Summary : Parties to the UNFCCC gathered over the last two weeks for their mid-year meeting in Bonn, Germany to attempt to translate the recent treaties into substantive government policies.  At center stage, was the recent Paris Agreement and its future effects as the parties begin to merge its elements with the UNFCCC’s Kyoto protocol and other pre-2020 pledges.

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By Tracy Bach

During the last two weeks of May, the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) gathered in Bonn, Germany for their regular mid-yearmeeting.  This session is called  SB44, which simply means the 44th meeting of the climate change convention’s subbodies , which include two standing groups, the SBI  (Subsidiary Body for Implementation) and SBSTA (Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice) and one temporary one, the APA  (Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement).  SB44 is the place where the rubber meets the road.  Few world leaders attend and even fewer members of the media.  Instead, career diplomats who focus on international environmental law in general and climate change specifically come to Bonn to work out the technical realities of translating treaty words into governmental actions.

At SB44, the parties continued work on climate change mitigation and adaptation programs initiated under the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol (KP).  But it’s fair to say that this work was perpetually overshadowed by the future impacts of the Paris Agreement  (PA).

What would happen to pre-2020 commitments under the KP’s Second Commitment Period if the Paris Agreement entered into force early? How do the NDCs or nationally determined contributions required under the Paris Agreement relate to the pre-2020 Cancun pledges? How will existing governance mechanisms under the UNFCCC and KP, like the KP’s CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) Executive Board , UNFCCC’s Standing Committee on Finance and Adaptation Committee , and the COP19-created  Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage , serve the Paris Agreement?  Will we simply learn from their track records of what (and what not) to do when creating new governance structures under the PA?

The Paris Agreement seized the center stage for at least a third of SB44’s agenda, given the number of tasks assigned by COP21 for moving into implementation.  While on the surface, this work has the appearance of being technical, in reality it is rooted deeply in international politics.  Hence the first week of the APA’s SB44 work was held up while the Parties disputed their agenda for the mid-year session.  The G77+China — the largest negotiating group in the UNFCCC negotiations — filed a request before the opening plenaries with concrete suggestions for “balancing” the agenda so that it was less mitigation-centric — a hangover from the UNFCCC and KP’s work programme foci.  Through these agenda corrections, the G77 also sought to launch the next phase of work using the precise language that parties forged last December when agreeing by consensus on the COP21 decisions.

Forging North American relations at a biergarten on the Rhein.

The APA agenda dispute (and to a lesser extent, those in SBSTA and SBI) served as the opening salvo of a consistent campaign to address the constructive ambiguity that Parties had built into the Paris Agreement’s provisions  very carefully. The art of compromise on display in Paris does not transition easily to the technical exercise in Bonn of translating those words into action. This difficulty stood out most strikingly for me on two agenda items: Paris Agreement Article 6 (“cooperative approaches”) and its relation to Article 5 (forests and other land use) and transparency and global stocktaking under Articles 13 and 14, including on finance.  More to come soon on these specific topics.

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Summary : Women have emerged as the most influential figures in the UN’s Convention on climate change. Female diplomats from Saudi Arabia and New Zealand have been elected to co-chair the fledgling APA, which develop guidelines pursuant to the recent Paris Agreement.

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By Bonnie Smith

For the first time ever, women dominate the most influential positions for the UN Climate Change negotiations. This significant change in leadership comports with the Preamble of the Paris Agreement, which states, “[p]arties shoul `d when taking action to address climate change, promote and consider their respective obligations…gender equality [and] empowerment of women.”

Significantly, Christiana Figueres, affectionately nicknamed the “Climate Queen” at SB44, stepped down from her six-year tenure as Executive Secretariat of the UNFCCC and  welcomed Patricia Espinosa , Mexican ambassador to Berlin, as her successor. The Parties elected Sarah Baashan, a Saudi Arabian diplomat, and Jo Tyndall, a former climate ambassador from New Zealand, to serve as the first co-chairs of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (“APA”) , established to develop rules and guidelines under the Paris Agreement.

UNFCCC leaders, delegates, and civil society groups maintained the dialogue on gender and climate change from the opening of the SB44 Conference  to its conclusion. Jo Tyndall concluded the APA Plenary Session by remarking on the “whirlwind couple of weeks” at SB44, during which time she and Sarah metaphorically got married, birthed the APA baby, and watched the baby take its first breaths. As she concluded the session she vowed that she and Sarah would not drop the newborn APA baby.

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Summary : Conscious consumption is each individual’s responsibility. Understanding what we consume and how we facilitate the commoditization of life is a necessity if we are to promote the modification of social values to include holistic stewardship of our planetary resources.

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By Madhavi Venkatesan, PhD

All life has intrinsic value. Human life may be able to dominate and subordinate other life forms due to nothing more than brute force but does this equate with a fundamental right to forcibly inseminate, isolate, and commoditize other life forms? Arguably, the claim of human status based on a hierarchy of life forms would appear to be more consistent with stewardship, not domination.

To justify the horrific treatment of other life forms through an assertion that provision of quality of life would be too expensive provides a greater insight into the social values of the present period and nothing more. The treatment we provide to the voiceless impacts our sense of humanity and the manner in which we will ultimately treat one another.

Economics does not justify exploitation, it is a discipline founded on moral philosophy. The value and fairness elements that were embedded explicitly and implicitly in the work of Adam Smith and David Ricardo did not survive the overly simplified twentieth century quantification of the behavioral science. The ignorant greed among some in our society has promoted the use of price as a means to perpetuate profit and consumption, but this is not economic theory, this is the oversimplified, myopic perspective of the individual who is succumbing to self-focused benefit without thought of holistic cost.

Price is not an appropriate measure on its own. It is the fairness of price that is important. A fair price captures the cost of raising a healthy animal. A cheap price implicitly captures the low cost of raising an animal, not necessarily healthy and not net necessarily of nutritious value. The animal is produced like a piece of equipment on an assembly line, fattened with hormones, injected with antibiotics, living in and eating its own feces, with limited development physically and mentally; cheaply treated, cheaply priced, it offers minimal consumption benefit. The flesh that composed the animal, the same meager nutrition and development embedded in the animal will be the fuel source for the consumer. The cheapness in its price imposes yet another adversity: that life can be thrown away—trashed—based on market-promoted price elasticity. Further from an ecological perspective, the concentrated living conditions of these voiceless, captive living commodities adversely impacts groundwater and, depending how feces are discarded, can create further human health impacts.

We have inherited frameworks that are based on ideas and beliefs that were and are not consistent with the reality of life. We live in a continuous system; how we treat other animals and how we treat the ecosystem we inhabit has an impact on human life both through human health and in how we develop, maintain, and pass on humanity as a social value.

Madhavi Venkatesan is a faculty member in the Department of Economics at Bridgewater State University, where her present academic interests are specific to the integration of sustainability into the economics curriculum. Prior to re-entering academics, Madhavi held senior level positions in investor relations for three Fortune 250 companies. In this capacity she was a key point of contact for investors and stakeholders and was singularly instrumental in the development of socially responsible investing strategies and corporate social responsibility reporting. Madhavi started her financial services career after completing her post-doctoral fellowship at Washington University in St. Louis. She has a PhD, M.A. and B.A. in Economics from Vanderbilt University and a Masters of Environmental Management from Harvard University. She is presently a Masters of Environmental Law and Policy candidate at Vermont Law School.

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Summary
: This post originally appeared in the Oxford Human Rights Blog on April 18, 2016. The systemic collapse of the U.S. coal extraction industry has scarcely been of benefit to the subordinated Appalachian citizenry. However, tangible socio-legal progress may be achieved in the Appalachian region vis-à-vis a critical human rights approach to environmental justice issues.

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By Nicholas F. Stump

 

The natural resource extraction industry has long wrought environmental, social, and economic devastation in Appalachia—a U.S. region historically defined by a deeply exploitative coal extraction mono-economy. However, in tandem with the (climate change-driven) global pivot towards non-carbon, cleaner energy sources, widely publicized market and legal developments have resulted in a systemic collapse of the once dominant American coal industry.

Progressive environmentalists rightly celebrate these historic energy market transitions towards a more renewables-focused power grid. The historic Paris Climate Agreement is perhaps a first crucial step in averting catastrophic, carbon-driven climate change. But the Appalachian region remains imperiled: Among other persistent issues ( endemic poverty , most notably), the catastrophic after-effects of surface mining—paired with environmental harms stemming inter alia from hydraulic-fracturing externalities and a crumbling infrastructure —pose serious public health concerns for the Appalachian citizenry.

“Appalachia” by Justin Meissen (licensed under CC by SA 2.0)

Poisons continuously leach into Appalachian waterways via, among other multitudinous sources, coal slurry ponds, decades-old acid mine drainage, and endless MTR valley fills (which have obliterated over one thousand miles of Appalachian headwater streams). This coal extraction-produced “environment degradation…will remain despite the reduction in the production of coal.” Concurrently, fracking operations poison Appalachian water and air alike—and incidents stemming from a rapidly deteriorating infrastructure produce environmental disasters on the scale of the Elk River Chemical Spill , a national U.S. scandal that left three hundred thousand Appalachian citizens without potable water. Therefore, vast stretches of Appalachia are marked by insufficient environmental protections.

These dire public health concerns are usefully explored using a human rights approach to environmental justice (“EJ”), which illustrates how disproportionate environmental impacts on subordinated groups are problematic and that structural environmental inequities must be remedied as part and parcel of any comprehensive and just regional socio-legal reconstruction project.

EJ has been a prominent critical discourse for decades. Supported by empirical literature , it teaches that environmental harms tend not to be distributed equitably within modern industrialized liberal democracies; rather, minority, female, and low-income populations suffer disproportionate health and economic-related impacts. Moreover, EJ has continued to evolve. Third and fourth wave critical re-visionings of EJ involve an “integrated particularized approach” that exhibits a “greater complexity based on each community’s cultural, historical, and political experience and its specific needs and goals.”

The Clinton Administration’s Executive Order 12898 institutionalized normative EJ principles in the U.S.; following a period of turbulent policy oscillation, President Obama subsequently reinvigorated the order in 2008. Under E.O. 12898, U.S. federal agencies must consider EJ dictates in applicable regulatory decision-making. To date, widespread implementation of the order has proved largely elusive—and the failure of E.O. 12898 to curtail the long-lasting public health impacts of the radically destructive mountaintop removal mining (“MTR”) practice on low-income Appalachian populations, in particular, is now well-documented.

A human rights approach to EJ strengthens the discourse and is especially applicable to the uniquely situated Appalachian region. Scholarly commentators and legal practitioners have “framed the demands of the environmental justice movements nationally and globally in the language of human rights.” For instance, insufficient environmental protections pertaining to the “substantive right to a healthy environment ” are a prima facie violation of principles articulated in numerous regional treaties ; additionally, tribunals have determined that insufficient environmental protections pertaining to ” life, health, food, [and] water ” implicitly violate other regional human rights treaties.

Such legal trends are heartening. E.O. 12898 has failed Appalachia in part because its dictates are merely one factor to be weighed by an often-captured governmental elite. Re-visioning EJ concerns as not a sole regulatory factor, but rather as enforceable, controlling human rights may indeed yield more transformative EJ outcomes for the region. Moreover, a critically informed human rights approach —wherein the Appalachia demos co-determines the scope and nature of such rights at the grassroots level—is a crucial procedural component for a citizenry so long marginalized by structural democratic deficits.

Profound Appalachian socio-legal reconstructions are indeed required in the region: And a more substantial human rights approach to EJ is perhaps one component of a more comprehensive critical project for radical Appalachian reform. Socio-reconstructions of this nature are necessary ends-in-themselves; however, such reformist efforts may additionally serve as a potentially potent model in broader regional and global work. Diverse reformist outcomes might, therefore, be accomplished through critical explorations of Appalachian human rights.

Nicholas F. Stump is a Library Faculty Member at West Virginia University College of Law, where he administers and teaches in the legal research curriculum. Professor Stump’s scholarship focuses on the intersection of environmental law, Appalachian studies, critical legal theory, and critically informed approaches to legal research and analysis.

The post Appalachia in Crisis: A Human Rights Approach to Environmental Justice in the U.S. appeared first on Vermont Journal of Environmental Law.

Summary : Wastewater from hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) is not well-regulated in the United States, even though regulations exist at federal and state/local levels. This author recently published an article in which he argues the need for a federal commission, similar to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to regulate fracking wastewater (link provided in the text below). The following is a taste of the author’s arguments from his article.

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By Curtis Morrison

Federal agencies have failed to effectively regulate the clandestine fracking waste disposal industry. Some state and local fracking regulation exists, but much of that regulation has not proven effective at protecting communities from fracking waste. And sometimes, local fracking regulation has not survived the scrutiny of courts and state legislatures.

Last week, the Whittier Law Review published an article I authored: Fracker in the Rye: The Necessity of Federal Fracking Waste Regulation and a Fracking Waste Regulatory Commission . The article surveys the giant loopholes and shortcomings within the shockingly scarce regulatory regime regulating fracking waste disposal. Through examples of wastewater disposal in places you might not expect, the potential hazards to human health and the environment are examined. The article proposes comprehensive federal regulation of fracking wastewater disposal and the fracking waste management industry through the creation of a new federal commission to enforce it. Finally, it calls on members of Congress to pass federal fracking waste disposal regulation, and create a federal fracking waste regulatory commission modeled off the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Wait . . . there’s a fracking waste disposal industry? And it’s unregulated? Yes and yes, but let’s backup for the newbies. Fracking is the process of pumping water and chemicals underground at high pressure to force out oil or natural gas that would have otherwise stayed in the ground for time immemorial. Once these fluids return to the surface, they can also contain metals, dissolved solids, salts, and naturally occurring radioactive material. Although the industry prefers the term “produced water,” these fluids are more accurately coined fracking wastewater.

“You’re destroying public trust resources . . . [l]iterally destroying water,” explained Helen Slottje, New York attorney and founder of Community Environmental Defense Council at a 2015 environmental law conference. “It would be better to take the water that they use for fracking and put it on a rocket ship and send it to the Moon than to [re-] use it for fracking because that water is then available to pollute more water.”

Fracking fluid and other drilling wastes are dumped into an unlined pit located along the Petroleum Highway. Nets were installed on these pits to keep birds from dying in the toxic water. Photo Credit: Sarah Craig/Faces of Fracking

While some larger oil and gas companies handle their own fracking wastewater disposal, typically a wastewater disposal contractor relocates the waste far from the fracking site via pipes, trucks, trains and even barges. Then where does that all that fracking waste go? That’s a good question, with no comforting answers. In Kern County, California , for example, wastewater is left to evaporate in unlined pits where it invariably infiltrates groundwater. Elsewhere, wastewater is injected into abandoned Class-II wells where it also threatens to infiltrate groundwater.

Would a federal ban on fracking be better? Of course. Will that be politically feasible in the near future? Before you answer, consider that a SuperPac supporting Sec. Hillary Clinton’s bid for the presidency, credits her for “channeling the domestic energy boom into a geopolitical tool to advance American interests around the world.”

In the meantime, under the existing legal regime, fracking wastewater continues to irreversibly pollute sacred groundwater and aquifers across the nation. Shouldn’t Congress do something?

Curtis Morrison is a Whittier Law School J.D. candidate expecting to graduate with an environmental law concentration next month. He volunteers as a law clerk with  Our Children’s Trust , the Oregon-based non-profit devoted to atmospheric trust litigation. When time permits, he also writes about  the environment, government, and politics

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Summary : Cyberattacks pose obvious threats to infrastructure and financial institutions, but they also create major environmental threats. Any dam, chemical plant, or nuclear power plant that uses computers is a savvy hacker away from being an environmental disaster.

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By Mark Latham

Cyberattacks occur today with alarming frequency. They can happen anywhere a computer performs some function, which today means any and everywhere. The recent revelation that the control system for a small dam outside New York City had been hacked by a group possibly associated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard is chilling evidence that nothing which is even remotely computer-dependent is immune from a cyberattack. Fortunately, the dam was offline for maintenance and the hack discovered before any harm occurred. Cyberattacks, too, have implications for the so-called critical infrastructure that we rely upon for our energy, industrial operations and environmental protection.

 

The exact purpose of the dam cyberattack is not clear. It could have been, though, a penetration test to see if a small component of our infrastructure could be breached as a precursor to larger, more sophisticated attack. Instead of a small dam, next time a hack could occur within a portion of our critical infrastructure, such as the electric grid.

 

What havoc might a cyberattack wreak if it shutdown power for a few weeks or months in the major population centers of the East coast? If a cyberattack targeting a portion of the U.S. electrical grid were successful in the summer then scores could die from the heat, similar to what occurred in Chicago during a brief but particularly brutish hot spell in 1995. That blast of intense Midwest heat directly caused hundreds of deaths. A grid shutdown coinciding with the depths of the winter cold would be equally lethal. Not only would the human toll likely be substantial if a determined cyber-foe successfully attacked the grid but the adverse financial consequences would be painful as well. And this type of malicious hack has occurred. Late last year a cyberattack occurred that left tens of thousands of Ukrainians in the dark.

 

Might a nuclear plant be subject to a successful cyber siege? Perhaps that sounds like a far-fetched, bad disaster movie plot, but perhaps not. According to the London-based policy institute Chatham House in its 2015 report, Cyber Security at Civil Nuclear Facilities , investigators alarmingly found that “the nuclear industry is beginning – but struggling – to come to grips with this new, insidious threat.” They also found that the risk of a damaging cyberattack at a nuclear plant is also heightened because off-the-shelf, commercial software programs are frequently used at these facilities and the vulnerabilities that are inherently a part of those programs could be exploited with the potential for truly horrific consequences. At the recently completed Nuclear Summit convened in Washington, D.C. by President Obama, cybersecurity experts recognized that, while the risk may be low, the age of U.S. reactors, virtually all of which were constructed before the digital revolution, also increased their vulnerability to cyberattacks.

 

Moreover, we must not forget that a nuclear facility has already been subjected to a remarkably successful cyberattack. In the first reported use of a true cyber weapon, the home of Iran’s illicit nascent nuclear program was stricken by a never seen before highly sophisticated piece of malware named Stuxnet. Likely the handy work of United States and Israeli computer scientists, Stuxnet was unleashed as a counterattack targeting the Iranian nuclear enrichment program. Despite the fact that the facility was intentionally kept free from the web as a defensive measure, this remarkable bit of cyber-prestidigitation halted Iran’s nuclear ambitions for years.

 

Because so many industrial processes heavily rely upon SCADAs—supervisory control and data acquisition devices, which are essentially mini-computers that run a wide variety of industrial operations ranging from the mundane to the critical—virtually any industrial facility is at risk of a cyberattack. In fact, at Iran’s Nantanz nuclear facility, Stuxnet specifically targeted SCADAs manufactured by the German industrial giant Siemens that controlled the hundreds of centrifuges located deep within the facility essential to produce weapons-grade nuclear material.

 

Other cyberattacks offer further compelling evidence that the critical components of our infrastructure, including sewage treatment plants, air pollution control systems, pipelines, refineries, and chemical plants, among others, are at risk. If, for instance, a sewage treatment plant’s cyber defenses were successfully breached, treatment operations could be brought to a halt resulting in the discharge of untreated sewage into the receiving stream with resulting harm to aquatic life and potential adverse consequences for the public health. Technically, this type of attack is certainly possible. Iran, for instance, reportedly retaliated in response to Stuxnet by hacking into a number of American banks. A more alarming and relevant example is that Iran also reportedly responded by accessing one of Saudi Arabia’s massive Aramco oil facilities compromising data and destroying thousands of computers. As 2014 came to a close, the German Federal Office for Information Security announced that an unidentified steel mill in that country had been hacked. As a result of this cyberattack, plant personnel couldn’t shutdown a blast furnace, which resulted in major damage to the plant.

 

Numerous financial institutions have been victims of hacks, of course, given that is where the money is to paraphrase Willie Sutton. But so far the adverse effects of those cyber attacks have not had far-reaching consequences. That may not be the case if cyber-thugs successfully gain access to the computers essential for the operation of our energy and environmental protection critical infrastructure.

Professor Mark Latham, deputy vice dean for academic affairs, joined the Vermont Law School faculty in 2005. He specializes in a range of environmental issues that arise in corporate and commercial real estate transactions and brownfields redevelopment. His research focus includes the intersection of business and environmental law, and also issues under the federal Clean Water Act.

 

 

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Summary: Prior to the Conference of Parties in Paris, this blog shared weekly stories about the intricacies of the compact that would come from the Conference. The environmental law world buzzed with optimism as late November neared. Less than four months from the release of the Paris agreement, Professor Mark Latham does not share the optimism expressed by others. Whether the Paris agreement can avoid being another Kyoto Protocol depends on the technology and lifestyles that developing nations choose to adopt as they eventually earn more income and whether the American government steps up to be a leader in environmental protection.

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By Mark Latham

The climate change negotiations held in Paris late last year achieved what many believe is a groundbreaking international agreement. While there may be a sense of optimism that the agreement reached at the COP 21 proceedings will serve to avert the catastrophic impacts associated with a warming planet, there are several reasons why I remain doubtful that the well-intentioned agreement will result in meaningful reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions.

First, let us not forget that we have trod down this path once before. Negotiators previously reached a “groundbreaking” international agreement that was expected to halt the global rise in greenhouse gas emissions. In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated at a previous Conference of the Parties and subsequently ratified by 190 countries. It was expected to set the stage for a five percent reduction in carbon emissions that would occur beginning in 2008 through 2012, based on 1990 emission levels. The Kyoto Protocol was undoubtedly a stunning example of what could occur through intensive international diplomacy, cooperation and negotiation.

The only problem, however, is that the Kyoto Protocol didn’t work to reduce overall global carbon emissions. Granted the United States didn’t help matters when it stepped aside and did not participate in the efforts to reduce emissions called for by the Kyoto Protocol. Another problem that contributed to the ineffectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol was the exclusion of rapidly growing economies, namely China and India, from the requirement to reduce carbon emissions.

Second, since it is virtually impossible for President Obama to take any meaningful action to reduce carbon emissions without Congress on board, EPA developed the Clean Power Plan, which obligated states to develop and implement plans to reduce carbon emissions. This was the center piece of the Obama administration’s plan to address climate change.

In an unprecedented step the Supreme Court stayed the implementation of the Clean Power Plan. Without the Clean Power Plan it is not likely that the U.S. will meet the reduction targets called for by the efforts of the COP 21 proceedings. Further, given the climate change skepticism routinely expressed by the Republican presidential candidates, if the GOP does indeed win the White House later this year, no federal effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will occur. Without U.S. leadership toward greenhouse gas reductions, other countries may decide to follow suit and not take action to combat climate change, which would sabotage the efforts called for by the COP 21 proceedings.

Third, as developing countries strive to achieve increased prosperity, those that succeed in this endeavor will raise the standard of living for hundreds of millions people. As incomes grow and concomitant gains in the standard of living occur, the new entrants to the middle class will desire what the middle classes in developed economies have had access to for decades, if not longer: namely, stable and reliable sources of electricity, and also access to the full range of energy-intensive consumer products and durable goods including computers, smart phones, tablets, HD televisions, refrigerators, washers and dryers, air conditioners, and automobiles. Alongside the acquisition of such goods, a corresponding rise in energy demand will also occur. This, in turn, will increase carbon emissions as energy demand rises to support the goods acquired by a growing global middle class. One only needs to consider the dramatic rise in carbon emissions that China has experienced side-by-side with its increased prosperity during its rise over the last thirty years as a major global economic power.

Finally, treaties, laws, and regulations simply cannot provide the long-term solutions required to address the global dilemma known as climate change. Sure, laws may help to speed along the development of non-fossil fuel sources of energy through “technology forcing.” But one crucial lesson from the Kyoto Protocol experience is that we can impose all the laws, regulations, and “clean power plans” that the imaginations of policymakers and regulators can muster, but they won’t provide the solutions required to successfully combat the threat that climate change presents. The crux of the problem is a scientific one, so the climate change threat that the world faces requires technology-based solutions. Rather than reliance on legal-based regimes that to date have proven ineffectual at sufficiently curbing global greenhouse gas emissions, policymakers need to unharness scientists and engineers around the world to tackle this problem. This can be accomplished through increased public and private funding into low carbon forms of energy production and increased research-and-development efforts. Policymakers also need to incentivize entrepreneurs through the tax code and offer grants and low interest loans to fund the research and development efforts that are necessary for the technologies that are essential for a low carbon future.

Professor Mark Latham, deputy vice dean for academic affairs, joined the Vermont Law School faculty in 2005. He specializes in a range of environmental issues that arise in corporate and commercial real estate transactions and brownfields redevelopment. His research focus includes the intersection of business and environmental law, and also issues under the federal Clean Water Act.

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Summary:  After Cecil the Lion was killed during a trophy hunt last summer, Congress proposed the CECIL Act. The CECIL Act has the potential to create a new layer of protection for candidate species. The study which is being requested as part of this bill may help determine whether or not trophy hunting actually benefits endangered species conservation.

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By Elizabeth Smith

After Cecil the Lion was killed last summer, the Conserving Ecosystems by Ceasing the Importation of Large Animal Trophies Act (H.R. 3526, also known as the CECIL Act) was proposed by members of Congress. The namesake of this bill is a lion who was well known by many tourists. This thirteen year-old lion lived in

Ed Hetherington Photography

Zimbabwe on the Hwange National Park and was part of an Oxford University study. A dentist from the United States, Dr. Walter Palmer, paid to go on a trophy hunt in July, 2015. During the hunt, Dr. Palmer shot and killed Cecil. Although the dentist thought it was a legal hunt, Zimbabwe officials say that this trophy hunt was illegally conducted. This became a huge story in the media because of the love which tourists had for Cecil. This event provided the impetus for Congress to propose the CECIL Act , which includes an amendment to the Endangered Species Act and a government-funded study on the pros and cons of trophy hunting.

Candidate Species

The purpose of the amendment is to change which species the importation and exportation provision of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) protects. Endangered and threatened fish and wildlife, which are defined under section 4 of the ESA, would still be protected. While the CECIL Act would not change the protections afforded to endangered and threatened species, it would extend this protection to species which are proposed for listing as endangered or threatened under the ESA. These species are also known as ” candidate” species. This provision would be added to Section 9 of the ESA, replacing the current language of section 1538(a)(1) “(A) import any such species into, or export any such species from the United States” with “(A) for any such species listed, or proposed to be listed, under section 4, import the species into, or export the species from, the United States.”

(Candidate species Arizona Treefrog (Hyla wrightorum)) http://www.thehibbitts.net/troy/photo/frogs/h.wrightorum.htm

By adding the provision about species proposed to be listed, this law would increase the number of species being protected by the ESA’s importation and exportation provision. Including these candidate species on the list of species protected by the above provision may make it more challenging for Americans to trophy hunt. By supplementing the current provision in the ESA with the one proposed in the bill, Congress would be filling a gap in the species protection process which has left candidate species without much protection since the ESA was enacted. This bill gives an opportunity for species which may be listed to have protection during the listing process. This would also be beneficial to the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) because these agencies would have time to analyze whether a proposed species should be listed, instead of rushing to list a species out of fear that it will become more critically endangered or extinct while the agencies decide if listing is appropriate.

(Candidate species Puerto Rico Harlequin Butterfly (Atlantea tulita)) http://www.puertohermina.org/ph/2013/03/24/majestuoso-vuelo-de-la-mariposa-quebradillana-por-los-acantilados/

Because of the potential benefits the CECIL Act may have for candidate species, it shares some goals with the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora ( CITES ). One of these shared goals is to ensure the protection of a species that might not be currently threatened with extinction by limiting how much the species is traded. The CECIL Act’s ESA provision would enhance the way that the U.S. implements CITES. If adopted, the CECIL Act should not be a violation of international trade laws because it is merely extending protection to another group of species which is still potentially vulnerable. CITES sets out to preserve the endangered species on the planet by regulating the trade of their parts. The CECIL Act would help meet those same goals that CITES sets forth in Article II. Further international support comes from many international airlines from a variety of countries (including South Africa and the U.A.E.) that voluntarily banned the transportation of certain species on flights. The CECIL Act’s requiring of these bans may raise awareness about the importance of protecting candidate species as well as endangered species.

Trophy Hunting

The CECIL Act also requires a Government Accountability Office study which analyzes “the effectiveness of trophy hunting in supporting international wildlife conservation efforts.” The debate about whether trophy hunting is effective or not has been going on for a long time and conservationists are on both sides of the argument.

Rex Shutterstock

Large non-profit organizations focused on species conservation, such as World Wildlife Fund (WWF), promote potential benefits from trophy hunting as part of a holistic approach. WWF is one of the leading organizations in species conservation across the world, which is possibly why so many people have asked the organization why it supports trophy hunting in some of its programs. The response is that the organization is “opposed to all forms of hunting that threaten species or habitat sustainability.” However, WWF says that “in some situations the only way to protect wildlife populations is ensuring that it’s in the interests of the local community to do so.” This means that in some situations, such as Namibia, there may need to be trophy hunting to ensure that the local community’s interest is in the preservation of the species.

Despite the inclusion of trophy hunting in the nature reserve, the articles written about the Namibia wildlife management plan focus much more on the benefits of ecotourism than the benefits of trophy hunting. One article states that the income of rural areas surrounding wildlife habitat has increased from practically nothing to over $6 million annually, “the majority of which is generated from tourism activities.” If the true economic benefits are coming from the ecotourism, which ranges from safaris to lodge stays, then perhaps trophy hunting no longer needs to be accepted as a way to ensure that conserving wildlife is in the best interest of the community. With safaris in Namibia starting at $11,895, perhaps these partially community-owned conservancies no longer need trophy hunting to supplement their budget.

There are reasons to cease trophy hunting other than no longer needing the fees from the hunters to sustain the nature reserves. Many conservationists argue that the funds from trophy hunting do not actually benefit the local communities or the reserves in a meaningful way. There are several confirmed examples of people in the hunting region being paid money to ignore the fact that the hunt is being conducted illegally. Of the whole fee that the hunters pay, “only a small portion of this is transferred to the [local] citizenry.” Some studies estimate that only approximately 3% of the fees paid go to local communities and assist conservation efforts. If the CECIL Act is passed, hopefully the study will help settle the controversy about the pros and cons of trophy hunting.

Enacting the CECIL Act

Without political support, despite the possible good the CECIL Act could create, the amendment will not be successful. An interesting political circumstance surrounding CECIL (H.R.3448) is that it was proposed on August 8, 2015 by eight sponsors, again on September 8, 2015 by one representative from Texas, and then finally on September 16, 2015 there were thirty-five total sponsors of the bill (H.R.3526). This may show that there was so much political support for the CECIL Act that many representatives decided they wanted to sponsor the bill. If the bill is passed, then these representatives can show their constituents that they are improving the situation for endangered species around the globe. Since the bill’s September 16 introduction, the bill has been referred to the House Ways and Means, Foreign Affairs, and Natural Resources committees. The lack of progress may not necessarily be due to a lack of public support. However, govtrack.us estimates that the CECIL Act only has a 7% chance of passing through committee and a 1% chance of being enacted based on the statistics of bills which were able to be passed between 2013 and 2015.

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It could be difficult to implement the CECIL Act because it will require ensuring that even more animals are not exported out of or imported into the United States. It will take more time for the officials who search the goods being shipped to recognize the candidate species, especially when the list is often changing. Officials in charge of making sure that animal parts do not travel in or out of the U.S. will need to be able to access all forms of shipping and be able to identify the bodies and body parts of candidate species. The type of shipping may range from airplanes to cargo ships, which are the most common forms of transporting trophy animals. Private companies will need to comply for the implementation to be successful. While some airlines have already voluntarily refused to transport trophy animals, it will be necessary for other international companies to participate in this ban on shipping so that the goals of the CECIL Act will be met.

Some of the countries in which trophy hunting continues may become angry with the U.S. for deterring trophy hunters from coming to their countries. However, several countries in which trophy hunting occurs have already banned the exportation of some species, which means that there may not be as much political backlash. Constituents from the U.S. have shown that, at least in the case of Cecil the Lion, they care very much about endangered species protection. There are, after all, over 33,000 “likes” on Cecil the Lion’s Facebook page. With a name like the CECIL Act and the purpose this bill purports, it should have enough political support in the United States.

This bill has the potential to create a new layer of protection for candidate species. The study, which is being requested as part of this bill may help determine whether trophy hunting actually benefits endangered species conservation. The CECIL Act passing would have a good impact on candidate species and it could shed some light on an issue that has divided conservationists for years.

Elizabeth D. Smith is pursuing her J.D. and Master’s in Environmental Law and Policy at Vermont Law School. She expects to graduate in May 2017 and plans to work at an international nonprofit in the Washington, D.C. area. While at VLS, Elizabeth has been involved in extracurricular activities and has become part in the South Royalton community through the work of the Red Door Church. She is currently a Staff Editor on VJEL and was recently elected to be a Symposium Editor for the Volume 18 Symposium on the Endangered Species Act. Her passion is protecting endangered species, especially Siberian Tigers. Elizabeth co-authored a paper while she was an undergraduate student at Slippery Rock University and she published a blog post when she was a student of Professor David Cassuto. She gives special thanks to her grandparents for encouraging her educational pursuits and to Professor Pat Parenteau for supporting her relentless inquiry into the plight of big cats everywhere.

 

The post You’re Gonna Hear Me Roar: How the Tragic Death of One Lion May Provide Protection for Candidate Endangered Species and Answer Controversial Questions about Trophy Hunting appeared first on Vermont Journal of Environmental Law.

This post is part of the Environmental Law Review Syndicate, a multi-school online forum run by student editors from the nation’s leading environmental law reviews.
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Mitigating Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic Transportation A Cap-and-Invest Approach 

James D. Flynn*

  1. Introduction

In recent years, states in New England and the mid-Atlantic region have made significant progress in reducing climate change-inducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the electricity generation sector.[1] Several factors¾including the effects of the economic recession, shifts in energy markets from coal to natural gas and renewable energy sources, and carbon pollution mitigation and clean energy programs like renewable portfolio standards¾have been identified as principal drivers of these reductions.[2] Another is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a cooperative effort among nine northeastern and mid-Atlantic states to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from the power sector.[3] RGGI employs a cap-and-invest approach in which the participating states set a regionally uniform, decreasing cap on CO2 emissions from covered power plants, periodically auction off emission allowances, and invest auction proceeds in other programs including end-use energy efficiency, renewable energy, greenhouse gas abatement, and direct customer electric bill assistance.[4] One study estimates that CO2 emissions in the RGGI region would have been approximately 24 percent higher in 2015 but for the program, which took effect in 2009.[5] At the same time, it is estimated that through 2015, RGGI generated approximately $2.9 million in net economic benefits,[6] and that the investment of RGGI allowance auction proceeds in 2015 alone will return $2.31 billion in lifetime energy bill savings for consumers.[7]

Over approximately the same period of time, however, CO2 emissions from the transportation sector in RGGI states have remained relatively level or have increased. Transportation accounts for 44 percent total CO2 emissions in the region, more than any other sector.[8] Each RGGI member state has adopted a long-term GHG reduction goal, set by statute or executive order, or in climate- or energy-related plans, “generally consistent with achieving an 80 percent reduction of GHG emissions by 2050 from 1990 levels.”[9] Most states’ goals do not include sector-specific emission targets, but because transportation is the largest source of emissions in the region, shifting to a cleaner transportation system is a “critical component of the action needed to meet economy-wide goals and to avoid further catastrophic harms of climate change.”[10] RGGI states already employ a variety of policy mechanisms aimed at decarbonizing transportation,[11] but have been considering whether to employ a cap-and-invest approach similar to RGGI or California’s multi-sector cap-and-invest program, which includes the state’s transportation sector.[12]

This paper first discusses the mechanics of RGGI and California’s cap-and-invest program generally, including how auction proceeds are invested. It then discusses the potential to use a cap-and-invest approach to mitigate GHG emissions from transportation in the Northeast and mid-Atlantic and addresses two key policy considerations: the type of fuels to be covered and the point of regulation. It concludes that, if properly designed, a cap-and-invest approach could achieve significant GHG reductions from transportation in the region and generate substantial funds for other GHG mitigation and climate change adaptation initiatives.

  1. The Cap-and-Invest Model

Cap-and-trade programs generally operate as follows.[13] The government sets an overall emissions target¾the cap¾and determines which facilities will be covered. Emission allowances, each generally equal to one ton of emissions, are periodically auctioned or distributed without cost—or both—to covered facilities.[14] The total number of allowances is equivalent to the cap number, which decreases over time.[15] A market is created in which covered facilities may purchase or sell allowances from other covered facilities. Covered facilities are required to hold enough allowances to cover their emissions at the end of a compliance period, which may range from one to three years.[16] If a facility lacks sufficient allowances, it will be assessed a monetary penalty in addition to having to purchase enough allowances to cover the shortfall.

This market-based approach provides covered facilities three options: (1) they may reduce their emissions to meet the number of allowances they purchase or receive; (2) they may purchase additional allowances on the market and emit more; or (3) they may reduce their emissions below the allowances they hold and sell the remainder on the market.[17] The advantage of cap-and-trade programs is that facilities that can reduce their emissions more cost-effectively will do so, while those that face higher emissions reduction costs will purchase additional allowances at auction or on the market.[18] Accordingly, cap-and-trade schemes provide firms with flexibility to design cost-effective, tailored emissions plans, and the regulator achieves its policy objective by means of the overall emissions cap.[19] “Cap-and-invest” refers to cap-and-trade programs that invest their proceeds into other policy initiatives intended to address the pollutant or its effects.

  1. RGGI

RGGI is the first market-based regulatory program in the United States designed to reduce GHG emissions.[20] It is a cooperative effort among the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont to cap and reduce CO2 emissions from the electricity generation sector.[21] RGGI is composed of individual CO2 budget trading programs implemented in each participating state. Through independent regulations, each state’s CO2 budget trading program limits emissions of CO2 from electric power plants with the capacity to generate 25 megawatts or more (some 164 facilities), issues CO2 allowances, and establishes participation in regional CO2 allowance auctions.[22]

RGGI began with discussions among the governors of seven New England and mid-Atlantic states, which led to a 2005 Memorandum of Understanding that outlined the program.[23] In 2008, the RGGI states issued a Model Rule that participating states could use as guidance to establish and implement their individual programs.[24] RGGI’s designers expected the initial program might be expanded in the future by covering other emission sources, sectors, GHGs, or states.[25] CO2 emissions from covered facilities in RGGI states account for approximately 20 percent of GHG emissions in the region.[26]

At the end of each three-year compliance period, covered facilities must surrender one allowance for each ton of CO2 emissions generated during the period.[27] Covered facilities are permitted to bank an unlimited number of emission allowances for future use.[28] Over 90 percent of allowances are distributed through periodic auctions, and a reserve price sets a price floor for allowances.[29] RGGI employs a “cost containment reserve” that allows for additional allowances to be auctioned if certain price thresholds are met.[30] In limited circumstances, covered facilities may also submit offsets, which are measurable reductions, avoidances, or sequestrations of emissions from non-covered sources, in lieu of emission allowances.[31] The RGGI states agreed that each would use at least 25 percent of its individual auction proceeds “for a consumer benefit or strategic energy purpose.”[32]

Member states invest the proceeds from allowance auctions in a variety of consumer benefit programs at scale.[33] In October 2017, RGGI, Inc. (the corporate entity that administers RGGI) released a report that tracks the investment of RGGI auction proceeds in 2015 and the benefits of these investments throughout the region.[34] The report estimates that “[t]he lifetime effects of these investments are projected to save 28 million MMBtu of fossil fuel energy and 9 million MWh of electricity, avoiding the release of 5.3 million short tons [4.8 million metric tons] of carbon pollution.”[35] The report also notes that “RGGI investments in 2015 are estimated to return $2.31 billion in lifetime energy bill savings to more than 161,000 households and 6,000 businesses which participated in programs funded by RGGI investments, and to 1.5 million households and over 37,000 businesses which received direct bill assistance.”[36] RGGI states have discretion as to how they invest RGGI proceeds.

The report breaks down these investments into four categories.  Energy efficiency makes up 64 percent of investments. Funded programs are expected to return $1.3 billion in lifetime energy bill savings to over 141,000 participating households and 5,700 regional businesses.[37] Clean and renewable energy makes up 16 percent of investments, and investments in these technologies are expected to return $785.8 million in lifetime energy bill savings to 19,600 participating households and 122 regional businesses.[38] Greenhouse gas abatement makes up 4 percent of investments and are expected to avoid the release of 636,000 short tons of CO2.[39] Finally, direct bill assistance makes up 10 percent of investments accounting for $40.4 million in bill credits and assistance to consumers.[40] One independent report notes that while RGGI states each have their own unique auction revenue investment programs, “[o]verall, greater than 60 percent of proceeds are invested to improve end-use energy efficiency and to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy technologies,”[41] which far exceeds the 25 percent investment “for a consumer benefit or strategic energy purpose” required by the Model Rule.

Whether or not RGGI has been successful is the subject of debate. As designed, it applies only to CO2 and only to emissions from some 164 power plants with the capacity to generate twenty-five megawatts or more.[42] Since CO2 accounts for only 20 percent of total GHG emissions in the RGGI states, and electricity generation accounts a fraction of total CO2 emissions, RGGI’s potential is limited.[43] The Congressional Research Service has thus described the initiative’s contribution to global GHG reductions to be “arguably negligible.”[44] In addition, RGGI significantly overestimated emissions from member states for its first compliance period and set an initial emissions cap that was actually above realized emissions levels.[45] This limited participation in the program and allowed participating facilities to bank substantial amounts of unused allowances.  After the 2012 program review, RGGI lowered the cap by 45 percent between 2014 and 2020.[46] And after the most recent review in 2016, RGGI lowered the cap by an additional 30 percent between 2020 and 2030.[47]  The extent to which these adjustments will hasten emissions reductions to be seen. On the other hand, several studies have shown that the combination of the price signal created by RGGI and the investment of allowance auction proceeds in other environmental programs has been the dominant driver of the recent emissions decline in the region.[48]

  1. California’s Cap-and-Invest Program

In 2006, California enacted its landmark climate change law, the Global Warming Solutions Act, also known as AB (“assembly bill”) 32.[49] The statute established an aggressive goal of reducing GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, and an 80 percent reduction from 1990 levels by 2050, across multiple sectors of the state’s economy.[50] AB 32 directed the California Air Resources Board (CARB), the state’s air pollution regulator, to implement a cap-and-trade program, which went into effect in 2013.[51]

According to CARB, the program, which covers approximately 450 entities, “sets a statewide limit on sources responsible for 85 percent of California’s greenhouse gas emissions, and establishes a price signal needed to drive long-term investment in cleaner fuels and more efficient use of energy.”[52] It is “designed to provide covered entities the flexibility to seek out and implement the lowest-cost options to reduce emissions.”[53] The 2013 cap was set at about 2 percent below the emissions level forecast for 2012, declines an additional 2 percent in 2014, and declines 3 percent annually from 2015 to 2020.[54]

Unlike RGGI, California’s program distributes free allocations of emission allowances earlier in the program, but those allocations decrease over time as the program transitions to an auction process.[55] The allocation for most industrial sectors is set at approximately 90 percent of average emissions and is updated annually based on each facility’s production.[56] Electrical distribution and natural gas facilities receive free allowances on the condition that the value of allowances must be used to benefit ratepayers and achieve GHG emission reductions.[57] The allocation for electrical distribution utilities is set at about 90 percent of average emissions, and for natural gas utilities, is based on natural gas supplied in 2011 to non-covered entities.[58] The program includes cost containment measures and allows for the banking of allowances, has a three-year compliance period with an annual obligation to surrender 30 percent of their previous year’s emissions, and allows for offsets of up to 8 percent of a facility’s compliance obligation.[59] AB 32 also employs a substantial penalty mechanism for facilities that fail to meet their compliance obligations: “If the compliance deadline is missed or there is a shortfall, four allowances must be provided for every ton of emissions that was not covered in time.”[60]

California’s cap-and-trade program became linked with Québec’s cap-and-trade system on January 1, 2014 and became linked with Ontario’s cap-and-trade program on January 1, 2018.[61] All allowances issued by the California, Québec, and Ontario programs before and after the linkage can be used for compliance interchangeably across jurisdictions.[62] The three jurisdictions also hold joint allowance auctions.

On January 1, 2015, suppliers of transportation fuels, including gasoline and diesel fuel, became covered under the program.[63] A fuel supplier is defined as “a supplier of petroleum products, a supplier of biomass-derived transportation fuels, a supplier of natural gas including operators of interstate and intrastate pipelines, a supplier of liquefied natural gas, or a supplier of liquefied petroleum gas.”[64] All fuel suppliers that deliver or import 10,000 metric tons or more of annual CO2 equivalent emissions are subject to a reporting requirement, but only suppliers that reach a 25,000 metric ton threshold are covered by the cap-and-trade program.[65]

Proceeds from the allowance auctions are deposited in the state’s Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund and are appropriated by the state legislature for “investing in projects that reduce carbon pollution in California, including investments to benefit disadvantaged communities, recycling, and sustainable transit.”[66] As of 2017, some $3.4 billion had been appropriated to state agencies implementing GHG emission reduction programs and projects, collectively referred to as the California Climate Investments.[67] Of that amount, $1.2 billion has been expended on projects “expected to reduce GHG emissions by over 15 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent.”[68]

  • Applying a Cap-and-Invest Approach to Northeast and Mid-Atlantic Transportation Sector

Under business-as-usual trends, carbon emissions in RGGI states will be 23 percent below the 1990 baseline in 2030.[69] These states must achieve much deeper emissions reductions across multiple economic sectors in order to achieve their “greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for 2030 that range from 35 to 45 percent, centered around a 40 percent reduction from 1990 levels.”[70] Since transportation represents the largest share of GHG emissions in the RGGI states, that sector should be a primary focus of policymakers’ attention.

One study finds that the levels of emissions reductions necessary to meet the GHG reduction goals of the states in the region could be accomplished “through a suite of clean transportation policies” including financial incentives for the purchase of clean vehicles, such as electric and hybrid light-duty vehicles and natural gas powered heavy-duty vehicles; investments in public transit expansion including bus rapid transit, light rail, and heavy rail; promotion of compact land use; investment in bicycle infrastructure; support for travel demand management strategies; investment in system operations efficiency technologies; and investment in infrastructure to support rail and short-sea freight shipping.[71]

One potential mechanism for achieving the levels of reductions necessary for the RGGI states to meet their targets “would be to implement a transportation pricing policy, which could both achieve GHG reductions and generate proceeds that could be used to fund clean and resilient transportation solutions.”[72] For example, “carbon-content-based fees, mileage-based user fees, and motor-fuel taxes” could “generate an average of $1.5 billion to $6 billion annually in the region.”[73] A mid-range pricing policy that generated approximately $3 billion annually “would create a price signal that would promote alternatives to single-occupancy vehicle travel and result in modest additional emission reductions. It would also raise a cumulative $41 billion to $46 billion for the region during 2015-2030.”[74] Proceeds from such a pricing policy would offset projected declines from existing state and federal gasoline taxes and could be used to fund other clean transportation initiatives.[75]

A hypothetical regional cap-and-invest program for vehicle emissions might be structured as follows. Member states would establish a mandatory regional cap on GHG emissions from the combustion of fossil transportation fuels calculated using volumetric fuel data and fuel emission factors available from the Environmental Protection Agency.[76] The cap would decline over time. States would auction allowances equal to the cap and establish an entity like RGGI, Inc. to administer the program, auction platform, and allowance market.[77] Regulated entities would achieve compliance by purchasing allowances at auction or from other market participants, and possibly with offsets earned from reductions in other aspects of their operations.[78] As with RGGI, individual member states would commit to invest a percentage of their auction proceeds into other initiatives aimed at reducing GHG emissions, including from transportation, and could retain the discretion to decide individually how to allocate those funds.[79]

Because power plants are stationary and relatively few in number, their GHG emissions can be regulated directly, i.e., at the stack. Vehicles, however, are mobile and far more numerous. To regulate the emissions from every fossil fuel powered vehicle at the tailpipe would entail a substantial and possibly prohibitive administrative burden, and would likely be politically unpalatable. An alternative is to use transportation fuel as the point of regulation. Determining which types of fuels and which entities in the fuel supply chain to cover under the cap-and-invest program will be critical.

Transportation fuels that could be covered include gasoline, on-road and off-road diesels, aviation fuels, natural gas, propane/butane, and marine fuels.[80] Considering both the volume of each type of fuel consumed and the comparative emissions resulting from its consumption, the program should cover, at a minimum, gasoline and on-road diesel, which account for approximately 85 percent of carbon emissions from transportation in the region.[81] Other fuels may make up too small a portion of total emissions to justify the additional technical and regulatory burden of covering them.[82] In addition, because all states in the region currently require reporting on gasoline and on-road diesel, the most straightforward approach would be to regulate those fuels. Covering other fuels would require at least some states that do not already require reporting of these fuels to establish new reporting requirements.[83]

Another key design choice is the point of regulation: which entities within the transportation fuel supply chain should be subject to the regulatory obligation to hold sufficient allowances. Because all states in the region have existing reporting and enforcement mechanisms for gasoline and on-road diesel (and many also tax off-road diesel and aviation fuel), one option would be to regulate existing state points of taxation for these fuels.[84] However, state points of taxation are not uniform throughout the region. They can include many different types of entities in the supply chain and in some states the point of taxation is different for different fuels.[85] State regulations also differ with respect to what actions by covered entities trigger the reporting requirement.[86] Many states have points of regulation low in the supply chain, such as entities that purchase fuel from the terminal rack and distribute it to retailers.[87] Thus, while using existing state points of taxation to regulate transportation fuels would make use of existing state regulatory mechanisms, it would also require regulating over one thousand entities across the region, many of which are smaller distributors.[88]

Another possible point of regulation would be one that is as far upstream as possible, i.e., entities that refine fuel in the region for use in the region, and those that import fuel into the region for use in the region.[89] This would include refineries, and for fuels refined outside the region, the first importers into the region.[90] Eight refineries in the region and an unknown number of first importers, including foreign suppliers and suppliers from U.S. states outside the region, would be subject to regulation.[91] This option would require reporting of the destination of all fuel produced in or that enters the region to ensure that a fuel to be used outside the region is not inadvertently covered.[92] While the Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the Environmental Protection Agency generally require destination data from refiners and importers into the U.S. and from interstate suppliers, the agencies do not publicly disclose this data.[93] Thus, regulating refiners and importers would likely cover many fewer entities as compared to existing state points of taxation, most of which would be large petroleum companies.[94] However, because only three states in the region have refineries within their borders, and because importers are not systematically tracked throughout the region, accounting for fuels that are transported through states to prevent double-counting would likely require the establishment of new regional reporting requirements that would include points of origin and destination.[95]

A third possible point of regulation would be entities known as prime suppliers, defined by the EIA as “suppliers who produce, import, or transport product across state boundaries and local marketing areas and sell to local distributors, local retailers, or end-users.”[96] For the region, this includes approximately 30 refiners, other producers of finished fuel, interstate resellers and retailers, and importers.[97] EIA requires these entities to report the amount of fuel, including gasoline, diesel, and aviation fuel, sold or transferred for end use by state on a monthly basis.[98] Although EIA does not publicly provide disaggregated prime supplier data because of statutory privacy restrictions, organizations may enter into data-sharing arrangements with EIA to obtain individual prime supplier data.[99] Thus, while the prime supplier group would include a larger number of regulated entities than importers and refiners, it would provide a consistent definition of a point of regulation already understood by the regulated entities.[100] Regulating prime suppliers, most of which are higher in the supply chain than existing state points of taxation, would also relieve most smaller entities of compliance obligations.[101]

  1. Conclusion

States in states in New England and the mid-Atlantic region must make much deeper emissions reductions in the transportation sector in order to meet their overall GHG emission reduction targets. Recognizing this reality, representatives from Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington, D.C., at the 2017 Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, signed a joint statement affirming their commitment to reducing GHG emissions from the transportation sector. In that statement, they identified “market-based carbon mitigation strategies” as potential pathways to achieving needed emissions reductions.[102]

Despite its early struggles, the cap-and-invest approach to mitigating emissions in the northeast and mid-Atlantic electricity generation sector has achieved, at a minimum, some emissions reductions, substantial investment in other GHG mitigation efforts, and overall net benefits within the region. California has achieved substantial GHG emissions reductions across multiple sectors, including transportation, and has invested substantial sums in a suite of other green programs. These examples demonstrate the potential of using a cap-and-invest approach to accomplish environmentally and economically sound policy objectives, both within the RGGI region and in the context of transportation. If properly structured, such an approach could achieve significant emissions reductions in the region and raise substantial funds for other GHG mitigation and climate change adaptation initiatives.

How would a cap-and-invest approach to transportation emissions be structured? The fundamental aspects of RGGI and California’s cap-and-invest program are similar in most respects. California occupies a unique position in federal regulation of automobile emissions and had the benefit of constructing a program applicable only to itself, although its program is now linked with programs in other jurisdictions. RGGI already covers much of the Northeast and mid-Atlantic region, could be expanded to include other sectors of those states’ economies, including transportation, and could be linked with the California-Québec-Ontario cap-and-invest system to create a larger and more efficient allowance market.

Owing to the practical differences between directly regulating emissions from power plants and indirectly regulating transportation emissions by fuel type and supply chain point, the mechanics of using a cap-and-invest approach to mitigate transportation emissions, especially across jurisdictions, poses some potentially challenging design issues. The program should cover, at a minimum, gasoline and on-road diesel. Identifying the appropriate point of regulation will require policymakers to consider a host of technical, administrative, and policy issues. Existing state points of taxation are numerous and vary by jurisdiction and by fuel type within jurisdictions. Upstream refiners and importers are far fewer in number but regulating these entities would likely require the development of new regional reporting mechanisms that might make this option administratively undesirable. While the prime suppliers group is larger in number than refiners and importers, regulating prime suppliers would provide a consistent state-based definition of a point of regulation already understood by the regulated entities, and would not subject most smaller entities to complia

* James Flynn is an LL.M. candidate at New York University School of Law and the graduate editor of the NYU Environmental Law Journal.

[1] See Energy Information Administration, State Carbon Dioxide Emissions Data (last visited Feb. 10, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/state/.

[2] See Gabe Pacyniak, et al., Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Transportation: Opportunities in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic, Georgetown Climate Center 8 (2015), http://www.georgetownclimate.org/files/report/GCC-Reducing_GHG_Emissions_from_Transportation-11.24.15.pdf.

[3] Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Welcome (last visited Feb. 10, 2018), https://www.rggi.org.

[4] Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, RGGI Benefits (last visited Feb. 10, 2018), https://www.rggi.org/investments/proceeds-investments.

[5] Brian C. Murray and Peter T. Maniloff, Why have greenhouse emissions in RGGI states declined? An econometric attribution to economic, energy market, and policy factors, Energy Economics 51, 588 (2015).

[6] See Paul J. Hibbard, et al., The Economic Impacts of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative on Nine Northeast and Mid-Atlantic States, Analysis Group 5 (July 14, 2015), http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedfiles/content/insights/publishing/analysis_group_rggi_report_july_2015.pdf; Ceres, The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: A Fact Sheet (2015), https://www.ceres.org/sites/default/files/Fact%20Sheets%20or%20misc%20files/RGGI%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf.

[7] Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, The Investment of RGGI Proceeds in 2015 3 (Oct. 2017), https://www.rggi.org/sites/default/files/Uploads/Proceeds/RGGI_Proceeds_Report_2015.pdf.

[8] See Energy Information Administration, supra note 1; Gerald B. Silverman and Adrianne Appel, Northeast States Hit the Brakes on Carbon Emissions From Cars, BNA (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.bna.com/northeast-states-hit-n73014470981/.

[9] Pacyniak, supra note 2.

[10] Id.

[11] See Gabe Pacyniak, et al., Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Transportation: Opportunities in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic, Appendix 3: State GHG Reduction Goals in the TCI Region, Georgetown Climate Center 4-13 (2015), http://www.georgetownclimate.org/files/report/Apndx3_TCIStateEnergyClimateGoals-Nov2015-v2_1.pdf.

[12] See, e.g., Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, California Cap and Trade (last visited Feb. 10, 2018), https://www.c2es.org/content/california-cap-and-trade/.

[13] See Joel B. Eisen, et al., Energy, Economics and the Environment 326 (4th ed. 2015).

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] See id.

[17] Id.

[18] See id.

[19] See id.

[20] See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, supra note 3.

[21] See id.

[22] Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Program Design (last visited Feb. 10, 2018), https://www.rggi.org/program-overview-and-design/elements.

[23] Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, A Brief History of RGGI (last visited Feb. 10, 2018), https://www.rggi.org/program-overview-and-design/design-archive.

[24] Id.

[25] Jonathan L. Ramseur, The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: Lessons Learned and Issues for Congress,

Congressional Research Service 3 (May 16, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41836.pdf.

[26] Id.

[27] Id.

[28] Id.

[29] Id.

[30] Id.

[31] Id. at 4.

[32] Id. at 3.

[33] See Brian M. Jones, Christopher Van Atten, and Kaley Bangston, A Pioneering Approach to Carbon Markets: How the Northeast States Redefined Cap and Trade for the Benefit of Consumers, M.J. Bradley & Associates 4 (Feb. 2017), http://www.mjbradley.com/sites/default/files/rggimarkets02-15-2017.pdf.

[34] Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, The Investment of RGGI Proceeds in 2015 (Oct. 2017), https://www.rggi.org/sites/default/files/Uploads/Proceeds/RGGI_Proceeds_Report_2015.pdf.

[35] Id. at 3.

[36] Id.

[37] Id.

[38] Id.

[39] Id.

[40] Id.

[41] Jones, supra note 33.

[42] Id.

[43] See id. at 3.

[44] Id. at 17.

[45] Id. at 4.

[46] Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Elements of RGGI (last visited Feb. 10, 2018), https://www.rggi.org/program-overview-and-design/elements.

[47] Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Summary of RGGI Model Rule Updates 1 (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.rggi.org/program-overview-and-design/elements.

[48] See Murray, supra note 5 at 25-26; Man-Keun Kim and Taehoo Kim, Estimating impact of regional greenhouse gas initiative on coal to gas switching using synthetic control methods, Energy Economics 59, 334 (2016).

[49] California Air Resources Board, Assembly Bill 32 Overview (last visited Feb. 10, 2018), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm.

[50] Id.

[51] Id.

[52] Id.

[53] California Air Resources Board, Overview of ARB Emissions Trading Program 1 (last visited Feb. 10, 2018), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/guidance/cap_trade_overview.pdf.

[54] Id.

[55] Id.

[56] Id.

[57] Id.

[58] Id.

[59] Id. at 2.

[60] Id.

[61] California Air Resources Board, Facts About The Linked Cap-and-Trade Programs 1 (updated Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/linkage_fact_sheet.pdf.

[62] Id.

[63] California Air Resources Board, Information for Entities That Take Delivery of Fuel for Fuels Phased into the Cap- and-Trade Program Beginning on January 1, 2015 1 (last visited Feb. 10, 2018), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/guidance/faq_fuel_purchasers.pdf.

[64] Id. at 2.

[65] Id.

[66] California Air Resources Board, 2017 Report to the Legislature on California Climate Investments Using Cap-And-Trade Auction Proceeds i (2017), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auctionproceeds/cci_annual_report_2017.pdf.

[67] Id.

[68] Id. at v.

[69] Elizabeth A. Stanton, et al., The RGGI Opportunity, Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. 3 (revised Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/The-RGGI-Opportunity.pdf. Notably, this study took into account the anticipated effect of the Clean Power Plan, which President Donald Trump and Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Scott Pruitt propose to repeal. See id. at 4.

[70] Id. at 2.

[71] Pacyniak, supra note 2 at 22. The Georgetown Climate Center serves as the facilitator for the Transportation Climate Initiative, which is “a collaboration of the agency heads of the transportation, energy, and environment agencies of 11 states and the District of Columbia, who in 2010 committed to work together to improve efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation sector throughout the northeast and mid-Atlantic region.” Id. at i.

[72] Id. at 25.

[73] Id.

[74] Id.

[75] Id. at 26-27.

[76] Drew Veysey, Gabe Pacyniak, and James Bradbury, Reducing Transportation Emissions in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic: Fuel System Considerations, Georgetown Climate Center 7 (Nov. 13, 2017), http://www.georgetownclimate.org/files/report/GCC_TransportationFuelSystemConsiderations_Nov2017.pdf.

[77] Id.

[78] Id.

[79] See id.

[80] Id. at 9.

[81] See id. at 11-13.

[82] See id. at 33.

[83] Id. at 20.

[84] Id.

[85] Id. at 16.

[86] Id.

[87] Id. at 17.

[88] Id. at 33.

[89] Id. at 21.

[90] Id.

[91] Id.

[92] Id. at 22.

[93] Id.

[94] Id. at 33.

[95] Id.

[96] Id. at 24.

[97] Id.

[98] Id.

[99] Id. at 25.

[100] Id. at 33

[101] Id.

[102] See Transportation and Climate Initiative, Northeast and Mid-Atlantic States Seek Public Input As They Move Toward a Cleaner Transportation Future (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.transportationandclimate.org/northeast-and-mid-atlantic-states-seek-public-input-they-move-toward-cleaner-transportation-future; Sierra Club, Northeast and Mid-Atlantic Governors Lauded for Announcement on Transportation and Climate, Press Release (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.sierraclub.org/press-releases/2017/11/northeast-and-mid-atlantic-governors-lauded-for-announcement-transportation.

Summary: An Ohio jury awards $1.6 million after finding DuPont liable for dumping toxic chemicals into drinking water near its Washington Works Plant in Parkersburg, West Virginia. The Environmental Protection Agency has yet to set a definitive standard allowable for the chemical, C8, in drinking water even though it is hazardous to human health, making it difficult to hold companies responsible for their actions.

__________________________________________

By Lauren Gates

On October 7, 2015, an Ohio jury awarded Carla Marie Bartlett $1.6 million ($1.1 million for negligence and $500,000 for emotional distress) after finding DuPont liable for leaking a toxic chemical into drinking water near one of its plants. Bartlett, who lived in Coolville, Ohio, a few miles away from the Parkersburg plant, was diagnosed with kidney cancer in 1997. This case, Bartlett v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. , was the first of two test cases that are part of more than 3,500 cases for individuals that either reside near or work at DuPont’s Washington Works Plant in Parkersburg, West Virginia. The plaintiffs all believe they contracted one of six diseases linked to the same chemical, perfluorooctanoic acid, or C8. The chemical was used by DuPont to make Teflon and is found in numerous household items such as kitty litter, cosmetics, and dental floss.

For decades DuPont buried C8 in unlined landfills and also dumped up to 50,000 pounds per year directly into the Ohio River but it was not until March 2001 that an attorney, Robert Bilott, tried to hold DuPont accountable and eliminate the chemical from the water supply. Billot sent packages containing over 100 documents he obtained through discovery in 1999 to the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection and the Attorney General of the United States. The documents revealed that DuPont knew for years that C8 is dangerous to health and that it entered drinking water so urces. The Environmental Protection Agency filed a lawsuit against DuPont in July of 2004 alleging that DuPont concealed evidence and DuPont eventually settled with EPA for $165 million, which pales in comparison to the $1 billion per year DuPont made in revenue for products containing C8.

In September of 2004, attorneys represented 80,000 plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit against DuPont which settled for $374 million. Part of the agreement stipulated that a portion of the money would go to fund a study to determine whether C8 actually harmed people. In 2005, residents near the Washington Works Plant were invited to be part of a health study conducted by court-appointed epidemiologists. In 2012, the results from the study were released and scientists found “more likely than not” that C8 exposure was linked to numerous health conditions including: testicular cancer, kidney cancer, liver cancer, thyroid disease, ulcerative colitis, high cholesterol, and pregnancy-induced hypertension. Based on these results, 3,500 residents that did not settle in the 2004 class action suit have brought individual liability lawsuits against DuPont for health problems linked to C8.

As of 2014, EPA found C8 in 94 public water systems in 27 states, serving over 6.5 million Americans. Additionally, C8 is in the bloodstream of 99.7% of Americans. The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 empowers EPA to study health impacts of chemicals and regulate its use but EPA has little authority to prevent use of chemicals before it is shown to be safe. Currently, EPA does not have an official drinking water standard for C8 and has only set a health advisory level for drinking water of .4 parts per billion. Studies suggest that even the advisory level for drinking water is not enough to protect the public. In May of 2015, over 200 scientists, including chemists, toxicologists, and epidemiologists, signed a statement urging governments to restrict the use of C8 because of the “risk of adverse effects on human health and environment.” If EPA sets definitive standard it would help people interpret results from water monitoring and would enable those affected to hold companies accountable for their actions.

Lauren Gates is a 3L at Vermont Law School, working towards her Masters of Environmental Law a
nd Policy, Water Law Certificate, and Energy Law Certificate. Prior to
law school, she attended Fairmont State University in West Virginia where she earned a B.S. in Biology. She is currently interning for the Vermont Natural Resources Board. Lauren enjoys reading, traveling, and spending time with friends and family.

The post Chemical Used to Make Teflon is Causing a Sticky Situation in West Virginia and Ohio appeared first on Vermont Journal of Environmental Law.

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