A Critique of the Louisiana v. Biden Decision
By Max Oechsner

            A coalition of Republican-led states and oil and gas industry groups was handed a win in the latest legal battle over drilling in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS).[1] The ruling in Louisiana v. Biden will allow renewed drilling in the OCS, the offshore land surrounding the continental United States.[2] The ruling, however, overly relied on former presidents’ actions and misinterpreted the act that governs the OCS. Not only was it poorly decided, but the ruling will have irreversible consequences on the climate crisis.

Background on the Controversy

            The OCS is roughly comprised of the submerged lands off the coast of the continental United States.[3] President Biden, at the very end of his term, withdrew the OCS from potential oil and gas leasing.[4] The President did this through two Withdrawal Memoranda (hereinafter memoranda), one addressing the coast of Alaska, and the other addressing the East Coast, West Coast, and the Gulf of Mexico.[5] Biden’s memoranda stated that the withdrawal was “for a period of time without specific expiration.”[6] The plaintiffs, comprised of Louisiana, Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, and Mississippi, the American Petroleum Institute, and the Gulf Energy Alliance, quickly filed suit.[7]

The plaintiffs filed suit in federal court three days before Trump took office.[8] They challenged the memoranda under the U.S. Constitution and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).[9] The plaintiffs argued that § 12(a) of OCSLA violated the U.S. Constitution, therefore making the memoranda unlawful.[10] They also argued the memoranda were unlawful because they exceeded the scope of the President’s authority under § 12(a).[11]

The day that Trump took office, he issued an executive order that rescinded the memoranda.[12] A month later, a coalition of environmental groups filed suit to challenge his rescission order.[13] The challenge to Trump’s order is still awaiting a decision. Meanwhile, the Louisiana District Court decided the Biden case.[14] In this ruling, the Court first sidestepped the question of whether OCSLA is constitutional by giving deference to Congress.[15] The Court then ruled that President Biden exceeded his authority under OCSLA.[16]

The Flaws in the Court’s Decision

            The Biden court had several flaws in its analysis. Its decision rested primarily on two strains of reasoning: how former presidents have used § 12(a) of OCSLA and the text of § 12(a) itself. The court also failed to properly consider the context of § 12(a).

The court first erred in its analysis of the text of § 12(a). Section 12(a) provides that “the President of the United States may, from time to time, withdraw from disposition any of the unleased lands of the outer Continental Shelf.”[17] The court read the text as “encouraging an ongoing duty to revisit and amend regulations.”[18] In support of this reading, the court reasons that “it is generally accepted that in the absence of a specific statutory limitation, an [executive actor] has the inherent authority to reconsider its decisions.”[19] However, the text only grants the power of withdrawal.[20] It does not grant the power to rescind a withdrawal.[21] When a statute does not grant the president a power, the president cannot exercise that power.[22] The Supreme Court, in Youngstown Sheet v. Sawyer, clarified this critical rule of constitutional law:

It is one thing to draw an intention of Congress from general language and to say that Congress would have explicitly written what is inferred, where Congress has not addressed itself to a specific situation.  It is quite impossible, however, when Congress did specifically address itself to a problem, as Congress did to that of seizure, to find secreted in the interstices of legislation the very grant of power which Congress consciously withheld.[23]

The application of this rule gives the president power to withdraw land, but not to rescind it. Therefore, the president should not be required to specify the future time at which a subsequent president may reconsider the withdrawal.

The court also errs in its reasoning that “presidential interpretations of their limited authority under § 12(a) support a [limited] reading.”[24] However, courts should not use presidential decisions as persuasive or binding authority.[25] Therefore, the court should not have looked to how earlier presidents seem to have interpreted OCSLA.

Finally, the context of § 12(a) was not adequately considered. In 2019, the Alaska District Court decided nearly the same issue in League of Conservation Voters v. Trump.[26] In that case, several environmental groups challenged Trump’s executive order rescinding an Obama-era withdrawal of the OCS.[27] Therefore, the court decided an inverse issue: whether the president had the authority under § 12(a) of the OCSLA to rescind a withdrawal. In their decision, the court took into consideration the context of OCSLA.[28] A major point in the analysis focused on the contrast between § 8 and § 12.[29] They interpreted § 8 to be “promoting leasing” and § 12 to be “entirely protective.”[30] Ultimately, they found that OCSLA did not give a president the power to rescind a withdrawal.[31] Therefore, the contrast in the structure lends to the idea that § 12 only grants protective withdrawal power.

Conclusion

            The decision in Louisiana v. Biden represents a significant misreading of both the text and the intent of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. By grounding its reasoning in the practices of past presidents and stretching the language of § 12(a), the court undermined the intent of Congress. The ruling not only weakens the President’s ability to safeguard ecologically vital offshore lands, but it also opens the door to unchecked executive reversals that erode the stability of environmental governance. Ultimately, Louisiana v. Biden stands as a cautionary example of judicial overreach—one that prioritizes political expediency and economic interests over statutory fidelity and the urgent need to confront the climate crisis.

[1] Lauren Berg, Biden-Era Drilling Ban Memos Overstepped Law, Judge Says, LAW360, (Oct. 3, 2025, 10:36 PM) https://www.law360.com/environmental/articles/2395998/biden-era-drilling-ban-memos-overstepped-law-judge-says.

[2] Louisiana v. Biden, No. 2-25-CV-00071, 2025 WL 2808502, at 1 (W.D. La. Oct. 2, 2025).

[3] Outer Continental Shelf, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt. (last visited Oct. 11, 2025), https://www.boem.gov/oil-gas-energy/leasing/outer-continental-shelf.

[4] Louisiana v. Biden, 2025 WL (2025).

[5] Id. (citing 90 C.F.R. § 6739 (2025); 90 C.F.R. § 6743 (2025)).

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Id. (citing 90 C.F.R. § 8237 (2025)).

[13] Id. (citing N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Trump, No. 3:25-cv-38, doc. 1 (D. Alaska Feb. 19, 2025).

[14] Id. at 2.

[15] Id. at 4.

[16] Id. at 6.

[17] 43 U.S.C. § 1341 (1953).

[18] Louisiana v. Biden, 2025 WL (2025) at 6.

[19] Id. (quoting Macktal v. Chao, 286 F.3d 822, 825–26 (5th Cir. 2002)).

[20] 43 U.S.C. § 1341 (1953).

[21] Id.

[22] Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 609 (1952).

[23] Id.

[24] Louisiana v. Biden, 2025 WL (2025) at 6.

[25] Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 604 (“No authority that has since been given to the President can by any fair process of statutory construction be deemed to withdraw the restriction or change the will of Congress as expressed by a body of enactments.”).

[26] League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1025 (D. Alaska 2019), vacated and remanded sub nom. League of Conservation Voters v. Biden, 843 F. App’x 937 (9th Cir. 2021).

[27] Id.

[28] Id.

[29] Id.

[30] Id.

[31] Id. at 1029.