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Border Patrol for Biodiversity: The Global Fight Against Invasive Alien Species
By Katherine Cantor

What comes to mind when you think of international trade? Is it wealthy businessmen and crowded shipyards? A lesser-known threat lurks: countries trade more than goods, they trade invasive species. Humans bringing non-native species into new lands is not new.[1] However, international trade has allowed these invasive alien species to lead ecosystem-altering sieges on foreign lands.[2] Much of the trade in invasive species is unintentional: they sneak across borders as secret seeds, parasites, or stuck on soil.[3] The main pathway for invasive alien species into new countries is through horticulture and the nursery trade, sometimes intentionally.[4]

Invasive alien species (IAS) are species brought to a new place by humans, which allows them to overcome barriers the native species face.[5] Unfortunately, this allows IAS to wreak havoc on native ecosystems.[6] IAS result in monetary harm through changes in nutrient cycling, hydrology, and the ecosystem’s ability to deal with disturbances.[7] Introduction of IAS also leads to significant extinctions. Since the 17^th century, “invasive alien species played a significant part ‘in nearly 40% of all animal extinctions’” with known causes.[8] This problem is especially widespread in America. Even disregarding overseas territories, the U.S. has some of the highest amounts of IAS worldwide.[9] Invasive species in the international markets are problematic, so what is being done?

International Regulations on Invasive Alien Species

There are many international treaties relevant to IAS.[10] The primary treaty is the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). The CBD states that countries should “[p]revent the introduction of, control or eradicate those alien species which threaten ecosystems, habitats or species.”[11] Unfortunately, while the U.S. signed the CBD, they did not ratify it.[12] The International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) governs “pests”—species that are injurious to plants.[13] It also governs “quarantine pests”—pests that pose an economic threat to the introduced area.[14] The IPPC also developed International Phytosanitary Measures (IPMs), which set rules preventing the spread of pests in international trade.[15] Because the CBD, IPPC, and IPMs are all international, cooperation across countries and various levels of government is imperative. To aid international cooperation, the IPPC introduced an EPhyto program, where countries can electronically send and receive messages and phytosanitary certificates.[16] 127 countries have adopted the EPhyto program.[17] Under the CBD and IPPC, countries have taken the reigns and established their own regimes to protect against IAS.

Case Studies: What Other Countries Are Doing

America operates a host of programs fighting IAS under the IPPC.[18] The main American program carrying out the IPPC is the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service’s Plant Protection and Quarantine program (APHIS-PPQ).[19] The APHIS-PPQ works to safeguard “against the entry, establishment, and spread of economically and environmentally significant pests.”[20] America is also a part of NAPPO, the North American Plant Protection Organization.[21] Under both the IPPC and NAPPO, the APHIS-PPQ developed their own set of International Phytosanitary Standards (IPS).[22] One specific IPS aims to prevent IAS from hitching a ride in on imported plants. Under that rationale, the NAPPO implemented a regional phytosanitary measure requiring plant-growers to ensure containment and control of possible pests.[23] This measure poses issues: what constitutes non-compliance and how the standard is enforced are both ambiguous.[24] Working internationally to prevent IAS, America also implemented the International Forestry Cooperation Act.[25] This Act allows support to non-U.S. forests through “prevention and control of insects, diseases, and other damaging agents.”[26] While America has many IAS regulations, the issue has not been diminished.[27]

Across the world, Viwa Island of Fiji is a success story in eradicating IAS.[28] This effort was congruent with the Fijian National Biodiversity Action Plan passed under the CBD.[29] The Action Plan notes concerns with IAS and states that it’s a priority for landowners to “use, manage, or eradicate species” that threaten biodiversity.[30] The Viwa Island plan originally started with the intent to eradicate poisonous and invasive cane toads.[31] After hearing community concerns, the project shifted to feral dogs, cats, and rats.[32] Community members were trained and “involved in all decisions and . . . engaged in the full range of management activities.”[33] Because community members were able to choose the IAS most disruptive to them, they were incredibly engaged.[34] Because of their engagement, all chosen species were completely eradicated.[35] The community has since cited increases in native lizards, birds, and crop yields.[36] Importantly, local communities now have the knowledge and skills to support biodiversity and manage IAS.

The goal of these international laws should be preventing IAS from being transported, rapid detection, and efficient eradication.[37] This necessitates global cooperation and enforcement of current laws. There are also moral questions raised in eradicating IAS that laws have not tackled.[38] While many regulations exist, the problem persists.

[1] Philip E. Hulme, Unwelcome exchange: International trade as a direct and indirect driver of biological invasions worldwide, 4 One Earth 666, 666 (2021).

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] Anna J. Turbelin et al., Mapping the global state of invasive alien species: patterns of invasion and policy responses, 26 Glob. Ecology & Biogeography 78, 78 (2016).

[5] Id.

[6] Petr Pyšek et al., Scientists’ warning on invasive alien species, 95 Biological Revs. 1511, 1512 (2020).

[7] Id.

[8] Vito De Lucia, Bare Nature. The Biopolitical Logic of the International Regulation of Invasive Alien Species, 31 J. Envt’l L. 109, 110 (2019).

[9] Turbelin, supra note 4, at 83.

[10] Id. at 87–88.

[11] Convention on Biological Diversity art. 8(h), June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79.

[12] List of Parties, Convention on Biological Diversity, https://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml. (last visited Oct. 9, 2025).

[13] International Plant Protection Convention, art. 2, Dec. 6, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1791, 150 U.N.T.S. 67. (2d ed., 2024, at 2–3).

[14] Id.

[15] Adopted Standards (IPSMs), Int’l Plant Prot. Convention, https://www.ippc.int/en/core-activities/standards-setting/ispms/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2026).

[16] IPPC ePhyto Solution, Four Years In, United Nations International Computing Centre (Mar. 15, 2022), https://www.unicc.org/news/2022/03/15/ippc-ephyto-solution-four-years-in/.

[17] Member countries of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation on the road to adopting the IPPC ePhyto Solution, International Plant Protection Convention (Oct. 9, 2023), https://www.ippc.int/en/news/member-countries-of-the-central-asia-regional-economic-cooperation-on-the-road-to-adopting-the-ippc-ephyto-solution/.

[18] International and Regional Plant Health Standards, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., https://www.aphis.usda.gov/international-standards/plant-health-standards. (last modified July 30, 2025).

[19] Id.

[20] Plant Protection & Quarantine, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., https://www.aphis.usda.gov/plant-protection-quarantine (last modified Sept. 30, 2025).

[21] International and Regional Plant Health Standards, supra note 18.

[22] Id.

[23] Secretariat of the North American Plant Protection Organization, RSPM 24 Integrated Pest Risk Management Measures for the Importation of Plants for Planting into NAPPO Member Countries 6–7 (2013).

[24] Id. at 10–11.

[25] 16 U.S.C. § 4501(b)(1)(D).

[26] Id.

[27] Turbelin, supra note 4, at 83.

[28] Sypmosia, A “Community” Approach to Invasive Species Management: Some Pacific Case Studies, Managing Vertebrate Invasive Species: Proc. of the USDA Nat’l Wildlife Rsch. Ctr. Symp. 29, 31 (2007).

[29] Fiji‟s Actions on IAS, Bioinvasion and Global Environmental Governance: The Transnational Policy Network on Invasive Alien Species 1, 2 https://www.cbd.int/invasive/doc/legislation/Fiji.pdf.

[30] Government of Vanuatu, National Biodiversity Conservation Strategy 21 (1999).

[31] Id.

[32] Id.

[33] Id.

[34] Id. at 32.

[35] Id.

[36] Id.

[37] Pyšek, supra note 6, at 1522.

[38] See Lucia, supra note 8, at 112.

All Politics is Local: Vermont Municipalities Can and Should Take the Lead in Driving Vermont to Achieve Energy Goals
By Aidan Sitler

The Vermont State legislature has made it easier for thermal energy networks to emerge as a viable option for clean heating and cooling in the State. The State set goals to lower energy costs and reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the Global Warming Solutions Act.^[1] Currently, Vermont is expected to fall short of attaining these goals.^[2] One of the best pathways for Vermont to achieve the target set in the Act is for towns to lead the efforts and establish municipally owned thermal energy networks.

Why Thermal Energy Networks?
Thermal energy networks “use a shared network of water-filled pipes that transfer heat in and out of buildings.”^[3] Thermal heating and cooling systems work by exchanging heat with the constant temperature below Earth’s surface to regulate the temperature inside the buildings.^[4] Thermal energy networks use a heat pump connected to the underground network of pipes. ^[5] The pipe’s water stores heat regulated by the in-building pumps.^[6] The pumps regulate heat as a sink to absorb excess heat during the summer months, and act as a heat source during the colder winter months.^[7] The more buildings connected to the same network, the more efficient the exchange and stronger the system.^[8] Thermal energy networks can replace traditional heat methods that rely on fossil fuels, such as natural gas, and traditional cooling methods that rely on inefficient air conditioning.^[9] In addition to replacing these methods entirely, thermal energy networks can co-exist with traditional heating and cooling methods as a way to supplement the majority of the energy needed to run them.^[10] Local municipalities benefit from the build-to-scale model for outfitting neighborhoods and existing infrastructure with thermal energy networks.^[11]

Why Local Municipalities?
The design and scale of thermal energy networks are what make them ideal for local municipalities to implement and control. Traditionally, in Vermont, any entity wanting to establish a thermal energy network would have to obtain a certificate of public good.^[12] The Vermont Public Utility Commission requires a certificate of public good to begin construction.^[13] Obtaining a certificate is a lengthy application process that requires many procedural obstacles, reducing a project’s chance of success.^[14] Because thermal energy networks are a way of distributing heat among citizens, they would normally be subject to the control and regulations of the public utility commission.^[15]

Recently, Vermont enacted Act 142, which changed regulations surrounding public utilities.^[16] A major change in the Act is that local municipalities no longer require a certificate of public good or permission from the public utility commission to establish and operate a thermal energy network.^[17] The Act now allows municipalities to “have the authority to construct, operate, set rates for, finance, and use eminent domain for thermal energy networks . . . .”^[18] This change creates opportunities for municipalities in Vermont to greenlight construction on thermal energy networks. The benefits from the Act for the municipalities include foregoing the application process and regulation from the public utility commission. The benefits from the Act for the citizens come in the form of reduced rates, energy efficiency, and having a voice in their energy needs.

Rate decreases for users in a thermal energy network are reflected in the efficiency of the system. As the network becomes more efficient, the municipality will be able to save on energy costs. These savings can then be passed down as lower rates for every user of the network. Thermal energy networks can also ensure fixed rates for users as they are not subject to traditional fluctuations in cost.[19] These fluctuations occur from the natural gas global market, supply chain, or fuel transportation fees.^[20] Instead, thermal energy networks rely on local resources to effectuate heating and cooling.^[21]

Citizens will also have opportunities to go directly to the town with concerns and feedback on how their thermal energy network is functioning. This creates a more local, hands-on experience for users of the energy networks in voicing their needs. Inclusion is important for creating an equitable energy system, which is more difficult to do when citizens must navigate the public utility structure.^[22] The local management of the thermal energy networks allows for a greater ease of access and accountability in the operations.

For Vermont to get back on track and achieve its goals of lowering energy costs and reducing its greenhouse gas emissions, there needs to be a greater push at the local level. Municipalities are in a unique position to be the best fit owners of a thermal energy network, both within the logistical and regulatory frameworks surrounding the networks. It is time for Vermont towns to take advantage of this new exemption and begin implementing thermal energy networks to address the energy concerns in the State.

^[1] 10 V.S.A § 578(a).

^[2] Austyn Gaffney, State concludes Vermont is failing to meet its carbon reduction targets, vtdigger, (July 22, 2025), https://vtdigger.org/2025/07/22/state-concludes-vermont-is-failing-to-meet-its-carbon-reduction-targets/.

^[3] Thermal Energy Networks, BDC, (Sep. 15, 2025), https://buildingdecarb.org/resource-library/tens.

^[4] Geothermal Heat Pumps, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, (Sept. 16, 2025), https://www.energy.gov/energysaver/geothermal-heat-pumps.

^[5] Id.

^[6] Id.

^[7] Id.

^[8] Reyna Cohen et al., Understanding Thermal Energy Networks, Cornell Univ. (2024), https://www.ilr.cornell.edu/sites/default/files-d8/2024-12/understanding-thermal-energy-networks.pdf.

^[9] Id. at 16.

^[10] Id. at 12.

^[11] Id. at 15.

^[12] 30 V.S.A. § 248(a)(2)(B).

^[13] Certificate of Public Good, VEPP, (Sept. 15, 2025), https://vermontstandardoffer.com/standard-offer/request-for-proposals/certificate-of-public-good/.

^[14] Id.

^[15] Reyna Cohen et al., Understanding Thermal Energy Networks, Cornell Univ. (2024), https://www.ilr.cornell.edu/sites/default/files-d8/2024-12/understanding-thermal-energy-networks.pdf.

^[16] 30 V.S.A. § 231(d).

^[17] Id.

^[18] Id.

[19] Cohen et al., supra note 15.

^[20] Id. at 12.

^[21] Id.

^[22] Certificate of Public Good, supra note 13.

Moving Backwards: EPA Aims to Repeal Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for Power Sector
By Matthew Allen

On June 11, 2025, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed to repeal greenhouse gas (GHG) emission standards for fossil-fuel-fired power plants. GHG standards act in direct accordance with the Clean Air Act (CAA).[1] The Supreme Court granted EPA this power after it held in Massachusetts v. EPA that the CAA authorizes EPA to regulate GHG emissions.[2] CAA requires standards for emissions of air pollutants from stationary sources like power plants.[3] EPA Administrator Lee Zeldin indicates this proposal would provide more reliable energy supply and drive down costs which would benefit U.S. citizens.[4] Eliminating GHG emission standards would not only violate the CAA, but would be a direct contradiction to what the EPA seeks to protect.

Administrator Zeldin’s reasoning is no more than a showing for public appeal. EPA proposal looks to neglect years of scientific data, research, and positive changes the CAA has helped to promote. Deregulating GHG emissions could create long lasting environmental and public impacts, reversing decades of effort.[5] This proposal leans more toward corporate and production convenience rather than focusing on EPA’s mission of protection and sustainability.[6] Although the proposal has been submitted, EPA ought to look back at its roots and prevent this injustice from continuing.

EPA is looking to cut the red tape burdening energy production for facilities. Actions like this proposal draw concern for quality of public health and future climate issues. Mary Rice and Amruta Nori-Sarma, Professors of Environmental Health at Harvard University School of Public Health addressed concerns on the long-term effects of deregulating GHG emissions.[7] Greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide (CO₂) and other toxic substances released expose harmful pollutants to the public, especially for children and the elderly.[8]

Not only are short-term air pollution effects of concern, so are long-term climate impacts. GHGs are linked to increased temperatures, more frequent and severe wildfires, and severe weather patterns.[9] Emissions from GHGs like CO₂, methane, and nitrous oxide from burning of fossil fuels and other production are the primary drivers of climate change.[10] Like some health professionals, American Public Health Association (APHA) strongly opposes EPA’s decision for these rollbacks.[11] APHA argues “these rules are especially important, as they would bring environmental and climate justice to historically disadvantaged communities, which face the greatest exposure to pollution from the power sector.”[12] Many private and public organizations have joined in opposition to these rollbacks including, U.S. Climate Alliance, Sabin Center, Health Care Without Harm.[13] All of which have expressed how the repeal of these standards can cause significant harm.[14]

Under the CAA, the Administrator shall include  sources that contributes significantly to air pollution resulting in possible endangerment to public health or welfare.[15] In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court originally only refers to motor vehicles or “moving” sources as a necessary regulated issue.[16] That holding addresses key distinctions that relied upon statutory interpretation of the CAA. Under CAA, a pollutant must reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.[17] EPA argues that GHG emissions from fossil-fuel-fired power plants do not contribute to dangerous air pollution.[18] EPA also proposes that it is the responsibility of the agency to prove the emissions are dangerous prior to issuing regulations.[19]

Removing the regulation standards opens the door for power plants to emit anything and everything they want without accountability. EPA estimates this proposal would save over $15 billion on regulatory costs over the course of two decades.[20] Not only does EPA believe GHG emissions play a little part in climate change, the proposal does not address any future public health concerns of these rollbacks.[21] A repeal of emission standards would constitute a clear violation of CAA. [22] New or previously existing facilities would no longer be enforced to regulate their emissions.[23]

EPA’s proposal is based on a new scientific and economic framework that contradicts the Endangerment Finding codified in 2009.[24] The Endangerment Finding states that regulation must be prescribed for any motor vehicle that emits air pollutants. The Endangerment Finding also states that regulations can be set if emissions contribute to the endangerment of public welfare.[25] EPA’s proposal to remove  the Endangerment Finding is supported by the Department of Energy, where multiple scientists challenged the validity of the climate crisis.[26] The scientists claim that models and experience suggest that CO₂ “might be less damaging economically than commonly believed, and excessive mitigation policies could prove more detrimental” to economic and environmental safety.[27] The authors of the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Review exhibit skeptic ideology regarding climate change.[28] An administrative push towards less regulatory restrictions and skepticism of climate change could play a major role on why the EPA is utilizing this report. Regardless, the objective to repeal the Endangerment Finding directly correlates to GHG emissions under CAA. A rollback of these necessary standards could cause legal and environmental uproar.

EPA challenges the established authority under CAA to set emission standards. EPA establishes the standard of performance which creates a standard that reflects the “degree of emission limitation.”[29] Subsequently, this standard represents the best system of emission reduction and monitoring to prevent poor quality of health and environmental impacts. Even with emission standards in place, facilities are still meeting energy requirements.[30] This standard directly correlates with the administrative power to enforce the regulations.[31] EPA’s proposal wishes to reshape the meaning of standard of performance to allow EPA more leeway with emissions regulations.[32] In turn, the administration is attempting to remove current authority established within CAA that authorizes EPA to establish emission standards. EPA’s argument stems from seeking to eliminate regulatory roadblocks that prohibit efficiency.[33] While this action may streamline regulatory process, the proposal creates an open market for facilities to ignore previous standards. GHG emission standards established a sense of responsibility for emitters to protect the environment and public welfare. This proposal could negate years of challenging work and corporate accountability.

CAA stands as the foundational element to authorize EPA to regulate emissions from stationery and mobile sources. This aligns with the protection of public health and welfare.[34] EPA should not look at flawed science or misrepresentations of foundational statutes. EPA should focus on sustainability and not jeopardizing the safety of the community. Courts should continue to act against rash decisions, like this proposal, which deregulate key initiatives instead of protecting our environment.

[1] Repeal of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units, 90 Fed. Reg. 25752 (proposed June 17, 2025) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).

[2] Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007).

[3] 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3).

[4] EPA, Greenhouse Gas Standards and Guidelines for Fossil Fuel-Fired Power Plants (July 10, 2025), https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/greenhouse-gas-standards-and-guidelines-fossil-fuel-fired-power.

[5] Karen Feldscher, Trump Administration Plans to Roll Back EPA Regulations Could Harm Health, Harvard T.H. Chan Sch. of Pub. Health (Sept. 16, 2025), https://hsph.harvard.edu/news/trump-administration-plans-to-roll-back-epa-regulations-could-harm-health/.

[6] EPA, Our Mission and What We Do (Jul. 23, 2025) https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do.

[7] Feldscher, supra note 5.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] See Hannah Ritchie et al., CO₂ and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Our World in Data  https://ourworldindata.org/co2-and-greenhouse-gas-emissions (last visited Sept. 17, 2025)

[11] See Rolling Back EPA Regulations Will Hurt Communities Across the Nation, American Pub. Health Ass’n (Mar 13, 2025), https://www.apha.org/news-and-media/news-releases/apha-news-releases/rolling-back-epa-regulations-will-hurt-communities-across-the-nation.

[12] Id.

[13] See also EPA Power Plant Rollback Sparks Opposition from Health, Faith, Business, State, and Local Leaders, AMERICA IS ALL IN (Aug. 8, 2025), https://www.americaisallin.com/epa-power-plant-rollback-sparks-opposition-health-faith-business-state-and-local-leaders.

[14] Id.

[15] 42 U.S.C § 7411(b)(1)(A).

[16] Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 497 (2007).

[17] 42 U.S.C § 7411(b)(1)(A).

[18] Repeal of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units, 90 Fed. Reg. 25752 (proposed June 17, 2025) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Repeal of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units, 90 Fed. Reg. 25752 (proposed June 17, 2025) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).

[22] 42 U.S.C § 7411.

[23] 42 U.S.C § 7411(d)(1).

[24] Eric Waeckerlin et al., EPA Proposes Rescission of Power Plant GHG Standards Under Clean Air Act Section 111, GreenbergTraurig (June 16, 2025), https://www.gtlaw.com/en/insights/2025/6/epa-proposes-rescission-of-power-plant-ghg-standards-under-clean-air-act-section-111.

[25] 42 U.S.C § 7521(a)(1).

[26] Department of Energy Issues Report Evaluating Impact of Greenhouse Gasses on U.S. Climate, Invites Public Comment, U.S. Dep’t of Energy (July 29, 2025), https://www.energy.gov/articles/department-energy-issues-report-evaluating-impact-greenhouse-gasses-us-climate-invites.

[27] Climate Working Group, A Critical Rev. of Impacts of Greenhouse Gas Emissions on the U.S. Climate U.S. Dep’t. of Energy x, ix (2025).

[28] Id.

[29] 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).

[30] Id.

[31] 42 U.S.C. § 7413(1).

[32] Repeal of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units, 90 Fed. Reg. 25752 (proposed June 17, 2025) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).

[33] Id.

[34] 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A).

Withdrawing from the UN Climate Negotiations: Cascading Mistakes from the Trump Administration
By Rachel Westrate

No one was particularly shocked when one of President Trump’s first acts upon returning to office on January 20, 2025 was to sign an executive order directing the State Department to withdraw from the Paris Agreement on climate change. After all, Trump pulled out of the Agreement during his first term, only for the United States to re-join the Agreement under the leadership of President Joe Biden in 2021. Now, a new January 7, 2026 Presidential Memorandum demands the U.S. withdraw from the parent treaty of the Paris Agreement—the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)—as well as 30 other United Nations entities and 35 non-U.N. organizations.

Withdrawal from the UNFCCC will make the United States the only U.N. member state that does not participate in the international climate treaty. For those who care about the health of our planet, U.S. foreign relations, or general international order, this move is deeply troubling. It is unsurprising that this Administration would take such drastic measures to prevent the United States from participating in the international climate conversation. But it is also a profoundly un-strategic move by the Trump Administration, given both their keen interest in international energy trends and ongoing domestic litigation against state climate laws.

This blog will provide a brief background on the international climate regime, summarize the legal speculations around the U.S. withdrawal from the UNFCCC, and discuss the implications for Trump’s international and domestic priorities.

Background: the UNFCCC & International Climate Negotiations

The United States was the first industrialized country and the fourth country overall to join the UNFCCC, after ratification by the Senate and signature by Republican President George H.W. Bush. As the first and still the most significant multinational climate treaty, the UNFCCC establishes the framework under which countries cooperate to address climate change. That framework entails an annual Conferences of the Parties (COPs) where UNFCCC member states negotiate “legal instruments” or “protocols” to help achieve the UNFCCC’s goal of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in our atmosphere.

Countries have negotiated and adopted two main instruments under the UNFCCC: the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement. The United States signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998. But the Senate never ratified that treaty, because it called for binding emissions reductions in developed countries without imposing similar obligations on developing countries (the Byrd-Hagel Resolution expressing the Senate’s distaste for Kyoto passed with a vote of 95 – 0). As soon as it became clear that the U.S., the largest annual emitter of greenhouse gases at the time, would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, negotiations began anew under the UNFCCC to work toward an agreement that would be more universally accepted.

The result was the Paris Agreement. Paris, unlike Kyoto, does not mandate emission cuts from any country. Instead, it establishes a cooperative framework under which countries work together to limit warming to under 2 degrees Celsius by creating and submitting plans to reduce national greenhouse gas emissions (called Nationally Determined Contributions, or NDCs). Parties to the Paris Agreement must also submit annual reports on their greenhouse gas emissions. Aside from those reporting obligations, though, the Paris Agreement is an entirely voluntary instrument, relying on bottom-up, domestic action within countries to address climate change—an evolution from the top-down, mandatory emissions reductions required under the Kyoto Protocol. 195 member countries to the UNFCCC adopted the Paris Agreement in 2015, and President Obama used his executive authority to ratify the Agreement on behalf of the United States in 2016.

President Trump withdrew from the Paris Agreement upon taking office, with the U.S. withdrawal becoming effective in 2020. The U.S. then rejoined under President Biden in 2021, only to deposit a notice of withdrawal from the Paris Agreement with the Office of the U.N. Secretary General on January 27, 2025, shortly into Trump’s second term. The U.S. withdrawal will become effective one year from that date, on January 27, 2026. (For a full timeline and guide, see NRDC’s Paris Climate Agreement: Everything You Need to Know).

Legal Implications of Withdrawing from the UNFCCC

While a President can unilaterally withdraw from the Paris Agreement (given that President Obama unilaterally entered it in 2016), it is a matter of legal debate whether the same is true of the UNFCCC. During the last Trump Administration, legal scholars built a body of work exploring this question. Professor Harold Koh published a 2018 essay arguing the President does not have the authority to unilaterally terminate or withdraw from any international agreement. Professor Jean Galbraith argued in a law review article that if a President unilaterally withdraws from a Senate-ratified treaty, the action does not negate the Senate’s initial advice and consent, and a future President could unilaterally rejoin the same treaty without seeking Senate re-authorization. But there is no Supreme Court precedent on unilateral withdrawal or rejoining of Senate-ratified treaties, and so the question remains up for debate.

This time around, the climate legal community has been quick to opine on whether or not the President can withdraw from the Framework Convention without consulting Congress and what withdrawal might mean for U.S. participation under a more climate-friendly future administration. Former U.S. climate negotiator Sue Biniaz and Professor Galbraith explained the international and domestic process of withdraw and reiterated their theory of rejoining without additional Senate consent. Carbon Brief collected experts’ thoughts on withdrawal, rejoining, and practical changes to the climate negotiations absent U.S. participation, detailing the legal uncertainty of the move and analogizing to other international organizations the U.S. has left and rejoined. Law Professor Dan Farber suggested that the U.S. may not even need to be a party to the UNFCCC to play a role in the Paris Agreement. The Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC issued a statement on Thursday, January 8^th noting that “the doors remain open for the US to reenter in the future”—but what that looks like legally is anyone’s guess.

We have yet to see if any litigation will be filed against the Trump Administration for this latest action—and whether any potential litigation may provide us with a definitive answer.

International Implications

By withdrawing from Paris, the United States will no longer be required to submit an NDC, nor will it submit yearly reports on domestic emissions (although, despite the withdrawal not officially occurring until 2026, the Trump Administration failed to submit the data in 2025). U.S. funding to the international climate organizations has ceased, including the UNFCCC and the Green Climate Fund (GCF).

But the U.S. withdrawal also means it can no longer participate in negotiations as a party and does not have the right to vote, which in turn means the U.S. will no longer have a say on topics that seem central to the Trump Administration’s policy agenda. In recent years, multinational climate negotiations have increasingly seen calls for an international roadmap to phase out fossil fuels, which would jeopardize the Administration’s goal of exporting domestic fossil fuels. The U.S. has already used its influence in other spheres to weaken environmental language coming out of the U.N., and it seems strange the Administration is willing to so easily give up the opportunity to thwart international climate progress.

Pulling out of the UNFCCC also means that future decisions and agreements will not reflect the interests or priorities of the United States—and are likely to be more heavily influenced by other big players. That includes China, which is rapidly expanding its global influence and renewable energy markets, and the European Union, which usually favors a more top-down, regulatory approach to addressing climate change in comparison to U.S.-favored market-based, voluntary approaches (for evidence of the U.S.-EU tension, see recently released State Department papers detailing the lead up to the Paris summit).

But what is bad for the Trump Administration could well be good for people and the planet. The lack of the presence of the United States, and particularly the Trump Administration, could leave room for more innovation and progress in the climate talks, as U.S. positions (in both Republican and Democratic Administrations) against mandatory emissions reductions, climate finance contributions, and phase-out of fossil fuel subsidies have frustrated negotiations in the past. While deep divides remain among countries party to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, the power vacuum left by the U.S. may create an opportunity for new players and alliances to support ideas that would have previously been considered dead on arrival.

The folly of the Trump Administration and the potential for new movement in the climate negotiations, however, are unlikely to outweigh the staggering loss of the U.S. withdrawing from the UNFCCC. A climate process without the largest historical emitter of greenhouse gases, the second largest current emitter of GHGs, and the world’s largest economy can only achieve so much when climate change is a collective action problem. And while the international climate negotiations process will not break down without the participation of the U.S., the country has been a major player for the last thirty years and often a broker of compromise.

Beyond this Administration, if decisions and agreements coming out of the COPs are not reflective of U.S. priorities and political landscape, it may also make it more difficult for the U.S. to rejoin in the future. President Obama was able to unilaterally join the Paris Agreement because domestic legislation and authority already existed to allow the country to comply with obligations under the agreement—and U.S. negotiators worked to design the agreement with this in mind. Even in the final hours of the negotiations over the Paris Agreement, State Department lawyers had to lobby for a one-word change that threatened the U.S.’s ability to support the outcome. Without U.S. input and pressure, it is possible for the negotiations to produce outcomes that even a climate-friendly Administration would be unable to rejoin without action from the Congress.

Domestic Implications: Inconsistencies in Ongoing Litigation

Perhaps especially cofounding is the Trump Administration’s decision to withdraw from the UNFCCC while relying on U.S. membership in the organization to justify ongoing domestic litigation against state climate laws. Both Vermont and New York passed climate superfund acts in 2024, which require payments from entities that emitted large amounts of greenhouse gases in the past several decades to help pay for climate adaptation projects in the states. On May 1, 2025, the United States of America and the United States Environmental Protection Agency filed suit against Vermont and New York, claiming (among other things) that the climate superfund laws are preempted by the federal government’s foreign affairs power.

The basis for the lawsuits overall is fundamentally flawed, given that the climate superfund laws do not regulate greenhouse gas emissions, states have both a right and responsibility to protect their citizens and environment, and both the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement support subnational action. But putting aside the Trump Administration’s mischaracterization of the laws and misunderstanding of national and international law, withdrawing from the UNFCCC fatally undermines their arguments that the federal government’s participation in the UNFCCC is what preempts states from acting on climate.

In its complaint against Vermont, the United States argues that “[b]y adopting the Framework Convention, the federal government undertook to formulate foreign policy” on greenhouse gases. It characterizes Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement as a foreign policy decision because Trump wants to “put the interests of the American people first in negotiating the terms of any future treaty to implement the” UNFCCC. The Vermont Act, the brief claims, “interferes with… the United States’ participation in the” UNFCCC. In a subsequent brief, the Department of Justice also argues that state climate superfund statutes conflict with the 1987 Global Climate Protection Act, in which Congress directed the President to “‘work towards multilateral agreements’ on greenhouse gas emissions.”

By withdrawing from the UNFCCC, the Trump Administration has pulled the rug out from under those arguments. The Administration has ensured that the United States will not be negotiating any future treaty to implement the UNFCCC or to carry out its obligations under the Global Climate Protection Act. By abdicating its role in formulating the American climate policy, the Trump Administration may well have cleared the way for states to fill the void.

The news from January 7^th is, without a doubt, a major setback for the international climate negotiations. But it is also, as U.N. climate chief Simon Steill said, a “colossal own goal” for the United States and the Trump Administration in their quest to influence international and domestic climate priorities in the coming years.

Justice and Equity in Community Forestry: An Enigmatic Dogma?
By Aayush Gautam[1]

In 1987, the Brutland Commission offered the world a new vision with the report “Our Common Future”: a development that meets present needs without compromising the future.[2] This gave rise to a new domain of developmental approach, the concept of “Sustainable Development”, which gained global prominence in the early 1990s.[3] With this came a wave of participatory natural resource management, an ethos grounded in local empowerment and ecological sustainability. Around the globe, countries began embracing models that placed communities as a frontier of development and environmental stewardship.

Nepal, a readily accepting nation for the global initiatives, rode this global wave with legal acceptance in the forestry sector giving legality to the Community Forestry (CF), which later became one of the most acclaimed environmental governance models in the country.[4] However, community-based forest management in Nepal had already taken root in earlier decades, under state-led programs such as Panchayat Forest and Panchayat Protected Forest under the legal provision of Forest Act, 1961.[5] While these earlier models were framed under the centralized Panchayat governance structure, they offered a glimpse of local involvement in forest care and use.

By the early 1990s, this evolved into a nationwide movement. Community Forests, now legally recognized and supported by formal policies, became one of the most acclaimed environmental governance models in the country. Fast forward to today, over 23,000 Community Forestry User Groups (CFUGs) manage approximately 2.58 million hectares, accounting for more than 36% of Nepal’s forest area.[6]

Community Forests: Beyond the canopy

The journey of CFs is, by many measures, a success story. Did CFs help reestablish depleted forest cover that had been lost in the 1970s and 80s? Yes. Did they support livelihoods and reduce dependency on state-managed resources? Yes. Did they strengthen local relationships and collective action? Yes. Did they inject value into local economies and into the national economy as a whole? Yes. But as in most complex social endeavors, bold “Yes” or “No” answers rarely capture the full picture. There is often a blurry line between the two sides of yes and no.

For example, while community forestry successfully restored forest cover, a critical examination is required: : What is the actual meaning of forest restoration? Is it just the visual recovery of the tree stands and increased forest cover? Or the regeneration of a healthy, functional forest ecosystem? Much of Nepal’s CF’s success has focused on reestablishing lost forest cover, but issues of monoculture plantation, the growing threat of wildfires, biodiversity loss of often ignored flora and fauna cast doubt on the ecological robustness of this restoration. Similarly, CFs were initially established to meet local sustenance needs, especially in Nepal’s mid-hills, where fuelwood was essential for cooking. But has CF governance evolved to meet the changing aspirations of communities whose energy needs, economic goals, and demographic dynamics have shifted? Theat remains an unreached terrain of answered geography.

However, caution to the readers, this article does not aim to glorify the pessimistic views presented to downplay CF’s notable achievements. Romanticizing or vilifying the participatory model misses the nuances of interpretation. The goal of this piece is to reflect honestly upon the scenario, on the dimensions of social justice and equity, which often remain buried beneath the roots of a tall standing forest canopy.

Story of the Musahar Community Forest[7]

The Musahar Community Forest is located at the confluence of Khairmara and Madiya river in Ward No. 10 of Bardibas Municipality, Mahottari district. With an area of 36 Hectares, it serves as a vital resource for its users, which provides both ecological benefits and livelihood opportunities. During the early 1980s, local communities from Gausala (south of the forest) felled the forest trees for agricultural purposes, starting a feud with the forest authorities. In the early 1990s, the forest was covered with overgrown bushes, which were cleared by the Musahar community and subsequently planted with fruit trees. Mangoes, jackfruit, citrus, and litchi trees were introduced in about 14 hectares of land. “Each of the 37 households planted 32 fruit trees in the forest completing almost 2000 fruit trees plantation in 1996” – says Dev Narayan Yadav and Ramchandra Sada.

The sale of mangoes through contracts brought an annual average income of almost 0.5 million (all financial figures written in Nepali rupees, NRS). The community already have provided assistance of almost 2 million in social and infrastructure development initiatives like roads, electricity, drinking water, and hospitals. “We were providing monthly salary of 49 thousand to four teachers of Musahar and Yadav community in the nearby school” – says one of the members in the meeting of the user groups. The hand-over of the community forest soon became a transformative initiative in enhancing both ecological and social well-being.

Nonetheless, things gradually took an unprecedented turn. Tensions began to rise among and within the community once lucrative income from the mangoes sales became apparent. Initially managed by the marginalized Musahar and Tamang communities, the CF soon faced demand for inclusion from communities like Koiri, Yadav, and Mahato households. These disputes led to divisions among community members, fueled by historical grievances and socio-political dynamics. “Whenever the meetings were held, disputes arose, and after that, forest officials stopped attending the meetings” – says Ram Babu Mahato in the user group meeting.

Internal tensions, coupled with allegations of financial mismanagement, also made Mangoes’ contract inconsistent and on the brink of closure. Total earnings from the sales were overshadowed by the Secretary of the committee, with significant amount left unrecorded and unaccounted for. This exacerbated mistrust among users. Consequently, the financial discrepancy is being watched by the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA), the bank account has been frozen, and the salaries of the teachers have not been paid for five months. The forest’s exemplary transformation to the community-managed resource spectacle devolved into a state of stalemate and governance fiasco.

Reflection and Conclusion

The issue in the Musahar CF is not an isolated case. It is a reflection, sometimes a warning, of deeper structural issues in community forests across Nepal. Power asymmetries, weak institutional safeguards, and selective participation often overshadow the ideals.

One of the female CFUG secretaries in Kavrepalanchowk district of central mid-hill region says, “I’m in the committee just as a mud statue. They tell me to sign a decision or a cheque, so I do. I don’t know what they do or how they do it. They say nothing will happen.” In the name of obligatory representation, it is a symbolic inclusion, a common practice across many CFUGs. We cannot deny that the “pseudo-participation” seen here is not mirrored in countless community-based forest governance, where decisions are made behind the back and marginalized voices are reduced to a mere signatory.

If Nepal’s community forestry model is to thrive ecologically and ethically, it must go beyond the practice of merely planting trees and sharing resources based on legal provisions. It must redistribute power, recognize structural inequalities, and represent all voices fairly, especially those of the marginalized ones. Because in the end, a community forest is more than just a patch of trees. It is a social contract, and its health depends as much on its canopies as on the justice rooted beneath it.

[1] Aayush Gautam is a forestry researcher working at the intersection of forest science, governance, and forest-based enterprise development in Nepal. He holds a Master of Science in Forestry (Gold Medalist) from Tribhuvan University and has a background in applied research, policy analysis, and field-based forest management.

[2] See Our Common Future, Rep. Of the World Comm’n on Env’t and Dev., U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (1987).

[3] . History of SD, Sustainable Development Commission, https://www.sd-commission.org.uk/pages/history_sd.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2025).

[4] Forrest Act, 2049 of 1993; see also G. C. Dhruba Bijaya, et.al., Community Forestry And Livelihood In Nepal: A Review, The Journal of Animal & Plant Sciences (2016), https://www.thejaps.org.pk/docs/v-26-01/01.pdf.

[5] Pramod Ghimire & Uchita Lamichhane, Community Based Forest Management In Nepal: Current Status, Successes and Challenges, Grassroots Journal of Natural Resources (June 20, 2020), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342501024_Community_Based_Forest_Management_in_Nepal_Current_Status_Successes_and_Challenges.

[6] Nepal’s Community Forest Groups: Incubators of Democracy, Community Conservation (July 2, 2025), https://communityconservation.org/nepals-community-forest-groups-incubators-of-democracy/; see also Hari Krishna Laudari, et.al., Community forestry in a changing context: A perspective from Nepal’s mid-hill, 138 Land Use Policy (Mar. 2024), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264837723004842.

[7] Some assertions are from the Author’s experience during a field visit to the Musahar Community Forest. The field visit was conducted in June 2025 and involved direct observation, participation in user group meetings, and discussions with community forest user group members and local residents. The following account draws on these field interactions and community testimonies.

Can You Dig It? Artificial Pond Construction in Vermont
By Dane Whitman

“What I have observed of the pond is no less true in ethics. It is the law of average.”[1]

In 1901, the Harvard Law Review published an article stating, “[a]lthough comparatively little has as yet been written about the law of ponds, the decisions are hopelessly confused.”[2] One could argue that, since then, ponds continue to attract relatively little attention in the field of environmental law. Rather than perform an extensive review of the “law of ponds” (previously attempted by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in the 1889 edition of Harvard Law Review),[3]  this blog post will explore a narrower topic: artificial pond construction in Vermont.

Vermont is home to “hundreds of small ponds, many of which provide a great habitat for plants, animals, and people.”[4] Satellite images over Vermont (such as the title image) reveal a landscape sprinkled with countless kidney-bean-shaped pockets of water seemingly unconnected to natural waterways.[5] Are these pools the result of lawless backwoods excavations? Or are backyard ponds evidence of Vermonters exercising their property rights to improve the local ecosystem? An overview of Vermont’s legal landscape suggests that there are both environmental opportunities and considerable risks regarding artificial ponds.

One example of a Vermont homestead utilizing artificial ponds for environmental benefits is Whole Systems Research Farm in the Mad River Valley.[6] The farm’s owner, Ben Falk, excavated a pond that catches rainwater and snowmelt from the upper portions of the property and then irrigates a series of terraced rice paddies.[7] The pond serves as a “bathroom” for his domestic ducks, and therefore the pond water irrigating the rice paddies is “rich in nutrients.”[8] The two small paddies are scaled for subsistence farming, producing enough rice “to satisfy the grain needs of a family of four.”[9]

Amy Siedl, a biologist and lecturer at the University of Vermont, has cited Falk’s farm as a model for climate adaptation.[10] Seidl has suggested that, given the Northeast’s increasing precipitation from climate change, artificial pond systems such as Falk’s are well-suited to capture rain from these events.[11] For example, Falk’s rice crop “thrives” during historic rain events, such as Hurricane Irene, whereas many of Vermont’s corn farmers have struggled with increasingly wet soil conditions.[12]

The remarkable potential of these artificial ponds begs the question: are they legal? Most prudent property owners might be intimidated by the prospect of renting an excavator and breaking ground without performing due diligence. Fortunately, Vermont regulators provide guidance (often accompanied by disclaimers of liability) for property owners to dig ponds that are structurally safe and environmentally sound.

To some extent, Vermont law supports property owners to construct artificial ponds. For example, Vermont’s statutes expressly allow property owners to stock and harvest fish from “artificial ponds.”[13] This requires, however, that “the sources of water supply for such pond are entirely upon his or her premises or that fish do not have access to such pond from waters not under his or her control . . . .”[14] In essence, this statute facilitates backyard fish farming, also known as “aquaculture.”[15]

Vermont’s administrative agencies also provide ample guidance for property owners who wish to excavate and manage artificial ponds on their property. Some of this guidance is practical, ranging from siting considerations; water supply needs; various depth requirements for fish versus waterfowl; which kinds of ponds require engineering consultation; and even a directory of excavation contractors.[16] The State also points potential pond owners to information regarding the best fish to stock, a list of native plants to prevent erosion, methods to maintain water quality for swimming, and how to optimize bird watching potential.[17]

While state resources appear to enable (if not encourage) pond construction, these materials also carry a strong dose of caution. Any pond “capable of impounding more than 500,000 cubic feet of water” will essentially constitute a dam requiring approval by the Department of Environmental Conservation.[18] For some perspective, a person could cover an acre of land with an 11-foot deep pond and still be shy of 500,000 cubic feet of water.[19] The Department explains, however, that even dams for small backyard ponds “are significant structures that can have major public safety and environmental implications.”[20] A variety of local, state, and federal laws can affect dam ownership, and more information can be found on Vermont’s Dam Safety Program website.[21]

Based on the specifics of a project, a suite of other regulatory entitles may also have a stake in your pond construction. Any construction that impacts a stream may require a stream alteration permit with Vermont’s River Management Program.[22] Any pond work that comes within fifty feet of a wetland may require a permit through Vermont’s Wetlands Program.[23] Other considerations include rare, threatened, and endangered species; fish and wildlife; local zoning bylaws; Vermont’s Act 250; historic or archaeological significance; and Vermont’s water quality standards.[24]

Of course, a great variety of tort and property law claims could also involve a pond. One illustrative case dates back to 1909, when a plaintiff successfully argued that mosquitos breeding behind a newly constructed dam caused him and his family to contract malaria.[25] While this was a Georgia case, the court’s words of wisdom apply to any Vermonter hoping to stay a good neighbor while constructing a new pond:

[I]n the construction of dams and in the backing of water they must choose their sites with due regard to the surroundings. They are not authorized to maintain stagnant ponds, polluted pools of water, or places in which mosquitoes breed, in unusual numbers to the endangering of the health of surrounding communities.[26]

Artificial ponds may provide an immediate opportunity for Vermont’s property owners to enhance biodiversity, climate resiliency, and land productivity on a hyper-local scale. Property owners should, however, perform due diligence to mitigate any potential environmental, public health, or safety issues associated with pond construction and maintenance. Nonetheless, it may be well worth the effort to hear choruses of frogs singing through the night; to watch birds inspecting the shoreline; or to ponder over schools of fish—all thriving because somebody dug a hole in the right place.

[1] Henry David Thoreau, Walden 188 (1854).

[2] Note, Rights in Public Ponds, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 68, 68 (1901).

[3] See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Law of Ponds, 3 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1889).

[4] Private Ponds, Agency of Nat. Res. Dep’t. of Env’t. Conservation, https://dec.vermont.gov/watershed/lakes-ponds/private-ponds (last visited Sept. 17, 2025).

[5] Image Credit: Google Earth, Airbus, (Apr. 20, 2025).

[6] Whole Systems Research Farm, Whole Systems Design, https://www.wholesystemsdesign.com/project-wsd-research-farm (last visited Sept. 17, 2025).

[7] Adam Regn Arvidson, Post-oil Groceries, 101 Landscape Architecture Mag. 54, 54 (2011).

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Audrey Clark, Facing Climate Change: Collapse or adaptation? Biologist Says Humans Can Adjust to Warmer World, vtdigger, (June 30, 2013), https://vtdigger.org/2013/06/30/facing-climate-change-collapse-or-adaptation-biologist-says-humans-can-adjust-to-warmer-world/.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] 10 V.S.A. § 5210.

[14] Id.

[15] George Devault, Small Scale Backyard Fish Farming, MOTHER EARTH NEWS, (Dec. 30, 2023), https://www.motherearthnews.com/homesteading-and-livestock/backyard-fish-farming-zmaz06amzwar/.

[16] Agency of Nat. Res. Dep’t of Env’t Conservation Water Quality Div., Vermont Pond Construction Guidelines (2006), https://anrweb.vt.gov/PubDocs/DEC/WSMD/Lakes/Docs/lp_pond-construction.pdf.

[17] Private Ponds – Pond Construction, Agency of Nat. Res. Dep’t of Env’t Conservation, https://dec.vermont.gov/watershed/lakes-ponds/private-ponds/private-ponds-pond-construction (last visited Sept. 17, 2025).

[18] 10 V.S.A. § 5210.

[19] Agency of Nat. Res., supra note 17.

[20] Private Ponds: What You Should Know About Constructing a Pond Or Dam, Agency of Nat. Res. Dep’t of Env’t. Conservation https://dec.vermont.gov/sites/dec/files/wsm/lakes/Ponds/Constructing%20a%20Private%20Pond%20Update.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2025).

[21] Id.

[22] Id.

[23] Id.

[24] Id.

[25] Towaliga Power Co. v. Sims, 65 S.E. 844, 845 (Ga. Ct. App. 1909).

[26] Id.