This post is part of the Environmental Law Review Syndicate, a multi-school online forum run by student editors from the nation’s leading environmental law reviews.
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By Malia McPherson, J.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School, Expected 2016 

Introduction

On November 4, 2014, the voters of San Benito County passed Measure J, a voter initiative banning hydraulic fracturing (‘fracking’) and all other high-intensity petroleum operations within county lines. Under California law, only a subsequent voter initiative can overrule this fracking ban. While it is not the first county or city within California to take a stand against fracking, San Benito’s path to a successful ballot initiative was unique. Despite being dramatically outspent in the run-up to the election, the San Benito anti-fracking coalition San Benito Rising defeated industry interests through a simple strategy of basic grassroots organization. The movement was largely leaderless, it was community focused, and it represented both minority and majority interests. How did it succeed? Given the potential risks posed by fracking, and the legal context that left a regulatory ‘gap’ for Measure J to fill, the San Benito experience shows that it is indeed possible for community-centered lawyering and the voter initiative process to protect community environmental integrity on a precautionary basis against encroachment from outside interests

  1. THE RISKS POSED BY FRACKING

“Fracking” is the collective and colloquial term for the use of high volume hydraulic fracturing for fossil fuel extraction.[1] Its purpose is to extract oil and gas from rock formations deep underground (in deep shale formations) with high-pressure ‘fracking fluids’. These fluids contain “significant amounts of water, sand, and chemicals” that fracture the rock layers to free the trapped oil or gas so it can be pumped out.[2]

Although fracking as a process has been in use for decades, its environmental consequences remain significant. First, fracking is an intensive activity that requires large access roads, acres of clearing sites, drilling rig access, and storage and processing structures.[3] Once a well is drilled, millions of gallons of water are brought into the site and mixed with chemical agents, sand and emulsifiers.[4] Although the fracking fluid is 98% water, the oil and gas industries have reported that between 2005 and 2009, 29 chemicals were used in fracking fluids that were “(1) known or possible human carcinogens, (2) regulated under the Safe Water Drinking Act for their risks to human health, or (3) listed as hazardous air pollutants under the Clean Air Act.”[5] These fluids have to be kept out of normal watersheds in surface containments, or be sequestered underground – in either location these fluids have the potential to “eventually . . . migrate into and contaminate groundwater sources for waterways and drinking supplies.”[6]

Separate from the concerns of storage and disposal of contaminated fracking fluids, there are risks with “propping” substances.[7] The oil and gas industries use silica gels to “prop” open wells before water injection. [8] If these gels are improperly handled, they can become airborne, enter a person’s lungs, and cause incurable lung diseases.[9] Further indirect effects can come transporting oil and gas away from the fracking site, which can be a way for accidents and spills to occur.[10] Finally, in California there are also concerns about fracking’s significant water use during drought conditions, and about the disposal of wastewater, which has been linked to small-scale earthquakes.[11] Cyclic steam injections used in unconventional oil and gas recovery also carry similar risks – millions of gallons of water are required for steam heating, leading to problems of aquifer depletion and contaminated wastewater.[12]

  1. LEGAL CONTEXT: THE REGULATORY GAP IN CALIFORNIA
  2. The Federal and State Regulatory ‘Patchwork’

The risks posed by fracking are worrisome in part because there is no national regulatory framework governing it, only a “patchwork” of inconsistent regulations that leave open the potential for spills, contamination and other ill effects throughout the country.[13] Although there are numerous other federal environmental regulations that explicitly preempt state law to ensure national uniformity,[14] prior to the passage of Measure J in 2014, the federal government had taken little action to regulate fracking.[15] Despite extensive federal environmental legislative activity from 1969 through the 1980s, fracking operations and “its roughly thirty affiliated and component processes” fell through the cracks.[16] This trend continued in 2005 when Congress explicitly exempted most types of fracking from the federal Safe Water Drinking Act.[17] Despite that statute’s goal of protecting public and municipal water supplies, the impacts of “underground injection and disposal of hazardous substances” on water quality were ignored.[18]

More recently, the federal government started taking small steps toward regulating fracking. These included announcing a long-term research plan to explore the impacts of fracking,[19] finalizing new Clean Air Act rules to limit emissions of some air pollutants,[20] and adopting regulations that create basic fracking standards for drilling on public lands.[21] These drilling standards, however, do not apply to private or state-owned land.

Recent California state legislation on fracking applies to operations throughout the state, but takes somewhat of a ‘light touch’ approach to regulating drilling operations. Senate Bill 4 (SB 4), passed in 2013,[22] is basically a type of permitting and disclosure scheme in which fracking operations can continue so long as operators meet basic requirements.[23] These requirements include groundwater and air quality monitoring, public disclosure of all chemicals used, and neighbor notification before well stimulation takes place.[24] At the time of its passage, critics were upset that SB 4 did not go much further than public disclosure and neighborhood notification of dangerous drilling operations; many environmental groups had sought a full ban or more strict regulation.[25]

Most importantly, SB 4 does not expressly preempt local law; instead, it contains provisions that “explicitly preserve local authority.”[26] A more robust state law may have stopped local initiatives from taking root[27] – two separate district courts have found that state law preempts the ability of local or county governments to ban fracking. A Colorado district court held that a voter-approved fracking ban in Longmont was preempted by the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act, and a New Mexico district court found a Mora County Ban preempted by state law.[28]

  1. Options for Local Governments – Room for Community-Based Lawyering

Local and county governments can step into the regulatory vacuum left by an incomplete patchwork of state and federal regulations. As authorized in the state of California, cities and counties in particular have great power to control the extent of oil and gas development within their jurisdiction.[29] First, the state Constitution broadly provides that local governments “may make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to municipal affairs…. City charters … with respect to municipal affairs shall supersede all law inconsistent therewith.”[30] Second, the California Public Resources Code confirms that local authorities retain the power to “enact and enforce laws and regulations regulating the conduct and location of oil production activities, including … zoning,… public safety, nuisance … [and] noise …”[31] California cities by extension have the inherent authority to ban oil and gas development through their zoning powers.[32]

In addition to the ability of local governments in California to pass legislation aimed at fracking concerns, California local governments have a unique voter initiative process. From its long history with voter initiatives, California is considered “the leader in direct democracy.”[33] In California, the initiative is not a right granted by the Constitution, but rather a “power reserved” by the people.[34] This process is certainly not without limits; voter initiatives are subject to numerous limitations and requirements, including constitutional and conflict of laws rules,[35] filing and notice requirements,[36] signature thresholds,[37],[38] and other ballot access regulations.[39] But if the initiative appears on the ballot and receives the approval of a majority of voters, it becomes law after ten days,[40] after which it cannot be repealed or amended except by another voter initiative.[41] Because of the procedural requirements and political mobilization necessary to mount an initiative campaign, issues settled by a successful initiative are particularly difficult to overturn later. This is especially the case for local level initiatives focused on community concerns such as land use, governance, and safety, which tend to garner more voter turnout than state-level propositions.[42]

Practically, and as seen in San Benito County, the voter initiative process can also offer new channels for community-based organizations to ensure not just direct, but also equitable democracy. Through inclusive ballot initiative campaigns, community-based organizations can seek (1) more community input into the formulation of public policy and (2) community participation throughout the decision-making process. In doing so, organizations can enlist wide swaths of the voting public in participatory coalitions, propagate messages through social networks, aggregate the interests of many community members, and both create and employ social capital.[43] San Benito Rising, the organization who led the Measure J campaign, used many of these broad techniques for community-based organizing to step into the regulatory gap through the initiative process.

III. MEASURE J IN SAN BENITO COUNTY

  1. Context and Motivations

The San Benito fracking ban was motivated by natural gas deposits found relatively recently within the Monterey Shale, a 1,750-mile shale gas formation running down the center of California[44] whose extraction was seen by some to be a potentially “enormous bonanza.”[45] San Benito was considered a “frontline county” before Measure J passed because drillers had already started extracting oil and gas from the region[46] and more exploration was underway in 2013.[47] Without federal or state regulatory protection before the passage of Measure J, San Benito County may have been a place where environmental harms could have gone unchecked. With a small total population, a significant portion of whom are migrant farm workers, and vast acres of undeveloped agricultural lands, San Benito County is “out of sight and out of mind” for many state politicians.[48]

            Skeptical that state regulations and regulators would adequately protect their interests, a small group of about twenty members of the San Benito County community banded together to form San Benito Rising. Early founders of San Benito Rising raised concerns that “[r]egulations are just a way of giving the industry a road map to frack. States like Pennsylvania and Texas have regulations, but that hasn’t stopped the [environmental impacts of the] process. It’s only made a mess. We realized we needed to ban the process entirely” to protect economically vital local groundwater resources.[49] Representatives of the group claimed they were not looking to role models of “environmental activism” within California for guidance, but rather to the many localities in New York that hired lawyers to draft local legislation.[50] With small amounts taken from their retirement funds, the early founders of San Benito Rising hired Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger LLP (SMW), a San Francisco law firm noted for its expertise in land use and community environmental issues, to help draft the legislation.[51]

  1. The Mechanics of Measure J

Lawyers from SMW carefully drafted Measure J’s text to prohibit “the use of any land within the County’s unincorporated area for “High-Intensity Petroleum Operations.”[52] The initiative defined such operations to include “well stimulation treatments (such as hydraulic fracturing, also known as fracking, and acid well stimulation treatments) and enhanced recovery wells (such as cyclic steam injection).”[53] Measure J’s general purpose was to “protect San Benito County’s water quality and supplies, agricultural lands, environmental quality, rural character, scenic vistas, and quality of life.”[54] This fell directly under the recognized local powers of zoning and public safety regulation. Rather than banning “all oil and gas extraction,” it banned all extraction activities in residential areas and stimulation treatments, except for vested interests.[55] The initiative allowed parties with vested rights to such operations to seek approval from the planning commission for up to three years.[56] It also allowed the San Benito County Board of Supervisors to grant exceptions to the initiative, if not doing so would constitute an unconstitutional taking.[57] Finally, for protection, it allowed severability if any portion was deemed invalid.[58] Unlike many voter initiatives in California, and perhaps as a result of its careful drafting, Measure J was fortunate to avoid any pre-election litigation challenge.[59] Though they had invested their own personal funds in the effort from the beginning, the leaders of San Benito Rising knew that their movement was not about themselves and would only succeed if it could engage and involve the larger countywide community.[60]

  1. The Measure J Campaign

San Benito Rising departed from several common approaches for California ballot initiatives: by using volunteers instead of paid signature gatherers, by focusing on voter education, and by having candid, largely unscripted discussions about the complexities surrounding fracking.[61] San Benito Rising did not formally associate with any political parties or hire campaign consultants.[62]

During the signature collection stage, several messages about the initiative helped expand their base of support beyond environmental protection to include those concerned about: (1) the future of the county and how fracking would affect agricultural interests, (2) the business community’s interests in avoiding extractive mining impacts, and (3) the general importance of water to sustain local life and families.[63] Because of this, San Benito Rising was able to attract prominent farmers, ranchers, and even Chamber of Commerce members to support a “green” initiative.[64] Perhaps most impressively, the environmental group was able to get support from the plumbers union and the state employees association.[65] Key support also came from the Latino community; Luis Valdez, regarded as the “father of the Chicano theater in the United States,” vocally and prominently supported the movement.[66] He helped organize events such as the “Latinos United Against Fracking Conference” in San Benito.[67] Additionally, prominent teachers with connections to former students and school districts became very involved.[68] Younger high school students also became allies and took to social media: “Hay Bailers Against Fracking” (a title invoking the local high school mascot) became the Facebook platform to unite the community.[69],[70] San Benito Rising fundamentally tried to be “as broad as possible.”[71] By the time their initiative was turned into the county elections office for certification on April 22, 2014, San Benito Rising had collected over 4,000 signatures. The signatures were collected in merely fourteen days, which may have set a state record.[72]

Lastly, the oil and gas industry marketing efforts deployed to oppose Measure J may actually have worked in favor of the initiative. As soon as “outside money” started flowing into community advertising – bringing repetitive television commercials, radio coverage, and mailings to San Benito County – the community became skeptical of its message.[73] Many of the groups had opaque “insider sounding names” such as “San Benito United for Energy,” which also frustrated community members.[74] Oil companies, including Chevron, Inc. and Occidental Petroleum, spent at least $6.7 million in the election cycle to oppose fracking bans.[75] In contrast, San Benito Rising raised and spent only $120,000.[76]

San Benito Rising’s inclusive and informative process succeeded in building consensus and generating interest through Election Day. The leader of Measure J’s opposition even called the movement a “great grassroots campaign,”[77] which succeeded in bringing out an extremely high voter turnout for an the off-year election (58.9%). The initiative found support from voters of all economic backgrounds, and enjoyed its strongest support from Latinos (with over 73% of Latino voters supporting the measure).[78] After the results were tallied, San Benito Rising was proud and optimistic for the future: “I think it means that people actually have more power than the biggest corporations that when you get a community involved in something ­– that has tremendous force. I think that the millions of dollars spent by the industry was really a sign of their fear more than anything else.”[79]

  1. CONCLUSION

Because of the strength of its initiative process, California is a unique state that enables environmental interests to prevail at the local level. While it may often seem that one small county alone is powerless to control its destiny, inclusive voter initiatives can help tip the scale back in favor of community-based decision-making. San Benito County became the first county to ban fracking in California, and presents at least anecdotal guidance for communities who desire a fracking-free future. While the economic interests of a particular region may provide the best guide to ultimate success,[80] because of Measure J, the oil and gas industry no doubt will approach the voter initiative process with greater caution in the future. San Benito County’s Measure J experience should make communities hopeful but realistic about the possibility of using direct democracy and grassroots organizing in what may otherwise be a David and Goliath struggle to safeguard community environmental interests.

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[1] Elizabeth Ridlington & John Rumpler, Fracking by the Numbers 8 (Envir. Am., Oct. 2013), http://www.environmentamerica.org/sites/environment/files/reports/EA_FrackingNumbers_scrn.pdf.

[2] Michael Murza & Richard M. Frank, Senate Bill 4: A Past and Future Look at Regulating Hydraulic Fracturing in California, 4 (U.C. Davis, June 2014),

https://law.ucdavis.edu/centers/environmental/files/CELPC-SB4-report.pdf.

[3] Emily C. Powers, Fracking and Federalism: Support for An Adaptive Approach that Avoids the Tragedy of the Regulatory Commons, 19 J.L. & Pol’y 913, 919 (2010-2011).

[4] Murza & Frank, supra note 2, at 9 (stating that the amount used is estimated between 2 to 5 million gallons of water per well stimulation);

[5] Id. at 8.

[6] Powers, supra note 3.

[7] Murza & Frank, supra note 2, at 9.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Id. at 10.

[11] Id. at 4.

[12] Protect San Benito, http://www.protectsanbenito.org/uploads/2/5/9/2/25924404/cyclic_steam_fact_sheet_.pdf (last visited June 27, 2015).

[13] Mfon Etukeren, Hydrofracking and Environmental Justice: A Proposal to Lower the Threshold for Evidence of Discriminatory Impact in Title VI Complaints, 4 Seattle J. Envtl. L. 51, 53 (2014).

[14] See Philip Weinberg & Kevin Reilly, Understanding Environmental Law, section 1.04 (Lexis Nexis, 2007) (noting that the Clean Air Act explicitly preempts state law with regards to emission control system for new cars and for the labeling of pesticides).

[15] Coral Davenport, New Federal Rules Set for Fracking, N.Y. Times (March 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/21/us/politics/obama-administration-unveils-federal-fracking-regulations.html?_r=0.

[16] Powers, supra note 3, at 913-14.

[17] Id. at 939.

[18] Id.

[19] Dr. Saby Ghoshray, Charting the Future Trajectory for Fracking Regulation: From Environmental Democracy to Cooperative Federalism, 38 T. Marshall L.Rev. 199, 204 (2013).

[20] Lawrence G. Cetrulo, Toxic Torts Litigation Guide, § 44:10 (West 2014) (noting that the rules don’t cover oil wells or set limits on methane release).

[21] Davenport, supra note 15.

[22] Murza & Frank, supra note 2.

[23] Michael N. Mills & Shannon L. Morrissey, California’s Efforts to Regulate Hydraulic Fracking Stimulates Litigation Flurry, ABA: Energy & Nat. Res. Comm., 9 (March 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/nr_newsletters/enrl/201503_enrl.authcheckdam.pdf.

[24] Id.

[25] The Times Editorial Board, A Fracking Bill Gone Bad, L.A. Times (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-fracking-california-sb4-20130912-story.html#ixzz2ncadpe8H.

[26] Hollin Kretzmann & Kassie Siegel, Local Governments and the Power to Ban Fracking and Other Forms of Unconventional Oil and Gas Activity in California, Ctr. Bio. Diversity (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.cafrackfacts.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Local-Governments-and-the-Power-to-Ban-Fracking-January-201412.pdf. See also Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 3690 (an existing law predating SB 4 that explicitly states that state-wide oil and gas regulations “shall not be deemed a preemption by the state of any existing right of cities and counties to enact and enforce laws and regulations regulating the conduct and location of oil production activities…”); Murza & Frank, supra note 2, at 35 (stating that “. . . author Senator Pavley and the legislation’s supporters have made clear that SB 4 should not be considered the definitive and final statement governing fracking in California. To the contrary, SB 4 permits a continuing role for California local governments that wish to enact more stringent fracking regulations or bans than the statewide provisions mandated by SB 4”).

[27] David R. Baker, To Fight Fracking Bans, Oil Firms Heavily Outspend Environmentalists, S.F. Gate (Nov. 2, 2014, 7:03 AM) (discussing that Santa Cruz County in 2013 and the Los Angeles City Council in 2014 both adopted a moratorium on fracking in response to statewide inaction), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/To-fight-fracking-bans-oil-firms-heavily-5864369.php#photo-7082245.

[28] See e.g., Colo. Oil and Gas Ass’n v. Longmont, 20th Jud. Dist., 2013-cv-63, order 7/24/14 (the decision is being appealed and an appellate ruling is expected later this year; SWEPI, LP v. Mora County et al., Case No. 1:14-cv-00035-JB-SCY, filed Jan. 19, 2015.

[29] Kretzmann & Siegel, supra note 27.

[30] Id. (quoting Cal. Const. art. XI, sec. 5).

[31] Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 3690 (West 2015).

[32] See Hermosa Beach Stop Oil Coalition v. City of Hermosa Beach, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 447, 462 (Cal. App. Ct. 2001) (stating that the enactment of a city ordinance prohibiting exploration for and production of oil, unless arbitrary, is a valid exercise of the municipal police power).

[33] Tracy M. Gordon, The Local Initiative in California, Pub. Pol’y Inst. Cal 4, 8 (2004), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_904TGR.pdf (observing in Note 3 that the exercise of initiative power might have been illegal under the city charters because the state didn’t authorize explicitly permit charters to adopt the initiative and referendum until 1902).

[34] Cal. Const. art. 4, § 1 (“[t]he legislative power of this State is vested in the California Legislature which consists of the Senate and Assembly, but the people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum.”).

[35] Gordon, supra note 34, at 14.

[36] Id. at 9-11.

[37] Id.

[38] Cal. Elec. Code §§ 9100-9126; 9200-9226 (2015).

[39] Gordon, supra note 34, at 11.

[40] Id. at 12.

[41] Using Municipal Zoning to Limit or Ban Fracking in California Communities, Earthjustice: Teleconference, http://earthjustice.org/features/using-municipal-zoning-to-limit-or-ban-fracking-in-california-communities (last visited June 27, 2015).

[42] Gordon, supra note 34, at iii.

[43] Nancy C. Carre, Environmental Justice and Hydraulic Fracturing: The Ascendancy of Grassroots Populism in Policy Determination, 4 J. Soc. Change 1, 6 (2012).

[44] Louis Sahagun, U.S. officials cut estimate of recoverable Monterey Shale oil by 96%, L.A. Times (May 20, 2014 9:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-oil-20140521-story.html.

[45] Id.

[46] Kate Woods,“Protect Our Water” Initiative Qualifies for November Ballot, Benito Link, (May 1, 2014, 2:13 PM), http://benitolink.com/%E2%80%9Cprotect-our-water%E2%80%9D-initiative-qualifies-november-ballot.

[47] Julie Morris, Oil Exploration to Proceed in South County, San Benito Link (June 5, 2013, 10:32 AM), http://benitolink.com/oil-exploration-proceed-south-county.

[48] Telephone Interview with Andrew Hsia-Coron, San Benito Rising (May 4, 2015).

[49] Deborah Luhrman, San Benito Rising Files Anti-Fracking Initiative, Edible Monterey Bay (May 17, 2014), http://ediblemontereybay.com/blog/san-benito-rising-files-anti-fracking-initiative.

[50] Jason Hoppin, Fracking Stirs Debate in San Benito County, Santa Cruz Sentinel News (April 30, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/general-news/20140430/fracking-stirs-debate-in-san-benito-county.

[51] Hsia-Coron, supra note 49.

[52] San Benito County Code § 25.29.161.

[53] San Benito County, Proposed Measure J (2014), http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/sites/default/files/frack_actions_sanbenitocountyca.pdf.

[54] Id.

[55] Id.

[56] Id. at Policy 41.

[57] Id. at Section 5.

[58] Id. at Section 8.

[59] Citadel Drops Measure J Lawsuit Against County, San Benito Link (April 6, 2015, 8:21 PM) (describing post-passage litigation effort), http://benitolink.com/citadel-drops-measure-j-lawsuit-against-county.

[60] Hsia-Coron, supra note 49.

[61] Id.

[62] Id.

[63] Id.

[64] Id.

[65] Id.

[66] Kate Woods, Luiz Valdez Speaks on the Issue of Fracking, San Benito Link (Oct. 2014), http://benitolink.com/multimedia/luis-valdez-speaks-issue-fracking.

[67] Id.

[68] Hsia-Coron, supra note 49.

[69] Id.

[70] Hsia-Coron, supra note 49, to see full list of endorsements, visit http://www.protectsanbenito.org/endorsements.html.

[71] Hsia-Coron, supra note 49.

[72] Lauren Sommer, Anti-Fracking Activists in California Take Fight to County Ballots, KQED: Science (October 10, 2014), http://ww2.kqed.org/science/2014/10/10/anti-fracking-activists-in-california-take-fight-to-county-ballots.

[73] Hsia-Coron, supra note 49.

[74] Id.

[75] Baker, supra note 28.

[76] Id.

[77] Kollin Kosmicki, Measure J Backers Reflect on Historic Victory, Hopes for “Movement,” San Bentito County Today (Nov. 5, 2014, 12:22 AM), http://www.sanbenitocountytoday.com/news/local_politics/measure-j-backers-reflect-on-historic-victory-hopes-for-movement/article_51cc6342-64c4-11e4-aa39-001a4bcf6878.html.

[78] Hsia-Coron, supra note 49.

[79] Id.

[80] At the same 2014 election, Santa Barbara County also voted on an anti-fracking measure (Measure P), also drafted by lawyers from SMW, and put forward by the Santa Barbara County Water Guardians. Despite the close similarities between the measures, its liberal voting history, and the fact that it was the site of an infamous 1969 oil spill in the Pacific Ocean, Measure P failed in Santa Barbara. Though the politics surrounding Measure P were complex, a few explanations can be found: 1) Santa Barbara is a larger county by population and has a larger oil industry footprint than San Benito, meaning that the general feelings towards the oil and gas industry were not as consistently negative; 2) Misconceptions about the mechanics of Measure P fed confusion about its applicability and effects, eroding support; and 3) The coalition formed in Santa Barbara was less successful at finding allies in other sectors of the economy and at convincing working class voters that their economic interests were served by Measure P. See generally, Darcel Elliot, The Healthy Air and Water Initiative to Ban Fracking, Acidizing and Steam Injection will be “Measure P, Santa Barbara Indep. (Jun. 26, 2014), http://www.independent.com/releases/2014/jun/26/healthy-air-and-water-initiative-ban-fracking-acid; Mike Mills, Two County Fracking Prohibitions Succeed While One Fails: What the Voting Results in Santa Barbara, San Benito, and Mendocino Counties Mean for the Oil & Gas Industry in California, Stoel Rives, LLP: Envir. L. Blog (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.californiaenvironmentallawblog.com/oil-and-gas/two-county-fracking-prohibitions-succeed-while-one-fails-what-the-voting-results-in-santa-barbara-san-benito-and-mendocino-counties-mean-for-the-oil-gas-industry-in-california/; Keith Carls, Measure P Oil Ban Soundly Defeated (Nov. 5, 2014, 10:35 AM), http://www.keyt.com/news/measure-p-going-down-to-defeat/29548048. See also Sommer, supra note 73.

This post is part of the Environmental Law Review Syndicate, a multi-school online forum run by student editors from the nation’s leading environmental law reviews.
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By Eric Anthony DeBellis, Senior Executive Editor for Ecology Law Quarterly. Berkeley Law School

On August 3, 2015, the EPA released its highly anticipated Clean Power Plan, establishing the nation’s first greenhouse gas emissions standards for existing power plants.[1] The Clean Power Plan (“the Rule”) also is the first of its kind in another sense: it employs a unique new regulatory framework that has drawn both praise and criticism. Here, I explain the legal controversy around the Rule and preview arguments both supporters and opponents are likely to raise in court.

Background

Traditionally, the EPA has regulated air pollutants from stationary sources through region-by-region air quality standards and source-by-source emissions permits.[2] The Clean Power Plan takes a broader approach. The EPA enacted the Rule under the Clean Air Act’s seldom-invoked section 111(d).[3] As section 111(d) prescribes, the EPA set an emissions reduction target in the Rule—cutting national power sector carbon emissions to 32 percent below 2005 (historical peak) levels by 2030—and identified the “best system of emission reduction” (BSER) that makes the target attainable. The EPA then established a target for each state[4] based on that state’s potential to reduce power sector emissions through three “building blocks:” improved efficiency at fossil fuel plants, increased utilization of existing low-emitting power sources, and development of new zero- and low-emitting power sources.[5] The greater the state’s potential to improve in any of these areas, the more ambitious its target. The EPA painstakingly detailed how it calculated each state’s target to be attainable and, according to the building blocks approach, fair.[6] However, the Rule leaves compliance plan specifics to the states.

Each state has broad discretion in determining how best to achieve its target. To reduce compliance costs, states may implement a wide array of tools, including traditional source-by-source command-and-control measures, interstate cap and trade, renewable portfolio standards, energy efficiency improvements, and an abundance of other options.[7] Once a state has determined which tools will best achieve its emissions target, that state must submit an implementation plan for EPA approval. The agency will devise its own plan for any state that refuses to do so itself. Supporters have praised the Rule’s flexibility for empowering states to devise innovative strategies to minimize compliance costs.[8] Opponents have questioned whether the Clean Air Act authorizes this unorthodox, broad-sweeping approach.[9]

Supporters: A Unique Challenge Calls for a Unique Solution

The Clean Power Plan’s supporters present the Rule’s unconventional aspects as necessary to properly address the realities of climate change.[10] Regulating greenhouse gas emissions to combat climate change presents several challenges that regulating traditional pollutants does not. Generally, the EPA regulates an air pollutant because it is toxic or otherwise harmful to ingest. The agency sets a limit on the concentration of each pollutant that may persist in any region’s air and tasks states with regulating individual major sources through emissions permits.[11] This regional air quality standards approach makes sense for toxic air pollutants because emissions distribution matters. Even if the nation as a whole has low emissions levels, if one city’s air quality is poor enough to pose a health hazard, the Clean Air Act obligates the EPA and states to devise a means to improve that city’s air quality.

But the EPA is not regulating greenhouse gases for toxicity. The EPA is regulating greenhouse gases because they contribute to climate change.[12] The greenhouse gases responsible for the bulk of climate impacts mix uniformly into the atmosphere regardless of origin.[13] As a consequence, the impacts of local greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate change on a global scale.[14] To decrease the United States’ contribution to climate change, the nation must decrease its total emissions, regardless of where those emissions cuts happen.[15] In light of this distinction, the EPA eschewed the traditional regional air quality standards approach in favor of a national reduction target.[16] Unhindered by regional distribution considerations, the agency designed the Clean Power Plan to allow states to focus their emissions reduction efforts wherever is most cost-effective.[17]

The Clean Power Plan’s other major departure from the traditional air pollution control paradigm is its “beyond the fenceline” approach. Conventional power plant air pollution regulation imposes technological and operational requirements onsite (within the plant’s “fenceline”). Many means to reduce power sector greenhouse gas emissions, such as substation and transmission line improvements, energy efficiency, carbon taxation, and connecting more renewables to the grid, lie beyond the fenceline and often are more cost-effective than a strictly on-site approach.[18] To capitalize on these opportunities to further reduce emissions at lower costs, the Clean Power Plan credits states for emissions reductions achieved through offsite measures. Further, the EPA calculated state targets under the assumption that plant operators will employ the most cost-effective methods available, regardless of whether it requires them to act outside of a plant’s fenceline. Rule proponents justify this unorthodox approach as providing needed flexibility and facilitating innovation to minimize both emissions and costs.[19] Nevertheless, critics have raised concerns that the Rule’s unorthodox approach oversteps the limits of the agency’s authority under the Clean Air Act.[20]

Opponents: The EPA May Be Exceeding Its Jurisdiction Under the Clean Air Act

Two days after the EPA published the final Clean Power Plan, sixteen states filed for an administrative stay of the Rule. The states challenging the Rule characterized it as requiring states to “entirely reorder their energy economies” or face “a potential federal takeover of significant State authority.”[21] Furthermore, the EPA rarely invokes section 111(d), leaving the scope of the agency’s authority under the provision largely unsettled. The lack of precedent on section 111(d) makes projecting a legal challenge’s outcome difficult.

Seizing upon this uncertainty, Clean Power Plan opponents have questioned the Rule’s legality since its inception.[22] Despite the long-established administrative law principle that regulations cannot be challenged until an agency promulgates a final rule, fifteen states challenged the proposed Clean Power Plan upon its publication.[23] The courts promptly dismissed these cases as premature,[24] but these states’ eagerness to align against the Clean Power Plan demonstrates that the EPA is in for a long court battle.[25] The debate over the scope of the EPA’s authority is still developing, but certain legal objections that have arisen already seem likely to arise in court as well. Here, I focus on “beyond the fenceline” jurisdiction, dueling amendments, and broader federalism concerns.

First, opponents likely will challenge the EPA’s beyond the fenceline jurisdiction.[26] The EPA calculated state targets under the assumption that it had the authority to require states to implement emission reduction strategies that go beyond on-site modifications to power plants themselves. Though the agency maintains that states can attain their targets without requiring any actions outside the energy sector’s control, the courts likely will have to decide whether BSER may include beyond the fenceline measures.[27] The EPA dropped energy efficiency—the fourth building block in the proposed rule—from the final rule in response to these jurisdictional concerns.[28] In the proposed rule, the EPA considered each state’s potential to reduce emissions via energy efficiency measures, like insulation and energy-saving appliances, with little if any nexus to power plants themselves in setting state targets.[29] By excluding the energy efficient building block from its calculations, the EPA not only adjusted some states’ targets but also made the Clean Power Plan less susceptible to a jurisdictional challenge.[30] However, even after this adjustment, the scope of the EPA’s beyond the fenceline jurisdiction remains an open question.

Second, challengers likely will highlight a drafting error by Congress when it passed section 111(d) to question whether the EPA may regulate greenhouse gas emission from power plants under the provision at all.[31] The Clean Air Act’s authors included section 111(d) as a catchall provision to cover pollution that did not fit neatly into the Act’s other categories,[32] but the Senate and the House of Representatives each passed its own version of the section. Accordingly, both versions contain language intended to prevent redundant application of 111(d) and another Clean Air Act provision to the same emissions. Due to an oversight by the members of both houses, Congress never reconciled the two versions.[33] The House version makes 111(d) inapplicable to any emission source already subject to regulation under section 112.[34] The EPA already regulates power plants under rule 112, and so does the Clean Power Plan.[35] Thus, the House language would invalidate the Clean Power Plan outright.[36] The Senate version bars the EPA from regulating the same pollutant from the same source under two rules.[37] The EPA never has regulated greenhouse gases from existing power plants before, so the Senate version would allow the Clean Power Plan.[38] Naturally, the EPA follows the Senate language.[39] The agency maintains that its choice of the Senate version is a reasonable resolution of a genuine legal ambiguity,[40] which rule proponents argue entitles the EPA’s choice to judicial deference under the Chevron doctrine.[41] Opponents argue that a legislative drafting error does not give the EPA the authority to ignore the version it disfavors.[42]

            Third, opponents likely will invoke constitutional federalism concerns.[43] Critics have emphasized one core principle in particular: the anti-commandeering doctrine.[44] According to the anti-commandeering doctrine, the federal regulation may not so coerce state agencies as to reduce them to mere extensions of the federal government.[45] Rule opponents argue that the Clean Power Plan runs afoul of the anti-commandeering principle by imposing a federal mandate to abandon certain energy sources (i.e., fossil fuels) in favor of other fuels (i.e., renewables).[46]

One potential counterargument would be that regulating any air pollutant under the Clean Air Act necessarily nudges the scales against energy generation methods that heavily emit the pollutant. Burning fossil fuels produces far more greenhouse gas emissions than generation from renewable fuels like solar and wind, so the EPA cannot limit greenhouse gas emission without putting fossil fuels at a competitive disadvantage. The states challenging the Clean Power Plan likely will argue that the EPA crossed the line by effectively ordering states to phase out fossil fuel generation, particularly from coal, in favor of lower-emitting power sources. In response, the EPA likely will maintain that the Clean Power Plan respects the anti-commandeering principles by leaving compliance specifics to states.

Conclusion

The Clean Power Plan is as ambitious as it is unique, and the legal challenges to the Rule raise many unsettled questions. The looming court battle over the Clean Power Plan will have tremendous implications for U.S. climate change policy as well as broader matters of federal agency jurisdiction. The legal community has been discussing the Clean Power Plan for over a year now, and it appears that the conversation will continue for years to come. The impending litigation should prove fascinating and will culminate in the most highly anticipated ruling on environmental law in recent memory. Clean Power Plan proponents and detractors alike eagerly await the outcome.

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* Senior Executive Editor for Ecology Law Quarterly. Berkeley Law School, J.D. expected 2016.

[1] Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: President Obama to Announce Historic Carbon Pollution Standards for Power Plants (Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/03/fact-sheet-president-obama-announce-historic-carbon-pollution-standards. For the full text of the final rule, see Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources; Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).

[2] See generally Justin E. McCarthy, Cong. Research Serv., RL30853, Clean Air Act: A Summary of the Act and Its Major Requirements (2005), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/47810.pdf (surveying EPA regulation under the Clean Air Act and thereby predominantly describing regional air quality standards and source-specific emissions permits).

[3] For the exact language of Clean Air Act section 111(d), see 42 U.S.C. § 4711(d) (2012).

[4] For a map listing state targets, see Ctr. for Climate & Energy Solutions, Final State Rate-Based Targets (2015), http://www.c2es.org/federal/executive/epa/carbon-pollution-standards-map.

[5] Final Clean Power Plan vs. Draft Plan: What Has Changed?, Envtl. & Energy Study Inst. (Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.eesi.org/articles/view/final-clean-power-plan-vs-draft-plan-what-has-changed.

[6] See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,820–26 (Oct. 23, 2015) (explaining the EPA’s methodology for calculating State targets).

[7] See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Air Agencies, Implementing EPA’s Clean Power Plan: A Menu of Options (2015) (explaining in detail a variety of potential compliance strategies available to States).

[8] E.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Understanding the EPA’s Clean Power Plan 1 (2015), http://www.nrdc.org/climate/files/cpp-national-compliance-IB.pdf; Robert Sussman, Obama’s Final Clean Power Plan: Merging Strong Climate Goals with Flexible Implementation, Brookings (Aug. 4, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/planetpolicy/posts/2015/08/04-obama-clean-power-plan-sussman.

[9] E.g., Mitch McConnell, States Should Reject Obama Mandate for Clean-Power Regulations, Lexington Herald-Leader (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.kentucky.com/2015/03/03/3725288/states-should-reject-obama-mandate.html; Press Release, Office of W.V. Attorney Gen., Attorney General Patrick Morrisey Denounces EPA’s Illegal, Over-Reaching Clean Power Plan (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.ago.wv.gov/pressroom/2015/Pages/Attorney-General-Patrick-Morrisey-Denounces-EPA’s-Illegal,-Over-Reaching-Clean-Power-Plan.aspx; Laurence H. Tribe, The Clean Power Plan Is Unconstitutional, Wall St. J. (Dec. 22, 2014, 7:06 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/laurence-tribe-the-epas-clean-power-plan-is-unconstitutional-1419293203.

[10] E.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council, supra note 8; Sussman, supra note 8.

[11] See McCarthy, supra note 2, at CRS-3 to CRS-4 (explaining the national ambient air quality standards and state implementation plan provisions of the Clean Air Act).

[12] Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,497 (Dec. 15, 2009) (finding that greenhouse gases threatened human health and the environment, warranting regulation under the Clean Air Act, because of their contribution to climate change).

[13] Id. at 66,514.

[14] Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 44,367 (July 30, 2008).

[15] Id.

[16] Id. at 66,514–15.

[17] Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Source: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34830, 34,832 (June 18, 2014).

[18] David Roberts, Obama’s Carbon Rule Hangs on This One Legal Question, Grist (Feb. 9, 2015), http://grist.org/climate-energy/obamas-carbon-rule-hangs-on-this-one-legal-question/.

[19] See, e.g., id.

[20] E.g., supra note 9.

[21] Application for Administrative Stay by the State of West Virginia and 15 Other States at 2, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electricity Generating Units; Final Rule, EPA Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 (Aug. 5, 2015), available at http://www.ago.wv.gov/Documents/WV%20-%20Administrative%20Request%20for%20Stay%20CPP.PDF.

[22] See, e.g., Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,760 n. 463 (Oct. 23, 2015).

[23] Neela Banerjee, 12 States Sue the EPA over Proposed Power Plant Regulations, L.A. Times (Aug. 4, 2014, 6:46 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-epa-lawsuit-20140805-story.html.

[24] Andrew Childers, Challenged to Proposed Clean Power Plan Are Premature, D.C. Circuit Says in Dismissal, Bloomberg BNA (June 10, 2015), http://www.bna.com/challenges-proposed-clean-n17179927524/.

[25] See Legal Challenges—Overview & Documents, E&E News, http://www.eenews.net/interactive/clean_power_plan/fact_sheets/legal (last updated Nov. 3, 2015) (predicting the D.C. Circuit will not rule on the merits until at least late 2016 and that an appeal to the Supreme Court likely will follow).

[26] Full disclosure: I disputed the fenceline distinction’s relevance in a piece I wrote for Ecology Law Quarterly’s annual review issue. Eric A. DeBellis, Note, In Defense of the Clean Power Plan: Why Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under Clean Air Act Section 111(d) Need Not, and Should Not, Stop at the Fenceline, 42 Ecology L.Q. 235 (2015).

[27] See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,767 (the EPA’s response to commenters’ arguments that section 111(d) only authorizes the agency to require pollution control measures that are “integrated into the design or operations of the source itself.”).

[28] Id. at 64,673.

[29] Brian Palmer, Is Energy Efficiency Still a Part of the Clean Power Plan?, onEarth, http://www.onearth.org/earthwire/clean-power-plan-energy-efficiency (last visited Nov. 3, 2015).

[30] Id.

[31] The academic literature on the dueling amendments debate has been prolific and, at times, heated. See, e.g., Dan Farber, Dueling Laws and the Clean Power Plan, Legal Planet (Aug. 17, 2015) (characterizing the dueling amendments argument as industry “trying to make too big a case turn on too small a technicality”); Laurence Tribe, Professor Tribe’s Reply, Harv. L. Sch. Envtl. L. Program (Mar. 22, 2015), http://environment.law.harvard.edu/professor-tribes-reply/ (rebutting Jody Freeman and Richard Lazarus by arguing that the Senate version was merely clerical in nature and Congress clearly intended to adopt the substance of the House’s version, which would not authorize the Clean Power Plan).

[32] Coral Davenport, Brothers Battle Climate Change on Two Fronts, N.Y. Times (May 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/11/us/brothers-work-different-angles-in-taking-on-climate-change.html.

[33] Jeremy P. Jacobs, Both Side Ready Arguments for Case that Could Scotch EPA Power Plants Rule, Greenwire.(Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060016647.

[34] Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-549, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 2399, 2574 (1990).

[35] Tribe, supra note 31.

[36] Id.

[37] Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101549, § 108(g), 104 Stat. 2399, 2467 (1990). The U.S. Code, 42 U.S.C. 7411(d) (2012), reflects the Senate language, but this is not dispositive. To quote the Supreme Court, “Though the appearance of a provision in the current edition of the United States Code is ‘pima facie’ evidence that the provision has the force of law, it is the Statutes at Large that provides the ‘legal evidence of laws.’” U.S. Nat’l Bank of Ore. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439, 448 (1993) (internal citations omitted). The Statutes at Large contains both versions, leaving the matter of which version controls open to debate.

[38] Farber, supra note 31.

[39] Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units; Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,715 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).

[40] Id.

[41] E.g., David Doniger & Benjamin Longstreth, Grasping at Straws: Why a Legislative Glitch Will Not Exempt Power Plants from Carbon Standards, Nat. Res. Def. Council: Switchboard (Nov. 1, 2013), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/blongstreth/grasping_at_straws_why_a_legis.html.

[42] E.g., Tribe, supra note 31.

[43] See, e.g., Mario Loyola, Federal Coercion and the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, The Atlantic (May 17, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/05/federal-coercion-and-the-epas-clean-power-plan/393389/ (arguing the Clean Power Plan unconstitutionally coerces States to abandon certain fuel sources in favor of others).

[44] See, e.g., Scott C. Ostdyk, A Constitutional Challenge to EPA’s “Clean Power Plan”, Law360 (Oct. 27, 2014, 2:42 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/590762/a-constitutional-challenge-to-epa-s-clean-power-plan.

[45] Id.

[46] See, e.g., id.

This post is part of the Environmental Law Review Syndicate, a multi-school online forum run by student editors from the nation’s leading environmental law reviews.
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By Luke Grunbaum, Editor-in Chief of UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy

            The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) establishes the basic principles and goals for future international agreements on climate change. However, incorporating the ambitious policies and provisions of the UNFCCC into a binding global agreement has proven incredibly challenging. Previous attempts to create a comprehensive international climate agreement (most notably the Kyoto Protocol) have been largely unsuccessful, and many believe that the top-down approach of prior eras must either be updated or completely abandoned. This article will briefly explain some of the inadequacies of prior top-down regimes, examine the shift towards a more bottom-up approach in UNFCCC negotiations, and elaborate on some of the strengths and weaknesses of this new approach.

The Inadequacies of Top-Down Regimes in the Context of Climate Change

Adopted in 1992, the UNFCCC is an incredibly ambitious international agreement that seeks to “achieve . . . stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations . . . at a level that [will] prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”[1] With over 150 signatories (Parties) by the time it went into effect in 1994, the UNFCCC has received remarkable acceptance within the international community and today it “has near universal membership.”[2] But despite its ambitious goals, the UNFCCC is essentially a guidance document; the treaty outlines objectives, principles, and general commitments, but is comparatively lacking in terms of implementation strategies and precise policy solutions.[3] Thus, although the UNFCCC has created a general consensus on core principles and objectives, it also leaves many important decisions and details unresolved.

Passed and adopted in December 1997, the Kyoto Protocol represents the first comprehensive agreement for the reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions under the UNFCCC framework. [4] However, despite strong initial support from the international community, the Kyoto Protocol ultimately failed to induce significant emission reductions on a global scale.[5] And while the relative failure of the Kyoto Protocol is often attributed to a variety of factors, one of the Protocol’s most significant flaws was its failure to promote participation by all UNFCCC parties.[6]

The lack of comprehensive participation under the Kyoto Protocol is largely a byproduct of the agreement itself. By its explicit terms, the Kyoto Protocol only requires emission reductions from thirty-three countries during the first period of Kyoto commitments (2005-2012). Additionally, the emissions reductions required under subsequent Kyoto periods (2012-2020) have yet to enter into force due to insufficient ratification by member Parties.[7] So while it is true that the Kyoto Protocol encourages all parties (including developing countries) to adopt emission reduction targets, the agreement ultimately failed to obtain emission reduction commitments from the some of the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitters, including the United States, China, Brazil, India, South Africa and various other countries. As a result, the Kyoto Protocol has failed to provide a truly comprehensive and effective solution to this increasingly pressing issue.

INDCs: A Bottom-Up Approach Under the UNFCCC

Citing the failure of the Kyoto Protocol and the international community’s subsequent inability to reach a successive agreement, some experts have called for a fundamental overhaul of the global climate change debate. Various sources suggest that the traditional top-down approach[8] as exemplified in the Kyoto Protocol might not be the best strategy for addressing global climate change today.[9] Instead, many believe that to stand any chance of global acceptance in the near term, future climate change agreements must be significantly more flexible and provide all Parties with the opportunity to pursue those strategies and solutions that best accommodate their unique interests and priorities.[10]

Indeed, even the UNFCCC acknowledges the limitations of a traditional top-down approach in the context of climate change. At COP17 in 2011, UNFCCC Parties created the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), an organization responsible for “[developing] a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the [UNFCCC] applicable to all Parties” that will be adopted “no later than 2015.”[11] And while the desire to replace the Kyoto Protocol is not surprising, some of the main features of this new agreement signify a paradigm shift in global climate change negotiations.

To ensure an agreement is reached by 2015, the ADP devised a radical new method that attempts to encourage greater levels of participation by all UNFCCC Parties. Rather than relying upon a more formalistic top-down approach as used in the Kyoto Protocol, the ADP has asked all member Parties to create voluntary emission reduction targets that are not only achievable, but also reflect the basic policies and priorities of the UNFCCC.[12] Known as Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), these proposals require parties to “outline national efforts towards low emissions and climate resilient development,” and identify specific policies and practices that will enable the country to reach its intended targets. [13] Moreover, there is no standard definition of what should be included in INDCs, a feature that allows Parties to formulate creative adaptation and mitigation strategies that take full advantage of their unique institutional capacities.

Strengths and Weaknesses of INDC Approach

The ADP’s new bottom-up INDC approach is noteworthy in that it is entirely voluntary; INDCs afford each Party the opportunity to set emission reduction targets independently and without regard to the efforts of other Parties. And because INDCs are completely discretionary, these commitments are likely to accurately reflect each Party’s inclination and ability to undertake climate policies in the near future. In fact, the ADP hopes that these INDCs will play an integral role in future climate change negotiations and serve as the starting point for any agreement coming out of the negotiations in Paris this year.[14]

Moreover, there are at least two reasons why this bottom-up approach may be a preferable alternative to a more legalistic top-down approach at the present time. First, INDCs offer substantial flexibility when it comes to setting emissions reductions targets and implementing policies to achieve this goal.[15] This flexibility allows the Parties to prioritize their efforts based upon their own unique economic, political, and geographic considerations and ensures that all Parties begin the transition towards a low-carbon economy at their own pace and in a cost-efficient and predictable manner.

A second important feature of the INDC system is that it poses relatively little threat to the sovereignty of individual nations. Because INDCs are not legally binding commitments, the INDC program is a far more attractive alternative for those countries that are most wary of international meddling in domestic affairs. Indeed, both the United States and China – two countries that have up until this point refused to commit to any emission reductions in formal international agreements – have submitted INDCs under the Durban platform.[16]

Yet despite its potential benefits, the INDC model cannot be considered a perfect solution since it will ultimately fail to achieve all of the ambitious policies and objectives outlined in the UNFCCC. Perhaps the biggest issue with the INDC approach is that despite widespread participation by UNFCC Parties, the current set of INDCs fail to achieve the emission reductions needed to keep climate change at manageable levels. Under the 2010 Cancun Agreements, UNFCCC Parties acknowledged that one of the main objectives of any future UNFCCC agreement should be to keep global average temperature increases below two degrees Celsius.[17]   According the UNFCCC’s own estimates, however, the current INDC pledges (assuming the Parties achieve their stated goals) will only limit projected warming to 2.7 degrees Celsius (4.9 °F) – and that projection includes fairly generous assumptions regarding the post-2050 actions of UNFCCC Parties.[18]

A second potential issue with the INDC method is that it completely overlooks several key issues that have traditionally prevented the formation of a truly comprehensive climate change agreement under the UNFCCC.   The UNFCCC explicitly acknowledges that developed countries are primarily responsible for the steady increase in greenhouse gas concentrations over the previous centuries, and as such, these developed countries must play a leading role in addressing climate change.[19] But despite its inherent logic, this notion of “common but differentiated responsibilities” has been notoriously difficult to operationalize within the framework of a global agreement.[20] INDCs do very little to address this contentious issue since their non-binding and unilateral nature fails to ensure that developed countries bear a disproportionate share of emission reductions and provide sufficient funding to aid in the global transition towards a low-carbon economy.   Therefore, since these INDCs will serve as the foundation for future negotiations, it can be argued that the inward-looking INDC model will ultimately prevent the resolution of certain controversial issues in the near future.

Conclusion

The INDC system represents a novel solution to the previously intractable issue of global climate change. This bottom-up approach has already received unprecedented support from the international community, with over 147 Parties (75% of all UNFCCC Parties) having submitted INDCs as of October 1, 2015. Unlike prior agreements under the UNFCCC such as the Kyoto Protocol, the INDC system currently covers “approximately 85% of global greenhouse gas emissions in 2010,” including all of the top ten largest emitters.[21] But even though the INDC process is largely responsible for enhancing the scope and pace of global negotiations, we must bear in mind that this approach is not the final solution to this incredibly complicated issue. Nonetheless, it appears that the INDC system has been a success in terms of increasing participation from all Parties, and there is hope that these proposals will form a strong foundation for an agreement coming out of Paris this December.

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[1] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 2, May 29, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (1992), available at http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/
convention/background/application/pdf/convention_text_with_annexes_english_for_posting.pdf
) [henceforth referred to as “UNFCCC”].

[2] UNFCCC, “First steps to a safer future: Introducing The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,” available at: http://unfccc.int/essential_background
/convention/items/6036.php
.

[3] UNFCCC, supra note 1.

[4] Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) (entered into force Feb. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. See also Andrew Long, Global Integrationist Multimodality: Global Environmental Governance and Fourth Generation Environmental Law, 21 J. Envtl. & Sustainability L. 169, 183 (2015).

[5] See e.g., Jonathan Zasloff, Choose the Best Answer: Organizing Climate Change Negotiation in the Obama Administration, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 330, 332 (2009) (“The Kyoto Protocol’s failure to achieve emissions reductions from the major greenhouse gas emitters suggests the need for new approaches.”); Lakshman Guruswamy, Climate Change: The Next Dimension, 9 J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y 341, 367 (2000) (“Current efforts to include developing countries within the emission reducing framework of the Kyoto Protocol have proven unsuccessful. By any analysis, portentous implications arise from the present diplomatic deadlock with regard to the cooperation of developing countries and the rising concentrations of GHGs.”).

[6] See, e.g., Jacquelynn Kittel, The Global “Disappearing Act”: How Island States Can Maintain Statehood in the Face of Disappearing Territory, 2014 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1207, 1218 (2014) (noting that the Kyoto Protocol “has been largely unsuccessful in reducing global greenhouse gas emissions” because over 100 nations, including some of the highest emitters such as the United States and China, are exempt from emission limits under the Protocol).

[7] United Nations Climate Change Secretariat, “Frequently asked questions relating to the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol,” available at https://unfccc.int/files/
kyoto_protocol/doha_amendment/application/pdf/frequently_asked_questions_doha_amendment_to_the_kp.pdf
.

[8] The term “top-down” is defined as “of or relating to a hierarchical structure or process that progresses from a large, basic unit to smaller, detailed subunits.” American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th Ed., 2011).

[9] David A. Wirth, The International and Domestic Law of Climate Change: A Binding International Agreement Without the Senate or Congress?, 39 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 515, 521 (2015) (“The first, and to date only, protocol to the [UNFCCC] is the Kyoto Protocol . . . which specifies quantitative emission reductions . . . by thirty-three enumerated industrialized countries . . . [but] no new emission-reduction commitments for [other] Parties.”); Cinnamon P. Carlarne, Rethinking A Failing Framework: Adaptation and Institutional Rebirth for the Global Climate Change Regime, 25 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (2012) (“The conventional wisdom that we need one, consensus-based, comprehensive treaty is wrong or – more accurately – woefully incomplete. . . . [T]he optimistic vision of this top-down system as a great enabling device is no longer viable.”); William Boyd, Climate Change, Fragmentation, and the Challenges of Global Environmental Law: Elements of a Post-Copenhagen Assemblage, 32 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 457, 457 (2010) (“The 2009 United Nations climate conference in Copenhagen has been widely viewed as a failure – a referendum in the eyes of many on the top-down, comprehensive approach to climate embodied in the Kyoto Protocol and carried forward in efforts to negotiate a successor regime.”).

[10] Carlarne, supra note 9 at 2-3 (“[T]he valiant efforts of the global community to negotiate a post-Kyoto treaty system have arrived at a crossroads and . . . instead of focusing on the finding the “right” pathway forward, there is a need to pursue multiple pathways. . . . We need a multilateral framework to respond to climate change and establish a global mitigation strategy.”).

[11] Report of the Conference of the Parties on its seventeenth session (2011), available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf).

[12] The ADP first established this voluntary emissions reduction framework at COP19 in 2013. For more information about this important meeting of the Parties, see “Warsaw Outcomes” (available at: http://unfccc.int/key_steps/warsaw_outcomes/items/8006.php.)

[13] Synthesis Report on the Aggregate Effect of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) (available at: http://unfccc.int/files/focus/indc_portal/application
/pdf/synthesis_report_-_overview.pdf
) [henceforth referred to at “INDC Synthesis Report”]. For more information about INDCs and their significance for future climate change agreements, see World Resources Institute, “What is an INDC?,” (available at: http://www.wri.org/indc-definition).

[14] INDC Synthesis Report, supra note 13 (“Parties have submitted their INDCs with the understanding that they would be anchored in a broader new climate agreement that would support sustainable actions nationally and globally.”).

[15] Further Advancing the Durban Platform, Dec. 1/CP.19, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1, at 3, para. 2(b) (Jan. 31, 2014).

[16] Mark Landler, U.S. and China Reach Climate Accord After Months of Talks, NY Times, Nov.11, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/world/asia/china-us-xi-obama-apec.html. To view copies of the INDCs that have already been submitted, visit the UNFCCC “Submitted INDCs” portal at http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission
%20Pages/submissions.asp
.

[17] UNFCCC, “The Cancun Agreements: An Assessment by the Executive secretary of the United nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,” available at http://cancun
.unfccc.int/cancun-agreements/main-objectives-of-the-agreements/ – c33
.

[18] INDC Synthesis Report, supra note 13.

[19] UNFCCC, supra note 1 (“Acknowledging that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries . . . in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions.”).

[20] See, e.g., Stathis N. Palassis, The IMOS Climate Change Challenge: Application of the Principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities, 6 Wash. & Lee J. Energy, Climate, & Env’t 160, 164-71 (2014).

[21] INDC Synthesis Report, supra note 13.

This post is part of the Environmental Law Review Syndicate, a multi-school online forum run by student editors from the nation’s leading environmental law reviews.
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By Liz Rasheed, Submissions Editor for  NYU Environmental Law Journal

  1. Introduction: What is Illicit Wildlife Trafficking?

Illicit wildlife trafficking refers to “any environment-related crime that involves the illegal trade, smuggling, poaching, capture or collection of endangered species, protected wildlife (including animals and plants that are subject to harvest quotas and regulated by permits), derivatives or products thereof.”[1] Many species are targeted by specific international markets, while some are targeted by a multiplicity of markets. For example, tigers are sold live as exotic pets, yet skinned for rugs, while their bones are sold for “medicinal” uses in Asia.[2] Many reptiles and amphibians are commonly targeted for the exotic pet trade, as are primates and tropical birds.[3] Still others are being driven to extinction due to their perception as “fine cuisine” in certain markets.[4] Most notably, illicit animal-derived goods, such as ivory carvings, animal-skin rugs, and taxidermy mountings are seen as status symbols in many parts of the world, and the existence of a market for “canned hunting” of endangered animals on private game reserves makes it increasingly easy for illicit trafficking syndicates to launder illegally poached hides under the façade of legal hunts.[5]

The growth of e-commerce in the global marketplace has made facilitation of illegal transactions increasingly efficient for would-be consumers while protecting their anonymity, and has thus made effective prosecution increasingly difficult. The International Fund for Animal Welfare found in a recent study that the number of online advertisements for CITES Appendix I-listed species in China alone had increased by 279 percent in the past six years, jumping from 544 advertisements identified in 2008 to 2,106 in 2014.[6] Furthermore, the widespread use of social media seems to have facilitated new means of contact between buyers and sellers.[7]

  1. Combating Wildlife Trafficking through International Law: CITES

The primary international legal tool for combating poaching and trade in endangered wildlife is the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).[8] CITES imposes procedural requirements on the import and export of certain species to enhance both the traceability of legal trade and the enforceability of illegal trafficking. It functions by listing species of wild plants and animals considered threatened by international trade in one of three Appendices. Appendix I lists the most critically endangered animal and plant species; international trade in these species is prohibited except for very limited noncommercial purposes. To demonstrate that applicable conditions have been met (e.g. scientific purpose, legal obtainment, humane transport), both export and import permits are required. Appendix II lists species that are “not necessarily threatened with extinction” but “may become so unless trade in specimens is subject to strict regulation in order to avoid utilization incompatible with their survival.” International trade in these species is authorized through grants of export permits or re-export certificates by relevant domestic authorities, who are charged with ensuring that the trade is in compliance with CITES. Though CITES does not require import permits on these species, domestic laws, such as the Lacey Act in the United States, may.[9] If a country already regulates trade in a certain species but determines that it needs the cooperation of other countries to prevent significant or illegal exploitation of that species, it may request that the species be listed under Appendix III, which requires export permits to be presented any time the listed species is exported from the requesting State and a certificate of origin when the species is exported from any other member States. Export permits issued in accordance with CITES are only valid for a maximum of six months, and a separate permit is required for each consignment of specimens.[10]

The Conference of the Parties (CoP) meets every two to three years and is responsible for amending the Appendices. Amendments enter into force after 90 days for all parties who have not entered formal reservations.[11] Parties may take a reservation to any new Appendix I or II listing so long as that reservation is registered within 90 days,[12] and reservations to Appendix III listings may be taken at any time.[13]

  • The Modern Poaching Problem
    1. The Current Crisis

On the ground, failures throughout the CITES system are reflected in the plummeting populations of multiple endangered animal species which the Convention specifically sought to protect. For example, in the mid-1970s, shortly after the signing of CITES, Tanzania’s Selous Game Reserve was home to over 100,000 elephants.[14] As of late 2013, only 13,000 could be found on the reserve.[15] It is estimated that at least 96 more African elephants are killed every day.[16] Illegal ivory trade increased by nearly 300 percent globally between 1998 and 2011;[17] raw data from ivory seizures in 2013 suggest that more ivory was seized that year than in any year since at least the late 1980s.[18]

Similarly, in 2014, the illegal rhino horn trade reached its highest levels since the early 1990s.[19] In South Africa, where over 80 percent of African rhinos reside, the incidence of rhino poaching increased by 7,000 percent between 2007 and 2013.[20] The western black rhinoceros was declared extinct only three years ago, and the northern white rhinoceros[21] has now reached its tipping point,[22] as has the Javan rhinoceros.[23] One subspecies, the Vietnamese Javan rhinoceros, was declared extinct in 2010 after the last remaining individual was found dead and missing its horn.[24]

While ivory is prized for its beauty and durability, rhinoceros horn is usually ground up and used in Chinese medicine.[25] Rhinoceros horn is primarily keratin, and none of its alleged healing properties has been validated by medical research. Unfortunately, scientific knowledge has failed to supplant the superstitions that drive international demand on the black market. The trade in elephant tusks and rhino horns, as well as countless other exotic animal products and derivatives, is larger now than ever before.

In fact, wildlife trafficking is reportedly the fourth largest black market in the world—behind trafficking in narcotics, arms, and humans.[26] Weak laws, corrupt officials, limited enforcement funding, and powerful incentives from criminal networks have contributed to a surge in poaching that the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) considers part of a larger “Environmental Crime Crisis.”[27] UNEP estimates that US $48-153 billion in resources are lost to illegal wildlife trafficking each year.[28]

  1. A Timeline of Elephant and Rhino Poaching

When CITES entered into force, African elephants were left off of the Appendix I list. But by the late 1980s, the impacts of poaching and ivory trade had nearly destroyed their population, forcing the Parties to upgrade African elephants by instating an Appendix I listing and effectively banning commercial trade of elephant ivory.[29] Japan, however, sought to protect its domestic ivory-working market and reserved the right to import raw ivory from African CITES Parties.[30] This ivory could theoretically be legally sourced, since the wildlife management authorities of several southern African countries periodically culled their elephant population to reduce strain on park resources. But in practice, these countries were prohibited from selling any of the hundreds of tons of tusks that they had stockpiled from these culls, even if the proceeds were to be used for conservation.[31] Thus, in 1997, the CoP voted to allow for a “one-time” sale at auction to Japanese buyers of stockpiled ivory from three southern African countries which generally had well-protected elephant populations: Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana.[32] The sale occurred in February 1999 and transferred a total of 49,574 kg of ivory at roughly $100 USD per kg.[33] Though this sale was expected to dampen global demand for ivory and reduce poaching and smuggling, it had the opposite effect. Even the Chinese government has stated that the surge in ivory smuggling in the early 2000s can be attributed to the 1997 Japanese purchase.[34] Ironically, China soon leveraged this claim to argue that the incentive to smuggle ivory across the Sea of Japan could be removed if China were allowed to buy stockpiled ivory at auction as Japan did.

Though the temporary downgrade of the African elephant to Appendix II in order to facilitate the 1999 auction was not intended to be recurring, the CoP approved a second temporary removal of the ivory ban in 2007. This time, the CoP approved a one-off sale of 108 metric tons of ivory to be sold to China and Japan from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana.[35] Though China and Japan did not even purchase their full allotted quota, they have been accused of colluding to keep ivory prices low by bidding on different types of ivory during the sale and then trading these between themselves at a higher profit margin than was afforded to the African source countries.[36] This Asian markup value is reflected and indeed exacerbated in the price differentials seen today.[37]

It seems universally accepted that China is the largest ivory market driving illegal trade, and most sources point to 2008 as the inflection point on the rising rate of market growth over time.[38] All evidence suggests that the creation of a legal ivory trade market in China has stimulated the growth of the illegal market, and there is a clear correlation between timing of these spikes in poaching and the international authorization of limited “legal” ivory sales.

Interestingly, the occurrence of rhino poaching remained low for nearly two decades before the elephant ivory sale in 2008. But in the years since China’s CITES-authorized 2008 ivory purchase, the shockingly rapid uptick observed in rhino poaching mirrored a simultaneous surge in ivory poaching across Africa. While only 13 rhinos were killed in South Africa in the year 2007, 83 were poached in 2008, and 1,004 fell to poachers in 2013.[39]

The low levels of rhino poaching during the early 1990s may be partly attributable to the United States’ threat of bilateral Pelly Amendment sanctions against the four main consumers of rhinoceros horns at the time: Yemen, South Korea, Taiwan and China.[40] With the passage of time, however, the threat of sanctions began to lose its bite,[41] and China’s economic growth and accession to the WTO lessened the influence of the United States as a valuable trade partner. Thus, by 2007, the United States’ objections to the proposed downlisting failed to sway the CoP or keep illicit trade at bay.

  1. What’s Changed?

Rather than isolated bushmen trying to make a living, the main culprits behind today’s poaching crisis are highly organized international crime networks. One reason why the criminal profile has shifted so drastically in recent decades is the rapid global advance in technology. Many parts of the savannah that were never reached by landline phone services are now accessible through cell phones. Internet connectivity additionally unlocks previously unfathomable possibilities for rapidly coordinating sales and shipments of poached ivory with wealthy buyers abroad, as well as marketing such goods for sale online. The civil unrest and political instability in much of Africa during this time also created new opportunities and demand for arms trafficking, and armed militant groups stand fully prepared to take down game animals should the opportunity for profit present itself. Specific drug routes have been identified as repeatedly-used routes for wildlife trafficking, and many militant groups and drug cartels are known to actively participate in or profit from poaching.[42]

  1. Technical Aspects of Transport

Generally, rhinoceros horns are more frequently transported by air, while ivory is almost always sent by sea.[43] Being much smaller than elephant tusks, rhinoceros horns can be smuggled in individual suitcases on passenger planes, much like many drug-smuggling operations.[44] While the standard international protocol of checking baggage theoretically gives more room for detection and enforcement, aviation also opens up many more potential through-ports for sales unreachable by sea, e.g., Eastern Europe. The relatively low level of sophistication needed to smuggle contraband by plane to Europe also makes the rhino horn market more accessible to small-scale criminal networks. Ivory, being much larger, requires a higher level of sophistication, larger criminal syndicates, and many more players. Most ivory is sent overseas from Eastern Africa to Asia in large containerized shipments, often hidden amongst metric tons of other products.[45] The criminal syndicates orchestrating these operations either exploit existing security holes in shipping networks (the shipper having no mens rea for criminal liability) or utilize entirely corrupt shell corporations formed by one businessman with a stake in the profits.[46] This is an area in which corporate and tax laws need strengthening in order to be certain that such shell corporations are neither operating without registering or paying taxes, nor shielding the bad actors behind them from criminal liability.

  1. Addressing the Crisis

How this crisis can be addressed through CITES will almost certainly be the main topic of discussion at the 17th Conference of the Parties, to be held in South Africa in 2016. While some countries are taking action to publicly destroy their ivory stocks and sending a message that elephants are more valuable alive than partially decapitated, others seem to cling to former ideas of how to balance economic and conservation interests. South Africa has recently reaffirmed its intention to propose legalizing the rhino horn trade, which it hopes will free up its stockpile of confiscated rhino horn products, driving down the price and removing the incentive to poach.[47] Given the tremendous failure of attempts to protect elephant populations through legalized ivory trade, South Africa’s predictions seem dubious at best.

  1. Addressing the Crisis Through Other Avenues of International Law: The Rise of International Involvement in Enforcing Prohibitions on Poaching

The good news is that the CITES Secretariat is not alone in this battle against illegal wildlife trafficking. TRAFFIC (Trade Records Analysis of Flora and Fauna in Commerce) is a partnership between World Wide Fund for Nature and International Fund for the Conservation of Nature, and is the leading source of information and decision-making assistance to CITES.[48] TRAFFIC manages the Elephant Trade Information System, which seeks “to track illegal trade in ivory and other elephant products,” on behalf of the CITES Parties, while CITES members themselves submit poaching reports to MIKE (Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants).[49] In 2010, the World Customs Organization, the World Bank, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and INTERPOL joined with the CITES Secretariat to form the International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime (ICCWC) to bring support to national wildlife law enforcement agencies that are most pressed by threats of poaching and wildlife trafficking and challenged by a concurrent need for social welfare and development. In January 2014, the ICCWC helped train wildlife enforcement agents participating in Operation COBRA II—a one-month multinational wildlife law enforcement operation that resulted in over 400 arrests and more than 350 seizures.[50] The ICCWC has also led development of protocols for forensic genetic analysis of seized ivory to determine its source, helping to link purveyors of illegal goods to their supply chain and source.[51] Such analyses are important to the work of INTERPOL’s Environmental Security Subdirective, which makes itself available to CITES governments in crisis by deploying Incident Response Teams and Investigative Support Teams at the request of a member country.[52]

Perhaps the most interesting development in the realm of enforcement has been the UN Security Council’s adoption of Resolutions 2134 and 2136 in January 2014. Resolution 2136 renewed the arms embargo and related sanctions imposed on the Democratic Republic of the Congo until 1 February 2015, and authorized targeted sanctions against poachers and wildlife product traffickers.[53] Resolution 2134 authorized similar actions to be taken in the Central African Republic.[54] The imposition of these sanctions raises several questions for the immediate future of CITES: Should we expect wildlife trafficking to become more widely recognized by the Security Council as a major contributing factor to threatened peace and security in other areas of Africa or even Southeast Asia? How effective can these remedial actions be at curtailing wildlife crimes in the face of a “pervasive breakdown in law and order?”[55]

  1. WTO: Doha and the Trade Facilitation Agreement

To strengthen global protections for endangered species like the African elephant, we will need to look beyond CITES to less conventional sources for addressing environmental concerns. One promising, but largely overlooked, source is the World Trade Organization and its enforcement capacity in implementing the new Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), introduced in the Doha Round and adopted last fall. Among the issues addressed in the TFA are: norms for the publication of laws, regulations and procedures; disciplines on fees and charges; pre-arrival processing of goods; uniformity in border procedures; simplified transit procedures; and provisions for customs cooperation and coordination.[56] Additionally, the preamble to the TFA specifically identifies itself as both “recognizing the particular needs of developing and especially least-developed country Members and desiring to enhance assistance and support for capacity building in this area,” and “recognizing the need for effective cooperation among Members on trade facilitation and customs compliance issues.”[57]

In addition to the goal of liberalizing trade in environmental goods and services, the Doha negotiations on trade and environment focused on the goals of building collaborative relationships between the WTO and multilateral environmental agreements to ensure consistency across their policies.[58] The TFA furthered these goals by requiring that WTO Members publish their importation, exportation, and transport procedures, as well as any fees and charges imposed in connection with these procedures. To better meet Doha’s goals, these documents reported in compliance with the TFA should be shared with the CITES Secretariat and jointly analyzed to help inform both Secretariats of countries and ports where underreporting may be an issue or where anomalies such as concurrent short dwell times and high shipping charges for cargo may suggest foul play.[59]

At bottom, fulfilling the TFA’s goals for increasing trade and addressing customs compliance issues will require far more effective border controls than are currently in place in major African port cities. Port cities should be the primary focus for these controls because current estimates predict that up to 90 percent of ivory seized in Africa is bound for East Asia,[60] and the majority of this Asian-bound ivory is trafficked by sea.[61] To improve efficiency, the process must be revised to increase speed while maintaining a standard minimum level of procedural quality.

  1. Technology-Based Solutions for Customs Compliance and CITES Enforcement

One means of streamlining processes to enhance compliance and efficiency at borders is through technology-based solutions. Increasing availability of intelligence data on listed trafficking suspects, which can be stored and shared in a wireless “cloud,” can help ensure that customs agents are aware of their passing and inspect their shipping containers more thoroughly. Ideally, these inspections would include additional technology-based solutions such as radio-frequency identification (RFID) chip scanning and forensic DNA sampling of animal products to verify claims of legal acquisition. To demonstrate the utility of forensic testing for identifying mismatches in reporting and enforcement, DNA testing of ivory seized in Asia has frequently traced it back to Tanzania, and specifically to the Selous Game Reserve (where nearly 66 percent of the park’s population, or approximately 25,000 elephants, disappeared between 2009-2013).[62] Despite the sudden drop in Tanzania’s elephant population, only two large-scale seizures were made in the country between 2002-2011, according to data reported to the Elephant Trade Information System (a program under CITES) while 28.6 tons of ivory seized in Asia were forensically traced to Tanzania during the same timeframe.[63]

Advances in information-sharing and data-analysis technologies can help us to not only build a body of shared collaborative data between the WTO and environmental secretariats, but also to move beyond the misconception that patrolling park rangers are the first line of enforcement against poachers. While this may have been true when CITES was adopted, and poaching efforts were more fragmented and localized, it no longer applies. What was once a crime dominated by local hunters seeking bush meat and ivory to trade in an urban black-market has become the province of transnational organized criminal networks. The first line of defense now lies with those collecting and analyzing intelligence on wildlife trade syndicates and predicting their moves.

Though many perceive the threat of wildlife trafficking and endangered species extinctions as a concern subordinate to trafficking in arms or drugs or political violence, the criminal groups involved in all of these are highly interconnected and often the same. C4ADS (Center for Advanced Defense Studies) utilized the Palantir Gotham computing platform to analyze a multiplicity of data sets and elucidate networks of relatedness in illicit ivory trade. These analyses provide further evidence of the interconnectedness of criminal syndicates in wildlife trafficking, arms trafficking, and militant violence. For example, one of the top three largest ivory seizures ever recorded was traced to its sources through the connections of warlord General Laurent Nkunda (for whom the Congolese government issued an international arrest warrant for alleged war crimes and who is imprisoned in Rwanda for human rights violations) as well as those of infamous Zimbabwean arms trafficker John Bredenkamp.[64] Only ten major shipping companies, whose business information can be used to link them to their primary sources of financing, dominate the Indian Ocean shipping route utilized in the ivory trade.[65] By working backwards from this narrow starting point, it seems that further data analyses could potentially uncover a wealth of information on interconnected criminal activities and persons, in both wildlife trafficking and other illicit networks.

The type of analyses used to trace organized crime and trade networks through Africa could be extremely helpful in tracing such networks all the way into China, whose ivory market is considered the primary financial driver behind African poaching activities.[66] This conclusion is supported by the fact that a single seizure in Guangzhou in 2013 contained the tusks of nearly 1,000 elephants, and Chinese ivory traffickers have been arrested across nearly every African country with elephants.[67] Despite overwhelming evidence that Chinese trafficking syndicates are highly involved in wildlife crime, the only major Southeast-Asian wildlife trade syndicate that has been exposed to date was operating from Laos, where its kingpin remains untouchable despite the $1 million bounty the US has put on his arrest.[68]

Unfortunately, there is a dearth of agencies filling this role at present, perhaps because of the sheer amount of information in need of sorting. But to treat the wildlife trafficking crisis as a problem limited to the decades-old domestic enforcement measures encouraged by CITES text would be to turn a blind eye to the today’s reality. By allowing import and export data to be collected and handled by the WTO and shared with them, the UNEP and CITES Secretariats will not only gain a more uniform and precise source of information, but will also help developing countries to benefit more from Doha.

  1. Conclusion

The crisis of illicit wildlife trade now extends beyond the confines of environmental law and policy; it pervades issues of national security, public welfare, and political and economic stability. CITES can no longer be regarded as a sufficient instrument of international law to effectively address this crisis. New levels of international cooperation, communication, and financial support must be dedicated to addressing illicit wildlife trade through additional avenues of international trade law (specifically the Protocol of Amendment to the Marrakesh Agreement inserting an Agreement on Trade Facilitation into Annex 1A) and international security (via the UN Security Council and INTERPOL).

Better enforcement and achievement of CITES’ goals can be achieved with: (1) international collaboration in strengthening border controls while still improving trade efficiency, (2) intelligence-gathering efforts to investigate criminal networks and identify key participants in the illicit wildlife trade through business connections as well as forensic DNA analysis of confiscated animal products, (3) increased numbers of wildlife product seizures and moreover, increased rates of arrest in relation to those seizures, (4) a unified effort by international judiciaries to prosecute more cases of wildlife trafficking and impose criminal sentences, (5) cooperation of CITES member governments to not knowingly harbor wildlife trafficking cartels within their borders and to protect their judges from violent public retribution for this enforcement, and (6) agreement of CITES member governments to not approve any further one-off sales of ivory or any new one-off sales of rhinoceros horn.

Collateral effects of the 2008 one-off sale of ivory to China are readily apparent in the subsequent surge of the Chinese ivory market from 2008–2014. Whether the correlation was causal or coincidental, this surge also corresponded with a surge of militant violence and political unrest throughout sub-Saharan Africa. Knowing that criminal networks are stationing syndicates across continents to move these shipments of ivory, it is unwise to launch headlong into an international effort to expedite customs procedures without creating an international plan for identifying and responding to criminal wildlife trafficking networks in international transit.

Most importantly, these international efforts must be spurred by a paradigm shift in how we conceptualize the issue of illicit wildlife trafficking. Gone are the days when CITES efficacy could be linked to a popular “Save the Whales” mentality. In order to properly combat the modern crisis of poaching and illicit wildlife trafficking, the issue must be addressed with the same level of gravity as the other organized crimes committed by the same international networks and syndicates.

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* Submissions Editor for the New York University Environmental Law Journal. Expected J.D. 2016.

[1] WWF & Dalberg, Fighting Illicit Wildlife Trafficking 9 (2014), http://www.dalberg.com/documents/WWF_Wildlife_Trafficking.pdf.

[2] International Fund for Animal Welfare, Wanted–Dead or Alive 54 (2014), http://www.ifaw.org/sites/default/files/IFAW-Wanted-Dead-or-Alive-Exposing-Online-Wildlife-Trade-2014.pdf.

[3] Id. at 49.

[4] Alexandra Andersson, China’s Appetite for Pangolin is Threatening the Creature’s Existence, Time (June 12, 2014), http://time.com/2846889/pangolins-china-cites-trafficking-endangered/; http://wwf.panda.org/?213352/Caviar-from-endangered-sturgeon-not-suitable-for-Christmas

[5] Michael Ray Harris, Home, Home On The Range, 13 ABA Endangered Species Committee Newsletter (Aug. 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/nr_newsletters/es/201208_es.authcheckdam.pdf.

[6] International Fund for Animal Welfare at 32.

[7] Id. at 35.

[8] See Philippe Sands et al., Principles of International Environmental Law 472 (3d ed. 2012).

[9] See 18 U.S.C. § 42; 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3372.

[10] Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora art. 6, March 3rd, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES].

[11] CITES art. 15.

[12] See Sands et al. at 476.

[13] Id.

[14] K.O. Peppeh, Tanzania: Elephant Population in Africa’s Largest Game Reserve Under Threat, Zegabi: East Africa News (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.zegabi.com/articles/7131.

[15] Id.

[16] WCS Supports “96 Elephants” Campaign, Wildlife Conservation Society (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.wcs.org/press/press-releases/96-elephants.aspx.

[17] See Tom Milliken, USAID & TRAFFIC, Illegal Trade in Ivory and Rhino Horn14 (2014), http://www.traffic.org/storage/W-TRAPS-Elephant-Rhino-report.pdf.

[18] New Report Identifies Actions Needed to Curtail Illegal Ivory and Rhino Horn Trafficking, TRAFFIC (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.traffic.org/home/2014/9/22/new-report-identifies-actions-needed-to-curtail-illegal-ivor.html.

[19] Id.

[20] Putting a Stop to Global Environmental Crime has Become an Imperative, 51 UN Chronicle (Sept. 2014), http://unchronicle.un.org/article/putting-stop-global-environmental-crime-has-become-imperative/

[21] Christine Dell’Amore, Extremely Rare White Rhino Dies in Kenya—His Kind Nearly Extinct, National Geographic (Oct. 21, 2014), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/10/141020-rhinoceros-death-suni-kenya-science-world-endangered-animals/.

[22] Matthew Knight, Western Black Rhino Declared Extinct, CNN (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/10/world/africa/rhino-extinct-species-report/.

[23] Javan Rhinoceros, WWF Global, http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/endangered_species/rhinoceros/asian_rhinos/javan_rhinoceros/ (last visited May 1, 2015).

[24] Id.

[25] NATURE: Rhino Horn Use, PBS (Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/nature/rhinoceros-rhino-horn-use-fact-vs-fiction/1178/

[26] See Milliken at 1.

[27] See UN Chronicle.

[28] Achim Steiner, Scenario Note for the First Session of the United Nations Environment Assembly of the United Nations Environment Programme (June 23-27, 2013), U.N. Doc. UNEP/EA.1/INF/20/Rev.2 (June 23, 2013), http://www.unep.org/unea/docs/concept_note_wildlife.pdf.

[29] Varun Vira et al., C4ADS & Born Free USA, Out of Africa: Mapping the Global Trade in Illicit Elephant Ivory (2014) [hereinafter Out of Africa], http://www.wwf.se/source.php/1578610/out%20of%20africa.pdf. See also International Environmental Law and Policy 1081 (David Hunter et al. eds., 4th ed. 2011).

[30] International Environmental Law and Policy at 1081.

[31] Id. at 1082.

[32] Id.

[33] Id.

[34] Adam Welz, Race to Save the Rhino, U. Minn. Inst. for the Env’t (Aug. 7, 2013), http://ensia.com/features/the-race-to-save-rhinos/

[35] David Daniels, Illegal Ivory Trade ‘Out of Control,Washington Times (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/9/illegal-ivory-trade-out-of-control/.

[36] Out of Africa at 47; Brian Christy, Ivory Worship, National Geographic (Oct. 2012), http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2012/10/ivory/christy-text.

[37] See Jason Straziuso, “Ivory for Sale in Angola; Big Tuskers Die in Kenya,” Associated Press (June 19, 2014), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ivory-sale-angola-big-tuskers-die-kenya.

[38] E.g., Ana Swanson, How China’s Ivory Addiction Explains the New World Economy, The Washington Post (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/11/07/how-chinas-ivory-addiction-explains-the-new-world-economy/; Environmental Investigation Agency, Vanishing Point: Criminality, Corruption and the Devastation of Tanzania’s Elephants (Nov. 2014), http://eia-international.org/wp-content/uploads/EIA-Vanishing-Point-lo-res1.pdf.

[39] Id.

[40] Milliken at 14; see also 16 U.S.C. § 4242 (Certification under Pelly Amendment).

[41] For example, Iceland has now been certified three times under the Pelly Amendment but continues its whaling practices. GPO, Message to the Congress on Pelly Certification and Icelandic Whaling (Apr. 2014), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201400227/pdf/DCPD-201400227.pdf

[42] Donald R. Liddick, Crimes Against Nature 49 (2011); see Switching Channels, WWF/TRAFFIC Briefing Document 4 (Dec. 2012) http://www.wwf.org.uk/filelibrary/pdf/switchingchannels.pdf.

[43] Out of Africa at 12.

[44] Id.

[45] Id.

[46] Id. at 17.

[47] See South Africa Department of Environmental Affairs, The Viability of Legalising Trade in Rhino Horn in South Africa 103 (2014), https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/docs/rhinohorntrade_southafrica_legalisingreport.pdf.

[48] Our Work, TRAFFIC, http://www.traffic.org/cites/ (last visited May 1, 2015).

[49] CITES Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP16): Trade in Elephant Specimens, http://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/res/10/E-Res-10-10R16.pdf.

[50] Press Release, Lusaka Agreement Task Force and CITES Management Authority of China, African, Asian and North American Law Enforcement Officers Team up to Apprehend Wildlife Criminals, Operation COBRA II Press Release (Feb. 10, 2014), http://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/news/sundry/2014/operation_cobra_ii_pr.pdf

[51] See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Guidelines on Methods and Procedures for Ivory Sampling and Laboratory Analysis, U.N. Doc. ST/NAR/50 (Nov. 2014).

[52] International Consortium on Combatting Wildlife Crime (ICCWC), Geneva, Switzerland, July 7–11 2014, Powerpoint Presentations from Side Events Held During SC65, SC65 Inf. 27, http://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/com/sc/65/Inf/E-SC65-Inf-27.pdf

[53] S.C.Res. 2136, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2136 (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2136(2014).

[54] S.C.Res. 2134, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2134 (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2134(2014

[55] See U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General on the Central African Republic Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 22 of Security Council Resolution 2121 (2013), U.N. Doc. S/2013/677 (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/677.

[56] World Trade Organization, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, Annex D, WT/L/579 (2004), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/ddadraft_31jul04_e.pdf.

[57] WTO Ministerial Conference Ninth Session, Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013, WT/MIN(13)/36, WT/L/911, WTO 13-6816 (Dec. 11, 2013) (Agreement on Trade Facilitation).

[58] World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, ¶ 31, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.pdf.

[59] Out of Africa at 22–23.

[60] Out of Africa at 7.

[61] Id. at 18.

[62] Id. at 8.

[63] Id. at 13.

[64] Palantir Technologies, Investigating the Illicit Ivory Trade with Palantir Gotham, Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yMv3TBxulu4#t=23 (last visited May 1, 2015).

[65] Out of Africa at 19.

[66] See Wittemyer et al., Illegal Killing for Ivory Drives Global Decline in African Elephants, 111 PNAS 13117–21 (2014).

[67] Out of Africa at 7.

[68] http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/14/world/asia/us-to-offer-reward-in-wildlife-trafficking-fight.html?pagewanted=all; see also http://eia-international.org/vixay-keosavang-an-untouchable-kingpin-of-wildlife-crime

This post is part of the Environmental Law Review Syndicate, a multi-school online forum run by student editors from the nation’s leading environmental law reviews.

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By Gillian Schroff

Although only a few inches in size, the delta smelt (Hypomesus transpacificus) has become a topic of intense debate in water-scarce California. When the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS or Service) determined that these small fish were a threatened species in 2005, the Service invoked the significant protections of § 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA)[1] and water agencies that managed the delta smelt’s habit were suddenly precluded from diverting water in ways that could negatively affect the fish.

The rivers that flow into the delta provide water to around two-thirds of Californians and large amounts of farmland.[2] FWS’s determination that the diversions would endanger the delta smelt and were therefore prohibited was criticized as “put[ting] fish above the needs of millions of Californians.”[3] When the cutback in water diversions began, farmers who had depended on the diversions were forced to institute alternative methods, including abandoning fertile land.[4] The problem was exacerbated by the fact that there was no other source of water in the region to irrigate the fields.[5] As of 2010, estimates suggested that there had been $2.2 billion in agricultural losses as a result of the decrease in water diversions. [6]

FWS proposed Reasonable and Prudent Alternatives (RPAs) that would allow the water diversions to continue, but even those required that the diversions to be limited to protect the delta smelt.[7] According to the plaintiffs, this alternative failed to resolve the water supply problems for farmers who had previously relied on water diversions from the agency.[8] As a result, various water agencies and farmers challenged the Service’s decision in the case San Luis and Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. Jewell.[9]

Because of conflicts like those at issue in San Luis, the ESA has been a source of contention, with environmental groups, private parties, and the courts debating the propriety of protecting endangered species at the expense of economic development. On one end of the spectrum, the Supreme Court held in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill (TVA)[10] that economic considerations are not relevant to Reasonable and Prudent Alternative (RPA) determinations.[11] Alternatively, the Fourth Circuit has held that economic considerations must be included in the analysis of RPAs.[12] In San Luis the Ninth Circuit adhered to the holding of TVA and held that the consideration of economic effects on private parties was inappropriate for an RPA analysis.[13]

Despite the complicated nature of the San Luis conflict and the significant economic effects that the FWS’s decision may have on farmers, the Ninth Circuit correctly determined that the economic effects on these private third parties did not need to be explicitly analyzed in the RPAs. The text of the ESA and the stated purpose of the ESA indicate that economics are not relevant to RPAs. In addition, RPAs do not restrict the options of agencies, but simply identify one way for the agency to proceed, despite the jeopardy determination, and the ESA already allows for the consideration of economics in the exemption provision. Finally, allowing for the consideration of economics in the creation of RPAs would impair the functioning of the ESA and would not clearly advance any goal that the private parties could hope to accomplish.

II. Alternative Interpretations of the RPA Provision

Following the TVA decision in 1978, courts have generally understood the ESA to prohibit an interest-balancing approach to the protection of endangered species.[14] This interpretation of the ESA is supported by the text and context of the statute. Still, conflicts often arise when development projects are restricted by the ESA.[15] There are those who argue that all species are inherently valuable and ought to be protected, while others believe that changing conditions and social development are more important than preserving those species that cannot adapt.[16] The various groups involved in these conflicts struggle to compromise because of their diametrically opposed views as to the value of species.[17]

This difference in priorities extends to the circuit courts of appeals. For example, as described above, the Ninth Circuit determined in San Luis that RPAs need not address third party economic consequences.[18] In Dow Agroscience LLC v. National Marine National Marine Fisheries Service,[19] however, the Fourth Circuit held that it was necessary to consider economic consequences in adopting an RPA.[20]

The facts of Dow are analogous to those in San Luis. The Fourth Circuit addressed the question of whether an insecticide manufacturer could challenge a Biological Opinion (BiOp) provision that limited the registration of its products based on the agency’s failure to consider economic consequences.[21] One of the manufacturer’s claims was that an RPA suggesting “buffer zones” for pesticide use was unreasonable because the National Marine Fisheries Service failed to explicitly address the economic feasibility of the buffer system.[22] The National Marine Fisheries Service argued that it did not have “‘to explain why [it] chose one recommended and prudential alternative over another.’”[23] The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, finding that the definition of RPA in C.F.R. § 402.02 indicated that “economic feasibility” was a requirement that the Service must show.[24] Because the National Marine Fisheries Service did not discuss economic feasibility at all, the court held that the RPA was insufficient, flatly rejecting the idea that “the economic feasibility requirement [is] simply a limitation that the reasonable and prudent alternative be economically possible.”[25]

Alternatively, in San Luis, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the idea that downstream economic effects ought to be considered in the RPA analysis.[26] Initially, the district court considered the downstream effects of the RPA on water for human consumption and agricultural use. However, the Ninth Circuit concluded that FWS is simply not required to address anything other than jeopardy in its RPA analysis because, while other factors are mentioned in the regulations, they are not explicitly included in the ESA.[27] Moreover, the Ninth Circuit criticized the district court’s application of “economic feasibility” language,[28] instead holding that the feasibility requirement in the regulations applied only to the actual implementation of the RPA, not to affects on third parties.[29] Based on that interpretation, the Ninth Circuit held that FWS’s RPA was feasible because FWS’s recommendations had in fact been implemented based on an interim order and were therefore economically possible to implement.[30]

Not surprisingly, given the importance of water in drought-stricken California, this decision was met with criticism. Following the Ninth Circuit decision, the media characterized the conflict, somewhat unjustly,[31] as a “humans vs. fish battle,” in which the Ninth Circuit had chosen “environmentalists over growers.”[32] In 2014, the California State Water Project met only five percent of users’ requests for water as a result of the drought and decreased water diversions.[33] As a result of the intense public scrutiny over the decreased diversions from the delta, it is unsurprising that a private party and a water authority both petitioned for review of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in the Supreme Court. The petitioners noted the extreme economic effects of the San Luis decision and the Ninth Circuit’s failure to weigh those economic consequences.[34] They also argued that the Ninth Circuit’s failure to consider the economic consequences was in conflict with the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Dow.[35] Ultimately, the Supreme Court denied the petitions for certiorari.[36]

III. RPA Provision in Context

The ESA was designed to prevent the extinction of wildlife and plant-life,[37] but it allows some flexibility by permitting FWS to propose RPAs by which the agency can continue to pursue its action without jeopardizing endangered species. [38] In this way, RPAs balance the ESA’s goal of preserving endangered species with an agency’s goals of continuing development and implementing its action. [39] Fundamentally, an RPA “must be a measure that ‘can be taken by the Federal agency or applicant in implementing the agency’s action.’”[40]

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in San Luis reflects the appropriate standard for RPAs based on the text and context of the RPA provision. The RPA language in the ESA does not include any reference to economic considerations. The provision states: “If jeopardy or adverse modification is found, the Secretary shall suggest those reasonable and prudent alternatives which he believes would not violate [the no-jeopardy/no adverse modification provisions] of this section and can be taken by the Federal agency or applicant in implementing the agency action.”[41] While other provisions of the ESA explicitly include economic considerations, there is no mention of economic considerations in the RPA provision.[42] Thus, the only explicit requirement for a RPA is that it must eliminate the risk of jeopardy to the endangered species.[43]

Moreover, the purpose of the ESA suggests that economic considerations are not relevant to the RPA analysis. The ESA was created because endangered species were being undervalued by society.[44] The Act allowed the government to speak for endangered species and communicate their competing demands for water allocations and other resources.[45] In fact, when the ESA was initially created, economic considerations were intentionally excluded from the Act because the focus of the legislation was on preservation, regardless of the cost involved.[46] Through subsequent amendments, Congress has continued to state that economics are not to play a role in the listing process.[47]

Accordingly, courts have consistently held that, under the ESA, the Secretary is “not even required to pick the best alternative or the one that would most effectively protect the [endangered species] from jeopardy,” as long as the alternative prevents jeopardy and it is possible for the agency to implement the alternative.[48] The Service thus has a large degree of discretion in creating RPAs, as long as jeopardy is avoided. [49] In practice, the Service’s decisions can be, and often are, influenced by politics or economics or any variety of social factors,[50] but an RPA need not explicitly include consideration of downstream economic consequences on parties who are not directly involved in the agency action.[51] Thus, an alternative may be “reasonable,” “prudent,” and “economically and technologically feasible,” even if it will have significant negative economic effects.

Significantly, the exemption process for jeopardy findings under § 1536 does provide for economic considerations through a cost–benefit analysis and a weighing of the overall effects on the public interest.[52] In fact, in the House Report for the Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Congress explicitly indicated that any “balancing between science and economics should occur subsequent to listing through the exemption process.”[53] Congress explicitly stated that the exemption process include a broad range of economic criteria.[54] Moreover, Congress indicated that this exemption analysis was broader than the initial consultation process and should include a “significantly larger” search for alternatives than was required for consultation.[55]

A. The Flexible Nature of RPAs

The flexible quality of RPAs also reveals that the RPA analysis should not be read to include economic considerations. The RPA provision was adopted in response to the TVA decision as a way to add some flexibility to the ESA.[56] The RPA directive in the ESA simply states that“[i]f jeopardy or adverse modification is found, the Secretary shall suggest those reasonable and prudent alternatives which he believes would not violate [the no-jeopardy provision] of this section and can be taken by the Federal agency or applicant in implementing the agency action.”[57] RPAs were thus designed to provide agencies with an option to avoid the “no jeopardy” prohibition on agency action, making them permissible, rather than mandatory, alternatives.

A jeopardy determination can stop any federal action, and the adoption of an RPA is only one way by which agencies can then proceed with the action, despite the jeopardy determination.[58] In practice, FWS almost always proposes RPAs.[59] One scholar noted that a theme was that the Service consistently made an effort to find an alternative that would be feasible for the agency, both in terms of economics and general practicality.[60] This option minimizes the negatives impacts of the ESA on agencies by balancing agency interests against the Act’s preservation purpose.[61] Congress intended that the consultation process surrounding a jeopardy finding would often result in a mutually beneficial resolution,[62] and the Service’s effort to find practical alternatives illustrates that it uses RPAs to help agencies continue their actions.[63] The ESA only prohibits action that jeopardizes the continued existence of endangered species,[64] so an agency is free, upon a jeopardy finding, to independently design and implement any action that avoids such jeopardy.[65] Thus, an agency can determine whether or not to consider the economic effects of the alternative action or whether or not to implement FWS’s recommendation at all.[66] Although it has been argued that FWS’s recommended RPAs have “a powerful coercive effect on the action agency,”[67] the agency remains free, under the law, to develop its own solution. [68]

Overall, RPAs are only one of many tools available to agencies when they are facing a jeopardy determination. The flexible and permissive nature of RPAs, and the fact that they are not mandatory, demonstrate that there is no need to consider downstream economic effects within the RPA analysis. In addition, as explained above, the exemption provision in § 7 already considers downstream economic effects in those exceptional cases in which such an analysis is necessary. [69]

B. Consequences of a Broader Standard

Because the RPA option was created as a way to allow agency actions to proceed despite a jeopardy finding, foreclosing the ability to find RPAs in some circumstances would decrease the likelihood that agencies could proceed with actions after a jeopardy finding. In fact, the agency could even be forced to forgo its action if the Service determines that there are no RPAs.[70] At that point, an agency’s only option would be the exemption process, which is already available in the rare circumstances when it is necessary to weigh additional factors that are not included in the consultation process.

Changing the RPA analysis to include downstream economic effects would also upset the existing balance in § 7. RPAs allow agencies to proceed under § 7 despite a jeopardy determination, and making this allowance more demanding would increase the power of the jeopardy finding, making § 7 stricter overall. This change would similarly increase the strength of the exemption provision as agencies come to rely on it more as the only option for avoiding the jeopardy determination.

Perhaps most importantly, adding this additional requirement may not have any effect on the Service’s behavior. FWS likely already considers these economic factors implicitly.[71] As Congress has recognized “there is some degree of flexibility in Section 7,” and FWS has significant discretion in determining when and how to enforce its provisions.[72] Thus, because making the analysis of economic effects explicit only complicates procedures under the statute and impairs the functioning of the RPA process, while potentially expanding the exemption process, the RPA analysis should not include a consideration of downstream economic consequences.

IV. Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit correctly determined in San Luis that the RPA analysis need not include a consideration of downstream economic consequences. The ESA’s preservation intent indicates that economics are largely irrelevant under the Act. In addition, the purpose of RPAs and the exemption provisions of § 7 demonstrate that economic considerations are not necessary in the RPA process because agencies can pursue these considerations in other ways. Finally, considering economics in § 7 would fundamentally alter the functioning of the ESA, without necessarily providing any benefit to the private parties. Thus, requiring consideration of downstream economics in RPAs is simply not the answer to California’s water problem. The delta smelt is an indicator species, reflecting the health of the Delta ecosystem, and its endangered status demonstrates that the water system is deteriorating. [73] Rather than blaming the threatened delta smelt and the ESA for California’s water problems, the parties must begin to craft a solution in light of drought that will maintain the water system for use by endangered species and humans. [74]

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[1] 16 U.S.C. § 1536.

[2] Kate Galbraith, Threatened Smelt Touches Off Battles in California’s Endless Water Wars, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/us/threatened-smelt-touches-off-battles-in-californias-endless-water-wars.html.

[3] Kyle Roberson, One Fish, Two Fish, More Fish, No Water: Granting an Exemption Under the Endangered Species Act Due to Economic Woes in the Central Valley of California, 19 San Joaquin Agric. L. Rev. 169, 172–73 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

[4] Id. at 173–74.

[5]Id. at 193.

[6] Roberson, supra note 3, at 173–74; Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 322–387 (E.D. Cal. 2007).

[7] Id. at 598–99.

[8] Id. at 600–01.

[9] 747 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2014).

[10] 437 U.S. 153 (1978).

[11] Id. at 184.

[12] See Dow AgroSciences LLC v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 707 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2013).

[13] San Luis, 747 F.3d at 636–37.

[14] Fedrico Cheever, Butterflies, Cave Spiders, Milk-Vetch, Bunchgrass, Sedges, Lilies, Checker-Mallows and Why the Prohibition Against Judicial Balancing of Harm Under the Endangered Species Act Is A Good Idea, 22 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 313, 313 (1998).

[15] Jon A. Souder, Chasing Armadillos Down Yellow Lines: Economics in the Endangered Species Act, 33 Nat. Resources J. 1095, 1110 (1993).

[16] Id. at 1096.

[17] Id. at 1110.

[18] See San Luis and Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581, 636–37 (9th Cir. 2014).

[19] 707 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2013).

[20] Id. at 474–75.

[21] Id. at 464.

[22] Id. at 473–74.

[23] Id. at 474 (quoting Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 143 F.3d 515, 523 (9th Cir. 1998)).

[24] Id.

[25]Id. at 474–75.

[26] See San Luis and Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581, 636–37 (9th Cir. 2014).

[27] Id. at 635–36.

[28] Id. at 636.

[29] Id.

[30] Id. at 637.

[31] While the San Luis decision may have further decreased the water available to farmers, California’s drought is the primary reason that farmers are suffering. Endangered species are sometimes compared to the “canary in the coal mine,” indicating that agency policy is posing “imminent harms to public welfare.” Zygmunt Plater, Classic Lessons from A Little Fish in A Pork Barrel-Featuring the Notorious Story of the Endangered Snail Darter and the TVA’s Last Dam, 32 Utah Envtl. L. Rev. 211, 239 (2012). In this case, perhaps the delta smelt is best viewed as the “canary in the coal mine” indicating that California is suffering from extreme water shortages that cannot be resolved by water diversions.

[32] Dan Levine, In Drought-Stricken California, Court Rules Smelt Fish Get Water, Reuters, Mar. 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/13/us-usa-california-water-idUSBREA2C1MB20140313.

[33] Galbraith, supra note 2.

[34] Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *4–*5, State Water Contractors v. Jewell, No. 14-402, 2015 WL 132973 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2015), 2014 WL 5017959; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *2, Stewart & Jasper Orchards v. Jewell, No. 14-377, 2015 WL 132972 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2015), 2014 WL 4948941.

[35] Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *21–*26, State Water Contractors, 2015 WL 132973 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2015), 2014 WL 5017959; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *19–*21, Stewart & Jasper Orchards, No. 14-377, 2015 WL 132972 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2015), 2014 WL 4948941.

[36] State Water Contractors v. Jewell, No. 14-402, 2015 WL 132973 at *1 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2015);

Stewart & Jasper Orchards v. Jewell, No. 14-377, 2015 WL 132972 at *1 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2015).

[37] Jacquelyn V. Raley, Narrow Mouth Toad v. Too Narrow Road: Maryland’s First Attempt at Balancing the Protection of Endangered Species with the Protection of Public Safety, 5 U. Balt. J. Envtl. L. 193, 193 (1995).

[38] 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (2012).

[39] Hannah Gosnell, Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act and the Art of Compromise: The Evolution of A Reasonable and Prudent Alternative for the Animas-La Plata Project, 41 Nat. Resources J. 561, 568 (2001).

[40] Dow AgroSciences LLC v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 707 F.3d 462, 474 (4th Cir. 2013).

[41] 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (2012).

[42] See, e.g., Id. § 1533(b)(2) (designation of critical habitat).

[43] See Robert S. Nix, Bennett v. Spear: Justice Scalia Oversees the Latest “Battle” in the “War” Between Property Rights and Environmentalism, 70 Temp. L. Rev. 745, 774 (1997) (“[There is no textual support in section seven, or the rest of the ESA, for the proposition that the economic interests of the plaintiff-private landowners fall under the zone of interests protected by section 1536.”).

[44] Jason F. Shogren & Patricia H. Hayward, Biological Effectiveness and Economic Impacts of the Endangered Species Act, 32 Land & Water L. Rev. 531, 532 (1997).

[45] Roberson, supra note 3, at 169–70.

[46] Shogren & Hayward, supra note 54, at 537.

[47] See, e.g., H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-835, at 19 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2860. (“The principal purpose of these amendments is to ensure that decisions in every phase of the process pertaining to the listing or delisting of species are based solely upon biological criteria and to prevent non-biological considerations from affecting such decisions.”)

[48] See, e.g., Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 143 F.3d 515, 523 (9th Cir. 1998).

[49] Gosnell, supra note 15, at 576–77.

[50] Id.

[51] See, e.g., Brief for the Federal Defendants in Opposition at *15–*18, Stewart & Jasper Orchards v. Jewell, No. 14-377, 2015 WL 132972 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2015) and State Water Contractos v. Jewell, No. 14-402, 2015 WL 132973 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2015), 2014 WL 7169717.

[52] 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h) (2012)

[53] H.R. Rep. No. 97-567, at 11 (1982), reprinted in 1982, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2811.

[54] H.R. REP. No. 95-1625, at 22 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9472 (explaining that the exemption process should include considerations of “(1) the cost impact on consumers, business markets, federal, state, and local governments; (2) the effect on productivity of wage earners, businesses and government; (3) the effect on competition; (4) the effect on supplies of important materials, products, and services; (5) the effect on employment; and (6) the effect on energy supply and demand”).

[55] Id. (“During the consultation process, the Secretary and the federal agency are required to evaluate a narrower range of possible alternatives to the proposed action.”).

[56] Gosnell, supra note 15, at 569.

[57] 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (2012).

[58] Reed D. Benson, So Much Conflict, Yet So Much in Common: Considering the Similarities Between Western Water Law and the Endangered Species Act, 44 Nat. Res. J. 29, 48–49 (2004).

[59] Gosnell, supra note15, at 562–63.

[60] Id. at 575 (citing See Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 278, 319–20 (1993)).

[61] Gosnell, supra note 15, at 576 (“[T]he FWS has relied on identifying reasonable and prudent alternatives to questionable projects subject to Section 7 consultation as a way of minimizing the impact of the law and appeasing developers.”); Robin Kundis Craig, Does the Endangered Species Act Preempt State Water Law?, 62 U. Kan. L. Rev. 851, 877 (2014) (“[T]he Section 7 consultation process can often mitigate conflicts that exist between the exercise of the federal agency’s water rights and species protections, either through reasonable and prudent alternatives or Incidental Take Statements or both.”).

[62] H.R. Rep. No. 95-1625, at 12 (1978, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9462 (“The evidence presented to the committee suggests that in many instances good faith consultation between the acting agency and the fish and wildlife service can resolve many endangered species conflicts.”).

[63] Id. (citing See Houck, supra note 64, at 319–20).

[64] 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012).

[65] See, e.g., Gosnell, supra note 15, at 590.

[66] Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1418 (9th Cir. 1990) (An “agency is given discretion to decide whether to implement conservation recommendations put forth by the FWS.”); Grand Canyon Trust v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 691 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2012), as amended (Sept. 17, 2012).

[67] Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997)

[68] H.R. Rep. No. 95-1625, at 12 (1978), reprinted in, U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9462 (“Any determination by the fish and wildlife service that the activity may jeopardize the continued existence of listed species does not necessarily mandate any particular action by the acting agency.”).

[69] Id. at 183.

[70] Gosnell, supra note 15, at 568.

[71] Gosnell, supra note 15, at 576–77.

[72] H.R. Rep. No. 95-1625, at 11 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9461.

[73] Roberson, supra note 3, at 195; Craig, supra note 61, at 890.

[74] See Roberson, supra note 3, at 197.

This post is part of the Environmental Law Review Syndicate, a multi-school online forum run by student editors from the nation’s leading environmental law reviews.

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By Christopher Hyner, Managing Editor—Georgetown Environmental Law Review

Climate change. Ocean dead zones. Fisheries depletion. Species extinction. Deforestation. World hunger. Food safety. Heart disease. Obesity. Diabetes. The list goes on. There is one issue at the heart of all these global problems that is too often overlooked by private individuals and policy makers alike—our demand for and reliance on animal products. We can take a substantial step towards addressing all these problems simultaneously through reducing or eliminating our reliance on meat and dairy products. This begs the question — what are the United States’ major governmental environmental policy enforcers doing to address animal agriculture’s contribution to climate change, if anything? This piece briefly highlights two things: (1) animal agriculture is a leading cause of many major environmental problems we face globally and domestically—most importantly, climate change; and (2) animal agriculture is too often left out of the policy discussion.

First, the interconnectedness of animal agriculture and the environment.

A multitude of environmental problems our planet faces share a common instigator: animal agriculture and our reliance on meat and dairy products. According to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), global agriculture—dominated by livestock production and the grains grown to support it—accounts for 30% of greenhouse gas emissions.[1] A 2006 study by the United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) finds that 18% of global greenhouse gas emissions is directly attributable to livestock production, which is more than the emissions attributable to the entire transportation sector.[2] Whichever number is relied upon, agricultural emissions are only going to increase as rising incomes and urbanization drive a global dietary transition towards increased consumption of meat and dairy products.[3] The growing demand for animal agriculture is expected to be a major contributor to a roughly 80% increase in global greenhouse gas emissions from the agricultural sector.[4] This means that animal agriculture must be a central element of our efforts to mitigate climate change.

In addition to being a major contributor to climate change, animal agriculture is also one of the leading causes of many other environmental issues, including overfishing, destruction of wildlife, deforestation, and depletion of freshwater resources to hydrate livestock or irrigate fodder. According the FAO approximately 75% of the world’s fisheries are either exploited or depleted[5] due to fishing, which will likely lead to the complete depletion of currently fished fish stocks by 2048.[6] As to wildlife, in order to protect the interests of primarily the livestock industry, the USDA and Bureau of Land Management sponsor programs to kill or entrap wildlife that threaten the industry’s bottom line.[7] This has led to the decimation of wolf populations in the Pacific Northwest[8] and the mass round up of wild horses in the Midwest, which compete with cattle and sheep to graze on public lands.[9] With regard to deforestation, the World Bank has found that animal agriculture is responsible for roughly 90% of the razing of the Brazilian Amazon.[10] Lastly, but likely most critically, animal agriculture is the number one consumer of fresh water by a significant margin. Animal agriculture consumes on average 55 trillion gallons of water annually—more than 520 times the water used in hydraulic fracturing. [11] On a micro level, it takes roughly 5,000 gallons of water to produce 1lb. of beef.[12]

Second, the policies . . . or lack thereof.

Animal agriculture is a significant contributor, arguably the most significant, to a variety of pressing environmental issues. Despite the magnitude of the problem, relatively few global and national policies addressing the environmental effects of animal agriculture exist, and those that do exist are grossly inadequate. Federal agencies, specifically, have neglected their statutory authority to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the animal agriculture industry.

The agency primarily responsible for regulating animal agriculture, the United States Department of Agriculture, fails to adequately address animal agriculture in its climate plan.
On April 23rd, 2015, Tom Vilsack, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, unveiled the Agency’s “Building Blocks for Climate Smart Agriculture & Forestry” plan. The plan is primarily designed to “help farmers, ranchers, and forest land owners respond to climate change.[13] The USDA draws its authority to address climate change from the recent enactment of the Agricultural Act of 2014, or the “Farm Bill.”[14] Interestingly, the only reference to climate change in any provision of the most recent Farm Bill is in its reauthorization of the Office of International Forestry under Section 2405(d) of the Global Climate Change Prevention Act of 1990.[15]

USDA’s strategic climate plan, which grants that “[t]he dominant drivers of land use emissions of carbon are the conversion of forest and grassland to cropland and pasture” for animal agriculture, fails to establish concrete measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from animal agriculture.[16] The climate plan instead relies on voluntary conservation programs that provide technical assistance for resource management to encourage the animal agriculture industry to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.[17] One building block of the plan recommends the deployment of anaerobic digesters, lagoon covers, composting, and solids separators to reduce emissions from livestock—the equivalent of telling the industry to voluntarily change their light bulbs and to recycle more.[18] Another building block encourages rotational grazing management of livestock even though it has been shown that grazing makes less sense than Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) in terms of accounting for emissions and overall sustainability.[19] These voluntary measures inadequately address animal agriculture’s contribution to climate change.

The two primary remedial measures the USDA identifies to curtail greenhouse gas emissions—improved agricultural management practices and nitrous oxide (N2O) and methane (CH4) sequestration—do not go far enough. Although USDA notes that improved agricultural management practices can have a potentially significant role in addressing the atmospheric build-up of greenhouse gas emissions, it admits that these benefits will be realized over the next century.[20] This is an essential step, but additional measures must be taken that will reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the short term to avoid the catastrophic effects of climate change.

Of particular concern is animal production’s contribution to N2O (nitrous oxide) and CH4 (methane) emissions. With both eyes on the economic wellbeing of the animal agriculture industry and ensuring that current levels of production are maintained, USDA looks to “technological advancement” as the pathway for reducing NO2 and CH4 emissions.[21] The USDA identifies sequestration capabilities as the key to reducing NO2 and CH4 emissions. The Agency, however, alleges that it does not know enough to specify any concrete practices to mitigate climate change, focusing on unknown economic consequences sequestration methods may have on the producer.[22] The USDA emphasizes that GHG mitigation is one of a number of conservation issues facing land management.[23] “Soil and water quality, wildlife resilience and sustainability, air quality,” among others are noted, and tradeoffs must be identified and evaluated in order to design effective programs that address climate change.[24] In other words, USDA evades imposing concrete measures to curtail N2O and CH4 emissions until it has a better understanding of whether such mitigation will have a negative impact on the industry’s economic viability as well as on attempts to address other conservation issues.

Likewise, the Obama Administration fails to adequately address animal agriculture in the Climate Action Plan.
The Obama Administration’s Climate Action Plan narrowly focuses on energy production with no mention of animal agriculture except as it may relate to “agricultural activities” in the release of nitrous oxide.[25] What the Climate Action Plan fails to tell us is that livestock is responsible for 65% of all human-related emissions of N20, which has 296 times the global warming potential of carbon dioxide.[26] Moreover, though carbon dioxide comprises a large percentage of greenhouse gas emissions, the Plan fails to explain that a substantial portion of those emissions are directly tied to the production life cycle of meat and dairy products.[27] These climate plans are simply lacking in generating sound policies that include strategies to reduce animal agriculture’s contribution to climate change.

Efforts to reduce carbon emissions from fossil fuels are certainly vital to addressing climate change. The administration’s policy picture, however, fails to address one of the leading causes of human-related greenhouse gas emissions by not directly curtailing emissions from animal agriculture. Animal agriculture is hardly mentioned by the agencies charged with developing policies and regulations to mitigate the negative impacts of not only climate change, but also other environmental and public health issues.

Concrete policies addressing animal agriculture’s environmental effects need to be created and implemented. The administration has several tools at its disposal to address this issue. First, the Obama Administration can pressure the USDA to redraft and implement a more sophisticated plan to cut greenhouse gas emissions from livestock production, much in the way the Environmental Protection Agency was charged in generating the Clean Power Plan in targeting fossil fuel emissions from power plants.

Second, eliminate all subsidies to animal agriculture and impose a meat tax. In his book, Meatonomics, David Simon spells out how eliminating subsidies and reforming taxes can force us to pay the true cost of meat and dairy products as well as put more money back into the taxpayers’ pockets.[28] In the United States, taxpayers support upwards of $38.4 billion a year in subsidies to animal food production and assume over $400 billion of externalized costs associated with animal food production including subsidies, healthcare costs, environmental costs, animal cruelty, and fish production.[29] Eliminating subsidies would rid our food system of market distortions and allow the market principles of free trade—the principles that govern our economy—to readjust our consumption patterns towards healthier and environmentally aligned products.[30]

All in all, if we want to make serious gains in minimizing harms to the environment and public health, we need concrete policies that take a serious stance on minimizing animal agriculture.

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[1] USDA, USDA Climate Change Science Plan 4 (2010), available at http://www.usda.gov/oce/climate_change/science_plan2010/USDA_CCSPlan_120810.pdf. These figures include contributions from land use change and deforestation for the purpose of agriculture—primarily to make land available for grazing.

[2] Henning Steinfeld et al., FAO, Livestock’s Long Shadow: Environmental Issues and Options (2006), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/a0701e/a0701e00.htm. A more recent and comprehensive study published by Worldwatch Institute, however, finds that livestock and their byproducts actually account for 51% of worldwide human-related greenhouse gas emissions annually. Robert Goodland & Jeff Anhang, Livestock and Climate Change, World Watch Magazine, November/December 2009, at 11.

[3] David Tilman & Michael Clark, Global Diets Link Environmental Sustainability and Human Health, 515 Nature 518, 520 (2014).

[4] Id.

[5] FAO, General Situation of World Fish Stocks, http://www.fao.org/newsroom/common/ecg/1000505/en/stocks.pdf.

[6] Boris Worm et al., Impacts of Biodiversity Loss on Ocean Ecosystem Services, 314 Science 787, 790 (2006).

[7] USDA, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, https://www.aphis.usda.gov/wps/portal/aphis/ourfocus/wildlifedamage (last visited Oct. 15, 2015).

[8] Ralph Maughan, Wedge Wolf Pack Will be Killed because of its Increasing Beef Consumption, The Wildlife News (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.thewildlifenews.com/2012/09/22/wedge-wolf-pack-will-be-killed-because-of-increasing-beef-consumption/.

[9] Ross W. Gorte et al., Cong. Research Serv., R40237, Federal Lands Managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Service (FS): Issues in the 111th Congress 11 (2010); see also 157 Cong. Rec. H420 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 2011) (statement of Rep. Burton); 180 More Wild Horses Found Dead in Nevada, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1988, at A15.

[10] Sergio Margulis, Causes of Deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon, The World Bank (2004), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/02/02/000090341_20040202130625/Rendered/PDF/277150PAPER0wbwp0no1022.pdf.

[11] EPA, Draft Plan to Study the Potential Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing on Drinking Water Resources 14 (Feb. 2011), available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/HFStudyPlanDraft_SAB_020711.pdf.

[12] David Pimentel et al., Water Resources: Agricultural and Environmental Issues, 54 BioScience 909, 911 (2004).

[13] USDA, Building Blocks for Climate Smart Agriculture and Forestry, http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=climate-smart.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2015).

[14] Id.; see also Katie Hoover, Cong. Research Serv., R43431, Forestry Provisions in the 2014 Farm Bill (Pl. 113-79) (2014).

[15] 7 U.S.C. § 6704(d) (2012).

[16] USDA, supra note 1, at 3-4.

[17] USDA, USDA’s Building Blocks for Climate Smart Agriculture & Forestry—Fact Sheet (Apr. 23, 2015), available at http://www.usda.gov/documents/climate-smart-fact-sheet.pdf.

[18] Id.

[19] Id.; see also Cowspiracy (A.U.M. Films 2014).

[20] USDA, supra note 18, at 4.

[21] USDA, supra note 1, at 15-17.

[22] Id.

[23] Id.

[24] Id.

[25] Climate Change and President Obama’s Action Plan, The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/climate-change#section-carbon-pollution (last visited Oct. 15, 2015).

[26] Supra, note 2, at xxi.

[27] Supra, note 3.

[28] David R. Simon, Meatonomics, 166 (2013); see also Marya Torrez, Accounting for Taste: Trade Law Implications of Taxing Meat to Fight Climate Change, 27 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 61 (2014).

[29] Id. at Appendix B.

[30] Emiko Terazono, OECD Warns Farm Subsidies Still Too High, Financial Times (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a42540e4-3384-11e4-85f1-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3okCLb03e.

This post is part of the Environmental Law Review Syndicate, a multi-school online forum run by student editors from the nation’s leading environmental law reviews.

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By Kristen Mae Rodgers, Note Editor, Vermont Journal of Environmental Law

Vermont is leading the nation in the local, sustainable food movement and the new food economy. In fact, Vermont is the frontrunner in farm stands, community supported agriculture (CSA) programs, and farmers’ markets per capita across the entire United States. According to the USDA, Vermont is one of few states to see a boom in new farms. In 2014, Vermont bucked national trends showing growth in large-scale agricultural operations, and instead favored growth in small-scale agricultural operations. These small-scale farms make up the real strength in the local food movement for the state and highlight Vermont’s community-based approach to agriculture.

The rise of new farms coupled with already well-established operations makes agriculture one of the most important facets to Vermont’s economy. Agriculture and other food related activities grew from $6.9 billion in 2007 to $8.6 billion in 2014. According to the 2014 VT Farm to Plate Annual Report, over 60,000 jobs within the state can be attributed to Vermont’s food system. Roughly 12,000 businesses in Vermont partake in the food system. Overall, Vermont is set to continue its agricultural growth into the future.

Vermont owes its booming agricultural economy to one of its most precious natural resources – soil. Soil is a finite resource in the state. Farmland with viable soils are in high demand statewide due to the growth of new farms and continuation of existing farm operations. This demand has especially impacted dairy farmers, who now have to travel substantial distances to grow enough forage for their animals. Soil integrity will play an even larger roll in the demand for farmland in the future, as climate change alters the viability of soils worldwide.

The importance of Vermont’s soils, and thus agriculture, is reflected in Vermont’s signature land use legislation. Act 250, formally named Vermont’s Land Use and Development Law (10 V.S.A. Chapter 151), ensures that development in Vermont will coincide with natural resource conservation. Act 250 specifically calls out for special consideration of “Primary Agricultural Soils”, also known as PAS. PAS as defined by 10 V.S.A. section 6001 are “. . . important farmland soils map unit[s] that the Natural Resources Conservation Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (NRCS) has identified and determined to have a rating of prime, statewide, or local importance.” PAS make up the backbone of Vermont’s agricultural economy.

Criterion 9(b) of Act 250 ensures that any development on farmland will be well thought out and least likely to damage PAS. Under Criterion 9(b) exist four subcriteria. The subcriteria of 9(b) call for: (1) any development to not impinge on abutting agricultural operations; (2) no other lands owned or controlled by the applicant be reasonably suited for development; (3) the development plans minimize the reduction of agricultural potential of PAS through compact development patterns; and (4) suitable mitigation will be provided for any reduction of PAS in accordance with 10 V.S.A. section 6093. Section 6093 deals with the flexibility of soil mitigation and whether onsite or offsite mitigation can occur for certain projects. Section 6093 allows for the District Commission to decide if “appropriate circumstances” exist that warrant offsite mitigation measures. The offsite mitigation decision must be consistent with local and regional plans, as well as Vermont’s codified Smart Growth Principals. Overall, this means that any development in Vermont must first and foremost protect the economic and agricultural viability of the land and surrounding villages.

In a series of recent District Commission hearings, Criterion 9(b) is going through the wringer. Act 250 allows for partial review of its 10 criteria to ensure that development plans meet specific criterion before applying for full Act 250 review. As proposed, the Green Mountain Center would create over 1 million square feet of development on rural Vermont countryside in Randolph, Vermont. The Green Mountain Center applicant is currently seeking review of Criteria 9(b) and 10. The hearings regarding Criteria 9(b) and 10 have spanned more than 6 months with no formal decision made by the District 3 Commission yet. Conservation groups like the Conservation Law Foundation and Vermont Natural Resources Council oppose the project due to its impact on farmland. The main issue at the hearings is if the Green Mountain Center developer’s plans will qualify for requested offsite mitigation. Offsite mitigation can only be allowed by the District Commission if appropriate circumstances exist. Current case law and documents from the Natural Resources Board, who oversee Act 250, give little guidance as to what appropriate circumstances mean. However, it is clear that offsite mitigation should only be favored in situations where development occurs in one of six state-designated growth centers. Because the Green Mountain Center is outside a designed growth center, the Commission is entering new territory for offsite mitigation under Act 250. One thing is for certain, the District 3 Commission’s decision will shape the way development in Vermont will occur in years to come.

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This post is part of the Environmental Law Review Syndicate, a multi-school online forum run by student editors from the nation’s leading environmental law reviews.

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By Sarah Stellberg, Editor-in-Chief, Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

In his June 7, 2013 opinion in Illinois Commerce Commission v. FERC,[1] Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit inserted two lines of dicta on the constitutionality of Michigan’s Renewable Portfolio Standard, or Public Act 295 (PA 295).[2] By discriminating in favor of in-state renewable energy, he opined that Michigan’s law “trips over an insurmountable constitutional objection. Michigan cannot, without violating the Commerce Clause of Article 1 of the Constitution, discriminate against out-of-state renewable energy.”[3] The opinion will have little precedential value—it was not necessary for the holding, not fully briefed by the parties, and not binding on the Sixth Circuit. Nonetheless, the statement sent a ripple through the energy community, casting doubt upon Michigan’s law and the many similar Renewable Portfolio Standards with preferences for homegrown renewables. Twelve of these laws have already faced lawsuits alleging out-of-state discrimination,[4] and Judge Posner’s statement may be a harbinger of things to come in Michigan.

Two years later and several hundred miles away in the state capitol, Michigan legislators began launching their own attack on PA 295. After the RPS targets are met this year, there is no legal mandate for utilities to further increase their share of renewable generation. Republican legislators have introduced a bill that would repeal the renewable portfolio standard altogether.[5] Meanwhile, the Democratic proposal would increase the RPS to 20 percent by 2022.[6]

These efforts to rewrite Michigan’s comprehensive energy policy could spell trouble for the future of the Renewable Portfolio Standard. Yet with complete repeal unlikely, perhaps clean energy advocates should welcome the bills rattling around in Lansing. This legislative debate provides the perfect opportunity to rewrite PA 295 to fend off the constitutional challenge foretold in Judge Posner’s opinion.

Dormant Commerce Clause: The Legal Standard

The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several states.”[7] While the Clause contains no explicit language to this effect, courts have long recognized a negative implication of this enumerated power, known as the “dormant Commerce Clause,” which prohibits states from discriminating against or unduly burdening interstate commerce.[8]

Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence distinguishes between state laws that openly discriminate and those that impose a burden upon interstate commerce. The first category—laws that discriminate facially, purposefully, or in practical effect against out-of-state economic interests—are virtually per se invalid.[9] To uphold a discriminatory law, a court must find that the law is justified by a legitimate state interest unrelated to economic protectionism and that no less discriminatory alternative is available.[10]

The second category, facially neutral statutes, is subject to a lower level of scrutiny under the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. balancing test and will be upheld if the law’s putative local benefit outweighs its burden on interstate commerce.[11] In practice, the test is very forgiving to states. Unless the purported state interest appears to be illusory, courts rarely strike down state laws under the Pike test.[12]

Michigan’s Clean, Renewable, and Efficient Energy Act of 2008

Michigan’s Renewable Energy Standard is part of the 2008 Clean, Renewable, and Efficient Energy Act, or PA 295, signed into law on October 6, 2008 by then-Governor Jennifer Granholm.[13] The RPS requires Michigan electricity providers to supply at least 10 percent of their Michigan retail sales from renewable energy by 2015, with interim targets in 2012, 2013, and 2014.[14] The standard is applicable to Michigan’s investor-owned utilities, electric cooperatives, municipal electric utilities, and alternative electric supplier (AESs).[15]

Under PA 295, electric providers demonstrate compliance through the purchase and/or production of Renewable Energy Credits (RECs).[16] One REC is created for each megawatt-hour of renewable energy generation from qualified technologies, including wind, solar and solar thermal, biomass, hydroelectric, geothermal, municipal solid waste, and landfill gas.[17]

Michigan’s law contains two provisions that raise dormant Commerce Clause questions. First, eligible renewable energy systems must be located either within Michigan or within the service territory of a utility serving customers in Michigan (the “geographic sourcing restriction”).[18] Second, PA 295 grants a 1.1 REC multiplier each megawatt-hour generated from a renewable energy system built using equipment made in Michigan or constructed by a Michigan workforce (the “Michigan incentive multiplier”).[19] These two geographic restrictions lie at the heart of a potential constitutional challenge.

Michigan Incentive Multiplier Trips at Strict Scrutiny

The Michigan incentive multiplier holds little promise of withstanding judicial review under the dormant Commerce Clause. This location-based preference facially discriminates against non-Michigan entities by granting bonus RECs to renewable energy facilities constructed using Michigan equipment or labor. Comparable incentives are not provided to renewable energy producers who do not use Michigan sourced materials and labor. The effect of the multiplier, then, is to limit competition and shift business to in-state entities, thereby impeding the flow of interstate commerce. While a law that evenhandedly promotes investment in renewable power is constitutionally permissible, a preference for in-state industry is not.

Facial discrimination should be enough to strike down the Michigan Inventive Multiplier on Commerce Clause grounds. On top of that, however, contemporaneous evidence provides indications of a protectionist motive. The declared purposes of PA 295 were to promote a diversified fuel mix, promote greater energy security through the use of local resources, improve air quality, and to encourage private investment in renewable energy.[20] Of these, the only goal meaningfully served by the Michigan incentive multiplier is in-state economic development. Indeed, the Michigan Public Service Commission noted in its 2014 report on the implementation of PA 295 that the “Michigan inventive REC provision is meeting its intended purpose to encourage developers to maximize utilization of Michigan equipment and labor.” Governor Granholm was also forthright that a primary goal of PA 295 was to aid Michigan’s manufacturing industry. In an early press event on the bill, she noted: “the package will do a lot of things, but for me the most important thing is the job creation and adding a whole new sector” for Michigan’s economy.[21] The dormant Commerce Clause does not prohibit states from promoting local economic development and job growth. As one commentator noted, “[n]o renewable energy mandate passed a state legislature without the promise of thousands of new jobs.”[22] However, while a law that evenhandedly promotes investment in renewable power is constitutionally permissible, one intended to preference in-state industry interests by encouraging increased consumption of local goods or services is not.[23]

Murkier Waters for the Geographic Sourcing Restriction

The constitutionality of Michigan’s geographic sourcing restriction is less certain. Public Act 295 would be easily struck down if the law banned utilities from purchasing out-of-state renewable power altogether. However, the limit on eligible renewable power does not fall into this trap. The RPS permits utilities to satisfy the 10 percent mandate with electricity generated from a renewable energy system (1) located in Michigan or (2) within the nearby service territory of a utility that also serves Michigan, which would include parts of Indiana, Ohio, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.[24] By its plain terms, therefore, the Act does not discriminate based on the territorial boundary of the state.

The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that a state law “need [not] be drafted explicitly along state lines in order to demonstrate its discriminatory design.”[25] Here, Michigan has closed its doors to power from forty-five states and most of Indiana, Ohio, Minnesota, and Wisconsin based purely on location. By limiting eligibility in this way, the state has attempted to “dr[aw] a line around itself and treat[] those inside the line more favorably than those outside the line.”[26] While a few out-of-state generators were swept under Michigan’s protective reach, the vast majority of entities were categorically excluded based on their geographic location outside the Michigan distribution network. This type of geographic Balkanization would likely amount to facial discrimination.

Even assuming that the geographic sourcing restriction is facially neutral, the law undoubtedly has the practical effect of discriminating against out-of-state renewable power producers.[27] Again, PA 295 requires RPS-eligible power to be generated within the Michigan service territory. By severely limiting a supplier’s compliance options, the RPS ensures that the renewable power used to satisfy the RPS is generally produced in-state, or at least in close proximity to the state.

The delineation between a “discriminatory effect” sufficient to trigger heightened scrutiny and an “incidental burden” to which the Pike balancing would be applied is imprecise.[28] However, evidence suggests that the Michigan RPS more than “incidentally” burdens the interstate trade in renewable power. A 2015 report from the Michigan Public Service Commission indicates that “[n]inety-three percent of the energy credits used for 2013 compliance were from renewable energy generated in Michigan.”[29] Only seven percent came from renewable energy generated in Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.[30] Furthermore, without the in-state mandate, renewable electricity produced in nearby states could be purchased far below current prices. The most recent contracts for new wind capacity in Michigan have levelized costs in the $50 to $55 per MWh range, according to a 2015 report from the Michigan PSC.[31] This exceeds the cost of other regional wind projects costs by over 30% and the nationwide average by roughly 50%.[32]

While this data does not demonstrate causation—that the RPS led to an appreciably greater use of in-state power and fewer imports than would otherwise have occurred—the data provides powerful evidence that PA 295 established a discriminatory barrier to the interstate sale and transmission of renewable energy into Michigan.

Applying Strict Scrutiny

The practical effect of a finding that PA 295 discriminates against interstate commerce is fatal. In order to uphold the law, a court must find that the law serves a legitimate state interest unrelated to economic protectionism, and that no less discriminatory means to advance its legitimate local interest.[33] The geographic sourcing restriction may be justified by legitimate public health, safety, or environmental goals that go beyond economic motivation. For example, local renewable power generation can displace electricity generated from coal and natural gas plants, thereby reducing conventional air pollutants, such as sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrous oxides (NOx), and particulate matter, and improving local air quality and public health.[34]

However, Michigan would ultimately have difficulty mounting any defense that it lacks a non-discriminatory means to achieve these permissible state goals. The geographic sourcing restriction is a blunt method of mitigating line-losses or achieving in-state emissions reductions. Furthermore, many of these goals would arguably be better served by technology-forcing regulations for in-state power plants,[35] subsidies for in-state renewables generators, demand response or energy efficiency regulations, or purchase quotas not relying on homegrown renewable power. This point is only underscored by the decision of most states to enact similar RPSs without relying on in-state preferences. Therefore, if the geographic sourcing restriction were deemed discriminatory, it would almost certainly fail under the rigorous strict scrutiny test.

Pike Test – Finding a Legitimate Local Purpose

If the Michigan RPS is lucky enough to survive strict scrutiny, the next stop is the Pike balancing test. At this stage the court would determine whether the burdens imposed on interstate commerce by Public Act 295 are excessive in relation to a legitimate public interests served.[36]

The burden Michigan’s RPS imposes on the interstate renewable power market is certainly not insubstantial. The practical impact of Michigan’s RPS has been to preclude energy suppliers in 45 states from competing for a share of Michigan’s renewable energy demand. On the other hand, the state has not banned the import of renewable energy for purposes other than meeting the 10 percent mandate. Electricity may continue to move freely across the Michigan border through the MISO or PJM markets. Additionally, it is unclear to what extent leveling the playing field in Michigan would lead to a greater influx of out-of-state power.

At a more general level, Michigan’s law may be seen as an impediment to the goals embodied in FERC Order 888, namely unimpeded and efficient competition in the wholesale power marketplace.[37] As the share of renewable power generation increases nationwide, protectionist Renewable Portfolio Standards threaten to splinter national energy markets. Therefore, even if Michigan’s law has only an incidental burden on the regional trade in renewable energy, a court may reasonably conclude that a patchwork of preferential renewable energy laws across the nation places an unwelcome burden on interstate electricity markets.

However, Michigan should have no trouble establishing sufficient evidence of one or more of the legitimate state interests that outweigh any burden on interstate commerce. Michigan has asserted several local interests in the text of the law. PA 295 expressly aims to:

promote the development of clean energy, renewable energy, and energy optimization through the implementation of a clean, renewable, and energy efficient standard that will cost-effectively do all of the following[:]

(a) Diversify the resources used to reliably meet the energy needs of consumers in this state.

(b) Provide greater energy security through the use of indigenous energy resources available within the state.

(c) Encourage private investment in renewable energy and energy efficiency.

(d) Provide improved air quality and other benefits to energy consumers and citizens of this state.[38]

The economic development goal expressed in subsection (c) would not suffice as a legitimate state interest, and advertising this purpose on the face of the statute may compromise the state’s ability to justify its protectionist design on other grounds.

However, as suggested by subsections (a) and (b), renewable power does have the distinct advantage of helping insulate consumers and the state economy from electricity or fuel price spikes. Michigan consumers rely on coal and nuclear power for more than 80% of their electricity.[39] The entirety of Michigan’s coal is imported, mostly by rail from Wyoming and Montana, and to a tune of $1.2 billion dollars annually.[40] Michigan’s dependence on coal generation has been declining due to falling natural gas prices and pressure from environmental regulations, but the state also imports 75% of its natural gas needs.[41] This overreliance on imported fuels exposes the state to volatile or increasing fossil fuel prices. Furthermore, pending environmental regulations such as EPA’s Clean Power Plan and Mercury Air Toxics Rule, as well as nuclear waste disposal costs, mean that a large part of the state’s portfolio is subject to considerable regulatory risk. Renewable energy can serve as a financial hedge, reducing the state’s exposure to these risks.

Michigan’s geographic sourcing restriction may also be warranted to achieve local emissions reductions from fossil-fuel power plants, as advanced in subsection (d). The climate change impact of renewable energy accrues globally regardless of where emissions are displaced. Therefore, a state cannot justify in-state preferences on the “local” climate benefits of greenhouse gas emissions reductions. Nonetheless, renewable power generation displaces electricity generated from coal and natural gas plants, thereby reducing conventional air pollutants—sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrous oxides (NOx), particulate matter, mercury, and lead—and improving local air quality and public health.[42] The actual effect on air quality depends on how renewable resources are added the supply mix. Constructing a solar energy project in Michigan has a chance of displacing polluting coal plants in Michigan. Buying RECS from an Arizona solar project probably does not. Under the more forgiving Pike Balancing test, however, Michigan would have little trouble establishing a rational connection between its purposes of air quality improvement and the geographic sourcing restriction, despite evidence that in-state location is an imperfect proxy for fossil fuel emission displacement.

While PA 295 does not expressly assert any state interest related to transmission losses and infrastructural costs, this is arguably one of the greatest state interests in the eligibility restriction based on the location of the power within the state’s distribution grid. First, requiring utilities to purchase renewable power from within the state avoids some electricity transmission and distribution losses, increasing the efficiency of Michigan’s generation mix. Transmission lines waste somewhere around 6% of the power they deliver.[43] Under both PJM and MISO’s Locational Marginal Price (LMP) schemes, customers in Michigan end up paying for the cost of these marginal losses.[44] PA 295 theoretically helps minimize the distance power travels to reach its load and thus the costs of delivering renewable electricity to Michigan consumers. Second, ramping up renewable power generation often entails costly transmission investments to move power from areas where renewable power is most abundant to load centers where it will be used. Notably, however, the court in ICC v. FERC itself rejected Michigan’s argument that it should pay a lower share of MISO transmission line investments because it draws little renewable power from outside the state.[45]

Conclusion

Michigan’s geographic sourcing restriction and Michigan incentive multiplier leave the state’s RPS vulnerable to a dormant Commerce Clause challenge. Of course, it is possible that PA 295 may never be contested in court, given the law’s carve-outs for certain existing projects and special interests that would have been most likely to sue. Here, an ounce of prevention was certainly worth a pound of cure. Article III limitations such as standing may also bar a challenge on the merits, as they did in a lawsuit against renewable standards in Connecticut.[46] Nevertheless, until the preferential language in Michigan’s RPS is removed, the law will remain in jeopardy.

For this reason, policymakers in Lansing should take heed. As Public Act 295 is retooled for a new chapter in Michigan’s energy policy, they have an opportunity to shield the state’s Renewable Portfolio Standard from constitutional challenge. Rather than a Michigan incentive multiplier, the state should provide production incentives for in-state renewable energy generators.[47] Rather than a geographic sourcing restriction, the state should condition RPS eligibility on in-state benefit delivery, such as local emissions offsets. These amendments would open Michigan’s borders to a blossoming renewable energy market while maintaining the state’s forward progress on its economic, environmental, and energy development goals.

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[1] 721 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2013).

[2] Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 460.1001 – 460.1195 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2008, No. 295, § 1, Imd. Eff. Oct. 6, 2008).

[3] Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 721 F.3d at 776.

[4] State Cases, State Power Project, http://statepowerproject.org/states/.

[5] H.B. 4297, 98th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2015), https://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2015-2016/billintroduced/House/htm/2015-HIB-4308.htm.

[6] The “Powering Michigan’s Future” bill package, announced by a group of Democratic lawmakers, includes House bills 4055, 4518 and 4519 and Senate bills 295, 296 and 297. See Andy Balaskovitz, Michigan Democrats propose doubling clean-energy standards, Mich. Energy News (Apr. 4, 2015), http://www.midwestenergynews.com/2015/04/23/michigan-democrats-propose-doubling-clean-energy-standards/.

[7] U.S. Const. art. I § 8, cl. 3.

[8] See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531 (1949); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 141-42 (1970).

[9] See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (“[W]here simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtual per se rule of invalidity has been erected.”); Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994) (“[I]f a restriction on commerce is discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid.”).

[10] Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1994). The Supreme Court has only once upheld a discriminatory statute under this test. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151-52 (1986) (upholding Maine’s ban on the import of out-of-state baitfish because Maine had no other way to prevent the spread of parasites and the adulteration of its native baitfish species); see also Erwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate Change, and the Constitution, 25 Envtl. F. 50, 54 (July/Aug. 2008) (noting that only one law has survived strict scrutiny analysis).

[11] 397 U.S. at 142 (1970).

[12] Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 449 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring).

[13] Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 460.1001-460.1195 (Westlaw).

[14] Id. § 460.1027.

[15] Id. §§ 460.1021(1), 23(1), 25(1).

[16] Id. § 460.1027(5).

[17] Id. Hydroelectric can include waves, tides, currents or water released through a dam. This does not include “a hydroelectric pumped storage facility or a hydroelectric facility that uses a dam constructed after the effective date Act 295 unless the dam is a repair or replacement of a dam in existence on the effective date of Act 295 or an upgrade of a dam in existence on the effective date of Act 295 that increases its energy efficiency.” Id. § 460.1011.

[18] Id. § 460.1029(1).

[19] Id. § 460.1039(c)(2).

[20] Id. § 460.1001 (emphasis added)

[21] Nathan Bomey, Granholm Says RPS Would Lead to ‘Tens of Thousands’ of Jobs, Ann Arbor Bus. Rev. (May 30, 2008, 10:57 AM), http://www.mlive.com/business/index.ssf/2008/05/granholm_says_rps_would_lead_t.html.

Governors’ statements have been used to strike down several laws under the dormant Commerce Clause. For example, in Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981), the Supreme Court considered the Iowa Governor’s articulation of an impermissible purpose—deflecting burdensome interstate traffic on Iowa’s highways—in striking down an Iowa truck ban purportedly passed for highway safety reasons. Similarly in Waste Management Holdings v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 336 (4th Cir. 2001), the Fourth Circuit struck down a Virginia cap on landfill waste based on the legislative history and the governor’s statements eliciting an discriminatory intent—to prevent Virginia from “becoming New York’s dumping grounds.”

[22] John Farrell, In-State Renewable Energy Development and the Commerce Clause, Inst. for Local Self-Reliance (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.ilsr.org/state-renewable-energydevelopment-and-commerce-clause.

[23] See, e.g., Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 596-97 (7th Cir. 1995) (invalidating the facially neutral Illinois Coal Act, under which coal plants in Illinois were required to install scrubbers so they would be able to continue using Illinois coal as a Clean Air Act compliance option; Illinois legislature could not do an end-run around Commerce Clause restrictions by merely “encouraging” consumption of Illinois coal); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (Hawaiian excise tax on liquor sales that exempted local varieties was found purposefully discriminatory, where Hawaii’s stated purpose for the exemption was to “foster the local industries by encouraging increased consumption of their product”

[24] Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 460.1029(1) (Westlaw).

[25] Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, 490 U.S. 66 (1989). In Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 350 (1951), for example, the court found that a Madison city ordinance requiring all milk sold in the city to be pasteurized and bottled within a five-mile radius of the city center was facially discriminatory. Similarly, in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977), the court struck down a North Carolina statute that banned the sale of apples from any states with a grading system other than USDA, even though the law precluded sales from only some states. Finally, in Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 576 (1997), the court held that a Maine property tax exemption for charitable institutions that serve mostly state residents was facially discriminatory, even though several out-of-state entities benefitted from the statute.

[26] C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 403 (1994) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

[27] There appears to be some disagreement in the circuits as to whether discriminatory effects alone can trigger heightened scrutiny. However, Brown-Forman makes clear that heightened scrutiny applies not only when legislation is facially discriminatory, but also when a state statute or regulation’s “effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests . . . .” 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986).

[28] As the Supreme Court has recognized, “there is no clear line separating close cases on which scrutiny [or tier of analysis] should apply.” Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. at 455 n. 12; see also Brown–Forman Distillers, Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986) (“We have . . . recognized that there is no clear line separating the category of state regulation that is virtually per se invalid under the Commerce Clause, and the category subject to the Pike v. Bruce Church balancing approach.”).

[29] Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Report on the Implementation of the P.A. 295 Renewable Energy Standard and the Cost-Effectiveness of the Energy Standards 7 (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mpsc/PA_295_Renewable_Energy_481423_7.pdf.

[30] Id.

[31] Id. at 30.

[32] U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, 2014 Wind Technologies Market Report Highlights 4 (Aug. 2015), http://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/08/f25/2014-Wind-Technologies-Market-Report-Highlights.pdf.

[33] See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).

[34] See Kristen H. Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Marked-Based Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 Ecology L.Q. 243, 266 (1999).

[35] For example, requiring coal-fired power plants to install carbon-capture technologies.

[36] Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).

[37] Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996).

[38] Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 460.1001 (Westlaw).

[39] U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Michigan, State Profiles and Energy Estimates (2014), http://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=MI.

[40] Id.

[41] U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Michigan, Natural Gas Annual (2014), http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/annual/pdf/table_S24.pdf.

[42] See Engel, supra note 36, at 268 n.72.

[43] U.S. Energy Info. Admin., How much electricity is lost in transmission and distribution in the United States?, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=105&t=3 (last updated July 10, 2015).

[44] See MISO, Electricity Prices: Wholesale Electric Rates, 2014 Transmission Expansion Plan (July 29, 2014), http://www.misomtep.org/electricity-prices/; PJM Markets: Energy and Ancillary Services; PJM Markets: Energy and Ancillary Services, PJM State & Member Training Dep’t Slideshow (Jul. 29, 2014), http://www.naruc.org/International/Documents/Mon%20PJM%20part%202.pdf.

[45] 721 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2013).

[46] Allco Finance Ltd. v. Klee, No. 3:13-cv-01874-JBA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170674 (D. Conn. Dec. 10, 2014).

[47] Such direct subsidization does not ordinarily run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause prohibition on discriminatory treatment of interstate commerce. See New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988) (“The Commerce Clause does not prohibit all state action designed to give its residents an advantage in the marketplace, but only action of that description in connection with the State’s regulation of interstate commerce. Direct subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of that prohibition; discriminatory taxation of out-of-state manufacturers does.”).

Alex Mayer
2000 First Place Winner

I. INTRODUCTION

In late 1999, A Civil Action, a major motion picture starring John Travolta, told America the tragic story of twelve children diagnosed with leukemia in Woburn, Massachusetts between 1969 and 1979.[1] The parents, eight of whom lived within a half-mile radius of each other,[2] suspected that their children contracted the cancers because they drank water supplied by two contaminated city wells that were closed in 1979.[3] The “cluster” of 12 childhood leukemias in Woburn was in fact 2.3 times more than epidemiologists had expected.[4]

Jan Schlictmann, the families’ attorney, soon determined that W.R. Grace, Inc. and the J.J. Riley tannery, a subsidiary of Beatrice Foods, may have contaminated the wells through their industrial practices. The families then sued Grace and Beatrice for damages caused by their exposure to the toxic substance trichloroethylene (TCE).[5] Schlictmann suspected the two companies because they had operated manufacturing facilities near the contaminated wells. Because the plaintiffs sued under Massachusetts tort law, they faced a difficult burden of proving that the defendants actually and proximately caused their injuries. This burden would prove insurmountable for the plaintiffs, as Schlictmann would spend the next four years unsuccessfully pursuing his case.

During the four years, Schlictmann and his law firm amassed volumes of evidence suggesting that the defendants were responsible for contaminating the wells,[6] and also that the contaminated wells caused the children to contract leukemia.[7] The scientific complexity of the case required Schlictmann to hire at least 12 medical experts, [8] and numerous engineers, geologists, and hydrogeologists,[9] all at a considerable expense. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, however, this evidence was inadequate to hold the defendants liable.

In fact, the jury would absolve Beatrice of all liability and find Grace liable for negligence, but only after September, 1973.[10] The 1973 date seriously weakened the plaintiffs’ case because the judge then instructed the jury to disregard all pre-1973 evidence. The jury’s verdict would soon lead to an eight-million dollar settlement with Grace, and end the plaintiffs’ hopes to send a “billion dollar” message to corporate boardrooms.[11]

After spending $2.6 million in expenses and accruing $2.2 million in legal fees,[12] the plaintiffs would net a smaller payout than the costs of the case. The $455,000 per family award seemed like petty change compared to the pain and suffering caused by the diseases and deaths. The verdict, instead of sending a message of fear to the corporate boardrooms, sent the opposite message: that toxic polluters can get away with anything.

Federal and state environmental statutes are designed to prevent the kinds of contamination that occurred in Woburn. The federal and state regulatory systems attempt to prevent the proliferation of harmful chemicals by closely monitoring major generators of pollution.[13] The federal system has also created an information base that tracks toxic chemicals and their exposure to the human environment.

The agencies’ latest toxic release information is not encouraging. First of all, the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) 1997 Toxics Release Inventory Report,[14] shows that 2.5 billion pounds of toxic wastes were released into the United States environment in 1997.[15] Considering the carcinogenic and systemic danger of toxic wastes, the 2.5 billion pounds of waste will further increase the risk to public health.

Other government documents discuss the current health risk posed by these toxic releases. For example, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (“ATSDR”) recently completed a survey of extant toxicological information. This study describes the increasing human health threats posed by toxic waste releases.[16] The study reports that the number of abandoned (labeled “uncontrolled”) toxic waste sites in the U.S. could range anywhere from 40,000 to 440,000.[17] Sources also estimate that between 1,500 and 3,500 of the sites covered by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”)[18] require corrective action.[19]

Of the 40,000 to 440,000 uncontrolled sites, only 1,296 sites are on the CERCLA’s National Priorities List (“NPL”).[20]This list consists of the sites that may be cleaned up using federal funding.[21] Because of this, only a small minority of the uncontrolled sites will become controlled in the near future, while the majority will remain uncontrolled.

The ATSDR has also conducted 1,826 public health assessments of randomly selected, uncontrolled waste sites.[22]Over time, the agency has generally increased the number of sites characterized as “urgent public health hazards” and “public health hazards”.[23] In fact, the number of sites that ATSDR classified in these two groups between 1992 and 1996 averaged 46%.[24]

In addition to its public health assessments, the ATSDR in 1997 found that 36% of NPL sites have “completed exposure pathways,” meaning that toxic chemicals from 36% of these sites are currently penetrating human bodies.[25]At these “completed pathway” sites, the ATSDR has called the 30 most common chemicals CEPPS (Completed Exposure Pathway Priority Substances) and has found that 18 of the 30 CEPPS represent a carcinogenic hazard.[26] All of these CEPPS present other non-carcinogenic health hazards (called “systemic toxic risk”) given a high enough exposure.[27]

Despite its efforts, the ATSDR maintains that the national extent of carcinogenic risk presented by uncontrolled hazardous waste sites is still unknown.[28] Though the actual risk is unknown, both the EPA and the ATSDR report that toxic wastes present an enormous public health hazard. This risk is increasing annually as companies release more toxics and as these toxics find their way to human populations.

Though the toxic tort common law and the federal command and control regulatory framework both work to reduce toxic injuries, they work separately because the toxic tort common law remedies harms while the regulatory system tries to prevent them. Both the Woburn case and the government toxic waste reports leave the reader with pressing questions. How can the common law allow a company like Beatrice to recklessly contaminate a community’s water source? Why do the EPA and the Department of Justice fail to enjoin such actions? Will large corporations think twice before releasing toxic chemicals into the environment, or will they continue their practices with no fear of the consequences or possible harm? Should our legal system be modified so that plaintiffs can face a more surmountable burden of proof in toxic tort cases?

This paper answers the last question affirmatively because many plaintiffs face the same recovery barriers as did the Woburn residents. Such plaintiffs will go uncompensated until the causation level is reduced to a more realistic standard. This paper first investigates the treatment of causation in the toxic tort common law. Next, it explores law reviews, proposed and enacted legislation, and other legal theories for guidance as to toxic tort reform. Finally, the paper suggests that Congress create a federal private cause of action available to any toxic tort victim injured through violations of CERCLA, RCRA or TSCA. [29]

II. BACKGROUND

A. Toxic Tort Causes of Action

Like the plaintiffs in the Woburn case, victims can bring suit against any tortfeasor who may have exposed the plaintiff to harmful toxic chemicals. For many centuries, the tort system has compensated victims for injuries to their bodies, reputations, emotional states, and property. To recover compensation for their injuries, toxic tort victims have mainly employed tort theories of nuisance, negligence, and strict liability.

1. Nuisance

A plaintiff may sue any individual who has disrupted the plaintiff’s right to the private use and enjoyment of his land or who has unreasonably[30] interfered with a right common to the general public. These two types of interferences are known as private and public nuisances, respectively. [31] To recover under nuisance theory, the plaintiff must show that the interference was either intentional and unreasonable, or unintentional and otherwise actionable under negligence or strict liability theories.[32]

Because private parties do not have standing to bring public nuisance claims if they suffer the same injury as the general public, public nuisance actions are generally brought by public officials. [33] However, some toxic tort plaintiffs have successfully used the public nuisance action. For example, Judge Walter Jay Skinner granted public nuisance standing to the Woburn plaintiffs because their various illnesses were, by their nature, special and peculiar injuries.[34]

Most courts have maintained that plaintiffs must sustain an injury “different in kind” from that of the general public, not just “different in degree.” For example, in Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,[35] the plaintiffs complained of respiratory disorders and allergies resulting from the defendant’s emission of fiberglass particles. The court held that this injury was not, by its nature, a special and peculiar injury, and therefore denied plaintiffs’ standing.[36]Because courts may refuse to declare a toxic personal injury “different in kind” from that of the general public, plaintiffs may find the public nuisance cause of action largely ineffective.[37]

Plaintiffs have attempted to use the private nuisance cause of action to recover for certain toxic tort injuries, even though the cause of action is intended to compensate for an interference with the use of land. [38] Such plaintiffs often collect diminution in land value caused by the nuisance.[39] The plaintiffs in Ayers v. Township of Jackson[40]collected additional damages. In Ayers, residents alleged that a township interfered with the use and enjoyment of their land by operating a landfill that leached toxic chemicals into the groundwater. [41] In affirming the jury’s award for impairment of quality of life, emotional distress, and medical surveillance, the court reasoned that a plaintiff could recover for “personal losses flowing directly from” the nuisance.[42] Thus, a plaintiff may successfully sue for certain personal injury damages under a private nuisance theory.

2. Negligence

Toxic tort victims have often alleged a negligence cause of action when seeking compensation. Negligence is conduct that “falls below the standards established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.”[43]A toxic tort plaintiff often contends that the defendant’s release of hazardous materials amounted to negligent conduct.[44] However, as was clear in the Woburn case, negligence is hard to prove because injuries often manifest themselves years after incriminating documents are hidden or destroyed by the defendant.[45] For example, after the jury exonerated Beatrice from negligence, Schlictmann found a hidden report that proved that Beatrice knew that its actions were contaminating the property’s groundwater.[46]

Plaintiffs have employed the negligence per se doctrine as another way to show negligence. The doctrine compares the defendant’s conduct with the conduct established by statute or regulation. In Bagley v. Controlled Environment Corp.,[47] the court noted that because the hazardous waste permit program protects the public, the failure of the defendant to abide by its permitting provisions was “sufficient to establish liability” under negligence.[48] Some cases like Kenney v. Scientific, Inc.[49] reject the negligence per se contention. In this case, the court ruled that violation of federal and state statutory standards for handling toxic chemicals did not amount to a negligence showing, but was only a fact the jury could consider in determining negligence.[50]

3. Strict Liability

Finally, plaintiffs unable to prove common law negligence have found success employing the strict liability approach first described in Rylands v. Fletcher.[51] The strict liability doctrine helps the plaintiff that lacks documentary or testimonial proof of the defendant’s “unreasonable” actions. Under the strict liability system, a defendant must compensate his victim even if he took reasonable precautions.

To aid the courts in determining when strict liability applies, the Restatement 2d of Torts lays out a six-factor balancing test.[52] The toxic tort plaintiff must use the test to show that the defendant’s hazardous waste practices amount to an abnormally dangerous activity (“ADA”). Jurisdictions are inconsistent regarding ADA determinations. For example, many courts have held defendants strictly liable for the operation of a toxic waste dump, storage and disposal of chemical waste, or even operating a dam.[53] However, other courts have held that because reasonable care can prevent toxic releases, plaintiffs cannot seek strict liability recovery, therefore must pursue negligence instead.[54]

 

B. Proof of Causation

Most courts today use the “substantial factor” test of causation. The substantial factor standard often applies to cases with many potential causes of injury. Under the test, the law will hold the defendant responsible for the injury if the plaintiff can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant played a substantial role among all the possible causes of injury.[55]

Unlike traditional tort cases, toxic tort cases often involve indirect links between cause and effect. For example, in a traditional negligence case, careless driver A rear-ends driver B, who was stopped at a traffic light. Such a case is straightforward because eyewitnesses often see that A failed to stop and caused an immediate damage to B’s trunk and bumper. Toxic torts often lack these helpful elements because the defendant’s chemical intrusion goes unnoticed and latent injuries manifest themselves years after the act. Because of these challenges, toxic tort courts may accept a less certain proof of causation.[56]

Because of the complexity involved in linking a toxic injury to a cause, judges will usually separate the causation issue into more understandable subparts. The PCB toxic tort case In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation[57] describes the typical causation elements, stating, “the personal injury plaintiffs must show that they were exposed to the chemicals released by the defendants, that these chemicals can cause the types of harm they suffered, and that the chemicals in fact did cause them harm.”[58] Legal commentators often refer to the first clause of this test as “exposure causation” and the last clauses as “medical causation.”

1. Plaintiff was Exposed to a Hazardous Substance

Some toxic tort plaintiffs, especially those complaining of a pharmaceutical’s product defect, will not need an environmental expert to prove their own exposure to the chemical or defendant’s responsibility as the source of the exposure. In such a situation, a lay witness may prove exposure by testifying about his own experiences such as repeated ingestion of a pharmaceutical or smell of a chemical’s odor.[59]

Most plaintiffs, however, claim exposure to odorless, colorless, or tasteless chemical agents. In these cases, the plaintiff must hire an expert to chemically prove that such exposure occurred. For example, in a situation like Woburn where plaintiffs complain about contaminated groundwater,[60] the plaintiff must chemically show that the contaminated groundwater entered their bodies.

Generally, a plaintiff must prove he was exposed to a concentration of the chemical generally higher than that of the general population.[61] In Paoli, the court accepted plaintiff’s expert Dr. Nisbet’s testimony that a 1987 exposure study by ATSDR showed PCB exposure levels for 89 Paoli residents that were much higher than the background level.[62]Often, however, the court demands more precise exposure information, such as the concentration of the exposure,[63]and the duration of exposure.[64]

Regardless of the extent of exposure information required by the court, the plaintiff must prove such an exposure through use of an expert, in which case the court will require that the expert be qualified to testify. All federal courts, and most state courts are now employing the test delineated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,[65] which requires the judge to exclude an unqualified expert’s testimony.[66] Thus, in order to withstand summary judgment, the toxic tort plaintiff must hope that its expert’s study methodology satisfies the Daubert test.[67]

2. Defendant was Responsible for the Exposure

The toxic tort plaintiff faces a second proof barrier when it sets out to prove that the defendant caused the exposure in question. Such proof was problematic in Woburn because the plaintiffs’ hydrogeologic experts were asked to recreate the 10-15 year-old footprints leading from the contaminated wells through the groundwater back to the defendants’ plants.[68] Such proof would require the determination of the soil porosity, knowledge of underground water flow direction, and proof that the contaminated groundwater flowed underneath a river.[69]

Plaintiffs often fail to show that the defendants were a substantial factor in creating the chemical exposure, and thus fail to state a cause of action. For example, in Carroll v. Litton Systems,[70] the plaintiffs charged that they sustained injuries by drinking water from four TCE-contaminated wells. Plaintiffs’ hydrologist testified that the TCE moved from defendant’s manufacturing plant to the wells via the groundwater. However, he could not rebut the defendant’s evidence that the groundwater moved in an opposite direction.[71] Thus the court weakened the plaintiffs’ case by excluding expert testimony under Daubert. Similarly, the case of Thomas v. Fag Bearings Corp.,[72] though not a personal injury case, reiterated the requirement of linking contaminated water to its source. The court discounted the expert’s opinion that a groundwater pathway ran from the defendant’s plant to the drinking wells, a decision that was fatal to plaintiffs’ cause of action.

Some toxic tort plaintiffs can trace the source of the exposure without aid of an expert witness. In a situation analogous to the layperson’s exposure testimony in products liability cases, a plaintiff will testify that she ingested the medicine produced by the defendant, or that she used defendant’s product.[73] Additionally, plaintiffs can link the cause of an odor to a plant emitting smoke at the time.[74]

Once the plaintiff proves exposure causation (proof of elements 1. and 2.), he must proceed to the second prong of the causation analysis: medical causation. As mentioned before, courts often bifurcate complex toxic tort cases so that a jury must reach a verdict on the exposure question before hearing evidence about plaintiff’s injuries.[75] To prove medical causation, the plaintiff must show both that the exposure can cause the particular injury (general causation) and that the exposure did cause the injury (specific causation).

3. The Hazardous Substance Can Cause the Alleged Injury

Plaintiffs in toxic tort cases must prove general causation through medical expert testimony.[76] Such a requirement exists because a court will rarely take judicial notice that a substance is capable of producing the harm.[77] However, the court may often accept evidence from published studies from other scientific experts or government agencies regarding the known effects of the particular chemical.[78] The two medical causation elements are related in the fact that a plaintiff who proves general causation will often try to use his general causation evidence to show specific causation. Such a strategy will be discussed in section 4.

If the expert cannot use studies published by others, he must prove general causation to the jury on his own. The expert will usually present his evidence through an epidemiological study or an animal study. Courts prefer epidemiological studies (if available) over animal studies and often have excluded animal studies under the Daubert“gatekeeping” authority.[79]

The EPA and other health agencies often conduct animal studies to classify chemicals according to their carcinogenicity. Because ethical mores prevent scientists from conducting tests on humans, scientists often test rat or other laboratory animal reactions to high doses of the chemical in question. Scientists then extrapolate the measured health effects on the animals onto the human population.

Critics argue that animal studies overestimate risk in two ways. First, the high doses administered to the animals do not resemble the low-level, long-term exposures experienced by humans.[80] Next, biological differences between humans and the laboratory species may make the extrapolation of animal studies inaccurate.[81]

In the absence of generally accepted epidemiological studies, the court will likely admit a proper animal study. For example, in Paoli, the 3rd Circuit reversed the district court’s exclusion of the plaintiffs’ monkey laboratory studies.[82]According to the plaintiffs’ expert, the studies showed that exposure to PCBs caused elevated levels of enzymes associated with liver damage, elevated lipids, and skin, liver and pancreatic cancer.[83] Because the defendant failed to submit any contradictory epidemiological studies, the court accepted the animal study as proof of general causation.

Courts prefer epidemiological studies as proof of general causation because the studies address the chemical’s cause and effect relationships on people, not animals. Most commonly, the epidemiological study statistically compares the occurrence of harm in the group allegedly exposed to the chemical with the occurrence of harm in a group not exposed to the chemical.[84] Epidemiologists then perform statistical operations on the data in order to quantify the general risk of the chemical. They often quantify the risk through either a relative risk ratio or an attributable risk proportion (“ARP”).[85]

The most common risk quantification method used in toxic tort cases is the risk ratio, which compares those exposed to the chemical with those not exposed.[86] With a risk ratio greater than one, a statistician will predict that more people exposed to the chemical will develop the disease than will those who are not exposed. Therefore, a chemical with a risk ratio of greater than one could be viewed as a general cause of the particular disease, meaning that the chemical can cause the injury in question.[87]

Critics of epidemiological studies point to uncertain results produced by small study populations (“small sample sizes”). A court may discredit such an epidemiological study, calling it “statistically insignificant.” As an example of statistical insignificance, suppose that Stan, a statistician, wanted to determine Shaquille O’Neal’s free throw ability. Stan attends one basketball game, in which O’Neal makes three of his four free throws (75%). Without witnessing many more free throws (increasing his sample size), Stan would unwisely conclude that O’Neal was a good shooter because O’Neal’s success that night may have been an aberration.[88] Likewise, it would be unwise for a court or jury to conclude that contaminated water caused cancer just because 1 of 10 people who drank the water developed cancer. Because sample sizes of most epidemiological populations are generally small, relative risk calculations can vary tremendously. For instance, the EPA has published risk ratios for the association between exposure to radon and lung cancer that have ranged from 3 to 75.[89] The courts therefore seek epidemiological studies with less variance and more statistical significance.

Because of this potential for error, the courts will generally insist that the epidemiological studies be “statistically significant.” The most common epidemiological indicator of statistical significance is the confidence interval. Confidence intervals are often described in terms of a percentage. If an epidemiologist states “the 95% confidence interval for radon’s relative risk is between 1.5 and 2.5,” he believes there is a 95% chance that the actual relative risk lies between 1.5 and 2.5, with the most likely actual risk being 2.0.[90]

Courts demand a 95% confidence interval that does not include a relative risk of 1.[91] Statistically, this requirement translates to a 95% chance that the relative risk is greater than 1, or, phrased differently, a 95% chance that exposure to the chemical can cause the injury. Thus the “95%” legal standard regarding epidemiological probability is much higher than the traditional “more likely than not” (51%) legal standard regarding causation.

A plaintiff can show general causation through published sources, animal studies, or epidemiological studies. The court will exercise its gatekeeping function by strictly monitoring the introduction of such evidence. The plaintiff therefore faces a risk that his suggested relationship between cause and effect will be excluded from the jury if it is not “statistically significant,” a factor determined by sample sizes often out of his control.

4. The Hazardous Substance Did Cause the Plaintiff’s Injury

Finally, once a plaintiff shows that the chemical can cause the injury complained of, he must prove that the chemical did in fact cause the injury. For this proof, the plaintiff’s physician usually testifies that the plaintiff is ill and that the physician believes the alleged exposure caused the illness. Additionally, the plaintiff may introduce an epidemiological study to show the statistical chance that the plaintiff’s injury resulted from the exposure.

Though some courts will allow the jury to infer specific causation from general causation, most courts require the physician to testify that (1) the plaintiff in fact suffered an injury and (2) the defendant caused the injury. Regarding the first element, the appeals court in Paoli excluded Dr. G. John Di Gregorio’s testimony as to specific medical causation because he relied on plaintiffs’ answers to a medical questionnaire instead of physically examining the plaintiffs or reviewing their medical records.[92] The court concluded that Di Gregorio “could not even reliably conclude that the plaintiffs had any illness.” The court thus announces that, at a minimum, the physician must examine the patient when testifying as to specific causation.

When testifying about specific causation, the physician must conduct a differential diagnosis, a diagnosis that rules out alternative causes of the injury. Courts are divided as to what comprises an adequate differential diagnosis. In Paoli, the district court excluded the testimony of two physicians because they did not properly consider the alternative causes of their patient’s illnesses.[93] The 3rd Circuit reversed, describing situations when “there is no need to examine alternatives.”[94] Also, a doctor may perform an adequate differential diagnosis by merely considering alternative causes without having to rule them out.[95] On the other hand, some cases have required a more extensive differential diagnosis.[96]

Finally, physicians have been prohibited from testifying based on exposure testimony that is inaccurate or that has been excluded. For example, in Curtis v. M&S Petroleum,[97] the court stated that if the Acausation opinion is not based on sufficient information of the level of benzene to which plaintiffs were exposed, [the physician’s] methodology would not be reliable, rendering his causation information inadmissible.”[98] Another court has struck medical causation conclusions based on inadmissible exposure duration testimony.[99]

Epidemiological studies have played a large role in specific causation determinations. As mentioned before, epidemiologists use a relative risk of 2.0 to predict that an exposed person was twice as likely to develop the illness than a non-exposed person.[100] From the relative risk ratio, epidemiologists have derived the attributable risk proportion (“ARP”) formula[101] to predict the likelihood that the harm to a person within the relative risk study population was actually caused by the exposure. According to the ARP formula, any relative risk greater than 2 will lead to the statistical conclusion that the chance that a member of the exposed study group suffered injury as a result of the chemical is greater than 50%. Some courts have instructed the jury to translate the statistical conclusion of the ARP to a legal conclusion. For example, courts have instructed jurors that an ARP of greater than .50 is sufficient proof of legal causation.[102] At the other end of the spectrum, however, other courts have prohibited a jury from inferring causation absent an ARP greater than .50.[103] Overall, epidemiological data plays such a large role in proof that the plaintiff should review the statistical limitations of his study before attempting to introduce it as evidence.

III. Analysis

Even though the federal government uses mechanisms designed to prevent releases, it is clear that toxic releases are continuing at an enormous rate that is threatening the public’s health. Similarly, the common law attempts to deter releases by forcing the polluter to compensate the victim for his injury. It is possible that neither mechanism is ensuring an adequate public health level.

The tort system may not be accomplishing its deterrence goal in the toxic tort arena. Manufacturers continue to release massive quantities of carcinogens and other toxic wastes into the environment without much fear that the law will hold them liable for the damages they create. Such liability would likely motivate the manufacturers to take greater care to contain chemical releases or even to find alternate chemical processes that eliminate the production of the harmful chemicals in the first place.

The question remains: Can the tort system be modified, or combined with the federal regulatory scheme, to better protect the health of U.S. citizens? To find a solution to the perceived problem, it is useful to describe and discuss the main challenges for the toxic tort plaintiff and suggestions for reform.

A. Problems With the Current Proof Standard

For over two decades, many legal commentators have lamented the troubles of the toxic tort plaintiff and have called for improvements in the system.[104] These critics isolate the particular challenges the plaintiff faces. Some noted problems include the great expense of most lawsuits, the high level of scientific uncertainty, the latency problem, the lack of defendant documentation, and the substantial factor rule.

1. Prohibitive expense of trial

First of all, the toxic tort plaintiff may be reluctant to sue for financial reasons. As noted in the introduction, the Woburn plaintiffs spent approximately $4.8 million (in 1986 dollars) to try the first half of the bifurcated trial, a financial burden which fell on Schlictmann’s firm because of its contingency fee arrangement.[105] The expense of the trial depleted all of the firm’s resources,[106] and may have pressured the plaintiffs to settle for a much lower sum than they sought.[107] In most cases, the result is that toxic torts will be tried on a contingency basis, and the law firms will likely select only the largest and easiest claims. Thus, the firms may ignore the lesser injuries because the expert and legal fees greatly outnumber the expected recovery. As a result, toxic tortfeasors compensate only the most seriously injured.

2. Scientific Uncertainty

A second major problem for the toxic tort plaintiff stems from science’s imperfect knowledge regarding disease etiology and the nature of exposures. When science cannot unequivocally trace injury back to its source, the judge will often exclude the evidence because it employs some speculation. Such tracing problems exist because the symptoms of diseases caused by toxics are often identical to symptoms caused by natural events. For example, there is no way for science to distinguish leukemia caused by benzene exposure from leukemia caused from a natural mutation.[108] One study panel’s statement reflects the consensus view that imperfect scientific knowledge makes “proof of causal connection between exposure and injuryY an almost overwhelming barrier to recovery.”[109]

3. Latency of Disease

Commentators often stress the latency problem, as many diseases allegedly caused by low-level toxic waste exposures manifest themselves only many years after the exposure. For example, some forms of cancer remain latent for 15 to 40 years between exposure and the onset of symptoms.[110] Such latency has a number of detrimental effects. First, it reduces the likelihood that the actual defendant will be available for trial. The defendant corporation may be out of business, or removed from the appropriate jurisdiction. Next, long latency periods make it very difficult for the plaintiff to accumulate relevant evidence.[111] Science is often faulted for being unable to trace the effect to the cause, but such inability often arises from the fact that natural processes cause the environment to change dramatically over time. Defendants can use this long latency period to cover up or remove any incriminating evidence that has not already been diluted by nature.

4. Defendant’s Control of Release Data

In the Woburn case, the plaintiffs sought documentation regarding the defendants’ knowledge of groundwater contamination, the amount of TCE they had dumped, and the duration they dumped TCE on the land. The plaintiffs obtained only a small fraction of this information because the defendants allegedly disposed of their old records.[112]However, after the settlement was finalized, Schlictmann discovered a hidden sixty page hydrogeologic report that the defendant had commissioned a few years before trial.[113] This helpful report, hidden from the plaintiff, exemplifies how the defendant can control its own documents to keep the plaintiff and the court in the dark. With such a long latency period, the defendant has many opportunities to destroy or alter important documents.

5. Substantial Factor Rule

As mentioned before, a plaintiff can hold a defendant liable if he can show the defendant was a substantial factor in causing the alleged harm. One legal commentator has suggested that the all-or-nothing character of injury-based liability rules allows “significant but not ‘substantial’ risks [to] go unpenalized.”[114] This is because a manufacturer may knowingly release toxic materials into the environment in small enough quantities that no court would call them a “substantial factor” in causing any carcinogenic injury. Though it may never be held accountable by the courts, the manufacturer’s behavior may combine with many other small releases to cause enormous injury. The current causation system seems to induce this type of behavior. The cumulative effect of such induced behavior is a community that is exposed to an increased risk of developing disease.

B. Suggestions for Toxic Tort Reform

1. Administrative Compensation Scheme

In 1980, when the U.S. Senate was proposing Senate Bill 1480 (the hazardous waste cleanup bill which would become CERCLA), between 25 to 30 senators successfully deleted a provision that would have created a federal cause of action for medical expenses and income loss resulting from exposure to hazardous waste.[115] As a compromise between those proposing the revised bill and those supporting the old bill, the negotiators added ‘301(e), which called for a CERCLA-funded study to examine the adequacy of the common law in providing redress for those harmed by hazardous wastes.[116] After concluding that the existing statutory and common law remedies were inadequate, the study suggested the creation of an administrative compensation system to provide a limited, no-fault remedy for those injured by hazardous releases.[117]

The study proposed a system that would keep the existing common law in place, but would create a no-fault administrative scheme to provide a “speedy remedy” for those who sought “limited compensation” for costs like medical expenses or lost earnings.[118] The scheme would be funded through taxation of selected industries.[119]Finally, the strict liability system would ease the plaintiff’s burden of proof by providing the plaintiff with rebuttable presumptions after the plaintiff showed basic causation facts.[120] Once granted, the rebuttable presumption would shift the burden of causation proof to the defendant. The Study Group’s suggestions were never enacted by Congress, but legal commentators have likewise called for a similar administrative compensation scheme.[121]

Such an administrative scheme could greatly improve the toxic tort plaintiff’s plight. For example, the scheme would reduce the financial burden that deters law firms from accepting cases where plaintiffs only suffer minor injuries as opposed to carcinogenic injuries.[122] Such “smaller” plaintiffs could then be compensated for their medical expenses and lost earnings so that these plaintiffs would have a good incentive to maintain good health. It appears the system of recovery would accomplish one of the main goals of the tort system: compensation.[123] Next, the system may be more efficient because the adjudicators could develop technical expertise to handle recurrent complex issues.[124]Finally, an administrative system could ease the current burden placed on the courts to handle lengthy and complex toxic tort trials.[125]

An administrative system contains drawbacks as well. First of all, paid medical expenses and lost earnings may not adequately compensate a victim for mental anguish, wrongful death, or reduction of life expectancy. [126] Such incomplete compensation could be a reason that most industrial manufacturers would support such a system.[127]Next, the industry funded system may provide little individual deterrence for toxic waste releases, resulting in a higher public health hazard. Finally, the costs involved in obtaining an attorney and proving causation under the reduced standard may still be high enough to deter “small plaintiffs.”

2. Statutory Right of Action

Instead of an administrative compensation scheme, others have suggested statutory reform as an avenue to help the toxic tort plaintiff. Though all of these proposals have been rejected at the federal level, some legislation have actually been implemented at the state level.

The first of these proposals creates an express federal right of action for personal injuries caused by hazardous wastes.[128] In 1983, after CERCLA was passed without a private right of action, U.S. Representative LaFalce proposed the Toxic Compensation Act,[129] which would allow any victim the nonexclusive right to sue in federal courts for injuries caused by hazardous wastes.[130] The statute would have provided the plaintiff with a rebuttable presumption of guilt upon “reasonably likely” proof of causation.[131] Two years Congress rejected the LaFalce bill was rejected, it rejected U.S. Representative Frank’s SARA[132] amendment proposal to allow victims to sue under Superfund.[133] Though nearly 15 years have passed since Congress has considered such proposals, there is no evidence that it is presently considering the option.

As opposed to federal inaction, some states have implemented statutory rights of action for toxic tort victims. For example, North Dakota allows any person injured by a state environmental law violation to bring an action for damages. [134] Pennsylvania provides a rebuttable presumption that a person who disposes of hazardous waste “shall be liable, without proof of fault, negligence, or causation, for all damages, contamination or pollution within 2,500 feet of the perimeter of the area where hazardous waste activities have been carried out.”[135] New Hampshire gives the plaintiff a right to collect treble damages if the defendant is both convicted of a hazardous waste violation and is held liable in a civil action.[136]

Finally, Minnesota holds any person who is responsible for hazardous waste release strictly liable for personal injury damages, including pain and suffering.[137] In 1985, however, the legislature repealed a portion of the law that created rules for directed verdicts and medical testimony that arguably lowered the causation proof level.[138]

Even though plaintiffs have rarely used these statutes to plead their causes of action, the statutes provide further evidence that states recognize the utility of statutory rights of action. Compared to the administrative scheme which seems to improve only compensation, the statutory rights of action address both the deterrence and compensation goals of the tort system. For example, in antitrust law, scholars believe that treble damage actions[139] accomplish both goals.[140] New Hampshire’s treble damage provision may prove to be just as effective. The statutory presumptions and reduced proof requirements make it easier for the plaintiff to prove causation. Finally, the North Dakota law allows the plaintiff to bootstrap his claim for damage by introducing evidence that defendant’s conduct violated the law.

These state and federal proposals show that statutory reform is a realistic solution. Though these laws have not been greatly embraced yet, they may show some promise for the future.

3. Modification of the Common Law

One final hope for the plaintiff lies in the possibility that the common law will continue to evolve. If accepted in the majority of jurisdictions, certain legal theories that exist in both the toxic and traditional tort arenas could ease the plaintiff’s burden.

In the toxic tort arena, the most famous example is the burden shifting approach used in the nuclear testing radiation case Allen v. United States.[141] In that case, Judge Bruce Jenkins laid out elements that the jury could balance to determine if the defendant was a substantial factor of injury. Some of the elements were the probability that the plaintiff was exposed to the defendant’s radiation at a rate higher than background, the consistency between plaintiff’s injury and those known to be caused by radiation, and the distance between plaintiffs’ residence and the testing site.[142] More importantly, Jenkins states that if the jury finds enough circumstantial evidence like disease etiology and ARP to conclude defendant was a substantial factor, the court would shift the burden of proof to the defendant.[143]Jenkins even suggests than a less that 50% ARP would suffice to shift the burden of proof.[144]

Next, courts may soon entertain the argument that a defendant who fails to keep proper records of his emissions is estopped from arguing that plaintiff’s case fails for lack of data.[145] Such a rule would greatly help the plaintiff in proving the quantity of the chemicals to which the defendant may have exposed the plaintiff. Though no court has announced such a rule, the court in Elam v. Alcolac, Inc.[146] hinted at such a conclusion. After ruling for the plaintiff, the court noted that the record intended by the state’s regulatory agency regarding toxic spills was never created.[147] Finally, in dicta, the court stated, “the but for proof [defendant] Alcolac insists upon the toxic tort plaintiffsYwas made impossible by the very conduct of the defendant,”[148] thus suggesting that the court would shift the burden of exposure proof from the plaintiff to the defendant because of the defendant’s conduct.

Finally, courts could apply existing tort theories to toxic tort cases. For example, the court in the medical malpractice case of Ybarra v. Spangard[149] employed a res ipsa loquitur theory to explain causation even though the plaintiff had no evidence of the tortfeasor’s identity due to the plaintiff’s unconsciousness.[150] The court stated, “without the aid of the doctrine a patient…would be entirely unable to recover unless the doctors and nurses in attendance voluntarily chose to disclose…the facts establishing liability.”[151] Such a theory could be employed in the toxic tort arena to shift the burden of proof when the defendant fails to produce sufficient hazardous waste records.

Next, in the wrongful death action of Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel,[152] a father and son drowned at defendant’s motel. The defendant had failed to provide a lifeguard, “a primary requirement” of a state statute.[153] The court noted the plaintiff’s proof problem, stating “the evidentiary void in the instant action results primarily from defendants’ failure to provide a lifeguard to observe occurrences within the pool area.”[154] The court thus shifted the burden of proof regarding drowning causation because requiring “plaintiffs to establish ‘proximate causation’ to a greater certainty…would permit defendants to gain the advantage of the lack of proof inherent in the lifeguardless situation which they have created.” Plaintiffs should argue, and courts should accept, similar reasoning where, because the defendant failed to keep records required by law, the plaintiff cannot show the exposure level defendant created.

The courts have taken steps that can ease the toxic tort plaintiff’s burden of proof. However, such steps must become common among all jurisdictions in order to protect the health of the nation. Additionally, courts could apply the theories expressed in Ybarra and Haft to shift the burden of proof when defendant has failed to maintain records.

IV. Proposal

For at least 20 years, legal commentators, national and state legislators, attorneys, and judges have sought to provide the toxic tort plaintiff a fair solution to its causation challenge. As potential solutions are debated, millions of tons of toxic chemicals continue to spew into the environment, often near someone’s residence. As the need for a solution becomes more urgent, priority should be placed on deterrence of potentially harmful conduct until science can catch up to explain how these harms occur. Secondarily, those who have suffered toxic injuries should be compensated.

Of all the suggested reforms, an express, federal right of action is best suited to deter toxic releases and compensate victims. This paper suggests legislation that contains the following aspects: (1) the plaintiff has a right to sue in federal court for personal injuries sustained as a result of any violation of CERCLA, RCRA or TSCA; (2) the court cannot direct a verdict for the defendant if the plaintiff can show that he was exposed to hazardous waste partially caused by defendant, exposure to this waste can cause injury of the type suffered, and the exposure level would be reasonably likely to contribute to that type of injury; (3) If successful in his lawsuit, the plaintiff is entitled to treble damages.

There are many reasons why the proposed legislation should be federal as opposed to local. First of all, federal legislators have proposed this type of statute for almost 20 years.[155] The main opposition to these proposals is they will cause insurance costs to rise.[156] This argument is a poor reason to threaten the health of the nation. Next, others argue that the states should use their police powers to legislate so that a number of different approaches can be tested and studied.[157] Supporters of federal legislation can counter, arguing that the federal government has already accepted the responsibility to protect the nation through its extensive environmental legislation.

Most importantly, the government should allow the private sector to supplement current federal efforts to contain the proliferation of toxic chemicals in the environment. Though the EPA and the Department of Justice have powerful resources at their command, these resources are insufficient.[158] Allowing private victims to sue will avoid the challenge of using a limited budget to create a bureaucracy to handle a problem of unknown scope. Congress should help the environmental agencies like it helped the federal antitrust agencies in their enforcement efforts when it created an antitrust federal private right of action.[159]

In most ways, the proposal removes many of the plaintiff’s barriers to recovery. However, the CERCLA/RCRA/TSCA provision burdens the plaintiff with another element to his prima facie case. This requirement is important to integrate the federal tort system with the federal hazardous waste regulatory structure. Once the plaintiff proves this requirement, he need not prove negligence because strict liability will apply. Thus the proposal borrows the rationale from the negligence per se doctrine, while simplifying the test.

In order to limit the breadth of the statutory right of action, the plaintiff may only sue for CERCLA, RCRA and TSCA violations. It is common for statutes to limit the types of violations to which the statutory right of action applies.[160]Limiting the right of action to these violations is sensible because most toxic waste releases fall within these statutes. Plaintiffs may complain that the statutes limit their ability to recover for injuries sustained as a result of lawful waste disposal. If necessary, the EPA could remedy these complaints by tightening its own standards. Additionally, if experience shows that the proposed law is limiting plaintiff recoveries resulting from toxics covered by other federal legislation, the right of action could be expanded to allow suit for other federal environmental law violations.

The directed verdict aspect of the proposal builds on repealed Minnesota ‘115B.07’s[161] attempt to prevent directed verdicts. However, it uses the liberal language of the LaFalce bill to determine whether a judge can direct a verdict. To survive a directed verdict, a plaintiff need only show the defendant partially caused the exposure in a reasonably likelyamount that can cause the particular injury. As a result of this new standard, the jury could possibly hear circumstantial scientific testimony that is currently excluded under Daubert.

This standard will permit the jury to make reasonable inferences regarding causation, instead of letting the judge determine the case at early phases of trial. Currently, only 2.8 percent of toxic substance cases reach a jury verdict.[162] Once a toxic substance case reaches the jury, 74% of the verdicts favored the plaintiff, compared to an overall 52% plaintiff success rate.[163] Thus, the new directed verdict standard will likely result in more plaintiff verdicts.

It should be noted that the proposed rule does not change the current causation standard per se. It merely allows the jury to decide the outcome of the case rather than the judge. This is especially important in cases of extreme scientific uncertainty because currently a judge may direct a verdict on the basis that neither the plaintiff’s nor defendant’s expert testimony is scientifically certain. Given that both sides present uncertain scientific testimony, the jury should be able to decide which of the “uncertain” scientific testimony is more credible. Our legal system entrusts the jury, not the judge, with the responsibility to assess the credibility of witnesses. Because the reduced directed verdict standard will prevent the judge from determining the case, the jury will have more power to decide toxic tort personal injury cases.

The treble damage provision borrows from the New Hampshire statute to supply extra deterrence for CERCLA/RCRA/TSCA violators. In the face of such scientific uncertainty, the best way to protect the public health is to deter producers of toxic discharges. Treble damage provisions provide extra deterrence because the defendant will be punished at a level three times greater than the damage he caused. One court has used deterrence as a justification for treble damages, stating, “Congress intended …to impose sanctions to secure the more effective enforcement of antitrust legislation.”[164] Others have reasoned that treble damages are granted because of the public interest of the antitrust laws. The treble damage provision is therefore sensible because the significant public health goals of the environmental laws call for deterrence.

V. CONCLUSION

Toxic tort plaintiffs like the ones in A Civil Action face a very challenging burden when attempting to prove causation of personal injuries. This is because a plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was exposed to a hazardous substance, that the defendant was responsible for the exposure, and that the hazardous substance can and did cause the plaintiff’s injury. Additionally, the courts impose very tight restrictions on expert testimony. Thus the judge may exclude helpful indirect or circumstantial evidence of causation that the jury may have found helpful. At the same time, toxic waste generators continue to spew chemicals into the environment. Accordingly, the rules must be changed.

Though some local jurisdictions provide the plaintiff with helpful rules regarding the burden of proof and permissible inferences, these rules are rare, not widespread. Congress should pick up where it left off in the early 1980’s and enact a law to create a federal private right of action for toxic tort victims. Such legislation would provide added artillery for the enforcement of federal toxic waste laws like CERCLA, RCRA, and TSCA. Additionally, the statute will let most toxic tort cases be resolved by a jury instead of a judge. If Congress passes the proposed legislation, the tragic story of A Civil Action will hopefully become an antiquated account of how life used to be in America.

Endnotes

* Third Year Student, Expected to Graduate in May, 2000 (Submitted for Academic Credit: March, 2000).

1 See, generally, A Civil Action (Paramount Pictures 1999).

2 See Jonathan Harr, A Civil Action 44 (Vintage Books 1996)(hereinafter “Harr”).

3 Id. at 38.

4 See Massachusetts Department of Public Health, Woburn Childhood Leukemia Follow-Up Study (1997).

5 At the time of the lawsuit, the U.S.EPA had listed TCE as a “probable carcinogen” based on animal testing. See Harr at 81.

6 For example, groundwater contamination expert George Pinder, Princeton University Chairman of Engineering, would testify that the TCE in the wells originated from Beatrice and Grace’s properties. Id. at 325. Likewise, geologist John Drobinski, who conducted extensive ground tests in Woburn, concluded that Beatrice’s property was contaminated for at least 25 years. Id. at 299.

7 Schlictmann’s medical experts all concluded that exposure to TCE could cause and did cause the children’s leukemias. Such experts included immunologist Dr. Alan Levin, (believing that exposure to TCE damages plaintiffs’ immune systems) immunopathologist Dr. Robert Colvin, (believing to a reasonable medical certainty that the TCE caused or substantially contributed to immune dysfunction and leukemia) neurologist Robert Feldman, (finding that every plaintiff had a slower than normal functioning of the trigeminal nerve) and Dr. Vera Byers (stating that long term exposure to TCE impaired the plaintiffs’ immune systems). See, generally Harr.

8 Id. at 208.

9 Id. at 209.

10I d. at 392.

11 Plaintiffs’ counsel Charles Nesson believed that a billion dollar verdict was within the realm of possibility. Id. at 251.

12 Id. at 453.

13 See Sheldon M. Novick, Law of Environmental Protection, section 3.07 at 3-49, 3-68 (1999).

14 See Environmental Protection Agency, 1997 Toxics Release Inventory Public Data Release Report .

15 Id. at table 2-4 (entitled ATRI On-Site and Off-Site Releases, by State, 1997). Texas led all states in 1997 with 261 million pounds released, followed by Louisiana with 186 million pounds. Id.

16 See Barry L. Johnson & Christopher T. DeRosa, The Toxicological Hazard of Superfund Hazardous Waste Sites (1997).

17 The Environmental Protection Agency’s estimate is 40,000, whereas the Office of Technology Assessment’s estimate is 440,000. Id.

18 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.A. sections 6901-6987, 9001-9010 (West 1995).

19 See R. Ruttenberg, et al., Labor Market Study of Hazardous Waste Workers and Associated Emergency Responders (1996).

20 See Johnson.

21 Id.

22 Id.

23 Id. The ATSDR defines an “urgent public health hazard” as a site that poses an urgent risk even if the exposures are short-term, while defining a “public health hazard” as a site that poses a risk if the exposures are long-term. Id.

24 Id.

25 Id. The ATSDR has a five-step method of determining whether the pathway is complete. A pathway is complete if there is a source of pollution (the waste site), an environmental medium of transport (e.g. groundwater), a point of exposure (e.g. a water well), a means of exposure (drinking water) and a receptor population (the community). In the absence of any one of the factors, the pathway is considered incomplete. However, an incomplete pathway can quickly become complete. Id.

26 Id.

27 Id. A “systemic toxic risk” is capable of damaging at least one of the following: the liver, the kidney, the lung, reproduction, the nervous system, the cardiovascular system, the immune system, skin, and the gastrointestinal system (nausea, etc.). Id.

28 Id.

29 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.A. section 9601 et seq. (West 1995); RCRA, supra note 18; and Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. section 2601 et seq. (West 1997).

30 See Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 821A-D (1977).

31 Id.

32 See Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 822 (1977).

33 See Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 821C (1977). The rule states, “In order to maintain a proceeding to enjoin to abate a public nuisance, one must…have authority as a public official or public agency to represent the state or a political subdivision in the matter.” Id.

34 See Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1233 (D.Mass. 1986).

35 99 Cal.Rptr. 350 (Cal. Ct. App.1971).

36 Id. at 356.

37 See Michael C. Skotnicki, Private Actions for Damages Resulting from an Environmental Public Nuisance: Overcoming the Barrier to Standing Posed by the “Special Injury Rule”, 16 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 591, 597 (1992).

38 See Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 821D (1977).

39 See, e.g. Mel Foster Co. Properties, Inc. v. Amoco, 427 N.W.2d 171, 175 (affirming jury diminution in value award for landowner damaged by defendant’s gasoline leakage)(Iowa 1988); Desario v. Industrial Excess Landfill, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 454, 457 (awarding diminution of value damages caused by leaking landfill contaminants in this private nuisance action)(Ohio Ct. App. 1991).

40 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).

41 Id. at 295.

42 Id. at 292.

43 See Restatement (Second) of Torts section 282 (1965).

44 See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F.Supp. 303, 316 (holding that Velsicol breached its duty to protect others from unreasonable harm by dumping harmful chemicals on its farm)(W.D. Tenn. 1986); Knabe v. National Supply Division of Armco Steel Corp., 592 F.2d 841 (5th Cir.1979) (deciding that Armco Steel breached its duty by releasing polluted water into neighboring dairy field); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So.2d 1151 (holding that defendant breached his duty of care owed to plaintiff) (La.1988).

45 See, e.g. Harr, supra note 2, p. 384. The jury found that the negligence occurred after 1973. This date made the plaintiffs’ pre-1973 evidence irrelevant. Id.

46 See Harr,supra note 2, at 460.

47 503 A.2d 823 (N.H. 1986).

48 Id. at 828.

49 497 A. 2d 1310 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985).

50 Id. at 1324.

51 L.R. 3 H.L. 330.

52 Such factors include (a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm; (b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; (c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; (e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and (f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes. See Restatement (Second) of Torts section 520 (1977).

53 See, e.g. Sterling, supra note 43, at 315 (deciding that “the operation of a toxic waste dump is inherently an abnormally dangerous activity”); Cities Service Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799, 803 (ruling that break in dam which impounded phosphate slime constituted a nonnatural use of land such that strict liability applied) (Ct. App. Fl. 1975); Schwartzman, Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 842 F. Supp. 475, 479 (holding that the storage and disposal of toxic chemical waste poses a serious threat to health such that the defendant is strictly liable for the consequences of the abnormally dangerous activity) (D.N.M. 1993).

54 See, e.g., Erbich Prods. Co. v. Wills, 509 N.E.2d 850, 852 (holding that manufacturer of liquid bleach was not engaged in an ADA because reasonable care would prevent the chlorine exposure) (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); Avemco Insurance Co., Inc. v. Rooto Corp. 967 F.2d 1105, 1108 (deciding that plant owner’s emissions of hydrochloric and sulfuric acid fumes which occurred after former employee unlawfully entered plant and intentionally opened acid storage tanks did not constitute an abnormally dangerous activity) (6th Cir. 1992); Richmond Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Davis Industries, Inc., 787 F.Supp. 572, 575 (ruling that the manufacture, storage and disposal of air conditioners containing PCBs was not an abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous activity) (E.D. Va. 1992).

55 “The actor’s negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if…his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.” See Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 421(1965). Such a substantial factor is distinguished from a negligible factor. Id. at comment b.

56 For example, the court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F. 3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995) states, “In the current state of scientific knowledge…we are ignorant…[However,] causation can be proved even when we don’t know precisely how the damage occurred, if there is sufficiently compelling proof that the agent must have caused the damage somehow.” Id. at 1314.

57 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994).

58 Id. at 752.

59 See, e.g. Daigle v. Shell Oil Co. 972 F.2d 1527, 1532 (10th Cir. 1992); Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W. 2d 42 765 S.W. 2d 42 (Mo. App. 1988).

60 See, generally, Harr, supra note 2.

61 See Paoli, at 771.

62 Id. at 778.

63 See Renaud v. Martin Marietta Corp., Inc., 972 F.2d 304, 307 (affirming district court’s grant of defendant’s summary judgment motion on grounds that plaintiff’s exposure model would not support a finding of exposure at sufficient concentration levels) (10th Cir. 1992).

64 See Allen v. Penn. Engineering Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 199 (stating that “[s]cientific knowledge of the harmful level of exposure to a chemical, plus knowledge that the plaintiff was exposed to such quantities, are minimal facts necessary to sustain the plaintiffs’ burden in a toxic tort case.”) (5th Cir. 1996). See also Yeater v. Allied Chem. Co., 755 F.Supp. 1330, 1337-38 (holding that proof of intensity of exposure and concentration of hazardous substance were necessary to show probability of injury) (N.D. W.Va.1991). See, generally, Harr, supra note 2. The Woburn defendants needed to establish when they first became exposed. Id.

65 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The test requires the judge to consider (1) whether the evidence can be, and has been, tested; (2) whether the evidence has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) to the extent that the evidence involves a particular scientific technique, the known or potential rate of error of the technique and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation; and (4) the degree of acceptance by the scientific community. Id. at 592-94.

66 See Fed. R. Evid. 702.

67 See, e.g. Renaud (affirming district court’s grant of defendant’s summary judgment motion on grounds that plaintiff’s exposure model would not support a finding of exposure at sufficient concentration levels). But See Curtis v. M&S Petroleum, 174 F.2d 661, 672 (applying Daubert to allow plaintiff’s expert to testify without being able to calculate the precise benzene exposure level) (5th Cir. 1999).

68 See, generally Harr, supra note 2.

69 Id.

70 1995 WL 56862 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 1995).

71 Id. at *2.

72 846 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mo. 1994).

73 See, e.g. Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 959 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1992); Roehling v. National Gypsum Co. Gold Bond Bldg. Prods., 786 F.2d 1225, 1227 (4th Cir. 1986).

74 See Elam, supra note 58, at 59.

75 Such bifurcation occurred in the Woburn case, a result which plaintiff’s counsel Charles Nesson believed to have benefited the defendants. See Harr, supra note 2, at 286-7. In this case, Schlictmann wanted the parents to testify about the extent of their children’s injuries and deaths. Such testimony would have given jurors a more thorough background into the controversy, and also provided circumstantial evidence that an external environmental force was affecting the community’s health. Id.

76 See L. Neal Ellis Jr. and Charles D. Case, Toxic Tort and Hazardous Substance Litigation,108 (Michie Butterworth 1995).

77 Id.

78 See, e.g. Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency, 636 F.2d 1267, 1271 (noting that the special attention accorded to PCBs in TSCA reflects that PCBs pose a serious threat to human health.) (D.C.Cir. 1980); Curtis, supra note 66, at 669 (allowing plaintiffs’ expert to show general causation by referring to the toxicological profile for benzene, which was published by the U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services and the ATSDR).

79 See, e.g. Paoli, supra note 56, at 780 (stating “in the absence of epidemiologic proof in humans we must drop to our second tier in the understanding of human carcinogenic prediction: Animal testing.”); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liability Lit., 611 F.Supp. 1223,1241 (excluding animal studies of Agent Orange based partly on the court’s conclusion that there was significant contrary epidemiological data)(E.D.N.Y. 1985).

80 See Colin Hugh Buckley, A Suggested Remedy for Toxic Injury: Class Actions, Epidemiology, and Economic Efficiency, 26 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 497, 517 (1985).

81 In one case, the plaintiff’s expert exposed pregnant female animals to Bendectin, a suspected teratogen. In excluding the testimony, the court criticized the extrapolation process, stating, “different species of animals react differently to the same stimuli for reasons not entirely understood…[thus] the analytical gap between the evidence presented and the inferences to be drawn is too wide.” See Turpin, supra note 72, at 1359-60. See also Foster, A Case Study in Toxic Tort Causation: Scientific and Legal Standards Work Against Recovery for Victims, 19 Envtl. L. 141, 156 (1988).

82 See Paoli, supra note 56 at 780.

83 Id.

84 Kenneth J. Rothman, Modern Epidemiology 57-62 (1989).

85 See infra note 102.

86 See Rothman, at 37. The formula is generally stated as: (exposed persons with disease)exposed persons without disease))(unexposed persons with disease)unexposed persons without disease).

87 See Daubert, supra note 55, at 1321 (stating that “a relative risk less than 2 may suggest teratogenicity”); Deluca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 911 F.2d 941, 947 (3d Cir. 1990).

88 In fact, over the course of a season, O’Neal averages only 50%.

89 See 45 Fed. Reg. 5,040 (1980).

90 Probabilistic techniques often predict such risks in the form of a symmetric bell-shaped curve. Thus, the confidence interval ranges from 1.5 to 2.5, the expected value lies at 2, the midpoint of the curve.

91 For example, one court hearing a Bendectin products liability case, describes, “the predominating choice of a 95% confidence levelY” See Deluca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 948 (3d Cir. 1990). See also Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 136 (validating plaintiff’s epidemiological study based on a 95% confidence interval) (D.C. Cir. 1996).

92 See Paoli, supra note 56, at 736.

93 Id. at 756.

94 Id. at 760. The court analogized plaintiff=s evaluation to a scenario where a patient with a broken arm complains about a biking accident. Id.

95 Id. at 765.

96 See, e.g. O=Conner, v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090, 1106-07 (holding expert=s proof insufficient to show that exposure to radiation specifically caused plaintiff=s cataract because expert had not considered alternate causes) (7th Cir. 1994); Conde v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 24 F.3d 809, 814 (ruling against plaintiffs causation allegations partially because experts failed to rule out causes other than insecticide exposure to explain plaintiffs= headaches, nausea, and diarrhea) (6th Cir. 1994).

97 174 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1999)

98 Id. at 671.

99 See Carroll, supra note 69, at *5 (holding that because physicians= specific causation opinions rested on inadmissible exposure concentration and duration testimony, such opinions were likewise inadmissible).

100 See supra note 85 (description of relative risk formula).

101 The formula is:(risk ratio B 1)_(risk ratio). Thus a risk ratio of 2.0 would yield an ARP of .50.

102 See, e.g. Marder v. G.D. Searle & Co., 630 F.Supp. 1087, 1092 (ruling that an ARP greater than .50 satisfies Athe required legal burden of proofCa showing of causation by the preponderance of the evidence) (D.Md. 1986); Manko v. United States, 830 F.2d 831 (holding that ARP greater than .50 translated into Amore likely than not@ causation proof) (8th Cir. 1987).

103 See Daubert, supra note 55, at 1320 (explaining that California tort law requires proof that the exposure doubled the relative risk).

104 See, e.g. Shelly Brinker, Opening the Door to the Indeterminate Plaintiff: An Analysis of the Causation Barriers Facing Environmental Toxic Tort Plaintiffs, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1289 (calling for a “substantial-factor” approach to allow for recovery when evidence of causation is less than 50%)(1999); John S. Forstrom, Victim Without a Cause: The Missing Link Between Compensation and Deterrence in Toxic Tort Litigation, 18 Envtl. L. 151 (calling for the creation of an administrative compensation scheme funded by industry or general taxpayers because proof requirements are so burdensome for the plaintiff) (1987); Glen O. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. Legal Stud. 779 (noting the causation problems the toxic tort plaintiff faces, author suggests an approach in which the plaintiff may seek compensation for bearing an unreasonable risk) (1985).

105 See Harr, supra note 2, at 453.

106 To pay the bills, Schlictmann’s car was repossessed, partners lost deeds to their homes, and the law firm liquidated its retirement plan. Id.

107 After the jury verdict came in, the firm decided a fair settlement with W.R. Grace would be $35 million. The firm ended up settling for $8 million. Id. at 407-8.

108 See Forstrom supra note 103, at 156.

109 Id. at 71.

110 See Brinker, supra note 103 at 1293-4 (citing Council on Environmental Quality report).

111 See Forstrom, at 155. One of the main justifications a statute of limitations generally is the increased difficulty of gathering relevant and accurate evidence as time elapses between the trial and the event. Id.

112 See, generally, Harr, supra note 2.

113 Id. at 460.

114 Robinson, supra note 103, at 784.

115 See, generally, 2 A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (Superfund) Pub. L. 96-510.

116 See 42 U.S.C.A. 9651(e)(1)(“In order to determine the adequacy of existing common law and statutory remedies in providing legal redress for harm to man and the environment caused by the release of hazardous substances into the environment, there shall be submitted to the Congress a study within twelve months of December 11, 1980.)(West. 1995)

117 See Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Injuries and Damages from Hazardous Wastes – Analysis and Improvement of Legal Remedies: A Report to Congress in Compliance with Section 301(e) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Comm. Print No. 97-12, part 1, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 26 [hereinafter “CERCLA Study”], at 4.

118 See CERCLA Study, at 197-8. See also Id. at 234.

119 Id. at 245.

120 Id. at 213-14. In particular, if the claimant could prove that (1) a “source” produced, disposed or transported hazardous waste, (2) the claimant was exposed to this waste, and (3) the claimant suffered the kind of disease known to result from the exposure, the adjudicative body would grant the claimant the rebuttable presumption that (a) the exposure contributed to the disease and (b) the “source” was responsible for the harm. Id.

121 See, e.g. Forstrom, supra note 103, at 180; Soble, A Proposal for the Administrative Compensation of Victims of Toxic Substance Pollution: A Model Act, 14 Harv. J. on Legis. 683 (1977).

122 See CERCLA Study, supra note 116, at 193.

123 See Forstrom, at 161 (arguing that since the victim does not care who compensates him, only that he is in fact compensated, an administrative compensation scheme would satisfy the needs of the victim).

124 See CERCLA Study at 211.

125 Id. at 200 (noting that the proposed system could unclog the court dockets).

126 Though the study directs these types of plaintiffs to the common law, the common law has been criticized for its high causation barriers.

127 See Theodore L. Garrett, Compensating Victims of Toxic Substances: Issues Concerning Proposed Federal Legislation, 13 Envtl. L. Reporter 10172 (1983).

128 Such a right is necessary because the federal courts have not allowed private rights of action to be implied from federal control legislation. See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).

129 See H.R. 2330, 98th Congress (1983).

130 See Garrett, at 10176.

131 The court would grant the plaintiff a presumption upon proof that (1) plaintiff was exposed to hazardous waste partially caused by defendant, (2) exposure to this waste can cause injury of the type suffered, and (3) exposure level would be reasonably likely to contribute to that class of injury.

132 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) Pub. L. No. 99-499, sections 1-531, 100 Stat. 1613-1782 (1986)(codified at 42 U.S.C. sections 9601-9675 (1988)).

133 See H.R. 3852, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.,(1985). Frank’s amendment was defeated by those who felt that the current remedies were sufficient, that such a cause of action would greatly increase insurance premiums, and that the amendment would create excessive federal litigation. See Rory A. Valas, Toxic Palsgraf: Proving Causation When the Link Between Conduct and Injury Appears Highly Extraordinary, 18 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 773, 777 n. 28 (1991).

134 See N.D. Cent. Code section 32-40-06 (Lexis 1999).

135 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35 section 6018.611 (West 1993). The Pennsylvania courts have interpreted the statute to apply only to violations of the Storage Tank and Spill Prevention Act. See Centolanza v. Lehigh Valley Dairies, Inc., 658 A.2d 336 (Pa. 1995)

136 See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. section 147:58 (Lexis 1999).

137 See Minn. Stat. Ann. section 115B.05(1)(b)(West 1997).

138 The court may not direct a verdict against a plaintiff on the issue on causation if the plaintiff produces evidence sufficient to enable a reasonable person to find that (a) defendant is the person responsible for the release, (b) plaintiff was exposed to a hazardous substance, (c) the release could reasonably have resulted in plaintiff’s exposure to the substance in the amount and duration experienced by the plaintiff, and (d) the type of injury is caused or significantly caused by exposure to the hazardous substance in an amount and duration experienced by the plaintiff. Additionally, evidence to a reasonable medical certainty that the exposure caused or significantly contributed to the injury is not required for the issue to go to the jury. See 1983 Minn. Laws ch. 121, section 7. One commentator believes the statute amounts to a substantial factor test. See Prince, Compensation for Victims, 11 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 657,691 (1985). However, it is clear that the legislature intended to lower the causation hurdle for the plaintiff.

139 Clayton Act, section 4 states, “any person who shall be injured…by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws…shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained.” See 15 U.S.C.A section 15 (1997).

140 See Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (stating, “Congress sought to create a private enforcement mechanism that would deter violators and deprive them of the fruits of their illegal actions, and would provide ample compensation to the victims of antitrust violations.”) (1982).

141 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984).

142 Id. at 415.

143 Id.

144 See Brinker, supra note 103, at 1322.

145 The plaintiffs’ argument was rejected in Renaud v. Martin Marietta Corp. 749 F. Supp. 1545, 1552 (D. Colo. 1990).

146 65 S.W. 2d 42 (Mo. App. 1988).

147 Id. at 176.

148 Id. at 177.

149 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944).

150 Id.

151 Id. at 689.

152 478 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1970)

153 Id. at 472.

154 Id. at 474.

155 See supra notes 127-132.

156 See supra note 132.

157 See Garrett, supra note 126, at 10175.

158 Between 1,500 and 3,500 of the sites covered by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) require corrective action. There are an estimated 40,000 to 440,000 uncontrolled hazardous sites in the U.S., whereas CERCLA only authorizes cleanup for 1,296 of these sites. See, generally, supra notes 17-20.

159 The Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission have limited resources, allowing them to bring perhaps 100 to 150 cases even in well-funded years. See Handler, Milton et al., Trade Regulation: Cases and Materials (4th ed.) (Foundation Press 1997) However, because the Clayton Act enables private citizens to receive treble damages for injuries resulting from for antitrust violations, private citizens have filled the void. For example, the ratio of private actions to public actions was 20 to 1 in the 1970’s. In the 1980’s, the ratio was 10 to 1. See Commentary by Salop & White, in White (ed.), Private Antitrust Litigation: New Evidence, New Learning 3 (1988).

160 For example, the Clayton Act section 4 lets the plaintiff sue under the section for violations of the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act, and part of the Wilson Tariff Act. See American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments (4th Ed. 1997) 759. Additionally, the Pennsylvania courts have interpreted its strict liability hazardous waste statute to apply only to violations of the Storage Tank and Spill Prevention Act. See supra note 134.

161 See supra note 136.

162 See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Jury Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties (1995) <http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/cjcavilc.txt>.

163 Id.

164 Trebuhs Realty Co., Inc. v. News Syndicate Co., Inc. 107 F. Supp. 595, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).

165 E. Compton Timberlake, Federal Treble Damage Antitrust Actions (Callaghan 1965) 10.

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