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Fracking The Hills: The Legal Exemption Flooding Appalachia
By Kathryn Stapleton

The Appalachian Mountain region has long endured frequent and devastating floods. From the shale-rich hills of West Virginia to the hollers of eastern Kentucky and the Blue Ridge Mountains of western North Carolina, communities have repeatedly witnessed creeks overflowing and valleys drowning in mud and debris. While climate change has intensified annual rainfall, another, less visible factor is compounding the crisis: the Halliburton Loophole. This exemption from federal regulations on hydraulic fracturing allows companies to inject millions of gallons of fluid underground with minimal oversight, further destabilizing the region’s already fragile hydrology and escalating the risk of catastrophic flooding.

The Halliburton Loophole: What It Is and How It Came to Be

The Halliburton Loophole was created by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which amended the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) to exempt most hydraulic fracturing operations from the Underground Injection Control (UIC) program.[1] The UIC program was originally established to regulate underground fluid injection and safeguard underground sources of drinking water (USDWs).[2] Prior to 2005, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had the authority to require permits, conduct testing, and monitor subsurface injections, including those involving fracking fluids.[3]

This changed with the 2005 amendment, heavily supported by Vice President Dick Cheney, a former Halliburton CEO, and redefined “underground injection” to exclude “the underground injection of fluids or propping agents pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations.”[4] Consequently, the EPA lost its authority to regulate the chemical makeup, injection pressures, or long-term impacts of fracking fluids.[5] Oversight now largely rests with state agencies, which in Appalachia are frequently underfunded, understaffed, and subject to political pressures.[6] The result is a fragmented regulatory system that leaves watersheds vulnerable to contamination, slope instability, and hydrologic alteration.

Connecting Fracking to Flooding: Hydrology in Hills

At first glance, fracking and flooding seem unrelated—one occurs deep underground, the other unfolds on the surface. Yet in the Appalachian Mountains, the two are deeply connected. The region’s folded shale, fractured sandstone, and legacy coal seams create natural pathways for groundwater flow. When millions of gallons of high-pressure fluid are injected into these formations, underground water movement is disrupted, potentially opening new fractures or reactivating dormant ones.[7] Without the SDWA’s UIC permitting requirements, these subsurface changes frequently go undocumented, leaving regulators unaware of dangerous buildups in groundwater pressure.[8]

When heavy rains arrive—and in Appalachia, they always do—these modified subsurface pathways amplify runoff.[9] Water that once seeped gradually into the ground may now be channeled directly to streams through fractures, raising discharge rates and peak flood levels.[10] The EPA’s 2016 assessment of hydraulic fracturing impacts found that these subsurface changes can “create or enhance hydraulic connections between deep formations and near-surface aquifers.”[11] In some instances, fracking fluids and brine have migrated upward through abandoned wells or faults, contaminating both groundwater and surface water sources.[12]

Surface disturbance further heightens the risk.[13] Fracking operations require clearing land for well pads, access roads, and retention ponds, which are often on steep, sensitive slopes.[14] These impervious surfaces limit infiltration and accelerate stormwater runoff.[15] When heavy rains pound barren hillsides, erosion worsens, stream channels become clogged with sediment, and flash floods grow even more destructive.[16]

West Virginia: Ground Zero for Legal and Hydrologic Failure

Nowhere are these dynamics clearer than in West Virginia. The 2016 West Virginia floods, which killed 23 people and caused over $1 billion in damage, were exacerbated by deforestation, slope development, and poorly regulated energy infrastructure.[17] Researchers have since argued that hydraulic fracturing and related industrial activity amplified runoff in already-fragile watersheds.[18]

A U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) study in the Monongahela River Basin found that stress-relief fractures—naturally occurring cracks in the bedrock—act as important groundwater pathways and are highly sensitive to changes in underground pressure caused by human activity.[19] Even deep injection activity can alter groundwater discharge patterns that sustain valley streams.[20] Research also shows that areas near shale-gas wells exhibit elevated groundwater pressures and disrupted base-flow dynamics, highlighting the connection between subsurface fluid injection and surface-water response.[21] These findings demonstrate how the Halliburton Loophole’s regulatory gap hinders the hydrologic review necessary to anticipate and prevent flood impacts.

Kentucky: Landslides, Injection, and the 2022 Floods

In eastern Kentucky, where steep terrain and shale formations intersect with intensive energy extraction, the effects of deregulation have been equally severe. The July 2022 floods killed more than 40 people and devastated entire communities.[22] Although extreme rainfall triggered the disaster, post-event analysis revealed that widespread landslides and debris flows were linked to saturated, fractured slopes already destabilized by mining and drilling.[23]

Kentucky’s oil and gas statutes lack robust requirements for cumulative hydrologic impact assessment or subsurface injection monitoring.[24] Because the Halliburton Loophole preempts federal UIC oversight, the EPA cannot require operators to model how injection pressures might interact with groundwater or slope stability. The result is a self-reinforcing cycle: weak regulation leads to altered hydrology, which amplifies natural hazards in already vulnerable mountain communities.

North Carolina: A Lesson in Prevention

Unlike its neighbors, North Carolina has so far avoided widespread fracking. In 2013, the state’s Mining and Energy Commission proposed rules to require chemical disclosure for hydraulic-fracturing fluids, but the effort was weakened by lobbying from industry groups citing trade secret protections.[25] Legal challenges and political shifts delayed comprehensive regulation, leaving the state with only partial transparency requirements.[26] If the Halliburton Loophole persists, any future expansion of fracking in North Carolina will likely proceed without essential hydrologic safeguards or baseline groundwater testing—raising the risk of destabilization and flooding seen elsewhere in the region.[27]

Legal and Policy Implications: Federalism at Its Breaking Point

The Halliburton Loophole undermines the Safe Drinking Water Act’s central goal: safeguarding underground drinking water from contamination and structural damage.[28] In hydrologically connected regions like Appalachia, this exemption threatens not just groundwater but also surface stability and flood resilience. By shifting oversight to states—without adequate funding, technical resources, or consistent standards—Congress created a regulatory blind spot at the intersection of energy development and climate risk..[29] As a result, fracking can move forward in flood-prone areas without federal review of hydrologic risks, cumulative injection pressures, or the interplay between slope geology and extreme rainfall.

Reform and Responsibility: Closing the Loophole for Climate Resilience

Congress should amend the Safe Drinking Water Act to repeal the 2005 exemption and restore EPA authority over hydraulic fracturing fluids under the UIC program. The Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (FRAC) Act—introduced multiple times since 2009—would close this loophole, mandating chemical disclosure and groundwater monitoring.[30] In addition to reinstating oversight, regulators should embed flood resilience into permitting by requiring hydrologic impact assessments, vegetative buffers, and adaptive monitoring in areas with steep topography or high rainfall.[31] States and localities should implement complementary zoning and stormwater controls in energy fields to prevent destabilization and capture runoff before it collects in hollows. A coordinated federal, state, and local approach is essential to close both the legal and hydrologic gaps.

Ultimately, the Halliburton Loophole exemplifies a breakdown of environmental federalism. It removed crucial oversight precisely where cross-jurisdictional coordination is needed most: in watersheds that span county and state boundaries. In Appalachia, water flows downhill through communities that often lack the political power to challenge upstream industry. The loophole enables private profits while transferring the costs—damaged homes, contaminated wells, and repeated flood recovery—to local taxpayers. Repealing the loophole will not stop the rain, but it would empower regulators to ensure industrial activity no longer exacerbates natural disasters. Water always finds the gaps—and in this case, the most dangerous gap is in the law itself.

[1] Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 322, 119 Stat. 594, 694 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)).

[2] Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b).

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, Permitting Guidance for Hydraulic Fracturing Using Diesel Fuels (Feb. 2014).

[6] Mary Tiemann & Adam Vann, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R41760, Hydraulic Fracturing and Safe Drinking Water Act Regulatory Issues (2015).

[7] Granville G. Wyrick & James W. Borchers, Hydrologic Effects of Stress-Relief Fracturing in an Appalachian Valley, U.S. Geological Surv. Water-Supply Paper 2177 (1981).

[8] U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, EPA-600-R-16-236, Assessment of the Potential Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing on Drinking Water Resources (2016) (finding that “limited data availability and lack of consistent monitoring make it difficult to determine the full extent of hydraulic connectivity or subsurface pressure changes resulting from hydraulic fracturing operations”).

[9] Id.

[10] USGS, Water Resources and Shale Gas/Oil Production in the Appalachian Basin (OFR 2013-1137).

[11] U.S. EPA, supra note 8.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Marcellus Shale Coal., Recommended Practices: Site Planning, Development and Restoration 7 (2012), https://marcelluscoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Site-Planning-Development-and-Restoration.pdf (listing surface disturbances for well pads, access roads, central impoundments, and pipelines, and recommending erosion and sediment controls).

[15] U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, Erosion and Sediment Control from Energy Extraction Sites, EPA/600/R-18/041 (2018).

[16] Id.

[17] Martina Angela Caretta et al., Flooding Hazard and Vulnerability: The 2016 West Virginia Floods, 3 Frontiers in Water, 5 (June 2021).

[18] Id.

[19] D.B. Chambers et al., US Geological Survey, SIR 2014-5233, Water Quality of Groundwater and Stream Base Flow in the Marcellus Shale Gas Field of the Monongahela River Basin (2015), https://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2014/5233/pdf/sir2014-5233.pdf.

[20] Id.

[21] Paul F. Ziemkiewicz et al., Evolution of water chemistry during Marcellus Shale gas development, 134 Chemosphere, 224, 226 (Sept. 2015).

[22] National Weather Service, July 2022 Significant River/Flash Flood in Southeastern Kentucky Summary (2023), https://www.weather.gov/media/publications/assessments/July_2022_Significant_River_Flash_Flood_SE_KY.pdf.

[23]Id.

[24] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. . §§ 353.500–353.720.

[25] Halliburton, Fracking, and the N.C. Public Records Act, SmithEnv’t Blog (May 3, 2013), https://www.smithenvironment.com/halliburton-fracking-and-the-n-c-public-records-act/.

[26] Id.

[27] Id.

[28] 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b).

[29] U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-14-555, Oil and Gas Regulation: Opportunities Exist to Improve Oversight of Hydraulic Fracturing Activities (2014).

[30] Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (FRAC) Act, H.R. 2133, 117th Cong. (2021).

[31] Id.

Cruelty for Me but Not for Thee: How Vermont’s Animal Cruelty Laws Could Protect Farmed Animals
By Anthony Corradi

Complaints of animal cruelty in Vermont rarely result in a change to an animal’s status. Voluntary compliance or enforcement via civil or criminal penalties only occur in 21% and 1.3% of cases respectively.[1] There are many reasons for this, including the fragmentation of the law’s enforcement and lack of knowledge as to what constitutes a violation.[2] Cases involving livestock and poultry are even rarer given the deference afforded to accredited animal husbandry practices.[3] Despite these challenges, an analysis of Vermont’s animal cruelty statute shows that Vermont can—and should—enforce a provision of the law to inhibit several common methods of farmed animal confinement.

The Vermont Legislature wrote the animal cruelty statute with the broad purpose of “prevent[ing] cruelty to animals.”[4] Correspondingly, the State should interpret and enforce the law to respect its breadth.[5] The statute states that one commits criminal cruelty when one “[t]ies, tethers, or restrains . . . livestock, in a manner that is inhumane or is detrimental to its welfare.”[6] This provision further exempts “[l]ivestock and poultry husbandry practices.”[7] However, in defining this term, the legislature did not simply defer to common or accepted industry practices. Instead, a three-part conjunctive test requires, in part, that farmers raise animals consistent with “husbandry practices that minimize pain and suffering.”[8] This language creates a powerful exception (to the exception) for farmed animals.

The State need not prove that farmers tying or restraining animals intended to act in a manner detrimental to the animal’s welfare. In State v. Gadreault, the Vermont Supreme Court held that this provision creates a strict liability offense.[9] Thus, Vermont only needs to show that a farmer has voluntarily tied or restrained an animal in a manner that causes harm.[10]

Further, because husbandry practices must minimize pain and suffering to be exempt from the cruelty statute imposes a real limit on acceptable farming techniques.[11] Since the legislature did not define “minimize,” we start with the dictionary definition.[12] The dictionary defines “minimize” as: “to reduce or keep to a minimum,”[13] where “minimum” means “the least quantity . . . possible.”[14] While some may interpret these definitions as only requiring a nominal reduction in pain and suffering, a straight reading requires farmers to take non-cost prohibitive measures to eliminate pain and suffering at any cost. The Vermont Supreme Court has not resolved this ambiguity in the context of the animal cruelty statute, as it has done in other statutes.[15] In those cases, the Court has generally taken the middle route, holding that one meets a mandate to “minimize” when a fact-intensive inquiry shows evidence of reasonable and concrete steps taken to mitigate negative effects.[16]

Accordingly, Vermont could use its current animal cruelty law to prevent several types of on-farm confinement such as battery cages and veal crates. Of special relevance to dairy-loving Vermont, though, is the “tie stall.” Tie stalls are a housing scheme in which farmers confine a cow to a narrow stall by a neck collar and chain.[17] Numbers for Vermont alone are unavailable, but as of 2014 between 20% and 42% of cows were kept in tie stalls in the eastern U.S.[18] These are likely conservative estimates for Vermont as the data also showed tie stall usage increased as herd size decreased.[19]

In a potential criminal or civil enforcement action, the State would need to show that confining a cow in a tie stall is a voluntary act done in a manner that is detrimental to the cow’s welfare. Of course, farmers choose to use tie stalls, and thus the voluntary requirement would generally be irrelevant. The question of the cow’s welfare is only slightly more difficult. Farmers can point to certain benefits of tie stall use that are incidental to a lack of outdoor freedom—such as the reduced prevalence of foot lesions.[20] Conversely, the negative effects of tie stalls are more numerous and arguably more severe. Harmful outcomes include disrupted natural lying behaviors, increased physiological stress levels and injury rates, and decreased emotional states.[21] As farmers and governments alike have concluded from similar observations and data, tie stalls are almost certainly more detrimental to cows’ welfare than not.[22]

Harmful or not, however, tie stalls are an accredited animal husbandry convention. Thus, Vermont would still need to show that the customary livestock practice exception should not apply. Here, the exception is void if the farmers using tie stalls have not taken reasonable actions to mitigate cows’ pain and suffering. Considering the statute’s broad purpose, the State could likely show that any act short of replacing tie stalls with free housing is unreasonable. Even if not, farmers would have to submit evidence of concrete steps taken to reduce the harm of tie stalls. Though less desirable than an outright exclusion, this would still reduce extended or permanent tie stall use as outdoor access is the clearest way to reduce negative outcomes.[23]

The State’s inaction on farmed animal cruelty is not solely due to a lack of legal authority. To the contrary, the Vermont Legislature and Supreme Court has made it clear that the law applies to farmers who do not take reasonable steps to reduce harm. This surely implicates the use of objectively detrimental practices like tie stalls, veal crates, or battery cages without further mitigating action. As a result, Vermont’s prosecutors and courts have a powerful tool—should they choose to utilize it—that could improve the lives of vast numbers of animals.

[1] Vt. Animal Cruelty Task Force, Report to Vermont House and Senate Judiciary Committees 23 (2016), https://legislature.vermont.gov/assets/Legislative-Reports/ACTF-Report-to-Judiciary-2016-FINAL.pdf.

[2] Id. at 22–24.

[3] Id. at 23.

[4] Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 351a (2024).

[5] See In re SM Farms Shop, LLC, 2025 VT 33, ¶ 10 (“[O]ur primary goal is to give effect to the legislative intent.”).

[6] Tit. 13, § 352(3).

[7] Id.

[8] Id. § 351(13)(C) (emphasis added).

[9] 171 Vt. 534, 536 (2000) (concluding strict liability offense since punishment not severe and provision lacking intent element other provisions include).

[10] Id. at 537, (holding that “the restraint need only be detrimental” and “the perpetrator’s actions be voluntary”).

[11] See In re SM Farms Shop, LLC, 2025 VT 33, ¶ 10 (“[W]e presume that language is inserted advisedly and that the Legislature did not intend to create surplusage.”).

[12] See Id. ¶ 31.

[13] Minimize, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/minimize (last visited Oct. 21, 2025).

[14] Minimum, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/minimum (last visited Oct. 21, 2025).

[15] See e.g. In re Appeal of Shaw, 2008 VT 29 (analyzing whether tower’s visibility “minimized” as required by zoning ordinance).

[16] Id. ¶ 14–17.

[17] U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Dairy Cattle Management Practices in the United States, 2014, at 4 (2016), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/sites/default/files/dairy14_dr_parti_1.pdf.

[18] Id. at 160, 165 (20% of non-lactating “dry” cows and 42% of lactating “wet” cows).

[19] Id. at 159, 163.

[20] Annabelle Beaver et al., The Welfare of Dairy Cattle Housed in Tiestalls Compared to Less-Restrictive Housing Types: A Systematic Review, 104 J. Dairy Sci. 9383, 9406 (2021), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022030221007177?ref=cra_js_challenge&fr=RR-1.

[21] Id. at 9401, 9406.

[22] Emily Fread, Transitioning From a Tie Stall to a Freestall, PennState Extension, https://extension.psu.edu/transitioning-from-a-tie-stall-to-a-freestall (last updated Aug. 15, 2024).

[23] Beaver, supra note 20, at 9392.

Border Patrol for Biodiversity: The Global Fight Against Invasive Alien Species
By Katherine Cantor

What comes to mind when you think of international trade? Is it wealthy businessmen and crowded shipyards? A lesser-known threat lurks: countries trade more than goods, they trade invasive species. Humans bringing non-native species into new lands is not new.[1] However, international trade has allowed these invasive alien species to lead ecosystem-altering sieges on foreign lands.[2] Much of the trade in invasive species is unintentional: they sneak across borders as secret seeds, parasites, or stuck on soil.[3] The main pathway for invasive alien species into new countries is through horticulture and the nursery trade, sometimes intentionally.[4]

Invasive alien species (IAS) are species brought to a new place by humans, which allows them to overcome barriers the native species face.[5] Unfortunately, this allows IAS to wreak havoc on native ecosystems.[6] IAS result in monetary harm through changes in nutrient cycling, hydrology, and the ecosystem’s ability to deal with disturbances.[7] Introduction of IAS also leads to significant extinctions. Since the 17^th century, “invasive alien species played a significant part ‘in nearly 40% of all animal extinctions’” with known causes.[8] This problem is especially widespread in America. Even disregarding overseas territories, the U.S. has some of the highest amounts of IAS worldwide.[9] Invasive species in the international markets are problematic, so what is being done?

International Regulations on Invasive Alien Species

There are many international treaties relevant to IAS.[10] The primary treaty is the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). The CBD states that countries should “[p]revent the introduction of, control or eradicate those alien species which threaten ecosystems, habitats or species.”[11] Unfortunately, while the U.S. signed the CBD, they did not ratify it.[12] The International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) governs “pests”—species that are injurious to plants.[13] It also governs “quarantine pests”—pests that pose an economic threat to the introduced area.[14] The IPPC also developed International Phytosanitary Measures (IPMs), which set rules preventing the spread of pests in international trade.[15] Because the CBD, IPPC, and IPMs are all international, cooperation across countries and various levels of government is imperative. To aid international cooperation, the IPPC introduced an EPhyto program, where countries can electronically send and receive messages and phytosanitary certificates.[16] 127 countries have adopted the EPhyto program.[17] Under the CBD and IPPC, countries have taken the reigns and established their own regimes to protect against IAS.

Case Studies: What Other Countries Are Doing

America operates a host of programs fighting IAS under the IPPC.[18] The main American program carrying out the IPPC is the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service’s Plant Protection and Quarantine program (APHIS-PPQ).[19] The APHIS-PPQ works to safeguard “against the entry, establishment, and spread of economically and environmentally significant pests.”[20] America is also a part of NAPPO, the North American Plant Protection Organization.[21] Under both the IPPC and NAPPO, the APHIS-PPQ developed their own set of International Phytosanitary Standards (IPS).[22] One specific IPS aims to prevent IAS from hitching a ride in on imported plants. Under that rationale, the NAPPO implemented a regional phytosanitary measure requiring plant-growers to ensure containment and control of possible pests.[23] This measure poses issues: what constitutes non-compliance and how the standard is enforced are both ambiguous.[24] Working internationally to prevent IAS, America also implemented the International Forestry Cooperation Act.[25] This Act allows support to non-U.S. forests through “prevention and control of insects, diseases, and other damaging agents.”[26] While America has many IAS regulations, the issue has not been diminished.[27]

Across the world, Viwa Island of Fiji is a success story in eradicating IAS.[28] This effort was congruent with the Fijian National Biodiversity Action Plan passed under the CBD.[29] The Action Plan notes concerns with IAS and states that it’s a priority for landowners to “use, manage, or eradicate species” that threaten biodiversity.[30] The Viwa Island plan originally started with the intent to eradicate poisonous and invasive cane toads.[31] After hearing community concerns, the project shifted to feral dogs, cats, and rats.[32] Community members were trained and “involved in all decisions and . . . engaged in the full range of management activities.”[33] Because community members were able to choose the IAS most disruptive to them, they were incredibly engaged.[34] Because of their engagement, all chosen species were completely eradicated.[35] The community has since cited increases in native lizards, birds, and crop yields.[36] Importantly, local communities now have the knowledge and skills to support biodiversity and manage IAS.

The goal of these international laws should be preventing IAS from being transported, rapid detection, and efficient eradication.[37] This necessitates global cooperation and enforcement of current laws. There are also moral questions raised in eradicating IAS that laws have not tackled.[38] While many regulations exist, the problem persists.

[1] Philip E. Hulme, Unwelcome exchange: International trade as a direct and indirect driver of biological invasions worldwide, 4 One Earth 666, 666 (2021).

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] Anna J. Turbelin et al., Mapping the global state of invasive alien species: patterns of invasion and policy responses, 26 Glob. Ecology & Biogeography 78, 78 (2016).

[5] Id.

[6] Petr Pyšek et al., Scientists’ warning on invasive alien species, 95 Biological Revs. 1511, 1512 (2020).

[7] Id.

[8] Vito De Lucia, Bare Nature. The Biopolitical Logic of the International Regulation of Invasive Alien Species, 31 J. Envt’l L. 109, 110 (2019).

[9] Turbelin, supra note 4, at 83.

[10] Id. at 87–88.

[11] Convention on Biological Diversity art. 8(h), June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79.

[12] List of Parties, Convention on Biological Diversity, https://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml. (last visited Oct. 9, 2025).

[13] International Plant Protection Convention, art. 2, Dec. 6, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1791, 150 U.N.T.S. 67. (2d ed., 2024, at 2–3).

[14] Id.

[15] Adopted Standards (IPSMs), Int’l Plant Prot. Convention, https://www.ippc.int/en/core-activities/standards-setting/ispms/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2026).

[16] IPPC ePhyto Solution, Four Years In, United Nations International Computing Centre (Mar. 15, 2022), https://www.unicc.org/news/2022/03/15/ippc-ephyto-solution-four-years-in/.

[17] Member countries of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation on the road to adopting the IPPC ePhyto Solution, International Plant Protection Convention (Oct. 9, 2023), https://www.ippc.int/en/news/member-countries-of-the-central-asia-regional-economic-cooperation-on-the-road-to-adopting-the-ippc-ephyto-solution/.

[18] International and Regional Plant Health Standards, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., https://www.aphis.usda.gov/international-standards/plant-health-standards. (last modified July 30, 2025).

[19] Id.

[20] Plant Protection & Quarantine, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., https://www.aphis.usda.gov/plant-protection-quarantine (last modified Sept. 30, 2025).

[21] International and Regional Plant Health Standards, supra note 18.

[22] Id.

[23] Secretariat of the North American Plant Protection Organization, RSPM 24 Integrated Pest Risk Management Measures for the Importation of Plants for Planting into NAPPO Member Countries 6–7 (2013).

[24] Id. at 10–11.

[25] 16 U.S.C. § 4501(b)(1)(D).

[26] Id.

[27] Turbelin, supra note 4, at 83.

[28] Sypmosia, A “Community” Approach to Invasive Species Management: Some Pacific Case Studies, Managing Vertebrate Invasive Species: Proc. of the USDA Nat’l Wildlife Rsch. Ctr. Symp. 29, 31 (2007).

[29] Fiji‟s Actions on IAS, Bioinvasion and Global Environmental Governance: The Transnational Policy Network on Invasive Alien Species 1, 2 https://www.cbd.int/invasive/doc/legislation/Fiji.pdf.

[30] Government of Vanuatu, National Biodiversity Conservation Strategy 21 (1999).

[31] Id.

[32] Id.

[33] Id.

[34] Id. at 32.

[35] Id.

[36] Id.

[37] Pyšek, supra note 6, at 1522.

[38] See Lucia, supra note 8, at 112.

All Politics is Local: Vermont Municipalities Can and Should Take the Lead in Driving Vermont to Achieve Energy Goals
By Aidan Sitler

The Vermont State legislature has made it easier for thermal energy networks to emerge as a viable option for clean heating and cooling in the State. The State set goals to lower energy costs and reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the Global Warming Solutions Act.^[1] Currently, Vermont is expected to fall short of attaining these goals.^[2] One of the best pathways for Vermont to achieve the target set in the Act is for towns to lead the efforts and establish municipally owned thermal energy networks.

Why Thermal Energy Networks?
Thermal energy networks “use a shared network of water-filled pipes that transfer heat in and out of buildings.”^[3] Thermal heating and cooling systems work by exchanging heat with the constant temperature below Earth’s surface to regulate the temperature inside the buildings.^[4] Thermal energy networks use a heat pump connected to the underground network of pipes. ^[5] The pipe’s water stores heat regulated by the in-building pumps.^[6] The pumps regulate heat as a sink to absorb excess heat during the summer months, and act as a heat source during the colder winter months.^[7] The more buildings connected to the same network, the more efficient the exchange and stronger the system.^[8] Thermal energy networks can replace traditional heat methods that rely on fossil fuels, such as natural gas, and traditional cooling methods that rely on inefficient air conditioning.^[9] In addition to replacing these methods entirely, thermal energy networks can co-exist with traditional heating and cooling methods as a way to supplement the majority of the energy needed to run them.^[10] Local municipalities benefit from the build-to-scale model for outfitting neighborhoods and existing infrastructure with thermal energy networks.^[11]

Why Local Municipalities?
The design and scale of thermal energy networks are what make them ideal for local municipalities to implement and control. Traditionally, in Vermont, any entity wanting to establish a thermal energy network would have to obtain a certificate of public good.^[12] The Vermont Public Utility Commission requires a certificate of public good to begin construction.^[13] Obtaining a certificate is a lengthy application process that requires many procedural obstacles, reducing a project’s chance of success.^[14] Because thermal energy networks are a way of distributing heat among citizens, they would normally be subject to the control and regulations of the public utility commission.^[15]

Recently, Vermont enacted Act 142, which changed regulations surrounding public utilities.^[16] A major change in the Act is that local municipalities no longer require a certificate of public good or permission from the public utility commission to establish and operate a thermal energy network.^[17] The Act now allows municipalities to “have the authority to construct, operate, set rates for, finance, and use eminent domain for thermal energy networks . . . .”^[18] This change creates opportunities for municipalities in Vermont to greenlight construction on thermal energy networks. The benefits from the Act for the municipalities include foregoing the application process and regulation from the public utility commission. The benefits from the Act for the citizens come in the form of reduced rates, energy efficiency, and having a voice in their energy needs.

Rate decreases for users in a thermal energy network are reflected in the efficiency of the system. As the network becomes more efficient, the municipality will be able to save on energy costs. These savings can then be passed down as lower rates for every user of the network. Thermal energy networks can also ensure fixed rates for users as they are not subject to traditional fluctuations in cost.[19] These fluctuations occur from the natural gas global market, supply chain, or fuel transportation fees.^[20] Instead, thermal energy networks rely on local resources to effectuate heating and cooling.^[21]

Citizens will also have opportunities to go directly to the town with concerns and feedback on how their thermal energy network is functioning. This creates a more local, hands-on experience for users of the energy networks in voicing their needs. Inclusion is important for creating an equitable energy system, which is more difficult to do when citizens must navigate the public utility structure.^[22] The local management of the thermal energy networks allows for a greater ease of access and accountability in the operations.

For Vermont to get back on track and achieve its goals of lowering energy costs and reducing its greenhouse gas emissions, there needs to be a greater push at the local level. Municipalities are in a unique position to be the best fit owners of a thermal energy network, both within the logistical and regulatory frameworks surrounding the networks. It is time for Vermont towns to take advantage of this new exemption and begin implementing thermal energy networks to address the energy concerns in the State.

^[1] 10 V.S.A § 578(a).

^[2] Austyn Gaffney, State concludes Vermont is failing to meet its carbon reduction targets, vtdigger, (July 22, 2025), https://vtdigger.org/2025/07/22/state-concludes-vermont-is-failing-to-meet-its-carbon-reduction-targets/.

^[3] Thermal Energy Networks, BDC, (Sep. 15, 2025), https://buildingdecarb.org/resource-library/tens.

^[4] Geothermal Heat Pumps, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, (Sept. 16, 2025), https://www.energy.gov/energysaver/geothermal-heat-pumps.

^[5] Id.

^[6] Id.

^[7] Id.

^[8] Reyna Cohen et al., Understanding Thermal Energy Networks, Cornell Univ. (2024), https://www.ilr.cornell.edu/sites/default/files-d8/2024-12/understanding-thermal-energy-networks.pdf.

^[9] Id. at 16.

^[10] Id. at 12.

^[11] Id. at 15.

^[12] 30 V.S.A. § 248(a)(2)(B).

^[13] Certificate of Public Good, VEPP, (Sept. 15, 2025), https://vermontstandardoffer.com/standard-offer/request-for-proposals/certificate-of-public-good/.

^[14] Id.

^[15] Reyna Cohen et al., Understanding Thermal Energy Networks, Cornell Univ. (2024), https://www.ilr.cornell.edu/sites/default/files-d8/2024-12/understanding-thermal-energy-networks.pdf.

^[16] 30 V.S.A. § 231(d).

^[17] Id.

^[18] Id.

[19] Cohen et al., supra note 15.

^[20] Id. at 12.

^[21] Id.

^[22] Certificate of Public Good, supra note 13.

Moving Backwards: EPA Aims to Repeal Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for Power Sector
By Matthew Allen

On June 11, 2025, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed to repeal greenhouse gas (GHG) emission standards for fossil-fuel-fired power plants. GHG standards act in direct accordance with the Clean Air Act (CAA).[1] The Supreme Court granted EPA this power after it held in Massachusetts v. EPA that the CAA authorizes EPA to regulate GHG emissions.[2] CAA requires standards for emissions of air pollutants from stationary sources like power plants.[3] EPA Administrator Lee Zeldin indicates this proposal would provide more reliable energy supply and drive down costs which would benefit U.S. citizens.[4] Eliminating GHG emission standards would not only violate the CAA, but would be a direct contradiction to what the EPA seeks to protect.

Administrator Zeldin’s reasoning is no more than a showing for public appeal. EPA proposal looks to neglect years of scientific data, research, and positive changes the CAA has helped to promote. Deregulating GHG emissions could create long lasting environmental and public impacts, reversing decades of effort.[5] This proposal leans more toward corporate and production convenience rather than focusing on EPA’s mission of protection and sustainability.[6] Although the proposal has been submitted, EPA ought to look back at its roots and prevent this injustice from continuing.

EPA is looking to cut the red tape burdening energy production for facilities. Actions like this proposal draw concern for quality of public health and future climate issues. Mary Rice and Amruta Nori-Sarma, Professors of Environmental Health at Harvard University School of Public Health addressed concerns on the long-term effects of deregulating GHG emissions.[7] Greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide (CO₂) and other toxic substances released expose harmful pollutants to the public, especially for children and the elderly.[8]

Not only are short-term air pollution effects of concern, so are long-term climate impacts. GHGs are linked to increased temperatures, more frequent and severe wildfires, and severe weather patterns.[9] Emissions from GHGs like CO₂, methane, and nitrous oxide from burning of fossil fuels and other production are the primary drivers of climate change.[10] Like some health professionals, American Public Health Association (APHA) strongly opposes EPA’s decision for these rollbacks.[11] APHA argues “these rules are especially important, as they would bring environmental and climate justice to historically disadvantaged communities, which face the greatest exposure to pollution from the power sector.”[12] Many private and public organizations have joined in opposition to these rollbacks including, U.S. Climate Alliance, Sabin Center, Health Care Without Harm.[13] All of which have expressed how the repeal of these standards can cause significant harm.[14]

Under the CAA, the Administrator shall include  sources that contributes significantly to air pollution resulting in possible endangerment to public health or welfare.[15] In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court originally only refers to motor vehicles or “moving” sources as a necessary regulated issue.[16] That holding addresses key distinctions that relied upon statutory interpretation of the CAA. Under CAA, a pollutant must reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.[17] EPA argues that GHG emissions from fossil-fuel-fired power plants do not contribute to dangerous air pollution.[18] EPA also proposes that it is the responsibility of the agency to prove the emissions are dangerous prior to issuing regulations.[19]

Removing the regulation standards opens the door for power plants to emit anything and everything they want without accountability. EPA estimates this proposal would save over $15 billion on regulatory costs over the course of two decades.[20] Not only does EPA believe GHG emissions play a little part in climate change, the proposal does not address any future public health concerns of these rollbacks.[21] A repeal of emission standards would constitute a clear violation of CAA. [22] New or previously existing facilities would no longer be enforced to regulate their emissions.[23]

EPA’s proposal is based on a new scientific and economic framework that contradicts the Endangerment Finding codified in 2009.[24] The Endangerment Finding states that regulation must be prescribed for any motor vehicle that emits air pollutants. The Endangerment Finding also states that regulations can be set if emissions contribute to the endangerment of public welfare.[25] EPA’s proposal to remove  the Endangerment Finding is supported by the Department of Energy, where multiple scientists challenged the validity of the climate crisis.[26] The scientists claim that models and experience suggest that CO₂ “might be less damaging economically than commonly believed, and excessive mitigation policies could prove more detrimental” to economic and environmental safety.[27] The authors of the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Review exhibit skeptic ideology regarding climate change.[28] An administrative push towards less regulatory restrictions and skepticism of climate change could play a major role on why the EPA is utilizing this report. Regardless, the objective to repeal the Endangerment Finding directly correlates to GHG emissions under CAA. A rollback of these necessary standards could cause legal and environmental uproar.

EPA challenges the established authority under CAA to set emission standards. EPA establishes the standard of performance which creates a standard that reflects the “degree of emission limitation.”[29] Subsequently, this standard represents the best system of emission reduction and monitoring to prevent poor quality of health and environmental impacts. Even with emission standards in place, facilities are still meeting energy requirements.[30] This standard directly correlates with the administrative power to enforce the regulations.[31] EPA’s proposal wishes to reshape the meaning of standard of performance to allow EPA more leeway with emissions regulations.[32] In turn, the administration is attempting to remove current authority established within CAA that authorizes EPA to establish emission standards. EPA’s argument stems from seeking to eliminate regulatory roadblocks that prohibit efficiency.[33] While this action may streamline regulatory process, the proposal creates an open market for facilities to ignore previous standards. GHG emission standards established a sense of responsibility for emitters to protect the environment and public welfare. This proposal could negate years of challenging work and corporate accountability.

CAA stands as the foundational element to authorize EPA to regulate emissions from stationery and mobile sources. This aligns with the protection of public health and welfare.[34] EPA should not look at flawed science or misrepresentations of foundational statutes. EPA should focus on sustainability and not jeopardizing the safety of the community. Courts should continue to act against rash decisions, like this proposal, which deregulate key initiatives instead of protecting our environment.

[1] Repeal of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units, 90 Fed. Reg. 25752 (proposed June 17, 2025) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).

[2] Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007).

[3] 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3).

[4] EPA, Greenhouse Gas Standards and Guidelines for Fossil Fuel-Fired Power Plants (July 10, 2025), https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/greenhouse-gas-standards-and-guidelines-fossil-fuel-fired-power.

[5] Karen Feldscher, Trump Administration Plans to Roll Back EPA Regulations Could Harm Health, Harvard T.H. Chan Sch. of Pub. Health (Sept. 16, 2025), https://hsph.harvard.edu/news/trump-administration-plans-to-roll-back-epa-regulations-could-harm-health/.

[6] EPA, Our Mission and What We Do (Jul. 23, 2025) https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do.

[7] Feldscher, supra note 5.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] See Hannah Ritchie et al., CO₂ and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Our World in Data  https://ourworldindata.org/co2-and-greenhouse-gas-emissions (last visited Sept. 17, 2025)

[11] See Rolling Back EPA Regulations Will Hurt Communities Across the Nation, American Pub. Health Ass’n (Mar 13, 2025), https://www.apha.org/news-and-media/news-releases/apha-news-releases/rolling-back-epa-regulations-will-hurt-communities-across-the-nation.

[12] Id.

[13] See also EPA Power Plant Rollback Sparks Opposition from Health, Faith, Business, State, and Local Leaders, AMERICA IS ALL IN (Aug. 8, 2025), https://www.americaisallin.com/epa-power-plant-rollback-sparks-opposition-health-faith-business-state-and-local-leaders.

[14] Id.

[15] 42 U.S.C § 7411(b)(1)(A).

[16] Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 497 (2007).

[17] 42 U.S.C § 7411(b)(1)(A).

[18] Repeal of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units, 90 Fed. Reg. 25752 (proposed June 17, 2025) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Repeal of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units, 90 Fed. Reg. 25752 (proposed June 17, 2025) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).

[22] 42 U.S.C § 7411.

[23] 42 U.S.C § 7411(d)(1).

[24] Eric Waeckerlin et al., EPA Proposes Rescission of Power Plant GHG Standards Under Clean Air Act Section 111, GreenbergTraurig (June 16, 2025), https://www.gtlaw.com/en/insights/2025/6/epa-proposes-rescission-of-power-plant-ghg-standards-under-clean-air-act-section-111.

[25] 42 U.S.C § 7521(a)(1).

[26] Department of Energy Issues Report Evaluating Impact of Greenhouse Gasses on U.S. Climate, Invites Public Comment, U.S. Dep’t of Energy (July 29, 2025), https://www.energy.gov/articles/department-energy-issues-report-evaluating-impact-greenhouse-gasses-us-climate-invites.

[27] Climate Working Group, A Critical Rev. of Impacts of Greenhouse Gas Emissions on the U.S. Climate U.S. Dep’t. of Energy x, ix (2025).

[28] Id.

[29] 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).

[30] Id.

[31] 42 U.S.C. § 7413(1).

[32] Repeal of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units, 90 Fed. Reg. 25752 (proposed June 17, 2025) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).

[33] Id.

[34] 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A).