Diamond in the Rough: Using Corporate Interests for Environmental Justice Goals
By Brett Davis

The Supreme Court’s latest term lacked blockbuster environmental decisions like years past.[1] The Court’s biggest decisions focused largely on the Trump administration’s various attacks on power within the Federal government.[2] Decisions like Trump v. Wilcox and Trump v. CASA have left the president with increased control over environmental policy decisions.[3] While those cases stole the spotlight, Diamond Alternative Energy v. EPA subtly shifted the legal standing in environmental suits.[4] Such a shift could change approaches to environmental justice litigation, where standing has long been a core obstacle.[5]

Standing derives from Article III of the Constitution, which requires a “case” and “controversy” for justiciability.[6] The Supreme Court has listed three requirements for standing: injury in fact, causation, and redressability.[7] Injury in fact requires an injury be both “concrete and particular” and “actual and imminent.”[8] The test limits plaintiffs’ ability to attack policies they are merely against.[9] Causation requires that the challenged rule cause the injury in fact and is not merely speculative.[10] Redressability requires that a favorable ruling will redress the injury in fact.[11] Causation and redressability are often opposite sides of the same coin.[12] Other issues, such as prohibiting suits involving generalized grievances, can also block environmental litigation.[13]

In Diamond, fuel producer plaintiffs challenged California’s heightened emission standards and electric-vehicle mandate under the Clean Air Act.[14] The Court found injury in fact to be relatively straightforward.[15] California’s policy would reduce the use of gasoline-powered vehicles compared to a free market.[16] Thus, there will be fewer gasoline sales and a monetary injury to gasoline companies.[17] Neither party meaningfully disputed this injury in fact.[18]

The Court focused mainly on causation and redressability.[19] Given that causation and redressability generally rely on the same thrust, the court interweaves their analysis.[20] The EPA argued that even if the laws were invalidated, the plaintiffs failed to prove why vehicle manufacturers would reduce the size of their electric vehicle fleets to favor gas-powered vehicles.[21] The Court emphasized the use of commonsense economics as a basis in evaluating cause.[22] The commonsense being that California’s policy has and could induce vehicle manufacturers to alter production in favor of electric vehicles.[23] Thus, the plaintiffs satisfied their burden to show California’s rule injured fuel interests without providing evidence.[24]

This commonsense approach also satisfied redressability.[25] Plaintiffs must simply show a “predictable chain of events that would likely result from judicial relief.”[26] The Court noted that regulation aimed at producing market effects ordinarily means the result of vacating policy would have the opposite effect.[27] And a mere dollar of relief satisfies the redressability standard.[28] The plaintiffs had a commonsense redress if a court struck California’s rule.[29] The Court denied any heightened redressability standard.[30]

Diamond’s leniency to causation and redressability standards gives corporations more grace than citizens.[31] And the Court’s grant of certiorari to a doomed policy would further indicate sympathy for companies.[32] While these concerns Justice Jackson provides are apt, the Court’s 7-2 decision indicates the remaining justices lack the same opinion.[33] Even with Justice Jackson’s critique, companies can be a vehicle for environmental change. Diamond’s relaxed standard may offer green companies or nonprofits easier opportunities to combat fossil fuel-centered policy.[34]

Rather than approaching people physically affected by environmental hazards, advocates can seek organizations economically disadvantaged from executive rules. For example, the Trump administration’s executive orders cutting green and electric programs in favor of fossil fuels are like California’s policy.[35] Following Diamond, renewable energy companies have a very straightforward argument for all three standing elements.[36] Trump’s regulations are “designed to produce a particular effect on the market.”[37] In this case, promote fossil fuel energy sources over alternatives. Therefore, renewable companies suffer an injury in fact through reduced sales.[38] Commonsense economics implies that those regulations caused the effect, and redress occurs upon a favorable ruling.[39] With injunctive relief, the executive orders would no longer produce their intended market effects—boosting revenue for the unfavored companies.[40]

Alternatively, environmental challenges outside of the corporate landscape could utilize Diamond’s reasoning. Citizens can utilize the Court’s focus on economic impacts as an obvious line to standing for more nebulous environmental policy challenges. Plaintiffs who gain economically from cleaner environments, such as farmers, may derive commonsense economic impacts of a degrading climate.

However, relying on environmental science rather than direct market interference likely overstretches the limits of Diamond.[41] Instead, plaintiffs will need to show economic impairment because of financial trends induced by rulemaking. The issue remains in uncoupling these economic impairments from corporate revenues so all citizens affected can bring suit.

Overall, Diamond does not drastically change the approach to standing.[42] The Court does seem to lower the burden on plaintiffs in showing economic injury, causation, and redressability.[43] This benefits companies’ standing arguments, but likely remains inconsequential to everyday citizens. Environmental justice advocates may need to approach standing difficulties by finding who fits Diamond’s slightly altered model. If the Court gives leniency to companies, savvy lawyers should take advantage of that leniency. While the Court fears gamesmanship,[44] any change to the rules requires new ways to play the game.

[1] Joseph Winters, The Supreme Court just ended its term. Here are the Decisions that will affect climate policy, Grist, https://grist.org/justice/supreme-court-term-climate-decisions-trump-workforce/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2025).

[2] See id.

[3] See Trump v. Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. 1415, 1415 (2025); Trump v. Casa, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 861 (2025); see also Joseph Winters, The Supreme Court just ended its term. Here are the Decisions that will affect climate policy, Grist, https://grist.org/justice/supreme-court-term-climate-decisions-trump-workforce/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2025).

[4] Sara Dewey, Environmental & Energy Law Program, Quick Take: Diamond Alternative Energy v. EPA (June 27, 2025), Environmental and Energy Law Program, https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/quick-take-diamond-alternative-energy-v-epa/.

[5] Lauren Cormany, Standing in the Way of Environmental Justice, 2024 Utah L. Rev. 167, 171 (2024).

[6] U.S. Const. art III, § 2, cl. 1; see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife et al., 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992) (clarifying justicibility standards).

[7] Id. at 560–61.

[8] Id. at 560.

[9] Id. at 575.

[10] Id. at 560.

[11] Id.

[12] Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC, et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency et al., No. 24-7 U.S. Reports 1, 8 (2025).

[13] Cormany, supra note 5 at 172.

[14] Diamond, No. 24-7 U.S. Reports 1, 1-2 (describing California’s exception to the Clean Air Act which allows the State to set more restrictive standards to address local pollution concerns).

[15] See id. at 11 (finding no meaningful dispute between parties).

[16] Id. at 11.

[17] Id.

[18] Id. at 10.

[19] Id. at 2.

[20] See id. at 13-20 (conducting analysis on traceability of both cause and redress).

[21] Id. at 10.

[22] Id. at 14.

[23] Id.

[24] See id. at 15-17 (noting plaintiffs did bring arguments and referred to California’s statue and stated aims).

[25] See id. at 18-20 (reasoning same commonsense chain of events as cause analysis).

[26] Id. at 18 (quoting FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. 367, 385 (2024)).

[27] Id. at 15.

[28] Id. at 11.

[29] Id. at 15.

[30] Id. at 19 (reasoning that a heightened standard would only involve “gamesmanship”).

[31] Id. at 1 (J. Jackson dissenting).

[32] Diamond, No. 24-7 U.S. Reports 1, 1 (J. Jackson dissenting).

[33] See id. at 1 (7-2 split).

[34] Dewey supra, note 4 at 2.

[35] See Exec. Order No. 14,154, 90 Fed. Reg. 8353 (Jan. 20, 2025) (eliminating incentives for green fuel systems); see also Exec. Order No. 14,261, 90 Fed. Reg. 15517 (Apr. 14, 2025) (promoting the coal industry).

[36] See Diamond, No. 24-7 U.S. Reports 1, 11.

[37] See id. at 15.

[38] See id. at 11.

[39] See id.

[40] See id.

[41] See id. at 14 (finding plaintiffs suffer classic monetary injury from regulation).

[42] Dewey supra, note 4.

[43] Diamond, No. 24-7 U.S. Reports 1, 1 (J. Jackson dissenting).

[44] Diamond, No. 24-7 U.S. Reports 1, 19.