Climate Negotiation and Litigation with the International Court of Justice and Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ 2025 Advisory Opinions
Written by Ilinca Johnson and Professor Beatrice Hamilton
In the past year, both the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) released Advisory Opinions articulating norms, rights, and obligations of citizens and States in the climate crisis. The ICJ articulates a comprehensive framework of customary obligations—including the prevention of significant harm, a due diligence standard, and cooperation—while the IACtHR applies parallel principles to protect human rights in the climate emergency. Both opinions accelerate action, narrow debate, and harmonize human rights with environmental rights and duties in ways that impact both climate negotiations and litigation. While the ICJ shapes the global standard and broad climate norms, the IACtHR adds specificity to rights and obligations that could be compelling for bringing suit in the American States. The following discussion begins with the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion focusing on the potential effects of the Opinion on climate negotiations and diplomacy through cooperation of States and a due diligence standard for action. Next, an overview and discussion of the IACtHR’s Advisory Opinion reflects particularly on the accountability of governments and corporations, as well as how climate litigation and negotiations may be advanced following this Opinion.
I. The International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change (2025)
The ICJ’s 2025 Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change[1] (AO or Opinion) emerges as one of the most significant developments in climate diplomacy and negotiations since the Paris Agreement.
While the Opinion is non-binding, the Opinion shifts what is largely considered a treaty-centric legal regime to one that is governed in combination with, and informed by, customary international law. In its findings, the Court reaffirmed that climate law, generally considered the lex specialis, does not displace the application of international law,[2] with an emphasis on the applicability of the duty to prevent significant environmental harm.[3]
The Court further concluded that the principles of sustainable development, common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, equity, intergenerational equity, and the precautionary principle are applicable as guiding principles for the interpretation and application of the most directly relevant legal rules.[4] States, therefore, remain bound by customary obligations, including the obligation to prevent significant transboundary harm,[5] to exercise due diligence,[6] and to cooperate[7] regardless of their status as parties to specific climate treaties.
1. The AO in Climate Diplomacy
By anchoring State obligations in customary international law and clarifying that responsibility for climate harm may be attributed to States[8], the Court transforms climate diplomacy, largely considered political and aspirational, to one that engages with legal questions of compliance, attribution of damage, and reparation. In doing so, the Opinion alters the strategic landscape in which States negotiate, cooperate, and set their commitments from a paradigm where soft-law and ambiguity serve to overcome differences and build consensus. The Opinion narrows the permissible range of political compromises by requiring that negotiators translate legal obligations into operational multilateral mechanisms. In doing so, the Court establishes a legal baseline capable of affecting the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) of States and diplomatic compromises, the diversion from which could lead to legal challenges.
2. Customary Obligations in International Law: Due Diligence, Equity and Differentiation
By confirming the applicability of the customary principles, the Court reshapes the obligations of States in relation to climate change and limits the ability of States to negotiate the terms of climate-related treaties. The AO’s articulation of due diligence sets out how States must integrate science,[9] assess risk,[10] and consult in good faith[11] when activities pose significant transboundary risks. The court articulated that the standard of due diligence must be exercised according to the best available science and State capabilities.[12] By doing so, the Opinion positions the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) not just as an informative entity in relation to quality science, but also as a benchmark for legal evaluation,[13] and confirms the normative power of COP decisions when decisions express agreement in substance between the parties regarding the interpretation of the relevant treaty,[14] shifting decisions relating to the 1.5°C goal from political instruments to having legal consequences. The Court also expressed the view that COP decisions may also be relevant for identifying customary international law, insofar as they reflect State practice and if they express an opinio juris of States.[15]
The due diligence standard in the context of climate change requires that regulatory mitigation mechanisms that are necessary for the prevention of significant harm to the climate system be established.[16] The Court also treats adaptation as part of the due diligence standard.[17] States, therefore, should assess climate impacts and vulnerabilities,[18] and adopt regulatory measures,[19] representing a shift from discretionary adaptation policies to a legal requirement. The Court also found that the duty to prevent significant harm to the environment is not confined to direct cross-border harm, but rather applies to global environmental concerns and therefore to the climate system and other parts of the environment,[20] widening the scope of responsibility.
Further, the Opinion expands the scope of State obligations in relation to their domestic emissions to include due diligence.[21] Importantly, beyond its climate litigation potential, States can no longer treat the regulation of private actors as a domestic matter, as it now falls under the ambit of international legal obligations., strengthening both regulation and oversight. Nonetheless, while the Court articulates States’ due diligence obligations, it does not set specific thresholds, maintaining a margin of flexibility and discretion. The Court, however, recognized that the standard of due diligence may become more demanding in the light of new scientific or technological knowledge.[22]
The applicability of the precautionary principle as an interpretive guiding principle means that where risks are foreseeable, States must act even in the face of scientific uncertainty.[23] This raises the bar for risk assessments, planning, regulatory measures and NDCs.
Cooperation is also recognized as a customary obligation rather than as a diplomatic and political tool. The Court highlights that the duty to cooperate is an obligation of conduct, the fulfillment of which is assessed against a standard of due diligence.[24] COP negotiations, therefore, would need to consider finance,[25] technology transfer,[26] capacity building,[27] and where appropriate develop regional adaptation measures[28] as legal requirements, preceding flexibilities in treaty texts.
Of significance is the Court’s treatment of mitigation ambitions and, in particular, its finding that aggregate NDCs must be compatible with the 1.5°C goal,[29] which the court considered as the parties’ agreed primary temperature goal for limiting the global average temperature increase and the scientifically based consensus under the Paris Agreement.[30] Recognition of the 1.5°C as a threshold removes the flexibility afforded to States under Article 2(1)(a) of the Paris Agreement to hold the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.[31]
The grounding of climate obligations in international human rights law, linking climate action to the right to life, health, and a healthy environment,[32] further broadens the grounds for challenging States’ climate actions. Consequently, it is likely that rights-based climate claims will increase in numbers as well as diversify. Recognition of the relevance of intergenerational equity[33] to States’ climate obligations affords the principle a normative effect.
3. State Responsibility, Causation, and Reparation for Climate Harm
Significantly, the Court expressed the view that States may incur responsibility for internationally wrongful acts in relation to breach of obligations of climate treaties and for loss and damage arising from the adverse effects of climate change under the rules of state responsibility under customary international law,[34] such as the failure of a State to regulate emissions of GHGs under its due diligence obligation.[35]
The factual questions relating to attribution and apportionment can be resolved on a case-by-case basis.[36] The Court concludes that although the causal link between the wrongful acts or omissions of a State and the harm arising from climate change is more tenuous than in the case of local sources of pollution, this does not mean that the identification of a causal link is impossible in the climate change context. Rather, it merely means that the causal link needs to be conducted through an in concreto assessment.[37] By articulating responsibility this way, the Court shifted from the ‘but-for’ causation test to a probable causation that is assessed according to scientific information that “may provide the necessary evidence to assess the probability and seriousness of possible harm.”[38] This also means that as due diligence becomes more stringent as new scientific knowledge emerges,[39] the scope and nature of claims may widen.
The Court confirms that a breach of climate-related obligations triggers the law of State Responsibility, including obligations of cessation and non-repetition, as well as full reparation, including restitution, compensation, and/or satisfaction. The Court also notes that breaches of States’ obligations do not affect the continued duty of the responsible State to perform the obligation breached.[40]
4. Effects on Diplomacy and Negotiations
The Opinion can be seen as strengthening climate action while focusing and potentially minimizing the negotiations process. Bodansky and Biniaz, however, highlight that climate negotiations have long been characterized by carefully crafted language, ambiguity as compromise, and soft law.[41] They argue that the Opinion may have unintended consequences for global climate diplomacy by undermining its historical reliance on flexible drafting techniques to achieve consensus by enabling parties to champion ambitions while preserving national priorities.[42] Shifting the focus from consensus building to legal contestation reduces the level of ambiguity permissible and undermines cooperation.[43]
They further point out that the 1.5°C as the benchmark is inconsistent with Article 2(1)(a) of the Paris Agreement, which uses softer wording[44] and that the shifting from discretionary pledges to commitments with a science-based legal benchmark (1.5°C) limit State discretion. They suggest that shifting soft-law NDC ambitions to hard obligations may make States reticent to establish more ambitious language or adopt ambitious NDCs, if such language might subsequently acquire legal enforceability.[45] Creating a legal baseline may also prompt the insertion of reservations or non-prejudicial clauses into COP decisions, undermining the impact and legal force of the AO.[46] Nonetheless, as Bodansky and Biniaz also suggest:
[T]he AO’s expansive interpretation of international law may more than compensate for whatever incremental progress might be lost in an international process they consider inadequate, even in the best of circumstances, for delivering sufficient climate action. After all, many of those who sought an advisory opinion likely did so, at least in part, out of frustration with diplomacy’s slow pace and consensus-driven compromises.[47]
The authors suggest that the ICJ’s AO does not displace the role of diplomacy, but rather it reshapes it. What was once viewed as matters of voluntary cooperation, now must be understood through the lens of legal responsibility and factored into decision making. The Opinion catalyzes the judicialization of climate governance. As diplomatic efforts fall short in delivering outcomes, courts and tribunals may become sources for norm development, although this presents the risk of fragmentation in the interpretation of States’ climate obligations by regional courts and human rights bodies. Ultimately, the AO represents the emergence of a hybrid system, in which climate obligations can evolve through both adjudication and political means.
II. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights Advisory Opinion (AO-32/25)
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) Advisory Opinion (AO or AO-32/25) and the ICJ’s opinion are mutually reinforcing persuasive legal authorities. Significantly, AO 32/25 may especially have impacts on climate litigation in the Americas. On January 9, 2023,[48] the Republic of Chile and the Republic of Colombia requested an IACtHR AO regarding State climate emergency obligations individually, collectively, and from its causes to consequences as related to human rights norms.[49] The IACtHR’s AO addressed three questions. First, Chile and Colombia asked the IACtHR to define the scope and measures American states need to take in the climate emergency to fulfill substantive human rights obligations under the American Convention.[50] The second question asked the same regarding the procedural rights, noting especially the right to access information, participate, and access justice.[51] The third and final question regarded the scope of obligations American states owe groups that face discrimination during the climate emergency—namely, “environmental defenders, women, Indigenous Peoples, Afro-descendant and peasant-farmer communities,” among other vulnerable peoples.[52]
The IACtHR requested briefs, testimony, and feedback relevant to the request.[53] The IACtHR Climate Emergency and Human Rights Opinion interprets the American Convention on Human Rights of 1969,[54] the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man of 1948,[55] and the “Protocol of San Salvador” also known as the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1988.[56] The Court used over a hundred sources of international legal and scientific authority to come to its conclusions.[57] The Court described the climate emergency as part of the “triple planetary crisis” of climate change, pollution, and biodiversity loss, which “‘threatens the well-being and survival of millions of people throughout the world.’”[58] After a detailed legal and factual reasoning, the IACtHR declared twenty obligations in its ensuing Opinion.[59]
1. Implications for Climate Litigation in the Americas
Many of the Court’s rulings and articulations on rights within the climate emergency reflect growing trends in climate litigation within the Americas and broader global context. AO-32/25 may bolster further legal actions now. The following three sections focus on AO areas (1) in corporate responsibility, where the IACtHR may not have entirely successfully articulated rights for climate litigation needs in respect to government and corporate frameworks, (2) in rights of nature, where the IACtHR may have created significant legal persuasive authority for rights of nature litigation, and (3) how AO-32/25 furthers climate negotiations internationally.
A. AO-32/25 and Climate Litigation on Government and Corporate Responsibility
The IACtHR ruled that States have general obligations to respect human rights and freedoms within the climate emergency—and with an enhanced due diligence standard[60] that should be incorporated into American States’ domestic legal frameworks.[61] The Court further clarifies the substantive rights that need to be protected from the extreme weather caused by climate emergency include “rights to life, personal integrity, health, private and family life, property and housing, freedom of residence and movement, water and food, work and social security, [and] culture and education.”[62] The Court noted there are no excuses for compromising democracy,[63] allowing preventable third-party harm, or delaying because of a lack of full scientific certainty in addressing climate change.[64] Indeed, human rights culturally, socially, economically, and environmentally should advance, not devolve, during the climate emergency.[65]
Corporate responsibility and state government obligations in relation to business were not entirely clear in the IACtHR Advisory Opinion. As part of the stated right to a healthy climate, the Court ruled that State legal obligations encompass preventable human rights violations by corporate and third parties.[66] As part of this, the Court recommended aligning with the “United Nations Guiding Principles on Business [(UNGPs)] and Human Rights and the most recent developments in international and comparative law.”[67] Notably, the UNGPs are best serving Western business models and culture; they do not necessarily easily transferable to developing parts of the world that face human rights violations by these same extractive Western businesses.[68] Perhaps the recommendation to adhere to these guidelines should have been tailored to take inspiration from rather than assuming this would be the correct authority for businesses and peoples across the Americas.[69]
The IACtHR did not articulate accountability by corporations and remedies for victims of corporate human rights violations as deeply as the Court could have based on climate litigation trends globally and within the Americas. 2025 climate litigation trends suggest significant focus by injured parties on government and corporate frameworks.[70] Such litigation challenges the focus of country and company-wide economic, social, and governmental strategies more deeply than AO-32/25.[71] Relatedly, novel “Turning-off-the-tap” climate cases focused on the investments of financial institutions in fossil fuels and climate solutions show the building scrutiny into how major powers use money to advance or slow climate-related progress for humanity.[72] The IACtHR’s rulings may aid in legal persuasion in the Americas in continuing such litigation, but the lack of financial legal instruments in the opinion may not wholly reflect current trends in climate action.
B. AO-32/25 Favorably Encourages Rights of Nature Litigation
However, the articulation of certain rights by the IACtHR could bolster types of climate litigation in the Americas previously unseen. As the IACtHR notes, the rights of nature are increasingly being recognized in national and subnational capacities across the Americas, particularly in the Global South.[73] In a four-to-three decision, the IACtHR recognized the rights of nature, furthering protections for the “long-term integrity and functionality of the ecosystems” through legal tools that help states address the “triple planetary crisis” before damage is irreversible.[74]
According to the IACtHR, the interdependence of humanity with all other life within ecosystems creates a norm of jus cogens to not conduct ourselves in a way that creates irreversible harm.[75] A jus cogens norm is a “peremptory principle of international law that is nonderogable, non-negotiable, and universally binding on all States, regardless of [a States’] consent.”[76] The IACtHR found that there is a right to a healthy environment.[77] Then, the Court recognized a healthy climate is a right necessary for the wellbeing of present and future generations and Nature; the wellbeing of all three are inseparably linked together and fundamental to advancing human rights.[78]
Rights of nature litigation is underway in the Americas. Just on September 30, 2025, several organizations filed a lawsuit on behalf of Californian whales arguing for their rights to prevent fossil fuel project development in the Gulf of California, the “Aquarium of the World” under Mexico’s General Wildlife Law.[79] This is building on other litigation happening in Mexico for rights of nature preceding the IACtHR opinion, including a Mayan human rights defender case brought on behalf of Melipona bees on the Yucatan Peninsula.[80] The IACtHR’s articulated authority on rights of nature may be used as a persuasive authority to grant legal rights to animals.
Global South climate litigation grew overall in the past year. Enforcement and compensatory actions for domestic climate damages brought by Global South governments totaled 56% of all cases brought in 2024.[81] Both the United States and Brazil are top climate litigators globally.[82] Four polluter pays litigations in Brazil were brought against individuals responsible for climate damages based upon carbon dioxide emissions caused by their rainforest destruction.[83] Studies show that the socio-legal capacity of country institutions enables climate litigation to be brought there, which aligns with the IACtHR’s findings on the importance of democratic and human rights as they interact with the climate emergency.[84] Going forward, many of the rights articulate in AO-32/25 could enable further litigation for human rights in the climate emergency. The Sabin Center notes that articulating climate and human rights obligations could “reshape interpretations of climate obligations under international law and spark new litigation.”[85]
C. Shaping Climate Diplomacy and Negotiations
The IACtHR opinion complements the ICJ opinion in narrowing climate debates—and prioritizing key issues at threat of being undervalued or overlooked. These include the role of science, corporate responsibility, and protection of human rights defenders often targeted for their work. In certain American States like the United States of America, AO-32/25 makes clear to political leaders that hemming and hawing on climate change is an affront to human rights and threatens the wellbeing and freedoms of their people.[86] Opinions like these bolster the legal strength of advocates of human rights and citizens within the climate emergency and add pressure to those who need to actively protect citizens against the adverse impacts of the climate emergency.
Author Bio:
Ilinca Johnson is a 3L student at Vermont Law and Graduate School. She is a senior staff editor and fall symposium editor on the Vermont Law Review. She has a B.S. in Marine Sciences and a B.A. in Human Rights from the University of Connecticut. She has a particular focus on international environmental law and green finance. Ilinca has clerked with the Coconino County Superior Court in Flagstaff, AZ and worked on Maine shellfish restoration permitting as a research associate with the National Sea Grant Law Center.
[1] Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change (Request for Advisory Opinion), Advisory Opinion, 2025 I.C.J. 187 (July 23).
[2] Id. ¶¶ 162–71.
[3] Id. ¶¶ 132-39.
[4] Id. ¶¶ 161, 172.
[5] Id. ¶¶ 132–39.
[6] Id. ¶ 280.
[7] Id. ¶¶ 140–142, 218, 301–02.
[8] Id. ¶¶ 429, 437.
[9] Id. ¶¶ 283, 293.
[10] Id. ¶¶ 297, 298.
[11] Id. ¶ 299.
[12] Id. ¶¶ 283, 290, 292, 345–49.
[13]“In this regard, reports by the IPCC constitute comprehensive and authoritative restatements of the best available science about climate change at the time of their publication.” Id. ¶ 284.; see also id. ¶¶ 74, 77–83.
[14] Id. ¶ 184.
[15] Id. ¶ 288.
[16] Id. ¶ 282.
[17] Id. ¶ 282.
[18] Id. ¶ 257.
[19] Id. ¶¶ 281-83.
[20] Id. ¶ 134.
[21] Id. ¶ 252.
[22] Id. ¶ 284.
[23] Id. ¶¶ 180, 293.
[24] Id. ¶ 218.
[25] Id. ¶¶ 212, 264–66.
[26] Id. ¶¶ 212–13.
[27] Id. ¶¶ 266–67.
[28] Id. ¶ 210.
[29] Id. ¶ 245.
[30] Id. ¶¶ 222–24.
[31] Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104, Art. 2(1)(a).
[32] I.C.J., supra note 1, ¶¶ 377–79, 391–93.
[33] Id. ¶¶ 155–57.
[34] Id. ¶ 420.
[35] Id. ¶ 444.
[36] Id. ¶ 432.
[37] Id. ¶ 438.
[38] Id. ¶ 283.
[39] Id. ¶ 284.
[40] Id. ¶ 445.
[41] Daniel Bodansky and Susan Biniaz, The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Climate Change: Does It Throw a Wrench into the Negotiator’s Toolbox of Diplomatic Problem-Solving Techniques? EJIL: Talk! (Sept. 23, 2025), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-icjs-advisory-opinion-on-climate-change-does-it-throw-a-wrench-into-the-negotiators-toolbox-of-diplomatic-problem-solving-techniques/.
[42] Id.
[43] Id.
[44] Id.
[45] Id.
[46] Id.
[47] Id.
[48] Maria Antonia Tigre, Maxim Bönnemann and Korey Silverman-Roati, A Blueprint for Rights-Based Climate Action: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Advisory Opinion on the Climate Emergency, Climate L: Sabin Ctr blog (July 8, 2025), https://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2025/07/08/a-blueprint-for-rights-based-climate-action-the-inter-american-court-of-human-rights-advisory-opinion-on-the-climate-emergency/.
[49] Climate Emergency and Human Rights (Interpretation and scope of Articles 1(1), 2, 4(1), 5(1), 8, 11(2), 13, 17(1), 19, 21, 22, 23, 25 and 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights; 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights “Protocol of San Salvador,” and I, II, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XVI, XVIII, XX, XXIII, and XXVII, of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man), Advisory Opinion AO-32/25, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 32, ¶¶ 2, 28 (May 29, 2025) (“Climate Emergency and Human Rights Advisory Opinion”) (“Our two countries face the ongoing challenge of addressing the consequences of the climate emergency, including the increasing occurrence of droughts, floods, landslides and fires. These phenomena underscore the urgent need for a response grounded in the principles of equity, justice, cooperation and sustainability, with a human rights-based framework”).
[50] Id. ¶ 28.
[51] Id.
[52] Id.
[53] Id. ¶ 7–12.
[54] American Convention on Human Rights Adopted at the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights, (Nov. 22, 1969), 1144 U.N.T.S., No. 17955.
[55] American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, E/CN 4/122 (May 2, 1948), Ninth International Conference of American States, Organization of American States.
[56] “Protocol of San Salvador,” Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Protocol of San Salvador (1988).
[57] Climate Emergency and Human Rights Advisory Opinion, supra note 49, ¶ 38.
[58] Id. ¶ 42.
[59] Id. at VII. Opinion.
[60] Id. at VII. Opinion (3) (unanimous); see id. ¶¶ 219, 231–37.
[61] Id. at VII. Opinion (5) (unanimous); see id. ¶¶ 238–43.
[62] Id. at VII. Opinion (12); see also id. ¶¶ 384–91,400–57.
[63] Id. ¶ 214 (citing to Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration encouraging concerned citizens to participate).
[64] Id. ¶¶ 226–30; see also id. ¶ 231.
[65] Id. at VII. Opinion (4).; see id. ¶ 368 (citing to Article 1 of the Protocol of San Salvador and Articles 2 and 26 of the American Convention); see also id. ¶ 243 (“Obtaining the necessary resources to respond to the climate emerges should not compromise the right of individuals and peoples. . .”).
[66] Id. at VII. Opinion (10); see also id. ¶¶323–51 (adopt regulations to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions “based on human rights” including for corporate actors); id. ¶¶ 352–57 (“adopting mitigation supervision and monitoring measures”); id. ¶¶ 358–63 (determine “climate-related impact on projects and activities”).
[67] Id.
[68] Business and Human Rights: Adopting the “Smart Mix,” OHCHR (Dec. 6, 2024), https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2024/12/business-and-human-rights-adopting-smart-mix#:~:text=Global%20value%20chains,at%20US%20apparel%20retailer%20Cotopaxi.
[69] Particularly when those States receiving the brunt end of multinational corporate (MNC) treatment may not be the same State where those MNCs are domiciled. Timothy J. Killeen, Global Markets and Their Effects on Resource Exploitation in the Pan Amazon, Mongabay (May 21, 2024), https://news.mongabay.com/2024/05/global-markets-and-their-effects-on-resource-exploitation-in-the-pan-amazon/.
[70] Joana Setzer & Catherine Higham, Global Trends in Climate Litigation: 2025 Snapshot, Sabin Ctr. for Climate Change L. 24 (2025).
[71] Id.
[72] Id.
[73] Climate Emergency and Human Rights Advisory Opinion, supra note 49, ¶ 286.
[74] Id. at VII. Opinion (7), ¶¶ 279–86.
[75] Id. at VII. Opinion (8); see id. ¶¶ 287–94 (“[T]he obligation to preserve our common ecosystem, as a precondition to the enjoyment of other rights that have already been identified as fundamental, are of peremptory importance and are, therefore, of a jus cogens nature”).
[76] Climate Emergency as a Human Right: Decoding the IACtHR’s Groundbreaking Advisory Opinion, EARTH.ORG (July 17, 2025), https://earth.org/understanding-the-iacthrs-advisory-opinion-on-the-climate-emergency-and-human-rights-and-its-implications/.
[77] Id. at VII. Opinion (11) (unanimous).; see id. ¶¶ 364–76.
[78] Id. at VII. Opinion (10); see id. ¶¶ 298–316.
[79] Gulf of California Whales Sue for Their Right to a Livable Habitat, Mex. News Daily (Oct. 13, 2025), https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/gulf-of-california-whales-legal-right/.
[80] Id.
[81] Setzer & Highman, supra note 70, at 3, 13.
[82] Id. at 3.
[83] Id. at 6.
[84] Id. at 15.; Climate Emergency and Human Rights Advisory Opinion, supra note 49, at VII. Opinion (1); see also id. ¶ 205 (providing the Court’s definition of “resilience”); id. at ¶ 596 (differentiated protection is “necessary to guarantee real equality in the enjoyment of rights in the context of the climate emergency”).
[85] Setzer & Highman, supra note 70, at 3.
[86] Upasan Kahtri, What a Historic Inter-American Court Ruling Means for Global Climate Justice, CIEL (Nov. 6, 2025), https://www.ciel.org/unpacking-the-inter-american-court-ao/.