization of the state’s judicial election process. On July 14, 2005, in the Ferdon case, the Court issued a decision holding that a statute setting a $350,000 cap on recoveries for “noneconomic” damages (i.e., “pain and suffering”) in medical malpractice cases violated the Equal Protection Clause of Article I, Section I of the Wisconsin Constitution.\[649\] The Court concluded that the $350,000 cap was not “rationally related” to the legislature’s goal of improving health care.\[650\]

The following day the Court issued a decision extending the “risk contribution” theory of tort liability to claims based on the use of lead in the production of household paints.\[651\] As a result of this ruling, a 15-year-old boy who allegedly suffered neurological damage as a result of ingesting


\[649\]. Ferdon ex rel Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Compensation Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. 2005).

\[650\]. Id. at 465–90 (concluding that denying recovery to the relatively small number of tort victims with very substantial damage claims did not rationally advance the legislature’s stated goals of enabling insurers to charge lower malpractice insurance premiums, reducing overall health care costs, or encouraging health care providers to practice in Wisconsin).

\[651\]. Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523 (Wis. 2005).
lead-tainted paint was allowed to proceed with a products liability claim against manufacturers of lead pigment, even though his lawyers could not identify the specific manufacturer who produced the lead pigment he allegedly ingested in various different homes over the course of his childhood.\textsuperscript{652}

The decision in \textit{Thomas}, the lead paint case, built upon a prior Wisconsin Supreme Court case involving claims based on medication of pregnant women with diethylstilbestrol ("DES"). In which the Court first adopted the risk contribution theory.\textsuperscript{653} The Court reasoned in that case that even though the plaintiff could not identify the specific manufacturer of the DES her mother had been prescribed, each defendant manufacturer of DES "contributed to the risk of injury to the public and, consequently, the risk of injury to individual plaintiffs," and in that sense, "each shared some measure of culpability in producing or marketing the drug."\textsuperscript{654} Finally, the Court reasoned that "the cost of damages awards will act as an incentive for drug companies to test adequately the drugs they place on the market for general medical use."\textsuperscript{655} In \textit{Thomas}, the Court concluded that claims arising from the manufacture of lead paint were sufficiently “factually similar” to the claims arising from the production of DES that the risk contribution theory should be expanded to apply to these other claims.\textsuperscript{657}

In both \textit{Ferdon} and \textit{Thomas}, the Supreme Court split along essentially the same ideological lines. In \textit{Ferdon}, Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson wrote the opinion for the Court, joined by Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, Louis Butler, Jr., and Patrick Crooks.\textsuperscript{658} The dissenters were Justices David Prosser, Patience Roggensack, and Jon Wilcox.\textsuperscript{659} This split reflected the relatively stark partisan divide on the Court, with Abramson and Butler

\begin{flushleft}
\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item[652.] \textit{Id.} at 564–65.
\item[653.] \textit{See} Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984).
\item[654.] \textit{Collins}, 342 N.W.2d at 49 (emphasis is original); \textit{Thomas}, 701 N.W.2d at 549 (citing \textit{Collins}, 342 N.W.2d at 49).
\item[655.] \textit{Thomas}, 701 N.W.2d at 549 (citing \textit{Collins}, 342 N.W.2d at 49).
\item[656.] \textit{Id.} at 549–50.
\item[657.] \textit{Id.} at 557 (concluding that “although this case is not identical to \textit{Collins}, we conclude that it is factually similar such that the risk-contribution theory applies”).
\item[658.] \textit{Ferdon}, 701 N.W.2d 445.
\item[659.] \textit{Id.} at 494, 524.
\end{thebibliography}
\end{flushleft}
having been initially appointed by Democratic Governors, and Prosser and Wilcox having been initially appointed by Republican Governors. 660 In Thomas, Justice Butler, Jr. wrote the opinion for the Court, joined by Chief Justice Abramson, and Justices Crooks and Bradley. 661 Justice Prosser and Justice Wilcox dissented; Justice Roggensack did not participate in the case. 662

The dissenters in both cases criticized the reasoning of the majority. In Ferdon Justice Prosser accused the majority of “utiliz[ing] several unacceptable tactics” to invalidate the cap on malpractice awards, including invoking the Wisconsin Constitution to avoid United States Supreme Court review of the Court’s decision, improperly modifying the test for review of legislation under the Equal Protection Clause, and “systematically minimiz[ing]” the significance of evidence that did not support the majority’s conclusions. 663 In Thomas, Justice Wilcox accused the majority of embracing “an unwarranted and unprecedented relaxation of the traditional rules governing tort liability,” and of “run[ning] roughshod over established principles of causation and the rights of each defendant to present a defense and to be judged based on its own actions.” 664 He also objected to the Court’s reliance on its precedent involving DES claims on the ground that the lead paint claims “were factually distinguishable [from the DES claims] . . . on several levels,” including because the lead paint claims arose over a “much longer time frame” than the DES claims and the defendants’ products did not produce “signature injury.” 665

The decisions in Ferdon and Thomas provided the impetus for business interests and right-leaning advocates to launch a major effort to tip the ideological balance on the Wisconsin Supreme Court in their favor. 666 Both decisions exposed business defendants to new and expanded financial liabilities and, therefore, affected business interests in a direct and substantial way. Paradoxically, the subsequent advertising attacking Justice Butler financed by the business community argued that Butler was soft on

660. Chief Justice Abrahamson was appointed by Governor Patrick Lucey and Justice Butler was appointed by Governor Jim Doyle. Supreme Court Justices, WIS. CT. SYSTEM, http://wicourts.gov/courts/supreme/justices/index.htm (last updated April 24, 2012). Justices Prosser and Wilcox were appointed by Governor Tommy Thompson. Id.
661. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 523.
662. Id.
663. Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 494–95 (Prosser, J., dissenting).
664. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 568 (Wilcox, J., dissenting).
665. Id. at 568, 574–75 (Wilcox, J., dissenting).
crime, presumably because this law and order message was perceived to be more compelling with voters than the charge that he was unfriendly to business.\(^667\)

These 2005 decisions did not represent the final resolutions of these cases. The ensuing legal as well as political battles launched by these two decisions help illustrates the sometimes complex interactions between judicial rulings and executive and legislative branch actions, as well as the potentially complex interactions between the state and federal courts.

Promptly after the decision in *Ferdon*, the Wisconsin legislature passed a bill placing a new, higher cap of $550,000 on noneconomic damages for plaintiffs under the age of 18 and $450,000 for adults.\(^668\) Democratic Governor Jim Doyle vetoed the measure, arguing that the new cap was too similar to the old cap invalidated by the Supreme Court.\(^669\) The legislature then passed a bill with a $750,000 cap on noneconomic damages and the Governor signed that bill in March 2006.\(^670\) There has been no subsequent litigation challenging the constitutionality of these higher caps. Thus, in the end, the business community succeeded in capping liability in malpractice suits, although not at the level it initially hoped.\(^671\)

The subsequent back and forth over the lead paint litigation has been more complicated and even today remains far from final resolution. Immediately following the 2005 decision in *Thomas*, the Wisconsin legislature adopted legislation designed to limit the use of the risk

\(^{667}\) See id. (“In 2008, WMC spent $2.25 million on issue ads about Justice Louis Butler and his opponent Judge Michael Gableman of Burnett County. One WMC ad—Loopholes—featured Justice Butler’s rulings that provided loopholes to protect criminal defendants. Butler had issued a news release embracing his nickname “Loophole Louie” and that became the centerpiece of the ad.”). The use of crime as campaign issues in judicial elections has not been limited to the business community. See *Justice For Just Us*, WIS. DEMOCRACY CAMPAIGN (August 20, 2008), http://www.wisdcc.org/sp082008.php (“Five special interest groups that spent an estimated $7.7 million on mostly negative ads focusing chiefly on crime in the past two Wisconsin Supreme Court races had little or no interest in crime and public safety proposals being considered during the two-year legislative session that coincided with those races, a Wisconsin Democracy Campaign analysis shows.”).


\(^{669}\) Id. (citation omitted).

\(^{670}\) Id. at 123 (citation omitted).

\(^{671}\) In 2011, as part of Governor Scott Walker’s omnibus tort reform legislation, introduced shortly after he was sworn into office, the legislature extended the cap on recovery of economic damages to “long-term health care provider,” such as nursing homes. 2011 Wisconsin Act 2 § 23, WIS. STAT. § 893.555 (2013–2014) (effective Feb. 1, 2011).
contribution theory in tort cases. However, Governor Doyle vetoed the legislation, leaving the *Thomas* decision in place.

After this initial legislative skirmish, the action turned to the courts. As some had predicted, the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s expansive ruling in *Thomas* was followed by the filing of additional lawsuits in Wisconsin based on childhood exposure to lead paint. Some of these cases were removed to federal court where the manufacturers argued that the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s adoption of the risk contribution theory violated their rights under the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution. In one case a Republican-appointed federal judge sided with the manufacturers, and in another case a Democrat-appointed federal judge sided with the victims of lead poisoning.

In the first case, *Gibson v. American Cyanamid Company*, Judge Rudolph Randa, appointed to the bench by President George H.W. Bush, ruled that the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s adoption of the risk contribution theory violated substantive due process. First, he ruled that insofar as the Court’s decision imposed an increased risk of financial liability for actions that took place in the past, the ruling imposed “unfair” retroactive liability. He cited no precedent directly supporting the idea that a state court’s modification of a common law tort rule can support a federal due


675. The defendant manufacturers initially raised the due process argument before the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the *Thomas* case, but the Court declined to address the issue on the ground that it was not ripe for resolution. See *Thomas*, 701 N.W.2d at 565 (outlining the due process issues raised by manufacturers).

676. *Gibson v. American Cyanamid Co.*, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (E.D. Wis. 2010); Judge Randa has been no stranger to controversy. In 2010, in *Figueroa v. United States*, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated a sentence he imposed in a criminal case on the ground that the sentencing hearing was so infected with “inflammatory,” “inappropriate,” and “extraneous” comments (ranging from the immigration status of the defendant and other members of his family, to Iranian terrorists and President Hugo Chávez, to “Hitler’s dog”) that Judge Randa failed to accord the defendant a “fair process,” and therefore, the defendant was entitled to a new sentence before a new judge. 622 F.3d 739, 743 (7th Cir. 2013). In 1995, Judge Randa ruled that Congress’ enactment of the 1994 Freedom of Access to Clinics Entrances Act banning “nonviolent, physical obstruction of reproductive health services clinics” exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, another ruling that led to a reversal by the Seventh Circuit. See United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 690 (7th Cir. 1995).

process claim, but nonetheless proceeded to address the claim based on the theory that the Due Process Clause applies to retroactive legislative enactments and modifications of a common law rule with “equal force.” Applying a mélange of factors derived from the Supreme Court’s divided ruling in *Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel*, he concluded that the risk contribution rule created “an arbitrary and irrational remedy” in violation of the Due Process Clause.

In the second case, *Owens v. American Cyanamid Company*, Judge Lynn Adelman, appointed to the bench by President Bill Clinton, rejected the due process argument. In his view, whether the *Thomas* case was viewed as shifting the burden of proof in a tort case or as imposing retroactive liability, the decision passed constitutional muster: “[t]he Wisconsin Supreme Court explained in great detail in *Collins* why it adopted the risk contribution doctrine and in *Thomas* why it applied it to the lead paint context. Nothing about the court’s reasoning is arbitrary and irrational.”

As to *Eastern Enterprises*, Judge Adelman distinguished that case on grounds that the company raising the due process argument “had not played a part in causing the problem that the legislation was attempting to solve.” By contrast, he said, in *Thomas*, a majority of the Justices on the Wisconsin Supreme Court “concluded that the manufacturers of white lead carbonate pigment were the principal cause of the problem.”

The losing side appealed the first of these two rulings to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The notice of appeal was filed in December 2010, oral argument before the Court was held in January 2012, and it took the Seventh Circuit nearly two and one-half additional years—until July 2014—to finally issue a decision.

The delay in the Seventh Circuit may be explained, in part, by the legal complexities created by the shifting politics surrounding this litigation. As discussed above, immediately after the *Thomas* decision was issued, the legislature passed a measure to blunt the effect of the Court’s decision, but Governor Doyle vetoed the measure. In January 2011, a few weeks after the

678. *Id.* at 1044.
680. *Id.* at 617.
682. *Id.* at 833–34.
683. *Id.* at 834.
684. *Id.*
installation of Republican Scott Walker as Governor, the legislature again passed a measure to restrict the application of the risk contribution theory and the new Governor signed it, effectively barring future lawsuits based on the reasoning of *Thomas.*\(^{687}\) A few years later, the legislature approved, and Governor Walker signed, another measure making the legislature’s abrogation of the *Thomas* risk contribution theory retroactive.\(^{688}\) The legislative nullification of *Thomas* naturally raised the question whether it was still necessary for the Seventh Circuit to resolve the constitutionality of the *Thomas* ruling.\(^{689}\) In addition, it raised the question whether Wisconsin needed to wait upon the federal court to resolve that issue.

Accordingly, following the adoption of the 2013 legislation, the manufacturer defendants in one of the lead paint cases pending in the Wisconsin courts filed a motion to lift a stay that had been in place awaiting a ruling on the constitutionality of *Thomas* by the Seventh Circuit, and asked that judgment be entered in their favor based on the legislature’s nullification of the *Thomas* decision.\(^{690}\) The plaintiff responded by arguing that the 2013 legislation itself violated the Due Process Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution by depriving the plaintiff of a vested right of action under the common law.\(^{691}\)

On March 25, 2014, Wisconsin Circuit Court Judge David Hansher ruled in favor of the plaintiff.\(^{692}\) Applying a test articulated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in *Martin v. Richards,* the Court evaluated whether the legislature had a “rational basis” for abrogating a vested legal claim by weighing the public interest served by applying the statute against the private interests the statute would affect.\(^{693}\) The Court ruled that the interest served by permitting the claims of “innocent and injured” victims to proceed outweighed the “rather generic public purpose” of protecting manufacturers from liability for injuries they may or may not have caused.\(^{694}\) The Wisconsin Court of Appeals granted the defendant leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal to that court.\(^{695}\) The case may eventually make its way up to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

---

690. *Id.*
691. *Id.* at *5* (discussing the three separate grounds supporting the plaintiff’s argument).
692. *Id.* at *25.
693. 531 N.W. 2d 70 (1995); *id.* at *24.
695. The plaintiff did not oppose the interlocutory appeal, but argued that if the court agreed to hear the defendant’s appeal it should also consider plaintiff’s arguments that the repeal legislation
In the meantime, on July 24, 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit finally ruled on the appeal from Judge Randa’s ruling that the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s adoption of the risk contribution theory in *Thomas* violated substantive due process under the federal Constitution. 696 The Court issued a unanimous opinion, authored by Judge Edmond Chang of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting on the appeals court by designation. 697 First, the Court decided that it had to address the threshold issue of the constitutionality of the repeal legislation under the Wisconsin Constitution before addressing whether the *Thomas* decision violated the federal Constitution. 698 If the repeal was valid, the Court reasoned, the plaintiffs’ claims had been terminated and the Court could avoid making an unnecessary ruling on a question of federal constitutional law. On the merits, the Seventh Circuit, agreeing with Wisconsin Circuit Judge Hansher, ruled that the repeal was invalid under the Wisconsin Constitution. 699 Turning to the federal constitutional challenge to the *Thomas* decision, the Seventh Circuit reversed the District Court and concluded that the *Thomas* decision comported with due process. 700 The Court rejected Judge Randa’s argument that the due process claim should be evaluated using a stringent standard of review, ruled instead that a deferential “rational basis” standard applied, and upheld the constitutionality of the *Thomas* decision under that standard. 701

The only shoes left to drop now in this complex litigation are possible U.S. Supreme Court review of the Seventh Circuit decision, and the pending appeal from Judge Hansher’s decision striking down the repeal legislation. The ultimate resolution of these issues may take several years, potentially finally clearing the way for individual plaintiffs to seek recovery for their alleged injuries due to lead paint exposure.

Due process is a notoriously recondite and flexible legal doctrine, variously criticized from the right, as well as the left, as unprincipled. 702 The irony of the situation in Wisconsin is that competing due process

---

696. *Gibson*, 760 F.3d 600.
697. *Id*.
698. *Id* at 606.
699. *Id* at 610.
700. *Id* at 625.
701. *Id* at 627.
arguments are being advanced from each side of the ideological spectrum in an attempt to thwart, in one instance, a judicial innovation, and, in the other, a legislative innovation. While each claim rests on distinctive legal theories and precedents, both invite normative—arguably even political—judgments about whether the judiciary should thwart the judgments of another branch or level of government. Unfortunately, at this stage of this highly charged battle of lead paint litigation, some judges and court watchers might regard any exercise of judicial restraint as a kind of political surrender.

Meanwhile, while these judicial challenges and legislative actions proceeded, the electoral battles surrounding the Wisconsin Supreme Court heated up. In other words, while business interests pursued a variety of legislative and litigation strategies to reverse the outcomes in these particular cases, the business community and its allies used these decisions as springboards for more systematic, long-range change in the jurisprudence of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

B. Judicial Elections in Wisconsin

Formally, Wisconsin holds nonpartisan elections to fill seats on its Supreme Court and other courts. 703 But there is actually nothing nonpartisan about the Wisconsin judicial election process.

By general consensus, Wisconsin began to join the ranks of states with expensive, highly politicized judicial races with Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson’s run for reelection in 1999. As one report put it, this contest marked a “turning point for negativity and expense” in Wisconsin. 704 The two candidates raised a total of almost $1.4 million combined. 705 The race was particularly notable for the fact that several conservative members of the Court were publicly identified as supporters of the challenger, Sharren Rose. 706 Ultimately, Chief Justice Abrahamson defeated her opponent by a comfortable 60% to 40% margin. 707

703. WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
705. Unseating Abrahamson from State Supreme Court a Daunting Challenge the Feisty Chief Justice is Tough Campaigner, MADISON.COM (June 1, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://host.madison.com/business/b2b/unseating-abrahamson-from-state-supreme-court-a-daunting-challenge-the/article_a4e6b6fa-bd79-5c0c-80f8-b57686142920ef.html.
Over the past decade, there have been three major election battles for seats on the Wisconsin Supreme Court that had the potential to define the ideological direction of the Court. By the end of this period, the business community and its allies had achieved a modest but decisive advantage in terms of Court membership. This long-range effort has apparently begun to pay off with more favorable environmental law decisions from a business community standpoint.\(^{708}\)

The first major battle was a contest in 2007 to fill an open seat created by the retirement of Justice Jon P. Wilcox, an appointee of Republican Governor Tommy Thompson. Judge Wilcox was a relatively reliable conservative vote on the Court, and had joined the dissenters in both Ferdon and Thomas. Thus, from the perspective of left-leaning advocates, this electoral contest presented an opportunity to pick up a potential vote, and from the standpoint of conservatives, presented a risk of losing influence on the Court. The race pitted Annette Ziegler against Linda Clifford.\(^{709}\) Ziegler had worked as a federal prosecutor and private attorney before being appointed by Governor Thompson to the Circuit Court, to which she was subsequently reelected two times.\(^{710}\) Linda Clifford, a private attorney, had not previously served on the bench. On April 3, 2007, Ziegler defeated Clifford in the election, 58% to 42%.\(^{711}\)

This race set a new record for expenditures in a Wisconsin judicial election, with the two candidates raising a combined total of $2,662,903.\(^{712}\) But, in an important new development, major independent groups for the first time invested more heavily in the race than the candidates themselves. Expenditures on televisions ads by three major groups—the Club for Growth and the Wisconsin Commerce and Manufacturers Association supporting Ziegler, and the Greater Wisconsin Committee supporting Clifford—totaled about $3 million, bringing the cost of the race to nearly $6 million.\(^{713}\)

The second major electoral battle, the following year, pitted conservative challenger Michael J. Gableman against Justice Louis Butler, the author of the Thomas decision. Justice Butler, the first and only African

\(^{708}\) Also during this period, long-time Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson won reelection fairly handily in 2009 by defeating Jefferson County Circuit Court Judge Randy Koschnick. In 2013, incumbent Justice Patience Drake Roggensack easily beat back a challenge from Professor Ed Falone.


\(^{710}\) Id.

\(^{711}\) Id.


\(^{713}\) JESSE RUTLEDGE, supra note 704, at 28.
American to serve on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, was appointed by Democratic Governor Jim Doyle in 2004, replacing Justice Diane S. Sykes, who was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit by President George W. Bush. Butler had served as a public defender and as a municipal judge, and was elected to the Circuit Court prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court. Michael Gableman was appointed to the Circuit Court by Republican Governor Scott McCallum and subsequently elected to that court. He had previously had a private law practice and worked as a government attorney. On April 1, 2008, Gableman defeated Butler 51% to 49%, making him the first candidate since 1967 to defeat an incumbent justice. Gableman’s defeat of Justice Butler in 2008 effectively swung the Court in the conservatives’ favor, reversing the swing in the Court’s ideological make up brought about by Governor Doyle’s appointment of Butler to replace the relatively conservative Sykes.

Though fundraising by the individual candidates was relatively modest, outside groups again spent millions of dollars on television advertising. The business community and its right-leaning allies focused on Justice Butler’s authorship of the Thomas decision as a reason to oppose his reelection, but most of the advertising by and in support of Judge Mike Gableman focused on law and order issues. Gableman’s campaign ran a controversial attack ad that falsely accused Justice Butler of being responsible for freeing a rapist from jail. One apparent effect of the

716. Id.
720. See Wisconsin Judgment Day: The Sequel, FACTCHECK.ORG (March 21, 2008), http://www.factcheck.org/2008/03/wisconsin-judgment-day-the-sequel/ (“This ad falsely implies that Butler was responsible for freeing the rapist and allowing him to commit another sexual assault. Actually, Butler failed to win the man’s release (while representing him as a public defender). The rapist served his sentence and didn’t commit his next crime until he had been paroled.”). The Wisconsin Judicial Commission lodged a complaint against Justice Gableman for violating the code of judicial ethics by knowingly making a false statement in a campaign advertisement, but the charge was dropped after the Supreme Court deadlocked three to three on whether to permit further prosecution of the ethics charge. Mary Spicuzza, Politics Blog: Ethics Case Against Justice Gableman Dropped, WIS. ST. J. (July 8, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://host.madison.com/news/local/govt_and_politics/blog/politics-blog-ethics-case-against-justice-gableman-dropped/article_bdbd6138-8ab3-11df-abd8-001cc4c05286.html.
campaign’s exceedingly negative tone was to depress voter turn-out below 20%.\(^{721}\)

The final significant election in Wisconsin during this period pitted Joanne Kloppenburg, a career environmental lawyer in the Wisconsin Attorney General’s Office, against Justice Prosser, a long-time member of the Court appointed by Governor Thompson. This race was enlivened by the considerable controversy over Governor Scott Walker’s advocacy of limitations on public employee bargaining rights, an issue that had the potential to become fodder for future litigation before the Supreme Court.\(^ {722}\) Prosser eventually won the 2011 reelection by a narrow 7,000 vote margin out of nearly 1.5 million votes cast.\(^{723}\)

The Prosser-Kloppenburg contest set yet another record for independent expenditures in judicial elections in Wisconsin with five groups spending almost $3.6 million.\(^ {724}\) One left-leaning group spent approximately $1.36 million, while four right-leaning groups spent a combined $2.21 million.\(^ {725}\) According to one account, nearly half of the latter amount “came from a secretive group affiliated with Americans for Prosperity, the conservative group backed by billionaires Charles and David Koch.”\(^ {726}\) As in the prior elections in Wisconsin, the advertising largely focused on criminal justice issues rather than the civil liability issues that were apparently of greatest actual concern to those financing the advertising.\(^ {727}\)

Not surprisingly, the harsh political contests for seats on the Wisconsin Supreme Court have generated personal animosities between some of the justices. Justice Prosser was accused of physically choking one of his colleagues.\(^ {728}\) In addition, Justice Prosser reportedly called Chief Justice

\(^{721}\) Rutledge, supra note 704, at 31.


\(^{723}\) G.A.B. Certifies Supreme Court Recount Results, WIS. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BD. (May 23, 2011), http://gab.wi.gov/node/1873.


\(^{725}\) Id.

\(^{726}\) See Billy Corrher, Ctr. For Am. Progress & Legal Progress, Fixing Wisconsin’s Dysfunctional Supreme Court Elections 2 (July 2013).

\(^{727}\) See Erik Opsal, One Week Later: What Happened in Wisconsin?, Brennan Ctr. For Just. (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/one-week-later-what-happened-wisconsin (describing the “Pedophile Priest” ad run by the Greater Wisconsin Committee against Prosser and an ad attacking Kloppenberg by urging voters to “tell her being weak on criminals is dangerous for Wisconsin families”).

\(^{728}\) See Corrher, supra note 726, at 3.
Abrahamson a “total bitch,” and declared that he would “destroy” her.\footnote{729} Justice Prosser reportedly admitted using this language.\footnote{730} The first incident occurred during the Supreme Court’s expedited consideration of a legal challenge to Governor Walker’s legislative agenda to reduce public employees’ collective bargaining rights. The Supreme Court derailed the ethics investigation into these matters by a three to three vote reflecting the same partisan divide that separates the justices on environmental law and other topics.\footnote{731}

C. Judicial Elections and Wisconsin Environmental Law

The ultimate question for the purpose of this research project is whether the highly ideological character of Wisconsin’s judicial elections has influenced the direction of the high court’s decisions on environmental law. The evidence strongly suggests that the outcomes of judicial elections are having a profound effect on the direction of environmental law in Wisconsin.

To address this question, I identified the ten most recent environmental law decisions issued by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, identified by each reported case’s inclusion of at least one West “headnote” for “environmental law.” These ten cases were decided between 2000 and 2013. This survey of Wisconsin environmental law is surely under-inclusive because it does not include cases catalogued under “water” or “planning and zoning,” for example, but which might nonetheless have serious environment implications. It also does not pick up the Thomas case, which presented a tort law issue, but which also involves a serious public health hazard attributable to an environmental condition, broadly speaking. Nonetheless, this survey appears to have yielded a representative and manageable sampling of core environmental law cases decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court over a certain period in which one can discern the effects of shifting ideological allegiances among the justices on the outcome of environmental law cases.

The ten cases, and their basic facts and holdings, are briefly summarized as follows (from most recent to oldest):

- **Rock-Koshkonong Lake District v. State Department of Natural Resources**: Reversing denial by the Department of Natural

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{729} Id.
  \item \footnote{730} Id.
  \item \footnote{731} Id. at 2.
\end{itemize}}
Resources (“DNR”) of a petition to raise water levels in an impounded lake in order to protect natural wetlands bordering the lake; majority extensively discussed why DNR jurisdiction to enforce the Public Trust Doctrine does not apply to private lands above mean high water. 732

- **Andersen v. Department of Natural Resources**: Holding that the DNR lacks the authority, in reviewing an administrative petition challenging a permit issued pursuant to Wisconsin’s delegated authority to implement the federal Clean Water Act, to consider whether the permit terms and conditions comply with the Clean Water Act and EPA regulations. 733

- **State v. Harenda Enterprises, Inc.**: Holding that trial court properly granted judgment in favor of State in suit seeking civil penalties and other relief based on environmental auditor’s failure to follow regulations prescribing the method for testing for the presence of potentially dangerous levels of asbestos in building undergoing renovation. 734

- **State v. Schweda**: Affirming trial court order striking a demand for a jury trial by defendant operator of waste-water treatment facility in a proceeding commenced by the State seeking penalties and other relief based on violations of conditions of permit and other regulatory requirements. 735

- **Hilton ex rel. Pages Homeowners’ Association v. Department of Natural Resources**: Upholding a decision by DNR requiring an association of lakefront homeowners to reduce the number

---


of boat slips at an association-owned pier in order to reduce adverse effects on lake habitat and safety hazards.  

- **Clean Wisconsin, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Wisconsin**: Upholding a Public Service Commission grant of an electric utility’s application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the construction of a coal-fired electrical generating plant.  

- **Donaldson v. Board of Commissioners of Rock-Koshkonong Lake District**: Upholding a lower court decision striking down the decision of a lake district board to deny a landowner’s application to “detach” his land from the district.  

- **Wisconsin Citizens Concerned for Cranes and Doves v. Department of Natural Resources**: Upholding a decision by DNR establishing an open hunting season for mourning doves.  

- **Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Insurance of Wausau**: Overruling the prior decision of the Court in *City of Edgerton v. General Casualty Company of Wisconsin*, and ruling in the context of a superfund case that an insured can recover under a Comprehensive General Liability insurance policy the costs of restoring and remediating a superfund site, and that the receipt of a potentially responsible party letter triggers an insurer’s duty to defend under an insurance policy.

---


741. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 665 N.W.2d 257 (Wis. 2003).
• Responsible Use of Rural and Agricultural Land (RURAL) v. Public Service Commission of Wisconsin: Upholding an order of the Public Service Commission and related DNR ruling granting a certificate of public convenience for the construction and operation of a natural gas-fired electric generation power plant. 742

These cases say a lot about the state of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s environmental law jurisprudence. First, this set of cases illustrates the sharp divisions on the Wisconsin Supreme Court over environmental law. 743 Dissents or at least separate concurrences were filed in nine of the ten cases. The only case in which the Court issued a unanimous decision was Wisconsin Citizens Concerned for Cranes and Doves, involving the question of whether DNR had the statutory authority to establish an open season for hunting of mourning doves. 744 In the other nine cases there were at least two justices, and in five of the cases (half of the cases) there were three justices, who wrote or joined in opinions departing from the opinion for the Court, indicating that very modest differences in the composition of the Court might have produced a different outcome in many if not most of the Court’s cases over this period. 745

These cases also demonstrate that the justices disagree in environmental cases along highly predictable ideological lines. In this group of ten cases, the so-called conservative justices almost always voted for less stringent environmental protection while the so-called liberal side almost always voted for more stringent protection. 746 The only significant exceptions to

---

743. Professor Alan Ball of Marquette University has assembled a database on all of the Court’s decisions between 2004 and 2013, indicating that over the past decade the percentage of unanimous decision each year has varied from a low of 38% to a high of 63%. See generally Alan Ball, Statistics for Previous Years, SCOWSTATS.COM, http://www.scowstats.com/statistics-for-previous-years (last visited Feb. 2, 2015).
744. See Wis. Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves, 677 N.W.2d 612 (holding that the Department of Natural Resources had express authority to establish an open hunting season).
745. In eight of these nine cases, the justices writing separately filed opinions dissenting in whole or in part from the opinion for the Court. See Hilton, 717 N.W.2d at 178–79 (Prosser, J. concurring) (three conservative justices filed a concurring opinion, agreeing with the Court’s decision to uphold, under “current law,” a decision of the Department of Natural Resources requiring an association of lakefront homeowners to reduce the number of boat slips at a private pier, but lamenting that the case “epitomizes the growth of agency power, the decline of judicial power, and the tenuous state of property rights in the 21st century”).
746. For these purposes, over the 13 years examined, the “conservative” justices include Justices Babitch, Gableman, Prosser, Roggensack, Sykes, Wilcox, and Ziegler. The “liberals” include Justices Abrahamson, Bradley, and Butler. These designations are primarily based on the party affiliation of the Governor that elected some of the justices (others were elected in nonpartisan
this pattern is the case involving the hunting season for mourning doves (in which the Court was unanimous), and a second case, Johnson Controls, involving the issue of whether companies can recover from their insurers the cost of restoring and remediating contaminated superfund sites (in which the Justices broke dramatically from the usual ideological voting pattern). The voting in the latter case might be explained by the fact that there was no clear “pro-” or “anti-environmental” side to the case, given that the basic issue was which of two private parties would bear the financial cost of cleaning up a contaminated site.

Finally, even with this limited set of cases spanning a limited period of time, one can clearly discern the effect of changes in the ideological composition of the Court on the outcomes of the Court’s environmental decisions. For this purpose, there were two pivotal events in the Court’s recent history. First, in 2004, President George W. Bush nominated Justice Sykes, a relative conservative, to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, creating a vacancy on the Court; Democratic Governor Jim Doyle appointed relatively liberal Judge Butler to fill the vacancy. Second, in 2008, after a very contentious and close race, conservative Justice Gableman beat liberal Justice Butler. In the four cases decided before Justice Sykes left the Supreme Court, the side favoring less stringent environmental controls prevailed three times, while in the fourth case (Johnson Controls) there was no clear “pro-” or “anti-environmental” side. In the four cases decided while Butler sat on the Court, three of the four cases came out in favor of the side favoring more stringent environmental controls. Finally, both of the cases decided since Gableman won election and the Court swung back in a more conservative agenda, came out in favor of the side favoring less stringent environmental protection. These data appear to provide clear and unmistakable evidence that the personnel on Wisconsin’s highest court, and the outcome of judicial elections in this

elections). Justice Crooks is the most difficult to categorize, switching between the “conservative” to “liberal” sides from case to case. One non-consequential departure from this pattern was Justice Butler’s vote with the conservative majority in Clean Wisconsin, Inc.

747. See Johnson Controls, Inc., 665 N.W.2d at 262, 295, 297. The justices from each political party took a different view of this case. The majority opinion was authored by Justice Prosser, a “conservative,” Chief Justice Abrahamson, a “liberal,” joined this opinion along with Justices Babitch and Sykes. Justice Crooks, a “moderate conservative,” wrote a concurring opinion and Justice Wilcox, a “conservative,” filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Bradley, a “liberal.”

748. See id. at 270 n.16 (“[T]he focus of our analysis in this case is on interpretation of the insurance policies and not on environmental law. The parties and amici curiae have extensively argued, in varying forms, how competing interpretations of the CGL policy will impact on the efficient and effective remediation of pollution. While we are sensitive to these issues, these discussions are not probative of whether coverage obtains under Johnson Controls’ policies.” (citation omitted)).
state, have determined the substantive content and enforceability of environmental law.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s two most recent environmental law cases help illustrate what is at stake in Wisconsin’s judicial elections. First, in *Andersen v. Department of Natural Resources*, the Supreme Court, by a four to three vote, ruled in 2011 that DNR, in an administrative challenge to a water pollution discharge permit, lacks the statutorial authority to determine whether the terms of the permit meet the requirements of the federal Clean Water Act and United States EPA regulations.749 The case involved a very important question not only for Wisconsin but for the many other states that work in cooperation with the EPA to administer the Clean Water Act. The Act vests the EPA with authority to implement the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”), but authorizes the EPA to delegate this permitting authority to the state. Wisconsin, like most states, has obtained delegated authority to administer the NPDES permitting program.

The question presented in *Anderson* was whether a coalition of citizens and advocacy groups could challenge a permitting decision by the DNR administratively (and subsequently, in state court) on the ground that the permit violated the requirements of federal law.750 The majority ruled that DNR lacked the authority to consider such a challenge.751 The Court recognized, as a general matter, that a state is required to exercise delegated Clean Water Act-permitting authority in accordance with federal requirements, and that the EPA retains the authority to review and overturn individual state permitting actions if they are contrary to federal law.752 But it does not follow, according to the majority, that individual state permitting actions are subject to challenge under federal law in a state forum.753 Citizens’ only recourse for state permitting actions that allegedly violate federal law, the majority said, is a potential legal challenge to an EPA decision not to challenge the state permit.754

Chief Justice Abrahamson filed a dissenting opinion, joined by two of her colleagues.755 She read both federal and state law to authorize the

---

749. *Andersen*, 796 N.W.2d at 19.
750. *See id.* at 4 (explaining that the issue presented by the case was whether Wis. Stat. § 283.63 requires the DNR to hold a public hearing on CWAC’s petition for review of the permit reissued to Fort James’ Broadway Mill when the premise of CWAC’s petition is that the permit fails to comply with basic requirements of the Clean Water Act and federal regulations promulgated thereunder).
751. *Id.* at 16.
752. *Id.* at 12.
753. *Id.* at 17.
754. *Id.* at 18.
755. *Id.* at 19–22 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).
Department to consider whether DNR permitting actions complied with federal law. Any other conclusion, she argued, “invert[ed] the federal-state partnership” the Clean Water Act was designed to implement. Furthermore, she said, the majority’s potential remedy of suing the EPA was hollow because EPA’s “discretionary decision not to object to permit terms cannot effectively be challenged in federal court.” Thus, Chief Justice Abrahamson wrote, “the majority opinion . . . leaves the petitioners in the present case, and all future challengers of Wisconsin-issued water pollution permits, without a forum to bring an effective challenge that the terms of a permit are unreasonable based on a violation of federal law.”

The Andersen decision is unquestionably problematic as a matter of federal statutory interpretation. But it is also significant because it essentially shuts off all avenues of appeal for citizens concerned that individual permitting actions violate federal standards. The EPA retains the authority to review and overturn individual state permitting actions, and, if permitting violations remain persistent, EPA has the ultimate authority to withdraw the delegation of permitting authority from the state. But, EPA cannot effectively oversee every state permitting action. Thus, Congress included citizen-enforcement mechanisms in the Clean Water Act to help ensure that states continue to implement the Act effectively. To the extent citizen enforcement to help ensure state compliance with the Clean Water Act is today a dead letter in Wisconsin, the goals of the Clean Water Act itself have been compromised.

The environmental consequences of Wisconsin’s judicial elections also came home to roost in the case of Rock-Koshkonong Lake District v. State of Wisconsin, decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 2013. The central issue in the case was whether the DNR had the authority, in deciding whether to grant a petition to raise water levels in an impounded lake, to consider the impact of higher water levels on natural wetlands adjacent to the lake. All of the justices ultimately agreed that the DNR

756. Id.
757. Id. at 22.
758. Id. at 21 (citing Dist. of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
759. Id. at 22.
760. See also Adam Babich, The Supremacy Clause, Cooperative Federalism, and the Full Federal Regulatory Purpose, 64 ADMIN. L. Rev. 1, 43–44 n. 205 (2012) (observing that the Anderson decision “arguably means that Wisconsin’s Clean Water Act program is now out of compliance with 40 C.F.R. §123.30 (2011), which requires that state water quality programs provide for an opportunity for ‘judicial review that is the same as that available to obtain judicial review in federal court of a federally-issued NPDES permit (see §509 of the Clean Water Act).’”).
762. Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist., 833 N.W.2d 800.
763. Id. at 804.
possessed the authority to consider these impacts pursuant to a Wisconsin statute. What principally divided the Court, however, was whether the statute was based on the state’s general police power authority or whether it rested on the constitutionally-based Wisconsin public trust doctrine. Justice Prosser, joined by Justices Gableman, Roggensack, and Ziegler, ruled that the statute was supported by the police power and the public trust doctrine did not apply. Justice Crooks filed a dissent, joined by Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justice Bradley, arguing that the statute was based on the public trust doctrine as well as the police power.

The majority’s extended discussion of the public trust issue is arguably dictum because the Court’s consensus conclusion that the statute represented a valid exercise of state authority on some basis made it unnecessary to consider whether the statute was supported by the public trust doctrine. Thus, the Wisconsin Supreme Court probably has no obligation to follow the logic of the majority in this case in future cases. But the resolution of this seemingly technical issue was obviously hard fought and the four to three loss for the public trust argument appears to reflect a major reversal in direction on one of Wisconsin’s signature contributions to United States environmental law.

The significance of the majority’s Rock-Koshkonong opinion lies in the fact that it appears to undermine the Court’s landmark 1972 decision in Just v. Marinette County, in which the Court unanimously rejected a claim that a county’s shore-land zoning ordinance adopted pursuant to state guidelines constituted a “taking” of private property. In rejecting the taking claim, the Court reasoned that the zoning ordinance implemented the state’s public trust doctrine by protecting public navigable waters from harm. Consistent with the reasoning of Just, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled in a subsequent case that the public trust doctrine supported state regulation of high capacity wells that could adversely affect the flows of adjacent navigable waters. While Rock-Koshkonong is potentially distinguishable

---

764. Id. at 800.
765. Id. at 835.
766. Id. at 840–46.
768. 201 N.W.2d 761, 767, 772 (Wis. 1972).
769. See id. at 768 (describing the zoning regulation as an exercise of “power to prevent harm to public rights by limiting the use of private property to its natural uses”).
770. See, e.g., Lake Beulah Mgmt. Dist. v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 799 N.W. 73 (Wis. 2011) (recognizing that state statute authorizing Department of Natural Resources to regulate high capacity wells that could adversely affect the flows of adjacent navigable waters implemented the public trust doctrine); see also City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820 (Wis. 1927) (“The trust reposed in the state is not a passive trust; it is governmental, active, and administrative. Representing the state in its
on its facts, the majority opinion purports to draw a new bright-line rule, which is patently inconsistent with the spirit and letter of *Just*, barring the state from invoking the public trust doctrine to justify the exercise of regulatory authority above the mean high water line. 771

As the contrasting arguments make clear, the seemingly technical legal justices’ debate in the *Rock-Koshkonong* case could have important resource management implications. First, because the public trust doctrine not only confers power on the state to protect trust resources but imposes a duty to do so, a ruling that public trust authority does not extend above the mean high water line could mean that the state legislature will have broader authority to pass legislation in the future, weakening protections for public trust waters from the potentially harmful effects of land use activities adjacent to navigable waters. Second, because the public trust doctrine provides a broad immunity from takings claims of the kind asserted in *Just*, such a ruling could also expose state and local government to greater takings liability and, in turn, undermine effective regulatory authority. 772

Already there is concern about what might come next from the Supreme Court. In 2013, after extensive public debate, the legislature passed, and Governor Scott Walker approved, new mining legislation designed to promote the creation of a major new iron mine in Wisconsin’s Penokee Hills, upstream of the Bad River Indian Reservation near Lake Superior. 773 A Florida-based company has purchased mineral rights covering a large area in northwestern Wisconsin and proposes what critics

---

771. The *Rock-Koshkonong* case arguably presented the narrow question of whether the public trust doctrine could be invoked to protect wetlands adjacent to navigable waters from activities harmful to the wetlands, in this instance flooding. Adopting this narrow reading of the Court’s opinion, the case would not necessarily preclude continued reliance on the public trust doctrine to regulate activities on lands adjacent to navigable waters that threaten public trust uses and values.


773. See also Dan Kaufman, *The Fight for Wisconsin’s Soul*, N.Y. TIMES (March 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/30/opinion/sunday/the-fight-for-wisconsins-soul.htm.?_r=0 (“To facilitate the construction of the mine and the company’s promise of 700 long-term jobs, Gov. Scott Walker signed legislation last year granting GTac astonishing latitude. The new law allows the company to fill in pristine streams and ponds with mine waste. It eliminates a public hearing that had been mandated before the issuing of a permit, which required the company to testify, under oath, that the project had complied with all environmental standards. It allows GTac to pay taxes solely on profit, not on the amount of ore removed, raising the possibility that the communities affected by the mine’s impact on the area’s roads and schools would receive only token compensation.”).
describe as potentially the largest open-pit iron-ore mine in the world. 774
Because the mine could have serious water quality impacts downstream, and critics contend that recent legislation fails to adequately protect public trust waters from the potential impacts, there has been widespread speculation that mine opponents could challenge the recently enacted legislation under the public trust doctrine. 775 Given the politicization of the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the recent Rock-Koshkonong opinion, there is natural trepidation about how a legal clash between the public trust doctrine and the proposed mine would turn out in the current Supreme Court.

Wisconsin voters were spared another electoral battle for a seat on the Supreme Court in the November 2014 elections. However, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley’s second term expires on July 31, 2015, meaning that the next Supreme Court election will be held in Spring 2015. Justice Bradley has not announced whether she will run for another term, but Republican Attorney General J.B. Van Hollen has indicated that he is considering running for a seat on the Court. 776 It seems inevitable that the races for the Wisconsin Supreme Court will remain contentious as well as consequential for the state of Wisconsin’s environmental law.

CONCLUSION

There are several clear conclusions to be drawn from these four case studies about the role of the environmental issue in state election contests: the identities of the persons sitting on the states’ elected high courts matter to the content of environmental law, and therefore effective participation in state judicial elections by supporters of environmental protection efforts is crucial to the success of those efforts. One might wish for the elimination of judicial elections. But the elected state courts have proven to be impervious to reform efforts to replace them with courts less prone to direct political influence. Given this reality, responsible citizens who care about the environment have no choice but to fully participate in these elections, as advocates for fair and impartial justice.

