Debunking EPA Administrator Lee Zeldin’s Claims of the Economic Harms of Emission Regulations
By Max Oechsner

The current American administration has been canceling climate change initiatives since its first day in office.[1] The administration has abandoned lawsuits,[2] heavily deregulated,[3] and issued executive orders that repeal environmental initiatives.[4]  Most recently, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed a rule[5] that would eliminate the 2009 endangerment finding by the EPA.[6] This finding determined that certain greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions hurt human health and the environment. [7] The endangerment finding is the only legal basis for the federal government to regulate GHG emissions.[8] This makes it a fairly special piece of regulation. If the endangerment finding goes away, potentially all emission regulations carried out since 2009 could go with it.[9]

Lee Zeldin, the current administrator of the EPA, has defended this proposal to the media vigorously. In one interview, Zeldin bashed the economic costs of EPA regulations as having been “significant.”[10] In another interview, Zeldin claimed that EPA regulations “were seeking, in some respects, to strangulate out of existence entire sectors of our economy.”[11] He claimed that he inherited a “mess,” which has contributed to the high costs of heating homes.[12] But how true is this rhetoric that he presents to the public in support of the EPA’s proposal?

First, we may look to the EPA proposal’s own Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA).[13] In the RIA, one major consideration is the change in assumptions related to consumer interests in purchasing electric vehicles.[14] Specifically, they discuss how recent uncertainty in the continuation of tax credits established by the Inflation Reduction Act has reduced projected demand for EVs.[15] The uncertainty comes from Trump’s “One Big Beautiful Bill,” but these projections raise concerns that current initiatives are underperforming. However, this consideration does not go so far as to include evidence of economic strangulation.

Another consideration in the RIA is the EPA’s estimate of future gasoline and diesel prices.[16] They conclude that rollback would cause the price of gasoline to be $1 lower compared to Biden-era projections.[17] This projection, however, is not supported by data.[18] The RIA only references President Donald Trump’s “energy dominance” policies.[19] And still, this consideration does not imply the strangulation of any sectors of the economy. To quote Kathy Harris, director of the Natural Resources Defense Council: “It’s a lot of funny math.”[20]

What about the past fourteen years since the endangerment finding? Has there been a noticeable strangulation of any sector of the economy that the endangerment finding regulates? Gas prices, despite being highly volatile, have not shown much increase or decrease in price since 2009.[21] U.S. field production of crude oil has actually gone up.[22] The automotive industry has seen significant growth, increasing by roughly 20 million jobs.[23] On the clean energy front, automakers have invested nearly $200 billion in U.S. clean vehicle production, supporting almost 195,000 jobs.[24] Clean energy itself has increased, with wind and solar production now providing more electricity than coal.[25] In fact, it appears that the more stable regulatory environment has been compatible with growth, innovation, and clean solutions.[26]

The inverse may also be true: a less stable regulatory environment could lead to worse economic conditions. As previously mentioned, rescinding the endangerment finding will result in important climate change regulations being repealed.[27] This could theoretically lead to patchwork state and local regulations in the absence of federal rules. Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have already adopted GHG emission targets.[28] It is not difficult to imagine that these states may increase those targets while others do nothing. This would likely negatively affect industry, as shown by some automakers recently signing on to self-regulate to avoid regulatory uncertainty.[29]

Ultimately, the endangerment finding being repealed will be harmful on many levels. Our economy will likely do worse overall, with the clean energy market being hit especially hard.[30] The clean energy market’s pain, in turn, hurts our environment and our communities. Socioeconomically disadvantaged communities bear a particularly disproportionate cost from the use of fossil fuels.[31] Without emission limitations, fossil fuel pollution will continue to hurt those communities, deepening existing health disparities.[32] This is especially true considering EPA regulations are the only real option for abating harm, given the significant hurdles to bringing private suits.[33] As a result, those who could benefit most from clean energy investments—through job creation, affordable energy access, and cleaner air—are left behind.

[1] See, e.g., 90 C.F.R. § 8237 (2025) (revoking several previous executive orders such as 86 C.F.R. 43583 (2021), 86 C.F.R. 51579 (2021), and 86 C.F.R. 7615 (2021)); 90 C.F.R. 8347 (2025); 90 C.F.R. 8353 (2025).

[2] Justice Department Dismisses Suit Against Denka, Delivering on President Trump’s Mandate to End Radical DEI Programs, DOJ (last updated March 7, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-dismisses-suit-against-denka-delivering-president-trumps-mandate-end.

[3] Press Release, EPA Launches Biggest Deregulatory Action in U.S. History, EPA (March 12, 2025), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-launches-biggest-deregulatory-action-us-history.

[4] See, 90 C.F.R. 8455 (2025); 3 C.F.R. 8353 (2025); 90 C.F.R 8347 (2025).

[5] 40 C.F.R. Parts 85, 86, 600, 1036, 1037, and 1039.

[6] 40 C.F.R. Chapter 1.

[7] Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, U. S. Env’t Prot. Agency (last updated Feb. 27, 2025), https://www.epa.gov/climate-change/endangerment-and-cause-or-contribute-findings-greenhouse-gases-under-section-202a.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] ABC News, EPA administrator defends repeal of landmark climate regulation finding, YouTube (Jul 30, 2025), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wF2SguLC_YA.

[11] CBS News, EPA Chief Lee Zeldin defends proposed repealing of endangerment finding, YouTube (Aug 1, 2025), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YCM_o0ora2E&t=207s.

[12] Id.

[13] Office of Transportation and Air Quality, Reconsideration of 2009 Endangerment Finding and Greenhouse Gas vehicle Standards: Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis, EPA-420-D-25-002 (July 2025).

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] EPA, supra note 11.

[17] Jean Chemnick, Inside EPA’s analysis for killing the endangerment finding, Politico (Sept.10, 2025 6:16 AM), https://www.eenews.net/articles/inside-epas-analysis-for-killing-the-endangerment-finding/.

[18] Id.

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Average price data (in U.S. dollars), selected items, U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stat., https://www.bls.gov/charts/consumer-price-index/consumer-price-index-average-price-data.htm.

[22] Petroleum & Other Liquids, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., (last updated Aug. 2025) https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/leafhandler.ashx.

[23] Industry and occupational employment projections overview and highlights, 2023–33, U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stat. (Nov. 2024), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2024/article/industry-and-occupational-employment-projections-overview-and-highlights-2023-33.htm.

[24] Supra note 22.

[25] In 2024, the United States produced more energy than ever before, US Energy Info. Admin. (Oct. 16, 2025), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php.

[26] Sean Hackett, Bad for business: The Trump Administration’s attack on EPA’s endangerment finding, Env’t Def. Fund, (May 6, 2025) https://business.edf.org/insights/bad-for-business-the-trump-administrations-attack-on-epas-endangerment-finding/.

[27] Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 722 F.3d 401, 404 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

[28] State Climate Policy Maps, Ctr. for Climate and Energy Sol. (last visited Oct. 6, 2025), https://www.c2es.org/content/state-climate-policy/.

[29] Joseph DeQuarto, Automakers Prefer Self-Regulation to Regulatory Uncertainty, The Regulatory R., (Sept. 19, 2019)

https://www.theregreview.org/2019/09/19/dequarto-automakers-prefer-self-regulation-regulatory-uncertainty/.

[30] See supra notes 21–29.

[31] See Aneesh Patnaik, et. al, Racial Disparities and Climate Change, Princeton Student Climate Initiative, (Aug. 15, 2020) https://psci.princeton.edu/tips/2020/8/15/racial-disparities-and-climate-change.

[32] Id.

[33] See Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the displacement doctrine precludes private nuisance suits).

Analyzing Legal Contradictions Between Michigan’s Energy Laws and the Natural Resource Act: Challenges and Policy Tips
By Haleigh Smith

 Michigan’s energy and environmental laws have experienced significant evolution in recent years, showing a strong effort to move toward cleaner, renewable energy. The Public Acts 235, 233, and 229 in 2023 exemplify this shift, establishing ambitious standards for clean energy, renewable project siting, and energy waste reduction.[1] Simultaneously, older laws like the Michigan Environmental Protection Act (MEPA) and the Michigan Zoning Enabling Act still play an important role in protecting the environment and managing land use.[2] However, the intersection of these new legislative initiatives with pre-existing environmental statutes presents complex legal contradictions that make it harder to put policies into action.

This post looks at these conflicts, what they might mean for Michigan’s environmental and energy goals, and suggests ways to fix these issues so laws can work better together and support sustainable growth.

Overview of Recent Energy Legislation in Michigan
The legislative reforms introduced in 2023 mark a pivotal shift in Michigan’s energy policy framework. Public Act 235 (PA 235) mandates a transition to 100% clean energy by 2040, requiring electric providers to submit comprehensive Clean Energy Plans starting no later than 2028, with guidelines to be established by 2026.[3] This act highlights Michigan’s commitment to decarbonization and aligns with broader national trends toward renewable energy adoption.

Complementing this, Public Act 233 (PA 233) addresses renewable energy project siting and permitting. It grants the Michigan Public Service Commission (MPSC) authority to approve large-scale renewable facilities, such as wind and solar farms, while delineating the role of local governments in land-use restrictions.[4] This act seeks to streamline project development, reduce permitting delays, and centralize authority to facilitate renewable infrastructure deployment. Public Act 229 (PA 229) revises energy waste reduction targets and mandates the filing of energy optimization plans by utilities, emphasizing efficiency and conservation.[5] These laws collectively aim to bolster Michigan’s renewable capacity, improve energy efficiency, and ensure a coordinated approach to sustainable energy development.

Pre-existing Environmental Frameworks
Alongside legislative efforts, Michigan’s environmental statutes, in particular MEPA and the Michigan Zoning Enabling Act, establish protections for natural resources and land use regulation.[6] The MEPA emphasizes the prevention of environmental degradation, requiring agencies and individuals to avoid unnecessary harm to Michigan’s ecosystems.[7] MEPA encourages environmentally conscious development and can serve as a safeguard against large-scale projects that could compromise ecological integrity.

The Michigan Zoning Enabling Act grants local governments authority to regulate land use, including the siting of energy projects.[8] This empowers local zoning boards to impose restrictions or guidelines to shape project development, often with considerations for community welfare, property values, and environmental impact. Complementing this, Michigan’s Renewable Energy Standards promote renewable generation and distributed energy systems, aligning with the state’s sustainability objectives.[9] These statutes collectively provide a comprehensive legal framework aimed at balancing energy development with environmental conservation.

Emerging Contradictions and Challenges
The intersection of the new energy laws with existing environmental statutes reveals multiple areas of potential legal conflict. These contradictions stem from overlapping jurisdictions, differing priorities, and statutory ambiguities. A central issue is authority and jurisdictional conflicts: Public Act 233’s centralization of siting authority within the MPSC may conflict with the Michigan Zoning Enabling Act’s delegation of land use regulation to local governments. While PA 233 seeks to streamline renewable project approvals, it risks overriding local zoning restrictions that aim to protect environmental quality or community interests.[10] Such preemption could lead to legal disputes, especially if local restrictions are grounded in environmental concerns or land conservation policies. Similarly, the expedited siting and permitting provisions in PA 233 and PA 295 may conflict with MEPA’s requirement to assess environmental impact comprehensively.[11] Fast-tracking projects without rigorous environmental review could undermine MEPA’s protections, raising questions about the legal hierarchy and procedural compliance.

Environmental Safeguards versus project development also present a challenge. MEPA’s emphasis on preventing unnecessary environmental harm may be at odds with the aggressive timeline and project approval mandates of the new energy laws.[12] For example, large-scale wind or solar projects designated as “statewide significance” could threaten habitats, water resources, or land stability if not carefully evaluated.[13] Projects might bypass or minimize the statutory requirement for environmental assessments under MEPA. Land Use and local restrictions further complicate the legal landscape. The Michigan Zoning Enabling Act’s provisions allow local governments to impose restrictions on energy projects.[14] However, PA 233 limits these restrictions and authorizes the MPSC to override local decisions if they exceed permissible limits.[15] This tension creates a legal ambiguity: should local land use policies prioritize environmental and community interests, or should they yield to statewide renewable development goals? The inconsistency could lead to litigation, delays, and project cancellations.

Implications for Policy and Implementation
The contradictions between Michigan’s energy legislation and environmental statutes threaten to undermine the state’s sustainability objectives. Legal conflicts may cause project delays, increase costs, or even result in legal challenges that halt development. Moreover, inconsistencies erode public trust and stakeholder confidence, essential for successful energy transition.[16]

Without clear legal coherence, energy projects may proceed without adequate environmental safeguards, leading to ecological degradation, loss of biodiversity, and community opposition. Conversely, overly restrictive local regulations could impede renewable infrastructure deployment, hampering Michigan’s clean energy commitments.[17] Therefore, achieving legal coherence requires resolving these contradictions through deliberate policy reforms, clear statutory hierarchies, and integrated planning processes.

Policy Recommendations for Enhancing Legal Coherence
To address these challenges, Michigan policymakers should pursue a versatile approach emphasizing clarity, consistency, and stakeholder engagement. Legislators should explicitly delineate the hierarchy of statutes governing energy development and environmental protection. Clarifying whether energy laws supersede local land use restrictions or require environmental assessments before project approval can reduce legal ambiguities. A statutory provision that mandates compliance with MEPA during energy project permitting, regardless of centralized or local authority, would reinforce environmental safeguards.[18]

Michigan should develop a unified planning framework that mandates environmental impact assessments (EIAs) as an integral part of the renewable project approval process. This could involve establishing a dedicated inter-agency task force or environmental review board that evaluates project proposals within the context of land use, ecological conservation, and community welfare, ensuring that energy development aligns with environmental statutes.[19] Enhancing local-state collaboration is equally important; while streamlining project approval is desirable, local governments possess valuable knowledge about their ecosystems and land use priorities. Policies should foster collaborative decision-making, incorporating local environmental concerns into statewide planning. This might include formal consultation requirements or joint review procedures that respect local zoning while aligning with statewide renewable goals.[20]

Clarifying and expanding the role of MEPA is also necessary; Michigan should consider updating MEPA to explicitly accommodate energy development projects, delineating procedures for environmental review of renewable energy facilities. Incorporating specific guidelines for wind, solar, and energy storage projects can streamline assessments and prevent conflicts with rapid project timelines.[21] Engaging communities, environmental organizations, and Indigenous groups in planning processes can ensure that energy projects respect ecological and social considerations. Establishing public comment periods, stakeholder advisory committees, and dispute resolution mechanisms can foster transparency and consensus.[22]

Finally, developing technical and financial incentives for environmentally compatible developments—such as habitat preservation, buffer zones, or technological innovations­—can align project objectives with environmental statutes. These measures can encourage developers to prioritize ecological considerations within the legal framework.[23]

Conclusion
Michigan stands at a critical contingency in its pursuit of a sustainable energy future. The recent legislative reforms demonstrate commitment but also expose underlying contradictions with established environmental statutes. Addressing these conflicts requires deliberate policy reforms emphasizing legal clarity, integrated planning, and stakeholder participation.[24] By establishing a coherent legal framework that balances energy development with environmental conservation, Michigan can foster a resilient, equitable, and sustainable energy system. Such coherence will not only facilitate the effective implementation of renewable energy projects but also uphold the state’s commitment to protecting its natural resources for future generations.

[1] Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 460.1051, 460.1221, 460.1071 (2023).

[2] See Mich. Comp. Laws § 324.101 (1994).; see also Mich. Comp. Laws § 125.3102 (2006).

[3] Mich. Comp. Laws § 460.1101 (2023).

[4] Id.§ 460.1222.

[5] Id.§ 460.1071.

[6] See Mich. Comp. Laws § 324.101 (1994).; see also Mich. Comp. Laws § 125.3102-125.3702 (2006).

[7] Id.

[8] Mich. Comp. Laws § 125.3507 (2006).

[9] Mich. Comp. Laws § 460.1001 (2008).

[10] Mich. Comp. Laws § 460.1223 (2023).

[11] Id.; Mich. Comp. Laws § 460.1002 (2008).

[12] Mich. Comp. Laws § 324.101 (1994).

[13] Id.

[14] Mich. Comp. Laws § 125.3507 (2006).

[15] Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 460.1080, 460.1223, 460.1055 (2023).

[16] Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Energy Legislation and Policy Workgroups (2023).

[17] Mich. Dep’t of Env’t, Great Lakes & Energy, Environmental Regulations and Guidelines (2023).

[18] See Mich. Comp. Laws § 324.101 (1994); see also Mich. Comp. Laws § 460.1010 (2008).

[19] Mich. Dep’t of Envt’l, Great Lakes & Energy, Environmental Regulations and Guidelines (2023).

[20] Mich. Comp. Laws § 125.3132 (2006).

[21] Mich. Comp. Laws § 324.101 (1994).; Mich. Dep’t of Env’t, Great Lakes & Energy, Environmental Regulations and Guidelines (2023).

[22]  Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Energy Legislation and Policy Workgroups (2023).

[23] Mich. Comp. Laws § 460.1009 (2008).; Mich. Dep’t of Env’t, supra note 15.

[24] Id.; Mich. Comp. Laws §§§ 460.1051, 460.1221, 460.1071 (2023).

Two Approaches to Energy Access: United States Justice vs. European Union Rights
By Diamond McAllister

            The United States (US) and the European Union (EU) take different approaches to energy policy.[1] The varying strategies reflect contrasting views of energy as a social right versus a matter of justice and equity. The EU favors a top-down strategy, relying on mandates, regulations, and penalties to achieve compliance.[2] Meanwhile the US leans on incentives, rewarding “good behavior” through subsidies and investments in sustainable energy initiatives.[3]

This brief comparison examines programs and policies from both sides of the Atlantic, highlighting approaches to clean energy and climate initiatives. The difference in strategies of implementing clean energy is reflected in the terminology and program design of the US and EU. The US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) invests in clean energy and lowers household energy costs to address climate change. The EU Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA), by contrast, expands net-zero technology manufacturing to meet climate goals and cut import reliance. Unlike the US framework, the EU framework holds those who fail to comply accountable.

I. Terminology Differences: Framing Justice vs. Rights
            Policy terminology matters. It not only describes issues but shapes how they are understood and acted upon. The US IRA emphasizes concepts such as environmental justice, equity, communities of color, disadvantaged, and underserved groups.[4] The EU NZIA does not adopt this language. While the environmental justice movement has not yet gained significant traction in the EU, related concepts appear under different terms.[5] EU law often frames these issues in terms of energy poverty, just transition, and social cohesion.[6] The US and EU’s employment of distinct terminology in drafting their clean energy and climate initiatives points to differing policy objectives.

Why do these two jurisdictions use different terminology? The answer lies in their distinct policy objectives and historical contexts. The United States’ emphasis on equity and justice is informed by its history of slavery and systemic injustice, shaping a policymaking approach that seeks to address historical disparities.[7] The NZIA primarily targets industrial strategy and green technology deployment, embedding social standards only minimally.[8] This contrast highlights how terminology signals not just priorities but the broader societal values that underpin energy policy in each jurisdiction.

II. The US Approach: The IRA and Justice40
            The IRA represents the most comprehensive federal climate policy in American history, integrating equity and justice as core components of its design.[9] The Justice40 initiative, supported by the IRA, directs 40% of federal climate and clean energy investment benefits to historically disadvantaged communities that have long faced environmental harms and systemic underinvestment.[10] These investments span a wide range of areas: climate action, clean energy development, energy efficiency improvements, clean transit infrastructure, affordable and sustainable housing, workforce development, pollution remediation, and clean water infrastructure.[11]

Building on this framework, Justice40 and other IRA provisions reflect a structural shift in federal policymaking, ensuring that historically marginalized communities are actively included in the benefits of the global clean energy transition rather than being “left behind.”[12] The IRA accomplishes these goals through a combination of tax credits, rebates, grants, and direct support for community solar projects, energy efficiency upgrades, electric vehicles, and other mechanisms designed to facilitate equitable access to clean energy technologies.[13] The IRA embeds social equity directly into funding allocations and program design.[14] This method demonstrates an approach to energy policy that leveraging incentives and targeted investments to advance both environmental and social objectives.[15]

III. The EU Approach: NZIA
           The EU emphasizes energy as a social right and frames policy around collective obligations and social solidarity. The NZIA represents the EU’s industrial and technological strategy for achieving net-zero emissions.[16] Unlike broader EU social protections, the NZIA primarily focuses on accelerating green technology deployment and supporting industrial innovation, rather than direct social equity measures.[17]

The NZIA is part of a larger EU legal and regulatory framework that embeds energy protections in law.[18] Energy protections are illustrated by directives that ensure member states monitor energy access and support vulnerable populations, and its incentives are targeted toward technology adoption and market transformation.[19] Because the NZIA is grounded in EU law, its provisions are legally binding and enforceable, providing a framework to hold member states accountable for meeting energy standards.[20]

IV. Why the EU System Is Superior to the U.S. Approach in Enforcing Climate and Energy Commitments
           U.S. equity initiatives like Justice40 lack justiciable rights, which renders them vulnerable to administrative reversal or inconsistent compliance. In the US, many programs are currently stalled or facing funding freezes due to recent federal policy changes.[21] Whereas, the EU is advancing its net-zero objectives rapidly, embedding social protections and industrial strategy into its policy framework.

The EU’s approach to enforcing climate and energy commitments is more robust than that of the US, primarily due to its structured accountability mechanisms. Under the EU’s European Climate Law, the European Commission can initiate infringement procedures against member states for non-compliance, which may lead to cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union.[22] Similarly, the Renewable Energy Directive (Directive 2018/2001) establishes binding targets for renewable energy adoption, and the Commission has actively pursued legal action against member states failing to meet these obligations.[23] These mechanisms create a level of enforceability and accountability that the U.S. system currently lacks.

In contrast, the U.S. system, exemplified by the IRA and Justice40 Initiative, lacks explicit statutory mechanisms to hold noncompliant parties accountable for failures in enforcement. Enforcement in the US often relies on administrative discretion and general legal principles, making it more challenging for communities to hold the government accountable for non-compliance. While there have been recent court rulings that have supported certain aspects of the IRA and Justice40, these decisions do not establish a clear, enforceable framework for communities to hold the government accountable for non-compliance.[24] The absence of an explicit right of action and the limited scope of judicial interventions underscore the challenges in ensuring consistent and equitable enforcement of these initiatives. Therefore, while the EU system offers stronger accountability mechanisms, the US approach remains less certain and more susceptible to political and administrative changes.

V. Conclusion
           Together, these approaches illustrate fundamental differences in policy style and priority. Exemplified by the IRA and Justice40, the U.S. strategy relies on incentives to direct clean energy investments toward historically underserved communities, integrating social justice into environmental policy. The EU, while embedding social protections in its regulatory framework, prioritizes energy as a right and emphasizes mandates and structural supports, with the NZIA focusing on industrial and technological advancement. Understanding these differences provide insight not only into policy design but also into the underlying societal values shaping energy and climate strategies on both sides of the Atlantic. Given that energy access is essential to dignity, health, and participation in modern society, the U.S.’s lack of structured accountability mechanisms represents a critical gap in its climate and energy policy.

[1] Milan Elkerbout et al., Transatlantic Cues: How the United States and European Union Influence Each Other’s Climate Policies 1 (2024), https://www.rff.org/publications/reports/transatlantic-cues-how-the-united-states-and-european-union-influence-each-others-climate-policies/.

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4]  The White House, Justice40 Initiative: A Whole-of-Government Initiative, The White House Archives, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/environmentaljustice/justice40/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2025) [hereinafter Justice40 Initiative]; Elkerbout et al., supra note 1.

[5] Isabela Mihalache, Environmental Justice in National Strategic Frameworks 4 (2024), https://eeb.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/report-ERGOEEB-V1.pdf.

[6] Directive 2019/790, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market and Amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92; Eur. Comm’n, About the EU ETS, https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/carbon-markets/eu-emissions-trading-system-eu-ets/about-eu-ets_en (last visited Oct. 10, 2025).

[7] Lukas Althoff, Stan. Inst. For Econ. Pol’y Rsch., Policy Approaches to Addressing a History of Racial Discrimination (May 2024), https://siepr.stanford.edu/publications/policy-brief/policy-approaches-addressing-history-racial-discrimination.

[8] Eur. Comm’n, Net-Zero Industry Act: Making the EU the Home of Clean Technologies Manufacturing and Green Jobs (2023), https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/industry/sustainability/net-zero-industry-act_en.

[9] Elkerbout et al., supra note 1, at 1.

[10] Justice40 Initiative, supra note 4.

[11] The White House, Building A Clean Energy Economy: A Guidebook to the Inflation Reduction Act’s Investments in Clean Energy and Climate Actions 5 (Jan. 2023), https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/cleanenergy/inflation-reduction-act-guidebook/.

[12] Id. at 7; Justice40 Initiative, supra note 4.

[13] Justice40 Initiative, supra note 4.

[14] The White House, supra note 11.

[15] Id.

[16] Eur. Comm’n, supra note 8.

[17] Id.

[18] Tobias Buscher et al., Clean Energy for All Europeans – An Overview, Bird & Bird (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.twobirds.com/en/insights/2019/global/clean-energy-for-all-europeans—an-overview.

[19] Alessandro Fiorini & Giuli Iorio, Main Energy Poverty Measures in Europe: Characterisation from the EPOV and the EED Perspectives, ODYSSEE-MURE (Aug. 2024), https://www.odyssee-mure.eu/publications/policy-brief/energy-poverty-measures-eu-epov-eed.html.

[20] Eur. Comm’n, supra note 8.

[21] See Unleashing American Energy, Exec. Order No. 14,975, 90 Fed. Reg. 1 (Jan. 20, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/unleashing-american-energy/.

[22] Latham & Watkins LLP, EU Sustainability: State of Play – EU Climate Law and Energy Transition (Oct. 1, 2025), https://www.lw.com/en/insights/eu-sustainability-state-of-play-eu-climate-law-and-energy-transition.

[23] Eur. Comm’n, Commission Takes Action to Ensure Complete and Timely Transposition of EU Directives – Key Decisions on Energy (Jul. 24, 2025), https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-takes-action-ensure-complete-and-timely-transposition-eu-directives-key-decisions-energy-2025-07-24_en.

[24] Olivia Guarna, Court of Appeals Sets Aside Preliminary Injunction in GGRF Litigation, Climate Law Blog (Sept. 4, 2025), https://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2025/09/04/court-of-appeals-sets-aside-preliminary-injunction-in-ggrf-litigation/; Eur. Comm’n, supra note 8.

Food Fight: Can State Bans on Cultivated Meat Survive Federal Preemption?
By Anthony Corradi

            Modern industrial agriculture’s negative impacts on animal welfare, public health, and the environment are some of the rare social issues that boast broad support across political and demographic divides.[1] In a March 2023 survey, 81% of Americans reported they were concerned with the effect of Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (“CAFOs,” or “factory farms”) on public health.[2] Similarly, 79% and 76% of Americans, respectively, expressed concerns about factory farms’ consequences for animal welfare and the environment.[3] These concerns ran so deep that 74% of Americans—including 83% of those who raised animals themselves—supported a ban on new factory farms.[4] Because an estimated 99% of all US farmed land animals are currently being raised in factory farms, these numbers suggest that hundreds of millions of Americans might welcome an alternative source of meat.[5]

In theory, cultivated meat (also known as cultured meat, clean meat, and cell-based meat)[6] seems uniquely capable of serving this nascent market. Unlike current imitation products like those from Beyond Meat or Impossible Foods, cultivated meat is identical to conventional meat at the cellular level.[7] Though conceptualized as long ago as the 1800’s, the recent discovery and isolation of stem cells first made cultivated meat possible.[8] Producing cultivated meat requires multiplying stem cells from a living animal in-vitro, differentiating those stem cells into either muscle or fat cells, then using tissue engineering techniques to assemble the muscle and fat cells into a tissue closely resembling conventional meat.[9] Though technological barriers remain before cultivated meat is competitive with the cost of conventional meat, significant public and private investments have substantially lowered prices thus far.[10]

In 2019, Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) formalized the current regulatory structure governing most cultivated meat production. FDA regulates the cell development stage; then authority passes to FSIS beginning with the food processing stage.[11] Two companies, GOOD Meat and UPSIDE Foods, were the first to receive both a premarket consultation clearance from FDA and a grant of inspection from FSIS.[12] Following this approval, both companies brought their products to the market—albeit in a very limited capacity—in July 2023.[13]

Despite federal regulatory approval and potential to mimic conventional meat without the need for deeply unpopular factory farming, cultivated meat has since faced a new hurdle: statewide bans. Currently, five states (Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, Montana, and Nebraska) have passed permanent bans on cultivated meat, while two more (Texas and Indiana) enacted two-year bans.[14] The specific conduct barred by these laws varies slightly, but, generally, they prohibit some combination of manufacturing, importing, distributing, or selling any cultivated meat product within the state.[15]

A promising legal challenge to cultivated meat bans stems from the federal preemption doctrine. Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution states that “the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” Express preemption is the most straightforward conflict between state and federal law, occurring when Congress expressly declares its intent to preempt state law.[16] With respect to cultured poultry, FSIS states that cell-cultured poultry food products are poultry food products as defined in 9 C.F.R. 381.1(b) (the Poultry Products Inspection Regulations), and “are, therefore, subject to the same statutory requirements, regulations, and FSIS oversight authority as . . . poultry food products derived from slaughter.[17] The Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) expressly preempts state law by proclaiming that no state may impose requirements with respect to “premises, facilities, operations . . . or ingredients . . .  in addition to, or different than, those made under this chapter.”[18] Thus, in an express preemption challenge, the question courts will have to answer is whether these state bans are imposing additional or different requirements on “premises, facilities, operations, . . . or ingredients.” For example, Florida’s law bans any “meat or food product produced from cultured animal cells.”[19] But since FSIS and the PPIA treat cultivated poultry and conventional poultry equivalently, Florida’s law—by distinguishing between methods of production—is arguably an impermissible regulation on poultry operations or ingredients. Although state bans vary and each will require a slightly different analysis, express preemption challenges seem broadly promising.

Alternatively, the Supreme Court has also recognized implied preemption, where congressional intent to preempt state law is implicit in a law’s structure and purpose. Implied preemption can take multiple forms, but, of relevance here, “obstacle preemption” arises when a state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”[20] As to the PPIA’s purpose, Congress declared that consolidating the nationwide regulation of poultry products under the Secretary of Agriculture was appropriate “to prevent and eliminate burdens upon [interstate] commerce, to effectively regulate such commerce, and to protect the health and welfare of consumers.”[21] By banning a product that federal regulations treat as indistinguishable from a non-banned product, these state laws directly frustrate Congress’s stated objectives of effectively regulating and reducing the burden on interstate commerce.

To be sure, cultivated meat is not a guaranteed success even without these bans. The technology might prove too difficult to scale. The cost may never be competitive with conventional meat. Consumers may reject it despite widespread concerns with factory farming. But courts should not allow states to protect their entrenched industries or score political points by removing a federally regulated product’s access to the national market.

[1] 2023 Industrial Animal Agriculture Opinion Survey, Am. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 2–4 (2024), https://www.aspca.org/sites/default/files/2023_industrial_ag_survey_results_report_052523_1.pdf.

[2] Id. at 2.

[3] Id.

[4] Id. at 3.

[5] Jacy Reese Anthis, US Factory Farming Estimates, Sentience Inst., https://www.sentienceinstitute.org/us-factory-farming-estimates (last updated Nov. 2, 2024).

[6] Mark J. Post et al., The Status of Cultured Meat and Scientific Challenges, New Harvest OpenCellAg Repository, 5 (2020), https://zenodo.org/records/7682919/files/Post_2020Challenges_Postprint.pdf.

[7] Id. at 3.

[8] Id.

[9] Id. at 3–4.

[10] Lisa S. Benson & Joel L. Greene, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R47697, Cell-Cultivated Meat: An Overview 1, 4–6 (2023).

[11] Id. at 8–10.

[12] Id. at 10–11.

[13] Id. at 11.

[14] Madyson Fitzgerald, Texas Becomes Seventh State to Ban Lab-Grown Meat, Stateline (June 30, 2025), https://stateline.org/2025/06/30/texas-becomes-seventh-state-to-ban-lab-grown-meat/.

[15] Compare Fla. Stat. § 500.452 (2024) (banning the manufacturing, sale, offering for sale, or distributing of cultivated meat), with Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 431.02105 (West 2025) (prohibiting the offering for sale or sale of cultivated meat).

[16] Bryan L. Adkins et al., Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45825, Federal Preemption: A Legal Primer 2 (2023).

[17] U.S. Dep’t of Agric., FSIS Directive 7800.1, FSIS Responsibilities in Establishments Producing Cell-Cultured Meat & Poultry Food Products 2 (June 21, 2023).

[18] 21 U.S.C. § 467e (2018); see also Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 602 (2018) (declaring the same purposes for federal regulatory control over non-poultry meat).

[19] Fla. Stat. §§ 500.03, 500.452 (2024).

[20] Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).

[21] 21 U.S.C. § 451 (2018).

Slithering Toward Trouble: A Call for Regulatory Action for Florida’s Snake Plants
By Katherine Cantor

            Florida faces an ongoing battle against invasive species. Although there are some state, county, and city-level regulations designed to curb their spread, the current law is insufficient. One aggressive invader, snake plant, continues to slip through the regulatory cracks. Despite their rapid growth and resilience, snake plants remain largely unregulated. To effectively protect Florida’s native ecosystems, action is needed: cities, counties, and the state must strengthen regulations to address invasive species like snake plants before they become even more unmanageable.

What are Snake Plants?
            Snake plants, primarily the species Sansevieria trifasciata and Sansevieria hyacinthoides, are invasive plants in Florida. Snake plants fit Florida’s definition of invasive plants as “a naturalized plant that disrupts naturally occurring native plant communities.”[1] Invasive species are harmful to native species and the ecosystem.[2] Sansevieria trifasciata is recognized as an invasive species in Florida by many entities, but not by the laws.[3]

Snake plant was first introduced to Florida for its fiber.[4] Quickly, however, the use of snake plant turned ornamental, because “Sansevieria is a very attractive and durable foliage plant.”[5] Today, it would be difficult to visit South Florida without seeing some, either in pots, as landscaping, or very often, completing taking over other foliage. Snake plant grows via underground rhizomes—horizontal roots—that make removal very difficult: “[t]he rhizomes are fragile and break easily when pulled by the leaves.  Resprouting is likely if any part of the plant remains . . . .”[6] Unfortunately, snake plant is also very well suited to the climate of South Florida.[7] Thus, it grows easily, spreads easily, outcompetes, smothers, and literally chokes native plants, and is extremely difficult to control or remove.[8]

Florida’s Invasive Species Laws
            Snake plants are harmful to Florida’s environment, but Florida’s current regulations are inadequate. Florida law prohibits anyone from “sell[ing], transport[ing], collect[ing], cultivate[ing], or possess[ing] any plant, including any part or seed, of the species Melaleuca quinquenervia, Schinus terebinthifolius, Casuarina equisetifolia, Casuarina glauca, or Mimosa pigra without a permit . . . .”[9] This is a strong statute, and the listed plants certainly are highly invasive: Melaleuca was used to drain the Everglades and is incredibly hard to remove;[10] Schinis, Brazilian pepper, grows like wildfire and has infested “over 700,000 acres” in Florida;[11] Casuarina equisetifolia, Brazilian pine, makes the soil around it unlivable for other plants;[12] Casuarina glauca—similarly to snake plant—spreads quickly, outcompetes natives, and is incredibly difficult to remove;[13] and lastly Mimosa pigra reproduces and spreads quickly in wetlands, completely choking waterways.[14] All of these plants deserve to be regulated, but this short list begs the question: why not more, and especially given the similarities, why not snake plant?

Florida’s broader statutes on harmful plants also fail to adequately address the threat posed by snake plants. Florida statute prohibits the cultivation of non-native plants “in plantings greater in size than 2 contiguous acres.”[15] Because snake plants are non-native, they would likely be covered under this statute, but unfortunately this allows for two acres of snake plant to be planted, which is effectively just as detrimental as no regulation.

Additionally, Florida prohibits knowingly selling or distributing noxious weeds,[16] but, Florida’s noxious weed list includes no species of snake plant.[17] Another statute aims at protecting waterways by prohibiting planting or maintaining any species listed as Category I or II in the Florida Exotic Pest Plant Council’s Invasive Plant List “within 300 feet of springs or spring runs.”[18] This list and statute, includes one species of snake plant, Sansevieria hyacinthoides, as it is listed as a category II invasive.[19] While it is ecologically beneficial to prohibit the planting of one species of snake plant within 300 feet of a spring, unfortunately that allows planting of the same species, and others, elsewhere. Currently, the University of Florida, which the Florida legislature may, by statute, rely on for recommendations[20] lists hyacinthoides as invasive, but lists trifasciata—an incredibly similar snake plant—as a high invasion risk.[21] Yet, trifasciata has wild populations in nine counties in Florida, and hyacinthoides in twenty:[22] they are both widespread and harmful, and both have the ability to outcompete native plants that makes them so dangerous. Minimally regulating one species, and not at all regulating the other, is not a viable solution.

County-level Regulations
            Because invasives vary by county, so do the regulations. While the North Miami Development Services Department lists snake plant as an invasive species, the official list of prohibited plant species in Miami Dade County does not list any species of snake plant.[23] The species on that list “may not be sold, propagated or planted anywhere in Miami-Dade County” and must be removed before development.[24] However, both trifasciata and hyacinthoides are listed as a controlled plant in the Miami-Dade County Landscape Manual, and thus cannot be planted “within 500 feet of native plant communities.”[25] Thus, snake plants are partially regulated in Miami. It is unclear what would constitute as a “native plant community,” but if planting snake plants were prohibited within 500 feet of native plants in general, that would be a near-complete ban on snake plants. Unfortunately, Miami Dade County qualifies the definition of a controlled species as one that “if located and cultivated properly may be useful or functional as elements of landscape design.”[26] As previously stated, snake plant is frequently used in landscaping and uses the opportunity to spread quickly. Given the definition, it is unlikely Miami Dade County would interpret the regulation of controlled species to be a ban on snake plants.

Like Miami Dade County, the keys in Monroe County have their own regulation on invasive species. The county requires the development of its own list of invasive plants.[27] Monroe County defines invasive plants as “any plant species on the most recent Florida Exotic Pest Plant Council’s list of category I or II invasive exotic plant species and/or the Florida Keys Invasive Exotics Task Force lists of invasive exotic plant species, as determined and interpreted by the County Biologist.”[28] The Keys Task Force list includes Sansevieria hyacinthoides, the only species of snake plant that is invasive in the keys.[29] Thus, ordinances at lower levels can build on and tailor state-level regulations to the specific localities invasives.

A Call For Regulation
            While different areas and different levels of governance regulate invasive species differently, a more comprehensive regulatory scheme is needed for all invasive species. County or city-level ordinances, like Miami-Dade’s and Monroe’s, must be imposed, and must cover all invasive species in the area. In the nine counties where trifasciata has wild populations and in the twenty where hyacinthoides does, regulations should prohibit the “sell[ing], transport[ing], collect[ing], cultivate[ing], or possess[ing] any” species of snake plant in the county.[30] Snake plants have a thriving market as a house plant, but when the risk of invasion is so high, counties would be better off prohibiting them entirely rather than spending precious resourses on their removal down the line. At the very least, county-level ordinances should prohibit the purposeful planting of any species of snake plant outside.

The City of Punta Gorda is a great example of what these codes could look like, as they state: “Any tree or plant on the current Florida Invasive Species Council Invasive Plant List as amended, are prohibited and shall be removed from any site prior to new development. In addition, all species of eucalyptus and ficus trees are prohibited to be sold or planted.”[31]  Any county or city affected by the invasion of snake plant could implement a similar provision, relying on the Florida Invasive Species Council Invasive Plant List, like Monroe County does, but additionally prohibiting the selling or planting of all species of snake plant.

To protect Florida’s beautiful and delicate ecosystems, implementing regulations that target all invasive species, including snake plant, is necessary, before the damage deepens beyond repair.

[1] Fla. Stat. § 581.011(15).

[2] See, e.g.,  Slowing the Spread of Invasive Species, The Nature Conservancy, https://www.nature.org/en-us/about-us/where-we-work/united-states/florida/stories-in-florida/combating-invasive-species-in-florida/ (last updated Sept. 30, 2022) (“The threat posed by invasive species is second only to habitat destruction through development.”).

[3] Nat’l Park Serv. & Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, Florida Invaders 7, https://www.rexano.org/Pythons/2008-Florida-Invaders.pdf (listing snake plant as an invasive species in Florida); Karen Pariser, Master Gardener Volunteers on… sansevieria: invasive, nuisance, or reliable addition to the garden?, Univ. of Fla. IFAS (July 30, 2021), https://blogs.ifas.ufl.edu/sarasotaco/2021/07/30/master-gardener-volunteers-on-sansevieria/ (“According to the latest UF/IFAS north-central-south Florida zone assessment, this group of plants presently is considered a high invasion risk, and is predicted to be invasive and not recommended by IFAS.”).

[4] Pariser, supra note 3; Richard Henley, Sansevieria in Florida-Past and Present, 95 Proc. Fla. State Hort. Soc. 295, 295 (1982).

[5] Henley, supra note 4, at 296.

[6] Mother-In-Law’s Tongue, City of Sanibel Vegetation Committee, https://mysanibel.com/DocumentCenter/View/534/Article-15-Mother-In-Laws-Tongue (“Any part of the plant—including leaves, seeds, or underground tubers—can regenerate new growth.”); Clarissa Chairez, Florida’s Hidden Invaders: Invasive Houseplants, Univ. of Fla. IFAS (Aug. 11, 2025), https://blogs.ifas.ufl.edu/orangeco/2025/08/11/floridas-hidden-invaders-2/.

[7] Invasive Species Awareness Week: Mother-in-law’s tongue, City of Sanibel (Mar. 18, 2025), https://www.captivasanibel.com/news/2025/03/invasive-species-awareness-week-mother-in-laws-tongue/ (describing that snake plants happily tolerate wet, dry, and disturbed terrain).

[8] Invasive Species, N. Miami Fla. Dev. Servs. Dep’t, https://www.northmiamifl.gov/1523/Invasive-Species (last visited Oct. 3, 2025).

[9] Fla. Stat. § 369.251(1) (2008).

[10] Melaleuca quinquenervia, Univ. of Fla. Ctr. for Aquatic & Invasive Plants, https://plant-directory.ifas.ufl.edu/plant-directory/melaleuca-quinquenervia/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2025).

[11] Schinus terebinthifolia, Univ. of Fla. Ctr. for Aquatic & Invasive Plants, https://plant-directory.ifas.ufl.edu/plant-directory/schinus-terebinthifolia/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2025).

[12] Casuarina equisetifolia, Glob. Invasive Species Database (Jan. 23, 2010), https://www.iucngisd.org/gisd/species.php?sc=365.

[13] Casuarina glauca, Univ. of S. Fla. Plant Atlas Fla. Invasive Plants, https://plantatlas.usf.edu/flip/plant.aspx?id=66 (last visited Oct. 3, 2025).

[14] Mimosa pigra, Univ. of Fla. Ctr. for Aquatic & Invasive Plants, https://plant-directory.ifas.ufl.edu/plant-directory/mimosa-pigra/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2025).

[15] Fla. Stat. § 581.083(4).

[16] Fla. Stat. § 581.091(1).

[17] Fla. Admin. Code 5B-57.007 (2020).

[18] Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 18-21.004(6)(b) (2025).

[19] FISC List of Invasive Plant Species, Fla. Invasive Species Council, https://www.floridainvasives.org/plant-list/2023-invasive-plant-species/ (last updated June 2025).

[20] Fla. Stat. § 581.083(4).

[21] Assessment of Non-Native Plants in Florida’s Natural Areas: Sansevieria trifasciata, Univ. of Fla. Ctr. for Aquatic & Invasive Plants, https://assessment.ifas.ufl.edu/assessments/sansevieria-trifasciata/ (last updated Aug. 8, 2022); Assessment of Non-Native Plants in Florida’s Natural Areas: Dracaena hyacinthoides, Univ. of Fla. Ctr. for Aquatic & Invasive Plants, https://assessment.ifas.ufl.edu/assessments/dracaena-hyacinthoides/ (last updated June 26, 2025) (note that the genus was changed from Dracaena and is now Sansevieria).

[22] Richard Wunderlin et. al., Dracaena trifasciata, Univ. of S. Fla. Atlas of Fla. Plants (2025), https://florida.plantatlas.usf.edu/plant/species/4330; Richard Wunderlin et. al. Dracaena hyacinthoides, Univ. of S. Fla. Atlas of Fla. Plants (2025), https://florida.plantatlas.usf.edu/plant/species/148.

[23] Miami-Dade Cnty., Fla., Code ch. 24, art. IV., div. 2, § 24-49.9(1) (2018).

[24] Id.

[25] Id.; Miami-Dade Cnty., Miami-Dade County Controlled Plant Species, www.miamidade.gov/environment/library/guidelines/controlled-species.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2025).

[26] Miami-Dade Cnty., Fla., Code ch. 18a, § 18A-3 (2025).

[27] Monroe Cnty., Fla., Ordinance No. 013-2022, Policy 209.1.1 (2022).

[28] Monroe Ctny., Fla., Code § 101-1 (2025).

[29] Fla. Keys Invasive Exotics Task Force, List of Invasive Plants of the Florida Keys, 1 (2019) https://bugwoodcloud.org/CDN/floridainvasives/Keys/FKIETF_List_2019_list_final.pdf; Wunderlin et. al., supra note 22.

[30] Modelled off of Fla. Stat. § 369.251(1).

[31] Invasive Species, City of Punta Gorda (2025), https://www.ci.punta-gorda.fl.us/residents/landscape/invasive-species (last visited Oct. 3, 2025).

 


Stewarding the Land: Why the Aquinnah Wampanoag Tribe Should Retain Their Sovereign Immunity
By Maddy Foley

In a 2004 Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decision, Building Inspector and Zoning Officer of Aquinnah v. Wampanoag Aquinnah Shellfish Hatchery Corp., the Court concluded that a Wampanoag shellfish hatchery was subject to the zoning laws of the Town of Aquinnah (formerly known as Gay Head, hereinafter “the Town”).[1] The Aquinnah Wampanoag Tribe (“the Tribe”) wanted to build a shed and a pier platform for the hatchery on tribal lands.[2] The Court, however, found that the Wampanoag Tribe waived its sovereign immunity when it entered into a settlement agreement[3] with the town (referred to in the agreement as “Gay Head”).[4] The settlement agreement permitted the Building Inspector to oversee the Tribe’s land use.[5] This post will examine the settlement agreement from a purposivist prospective and answer the question of why the Tribe waived their sovereign immunity.

The Tribe does not have sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity prevents litigants from suing a government  for their harmful conduct.[6] Like the federal and state governments, tribes also have sovereign immunity.[7] But tribes can waive their sovereign immunity.[8] Tribes may waive sovereign immunity  to enter into agreements like large construction contracts.[9] This can subject tribes to lawsuits. Unfortunately, one lawsuit could potentially significantly impair the tribal government due to waived sovereign immunity.[10] In contrast, waiving sovereign immunity can open up a tribe to business opportunities to support their economy.[11] Here, the Tribe waived their sovereign immunity so that it may acquire their tribal land.[12]

Tribal autonomy over lands is important, not only to preserve Indigenous cultures and traditions, but to protect the land and biodiversity.[13] Indigenous communities often  act as stewards to the land which can mitigate the impacts of climate change.[14] In fact, Indigenous peoples protect 85 percent of the Earth’s biodiversity.[15] In Building Inspector, the Tribe built improvements for their shellfish hatchery, practicing land stewardship in the process.[16] The Tribe should have more power over what they can do with their land especially when it involves something as important as protecting the land’s biodiversity.

The Settlement Agreement in question involves agreements with the State and local government.[17] The U.S. Constitution, however, delegates the federal government the power to manage affairs with tribes in the Commerce Clause.[18] Further, tribal land can either be trust land where the land is held in trust by the federal government, or fee land, where the Tribe, or a Tribal member purchases the land.[19] The Aquinnah Wampanoag Tribal land is held in trust, as are most Native American lands. Yet, the Tribe’s situation is unique because it is also tied to the restrictive Settlement Agreement with the Town and the State.

Initially, individual tribal members owned the land subject to the agreement, but then the State took the land.[20] The area known as the “common lands” were held in common by all tribal members by tradition and their culture.[21] Then in 1870, the General Court of Massachusetts took the Tribe’s land and claimed it as the Town of Aquinnah.[22] The stolen land was then divided into lot and deeded to tribal members.[23] The common lands were kept as part of the Town. Next, the Tribe incorporated as a Massachusetts nonprofit in 1972.[24]

The Tribe needed to file suit to get their land back. In 1974, the Tribe sued the Town for the Common lands.[25] The Tribe alleged that some transfers of land within the Town violated the Indian Non intercourse Act because the Tribe had claimed title to them.[26] The Tribe, however, did not have federal tribal status at the time.[27] In 1976, the Town’s citizens urged their selectmen to negotiate a settlement with the Tribe to transfer the Common Lands back to the Tribe.[28] Then, the selectmen approved to transfer the Common Lands to the tribe.[29] A week later, the Gay Head Taxpayers Association argued that the selectmen did not represent their interest and filed papers with a federal judge.[30] The association thus became a negotiating party in the settlement agreement.[31]

The Tribe and the Town took several years to reach an agreement. In 1981, the Tribe petitioned the Bureau of Indian Affairs for tribal recognition.[32] Finally in 1983, the Bureau placed the Tribe’s land request in active consideration. But then the Tribe, the Town, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and the Aquinnah/Gay Head Community Association, Inc. all entered into a “Joint Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Settlement of the Gay Head, Massachusetts Indian Land Claims,” which is the Settlement Agreement.[33] The Tribe agreed to the settlement for the purpose of acquiring 238 acres of land in Aquinnah.[34] The joint memorandum stated that federal funds will maintain the common lands, the Cook property, the former Strock Estate, and the Menemsha Neck Lands.[35]

The Settlement Agreement established many predatory terms between the Tribe, the Town, and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The agreement extinguished all the Tribe’s “aboriginal” land claims in exchange for funding to acquire the lands in dispute for the Tribe.[36] The Tribe also agreed to create a state-charted corporation, the Tribal Land Corporation, which would be subject to the Settlement Agreement.[37] The Agreement states “[a]ny structure placed on this property shall be subject to all Federal, State and local laws, including Town zoning laws, State and Federal conservation laws, and the regulations of the Martha’s Vineyard Commission. . . .”[38] Additionally, the Land Use Plan in the Agreement was a part of the Town’s zoning laws. The Plan enabled the Tribe to approve of future amendments to the zoning laws.[39] Further, the Building Inspector regulates the Land Use Plan as applied to the Cook Lands.[40] The Building Inspector specifically prohibited the Tribe from building structures within 200 feet of wetlands, bodies of water, beaches, dunes, and certain bluffs. In essence, the Plan prohibited the Tribe from building any structures within  the Cook Lands.[41]

Further, Massachusetts required  payments in lieu of taxes when the Tribe built structures  or  made improvements to the land.[42] If the payments are not made, the Town or anyone with the proper authority may not foreclose on the lands but instead enforce a lien against the Tribes assets.[43] If the Tribe does not pay the liens in 5 years, the Town may seize the land, but it would not affect the Tribe’s title to the land.[44]

Moreover, the Agreement limited the Tribe’s delegation of power to decide its own hunting regulations. The Tribe could not regulate  firearms or crossbow.[45] The Tribe may not establish its own trapping or fishing regulations.[46] Also, any regulations made by the Tribe are subject to Judicial review “for reasonableness.”[47] Additionally, the Agreement did not establish federal recognition for the tribe.[48] These terms purposefully limit the Tribe’s autonomy on the land they acquired through the Agreement.

The Settlement Agreement significantly impacts the Tribe’s autonomy. The Tribe finally gained Federal recognition in 1987.[49] The State placed the lands in trust with the U.S. under the Federal Implementing Act.[50] The federal government, however, allowed the Settlement Agreement to still stand between the Tribe and the Town.[51] Thus, claims against the Tribe, like the one in Building Inspector, were permissible. The Tribe does not have complete power over their lands due to the zoning laws. In contrast, the Tribe in Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources v. Tiber and Wood Products Located in Sawyer County retained their sovereign immunity and prevented an entity from taking natural resources from the Tribe’s land.[52] The federal government should allow the Aquinnah Wampanoag Tribe to retain their sovereign immunity.

The purpose of the Tribe entering into the Agreement was to acquire their tribal lands. The Agreement was an essential step in securing the lands for the Tribe. The Town’s objective, however, was to control the use of the land, among other things. The Town should not have major power over what the Tribe does with their land considering most of the tribal land is undeveloped conservation lands.[53] Tribes can benefit from waiving sovereign immunity in some instances, for example, to facilitate  economic growth. The Aquinnah Wampanoag Tribe should be allowed to decide what is the best use for their land.

[1] Bldg Inspector and Zoning Officer Aquinnah v. Wampanoag Aquinnah Shellfish Hatchery Corp., 818 N.E.2d 1040, 1042 (2004).

[2] Id.

[3] Wampanoag Tribal Council of Gay Head, Inc., Joint Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Settlement of the Gay Head, Massachusetts Indian Land Claims (Sept. 28, 1983), https://www.decoulos.com/legislative/1983_Settlement_Agreement.pdf.

[4] Id.

[5] Id. at 1044.

[6] Padraic I. McCoy, Sovereign Immunity and Tribal Commercial Activity: A Legal Summary and Policy Check, The Federal Lawyer, Mar.–Apr. 2010, at 41, 42.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Id. at 44.

[11] Id.

[12] Joint Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Settlement of the Gay Head, Massachusetts Indian Land Claims at 3, Wampanoag Tribal Council of Gay Head, Inc. v. Town of Gay Head (Aquinnah) 853 F.3d 618 (2017) (No. 74-5826-G).

[13] Stewarding Native Lands, First Nations Development Institute, https://www.firstnations.org/our-programs/stewarding-native-lands/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2025).

[14] Land Back: How Two Tribes are Re-Acquiring and Leveraging Community Forests, First Nations Development Institute, https://www.firstnations.org/stories/land-back-how-two-tribes-are-re-acquiring-and-leveraging-community-forests/ (last visited Sept 16, 2025).

[15] Id.

[16] Bldg Inspector and Zoning Officer Aquinnah v. Wampanoag Aquinnah Shellfish Hatchery Corp., 818 N.E.2d 1040, 1042 (2004).

[17] Wampanoag Tribal Council of Gay Head, Inc., Joint Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Settlement of the Gay Head, Massachusetts Indian Land Claims (Sept. 28, 1983), https://www.decoulos.com/legislative/1983_Settlement_Agreement.pdf.

[18] U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

[19] Office of Natural Resources Revenue, Native American Ownership and Governance of Natural Resources, U.S. Dep’t Interior, https://revenuedata.doi.gov/how-revenue-works/native-american-ownership-governance/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2025).

[20] W. C. Platt, Historic Transfer of Indian Lands Signed, Vinyard Gazette (July 21, 1989) https://vineyardgazette.com/news/1989/07/21/historic-transfer-indian-lands-signed.

[21] Id.

[22] Id.

[23] Id.

[24] Building Inspector, 818 N.E.2d at 1042.

[25] See Joint Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Settlement of the Gay Head, Massachusetts Indian Land Claims, Wampanoag Tribal Council of Gay Head, Inc. v. Town of Gay Head (Aquinnah) 853 F.3d 618 (2017) (No. 74-5826-G).

[26] Building Inspector, 818 N.E.2d at 1042.

[27] W. C. Platt, Historic Transfer of Indian Lands Signed, Vinyard Gazette (July 21, 1989) https://vineyardgazette.com/news/1989/07/21/historic-transfer-indian-lands-signed.

[28] Id.

[29] Id.

[30] Id.

[31] Id.

[32] Id.

[33] Id.; Building Inspector, 818 N.E.2d at 1043.

[34]Joint Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Settlement of the Gay Head, Massachusetts Indian Land Claims at 2–3, Wampanoag Tribal Council of Gay Head, Inc. v. Town of Gay Head (Aquinnah) 853 F.3d 618 (2017) (No. 74-5826-G).

[35] Joint Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Settlement of the Gay Head, Massachusetts Indian Land Claims at 5, Wampanoag Tribal Council of Gay Head, Inc. v. Town of Gay Head (Aquinnah) 853 F.3d 618 (2017) (No. 74-5826-G).

[36] Building Inspector, 818 N.E.2d at 1043.

[37] Id.

[38] Id.

[39] Id. at 1044.

[40] Id. at 1045.

[41] Id. at 1044.

[42] Joint Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Settlement of the Gay Head, Massachusetts Indian Land Claims at 9, Wampanoag Tribal Council of Gay Head, Inc. v. Town of Gay Head (Aquinnah) 853 F.3d 618 (2017) (No. 74-5826-G).

[43] Id.

[44] Id.

[45] Id.

[46] Id. at 10.

[47] Id.

[48] Id.

[49] Bldg. Inspector, 818 N.E.2d at 1045.

[50] Id.

[51] Id.

[52] See Wisconsin Department of National Resources v. Timber & Wood Prod., 379 Wis.2d 690, 721 (2017).

[53] Tribal Lands, Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah), https://wampanoagtribe-nsn.gov/lands (last visited on Sept. 16, 2025).

Right to Farm or Right to Monopolize? How Litigation Shields Accelerate Agricultural Consolidation and Environmental Degradation

By Grace Cunningham

            For decades, pharmaceutical and biotechnology company Bayer (formerly Monsanto) has insisted that its Roundup herbicide was safe to control weeds, despite one of its active ingredients being linked to cancer and shown to be carcinogenic to humans.[1]Across the country, veterans exposed to cancer-causing chemicals in contaminated water at Camp Lejeune are just now beginning to seek justice.[2] And in hospital neonatal intensive care units (NICUs), Abbot Laboratories, a global healthcare company,  pushed baby formula out to the most vulnerable population despite its links to necrotizing enterocolitis––a serious and often fatal disease.[3]

These high-profile cases demonstrate that when corporate interests endanger public health and the environment, the legal system is often the only path to accountability and justice. But what happens when that path is blocked? For rural communities, Right-to-Farm laws (RTFLs) are doing just that. These laws have shielded corporate-owned mega-farms from lawsuits and have allowed agriculture consolidation to accelerate, leaving rural communities and traditional farms to bear the environmental, health, and economic costs.[4]

Developed in the 1970s and 1980s, RTFLs were the response to a sprawling suburbia encroaching on farmland.[5] As residential development expanded into agricultural areas, long-established farms increasingly faced nuisance lawsuits – claims that ordinary farming activity unreasonably interfered with neighboring properties. RTFLs were designed to limit these suits and protect farmers from liability while adhering to standard agricultural practices.[6]

Overtime, lobbying efforts from large agribusiness have expanded the scope of Right-to-farm laws to coincide with the market consolidation and growth of industrial agriculture.[7] State legislators expanded what “normal” practice means to cover these industrial-scale activities.[8] Legislators also redefined phrases such as “significant change” to exclude the expansion of size or the conversion of a small farm into a Concentrated Animal Feed Operation (CAFO).[9] These Right-to-Farm laws were deliberately re-drawn to fit the new wave of industrialized agriculture, all while excluding traditional farms.[10]

The effect of these changes has been profound. As consolidation increased, a small handful of corporations now control the vast majority of livestock markets, leaving independent farmers with little to no bargaining power.[11] Communities near these factory farms face declining property values due to odor, water contamination, and public health risks tied to poor air quality.[12] While RTFLs were meant to help rural communities, they now are used to block rural residents from accessing justice.

Many state RTFL protections require agriculture operations to be of a commercial scale or meet acreage requirements.[13] Notably, there are currently no RTFLs that are specifically focused on protecting traditional and family farmers. In 1982, Minnesota was the only state to define “family farm,” then subsequently struck down this provision.[14]

Going back to the original intent of these RTFLs, to protect farmers and farmland from urban takeover, it is clear that the laws were designed with good intentions.[15] However, over time, these laws have been exploited to serve the interests of factory farms and have accelerated the path to consolidation of the agricultural industry. Consequently, this has left traditional farms and rural communities vulnerable to the unregulated factories put up next door.[16]

Closing loopholes that have allowed factory farms to escape litigation is necessary to hold industrial agriculture accountable to the communities that they pollute. At the same time, RTFLs should continue to protect independent family farmers while preserving the original purpose of these laws. This would allow traditional farmers to have a better chance at competing in the marketplace and could revitalize rural economies.

The benefits extend far beyond economics. Protecting traditional farms while limiting the expansion of industrial-scale factories would have significant environmental benefits. Factory farms are notorious for their contribution to local pollution and worldwide greenhouse gas emissions.[17] By protecting traditional farmers, who are far better stewards of the land, we can reduce the environmental harms of modern-day agriculture.

Just as lawsuits against Bayer, the federal government, and Abbott have been critical in exposing the hidden costs of unsafe practices and products, litigation remains an essential tool for holding corporations accountable. When RTFLs are manipulated to block access to the courts, rural communities lose the same chance at justice that cancer patients, veterans, and families in NICUs have fought to secure. By restoring RTFLs to their original purpose of protecting traditional farmers, we can use the legal system to work as a safeguard for public health, the environment, and the future of farming.

[1] ConsumerSafety, Roundup Cancer Lawsuit: 2020 Updates & Settlements (last updated Sept. 23, 2024), https://www.consumersafety.org/product-lawsuits/roundup/.

[2] U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Camp Lejeune Water Contamination Health Issues (last updated July 28, 2025), https://www.va.gov/disability/eligibility/hazardous-materials-exposure/camp-lejeune-water-contamination/.

[3] International Baby Food Action Network, Abbott Must Pay $495M in Infant Formula Trial for Hiding Risks (Aug. 12, 2024), https://www.ibfan.org/abbott-must-pay-495m-in-infant-formula-trial-for-hiding-risks/.

[4] Loka Ashwood et al., How “Right-to-Farm” Laws Hurt Farmers, Disenfranchise Voters, and Empower Corporations, Barn Raising Media (Jan. 22, 2024), https://barnraisingmedia.com/right-to-farm-laws-hurt-farmers-disenfranchise-voters-empower-corporations/.

[5] Terence J. Centner, Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When Do Right-To-Farm Laws Go Too Far? 33 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 87, 88 (2006).

[6] Id.

[7] Id. at 90.

[8] Danielle Diamond et al., Agricultural Exceptionalism, Environmental Injustice, and U.S. Right-to-Farm Laws, 52 Env’t. L. Rep. 10727 (2022).

[9] Ashwood et al., How “Right-to-Farm” Laws Hurt Farmers, Barn Raising Media (Jan. 22, 2024).

[10] Neil D. Hamilton, Right-to-Farm Laws Reconsidered: Ten Reasons Why Legislative Efforts to Resolve Agricultural Nuisances May Be Ineffective, 3 Drake J. Agri. L. 103, 112 (1998).

[11] Mary Hendrickson, et al., The Food System: Concentration and Its Impacts 1 (2020) https://farmaction.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Hendrickson-et-al.-2020.-Concentration-and-Its-Impacts-FINAL.pdf.

[12] Id. at 18.

[13] See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Tit. 7, §152(5) (2025); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 2-4402 (2024); Tenn. Code Ann. § 43-26-102.

[14] Ashwood et al., supra note 9.

[15] Centner, supra note 5, at 88,

[16] Don E. Albrecht, The Industrial Transformation of Farm Communities: Implications for Family Structure and Socioeconomic Conditions, 63 Rural Sociology 51 (1998).

[17] Karuppan Sakadevan & Minh Long Nguyen, Livestock Production and Its Impact on Nutrient Pollution and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 141 Sci.s in Agronomy 147, 155 (2017).

Community Land Trusts as a Tool for Land Reparations

By: Jill Reynolds

            Whiteness is embedded in property law. From the groundbreaking law review article, Whiteness as Property, “American law has recognized a property interest in whiteness that, although unacknowledged, now forms the background against which legal disputes are framed, argued, and adjudicated.”[1] As a result of this bias, Black communities have been systemically prevented from acquiring or maintaining land and thus, generational wealth.

Agricultural land is no different. In fact, farmland rests overwhelmingly in white hands. In 1920, Black farmers made up 14% of all producers.[2] Today, Black farmers make up 1.4% of the 3.4 million producers in the country.[3] This is nearly a ninety percent loss.[4] Numerous factors led to Black farmland loss, including institutional discrimination. Much of the institutional discrimination took the form of discriminatory lending. Pigford v. Glickman is the seminal class action lawsuit brought by Black farmers against the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) for decades of discriminatory lending practices.[5]

In Pigford, Black farmers brought claims of discriminatory loan practices by the Farmer Service Agency (FSA)––formerly known as the Farmers Home Administration (FHA), the branch of the USDA responsible for administering loans to American farmers. First, USDA “willfully discriminated against them and other similarly situated [Black] farmers on the basis of their race when it denied their applications for credit and/or benefit programs or delayed processing their applications.”[6] Second, when farmers “filed complaints of discrimination… the USDA failed properly to investigate and resolve these complaints.”[7] Pigford resulted in a $1 billion settlement.[8] While historic, this remedy only scratched the surface of addressing harms. Foremost, the payout went only to producers discriminated against between 1982 through 1996.[9] For some, it was already too late.

New Communities Incorporated (New Communities), a Black owned and founded community land trust (CLT), failed due to these discriminatory practices. CLTs are an alternative land access model that prioritizes community ownership and takes land out of the speculative market. A CLT is a nonprofit entity that holds title to land to serve community-oriented interests.[10] Primarily, they exist to serve as long-term, affordable solutions for buying homes and leasing low-cost agricultural land.[11]

The first CLT, New Communities, grew out of the southern civil rights movement in the 1960s in Georgia.[12] The goal was to establish economic and political independence for Black farmers and their families being forced off the land. New Communities bought 5,000 acres of agricultural and forested land in 1970. However, they had to borrow much of the one-million-dollar purchase.[13] Caught in a debt treadmill, all agricultural products produced went towards paying down their debt burden.[14] After successive years of drought and discriminatory lending practices by FHA, New Communities had to sell off a parcel of their land: 1,300 acres.[15] The rest of the land was lost a few years later to foreclosure.[16]

Fortunately, the entity of New Communities never dissolved, and through Pigford they recovered monetary damages.[17] Using the $12 million payout, they purchased the Cyprus Pond Plantation outside Albany, Georgia, a 1600-acre parcel in June of 2011.[18] Despite these setbacks, community land trusts (CLTs) are still a powerful, underutilized legal solution to reclaim lost agricultural land.

Currently, there are few agricultural community land trusts in the U.S. Yet, they offer flexibility for landholders and farmers without much capital. In practice, the CLT holds title to the land and grants ninety-nine-year ground leases to farmers. Farmers are allowed to make improvements to the land, such as building infrastructure and installing irrigation.[19] The farmer then owns these improvements and can sell them when they decide to retire or move on to a new venture.[20] The land itself is held by the CLT and rented out for a low cost.[21] Not only does the agricultural land stay perpetually affordable, but it also allows farmers to adapt to a changing climate and steward their land as they see fit.[22] This arrangement is far more flexible than a conservation easement, which can forbid certain types of improvements to land, often to the detriment of the farmer.[23]

Importantly, a CLT is governed by a tri-partite board. One part is individuals on the land, one part community members, and one part public interest representatives. The democratic style of this governing structure allows for community involvement and community buy-in to the land. While it may be a more challenging model than individual ownership of land, it presents an opportunity for coalition building and political might.

Community land trusts can increase land access for groups historically disadvantaged from land ownership, but they still require institutional support. Until other funding structures fill in the gaps, it is crucial to prevent discriminatory lending practices to allow for equal access to land. Institutional funders should prioritize socially disadvantaged groups and conduct outreach into these communities. Community-based lawyers can assist in facilitating outreach and be on alert for discriminatory practices. Advocacy groups can call farmers in and call injustices out. On stolen land, everyone has a role to play in reparations.

[1] Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1707, 1713-14 (1993).

[2] Black Producers, USDA NASS, https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2019/2017Census_Black_Producers.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2025).

[3] Id.

[4] Tom Philpott, White People Own 98% of Rural Land, Grist, (June 20, 2020), https://grist.org/justice/white-people-own-98-of-rural-land-young-black-farmers-want-to-reclaim-their-share .

[5] Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999) aff’d 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000), and enforcement denied sub nom. Pigford v. Schafer, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2008).

[6] Id. at 86.

[7] Id.

[8] The Pigford Cases: USDA Settlement of Discrimination Suits by Black Farmers, Cong Rsch Serv., https://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RS20430.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2025).

[9] Id.

[10] What is a Community Land Trust?, Int’l. Ctr. for Cmty. Land Tr.s, https://www.cltweb.org/resources/what-is-a-community-land-trust  (last visited Sept. 19, 2025).

[11] Id.

[12] New Communities, Int’l. Ctr. for Cmty. Land Tr.s, https://www.cltweb.org/resources/clt-case-studies/new-communities  (last visited Oct. 6, 2025).

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] New Communities, Int’l. Ctr. for Cmty. Land Tr.s, https://www.cltweb.org/resources/clt-case-studies/new-communities  (last visited Oct. 6, 2025).

[18] Id.

[19] Land Trusts, Ctr. for Agric. and Food Sys., https://farmlandaccess.org/land-trusts  (last visited Oct. 6, 2025)

[20] Id.

[21] Id.

[22] Id.

[23] Conservation Easements, Ctr. for Agric. and Food Sys., https://farmlandaccess.org/conservation-easements (last visited Oct. 6, 2025).

Our Food System is Sustained by Undocumented Immigrants

By Dalia Rodriguez-Caspeta

            On January 20, 2025, Donald Trump signed 26 executive orders.[1] Amongst them was Executive Order 14159 titled “Protecting People Against Invasion.”[2] The order’s purpose is to “protect the American people by faithfully executing immigration laws of the United States.”[3] The order authorized the “efficient and expedited removal of [immigrants] from the United States.”[4] Since then, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has “arrested 66,463 [undocumented immigrants] and removed 65,682 [immigrants]” and counting.[5] “Over forty percent of hired crop farmworkers lack legal immigration status” in the United States.[6] In California, it is estimated that about 75% of farmworkers are undocumented.[7]

To understand the effect expedited removal of undocumented individuals will take on the nation, understanding California’s contribution to food production is crucial. “California is the nation’s sole producer . . .of a large number of specialty crops.”[8] The list includes almonds, artichokes, figs, olives, and walnuts.[9] “The state produces about half of the U.S.-grown fruits, nuts, and vegetables.”[10] In 2023, agricultural exports from California totaled $22.4 billion.[11] Essentially, food produced in California reaches the entire nation.

Amongst the fields, farmworkers are vital for the harvesting of the produce.[12] Yet, under the new ICE efforts, Latino farmworkers have stopped going to work.[13] Initially, the Trump administration refrained from ICE raids in farming communities, but quickly changed course.[14] ICE agents started conducting raids “at farm fields and packinghouses from the Central Coast to the San Joaquin Valley.”[15] Raids were documented on farms and fields in Tulare and Ventura counties.[16]

The Central Coast and San Joaquin Valley house some of the top food production counties in the United States.[17] At the top is Fresno County, followed by Tulare, Monterey, and San Joaquin.[18] Most of the farms located in these counties employ undocumented workers.[19] As the immigration raids began targeting these communities, farms have suffered. Farmworkers have stopped going to work for fear of being taken on their commute to work.[20] According to Marcy Kreiter, “Migrants are reluctant to take the chance of being hauled off to detention.”[21] Farmers are struggling to get their crops harvested as more than half of their workers have stopped showing up for work.[22] Farms expecting about 300 workers have only 80 show up after immigration raids.[23]

Farmers are not only experiencing losses in labor, but their crops have also gone unharvested, creating economic losses for them as well.[24] A farmer in Ventura County stated, “if 70% of your workforce doesn’t show up, 70% of your crop doesn’t get picked and can go bad in one day.”[25] Loss of labor thus means loss of crops and loss of food on American tables.

Outside of California, farmers are also experiencing crop and revenue loss. In Oregon, a farmer lost most of his workforce, leaving cherries to rot on the tree.[26] At the end of the picking season, the farmer will lose $250,000–$300,000 of revenue.[27] In Texas, Farmer Nick Billman lost his entire workforce.[28] He is struggling to find workers as he starts planning for the fall season.[29] Billman estimates that if he cannot find labor for his harvest plans, he is going to lose about $100,000 to $150,000 in revenue.[30]

In addition to the loss of revenue, grocery prices may be affected by immigration raids. From July 2024 to July 2025, food prices rose 2.9%.[31] If the produce is not harvested within a specific timeframe, it risks being sunburned or becoming over mature.[32] The labor shortage, in some instances, has prevented the harvest of crops, leading to loss not just for the farmers but for the nation.

The ongoing immigration raids affect the entire food system in the United States. Undocumented immigrants compose 75% of farmworkers in California[33] and 42% nationwide.[34] In addition to farming and agriculture, undocumented workers have a significant presence in food production, wholesale, and restaurants.[35] The fear of being taken away from their families has prevented many from going to work.[36] After a couple of days, others resume going to work due to economic necessity.[37]

The current approach to immigration in the United States is ineffective and harmful to the immigrant community. The leaders of this nation must take a different approach to immigration. Mass deportations are not the solution. Rather, our focus should be looking to new reforms tailoring pathways to legalization. Our food system depends on the immigrant community. They sustain our food system. No one should be living in fear.

[1] Sarah Fortinsky, Trump Executive Orders and Actions: By the Numbers, The Hill (Jan. 21, 2025), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5098445-trump-executive-orders-first-day/.

[2] Proclamation No. 14159, 90 Fed. Reg. 8443 (Jan. 20 2025).

[3] Id.

[4] Id. at 8445.

[5] U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enf’t, 100 Days of Record-Breaking Immigration Enforcement in the U.S., (Apr. 29, 2025), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/100-days-record-breaking-immigration-enforcement-us-interior.

[6] Economic Research Service, Farm Labor, USDA (Sept. 12, 2025), https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-labor.

[7] La Cooperative Campesina de California, 31 Farmworker Facts You Should Know (Mar. 28, 2023), https://lacooperativa.org/31-california-farmworker-facts-you-should-know/.

[8] FSA, USDA, California State Fact Sheet (2011), https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/10cafacts_v3.pdf.

[9] Id.

[10] Id.

[11] Cal. Dep’t of Food and Agric., California’s Agricultural Production Statistics, https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/Statistics/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2025).

[12] Marcy Kreiter, Crops Rotting in Fields with Undocumented Farmworkers Gone, The Food Institute (July 7, 2025), https://foodinstitute.com/focus/crops-rotting-in-fields-with-undocumented-farmworkers-gone/.

[13] Tim Reid et al., Immigration Raids Leave Crops Unharvested, California Farms at Risk, Reuters (June 30, 2025), https://www.reuters.com/business/immigration-raids-leave-crops-unharvested-california-farms-risk-2025-06-30/.

[14] Jessica Garrison et al., ICE Expands Immigration Raids into California’s Agricultural Heartland, L.A. Times (June 10, 2025), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2025-06-10/ice-expands-immigration-raids-into-californias-agricultural-heartland.

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17]  Office of Public Affairs, Nine California Counties Make Top-10 List for Ag Sales in the U.S., Cal. Dep’t of Food and Agric. (Feb. 13, 2024), https://plantingseedsblog.cdfa.ca.gov/wordpress/?p=27335.

[18] Id.

[19] La Cooperative Campesina de California, supra note 7.

[20] Rebecca Davis O’Brien & Miriam Jordan, A Chill Sets in for Undocumented Workers and Those Who Hire Them, N.Y. Times (Mar. 9, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/09/business/economy/immigrant-workers-deportation-fears.html.

[21] Kreiter, supra note 12.

[22] Reid, supra note 13.

[23] Id.

[24] Id.

[25] Id.

[26] David Culver et al., Deportation Fallout: This farmer lost half his workforce. Now he’s losing his crop too, CNN (Aug. 7, 2025), https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/06/us/oregon-cherry-harvest-immigrant-worker-shortage.

[27] Id.

[28] Edgar Sandoval, On a Quiet Southern Border, Empty Farms and Frightened Workers, N.Y. Times (June 27, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/27/us/politics/border-immigration-farms.html.

[29] Id.

[30] Id.

[31] Economic Research Service, Food Price Outlook – Summary Findings, USDA (Aug. 25, 2025), https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/food-price-outlook/summary-findings.

[32] Reid, supra note 13.

[33] La Cooperative Campesina de California, supra note 7.

[34] Amrit Cheng, Mass Deportations, the Economy, and You, Nat’l Immigr. L. Ctr. (Apr. 16, 2025), https://www.nilc.org/articles/mass-deportations-the-economy-and-you/.

[35] Nicole Prchal Svajlenka, Undocumented Immigrants in the Food Supply Chain (2021).

[36] Carolyn Jones, ‘Afraid to go to school’: Immigrant families in the Salinas Valley are gripped by fear, Cal. Matters (Feb. 20, 2025), https://calmatters.org/education/k-12-education/2025/02/deportation/; Mary Miliken & Arafat Barbakh, In California strawberry fields, immigration raids sow fear, Reuters (July 14, 2025), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/california-strawberry-fields-immigration-raids-sow-fear-2025-07-14/.

[37] Reid et al., supra note 13.

Are Youth Plaintiffs Winning the Court Battle but Losing the Climate War? Lessons from Montana and Hawai’i Youth Plaintiff Climate Cases

By Swithin Shearer

            Young people occupy a unique space in the fight against climate change. Today’s youth are projected to see some of the most drastic climate change impacts unless countries take immediate action to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.[1] However, the voting age is 18 or older in the vast majority of countries.[2] Without a political voice, youth can be forgotten or excluded from the climate change conversation. Youth have raised their voices and responded by filing climate lawsuits against the government to effectuate positive change.[3] But does litigation, or a court victory, necessarily result in climate or environmental benefits? The classic legal answer is: it depends.

Two recent cases in the United States, brought on behalf of young people in Montana[4] and Hawai’i[5], are illustrative. In Held v. Montana and Navahine F. v. Hawai‘i Department of Transportation, the plaintiffs demanded that their voices be heard as part of the climate conversation. In both cases, youth plaintiffs sued their State to demand changes to policies that adversely affected the environment.[6] The plaintiffs in each case alleged the State violated their constitutional right to a “clean and healthful environment”[7] when the State endorsed the use of fossil fuels.[8] The plaintiffs in both cases leveraged environmental protections embedded in their state constitutions to challenge the government. And, in both cases, they won their legal battles. For the Navahine F. plaintiffs, the on-the-ground outcome was a happy ending; the Held plaintiffs were not so lucky.

Montana Litigation: Empty Victory

Montana youth are arguably worse off than before the Held decision. In Held, the plaintiffs’ argument centered around the Montana Department of Environmental Quality’s analysis (or lack thereof) of GHG emissions during environmental review pursuant to the Montana Environmental Policy Act (“MEPA”).[9] The district court determined the statutory scheme for environmental review was not compatible with the constitutional guarantee of a clean and healthful environment.[10] Rather than accepting the district court’s decision, the State elected to appeal the decision to the Montana Supreme Court.[11] Two of the issues on appeal were whether the Montana Constitution required a “stable climate system” and whether the challenged portions of MEPA were unconstitutional.[12]

By challenging the substantive core of the district court’s decision, Montana showed it was not willing to improve its environmental policy voluntarily. After the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision,[13] the legislature passed two bills in response.[14] The bills amended MEPA by making evaluation of GHG emissions optional and eliminating the unconstitutional portions that prohibited evaluation of GHG emissions.[15]

Combined, the changes to MEPA weaken environmental protections for actions requiring environmental review. GHG emission data, if evaluated, may only be “given appropriate consideration and assessment.”[16] Previously, GHG emissions could be considered in decision-making.[17] Legislators had the opportunity to bolster environmental protections by requiring, rather than prohibiting, GHG emission assessment. Instead, they downgraded the value of emissions data by choosing to make evaluation optional and limiting the use of that information. This may ultimately leave Montanans, and the youth plaintiffs who brought the suit, in a more vulnerable position than they previously occupied.

Hawai’i Litigation: Ideal Outcome

In Navahine F., the youth plaintiffs argued their constitutional rights had been violated because Hawai’i’s carbon emissions had no reasonable prospect of decreasing enough to meet the State’s “Zero Emissions Clean Economy Target” by 2045.[18] In contrast with Held, the Navahine F. litigation in Hawai’i resulted in a favorable settlement agreement that required the State to, among other terms, “develop and implement a concrete and comprehensive statewide plan . . . to reduce GHG emissions . . . .”[19] The Hawai’i Department of Transportation (HDOT) has since set a goal to achieve “zero emissions in the transportation sector.”[20] HDOT has also drafted a plan for GHG reduction across the State in order to achieve that goal;[21] a final plan is scheduled to be completed by October 2025.[22] The State must set five-year “GHG emissions reduction targets” and perform a periodic “comprehensive review and update.”[23] Unlike Montana’s response to the Held decision, Hawai’i has shown its willingness to embrace its responsibility to protect the environment for its citizens in the aftermath of litigation.

Reflecting on Held and Navahine F.: Was Litigation Successful?

Two key questions arise when comparing the outcomes of the Held and Navahine F. cases. First, why were the outcomes so starkly different? And second, does a court win really mean the plaintiffs will be better off? The answer to both questions seems to hinge on whether the government’s actions are voluntary or forced. The aftermath of Held shows the risks of climate litigation when a state’s elected officials do not wish to grapple with climate issues. Where a state takes a hostile view toward climate-conscious policies, a victory in court does not necessarily translate to a successful shift in a government’s climate policies. Yet, it is those circumstances where climate litigation is the most enticing to try to force the government to shift its policies. This is particularly important for youth plaintiffs, who are unable to vote to influence policy. Litigation therefore provides a much-needed forum for youth to seek justice on climate-related issues, especially those that violate explicit state constitutional protections.

Youth plaintiff lawsuits that challenge a state’s climate policies based on state constitutional protections are fairly novel.[24] Such litigation is unlikely to be widespread; only a handful of state constitutions have sufficiently specific provisions protecting a citizen’s right to a clean and healthful environment to support legal claims such as those raised in Held and Navahine F.[25] Yet, the possibility of success has prompted similar lawsuits in other states.[26] However, youth plaintiffs would be wise to pause before jumping into litigation. They will need to consider the possibility that their government may choose to further retreat from environmental policies when faced with climate litigation, as the Held plaintiffs are now witnessing in Montana. Because in Montana’s case, the youth plaintiffs won the court battle, but they may have lost the climate war.

[1] See Overarching Frequently Asked Questions and Answers 3: How will climate change affect the lives of today’s children tomorrow, if no immediate action is taken?, IPCC (June 16, 2023), https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/about/frequently-asked-questions/keyfaq3.

[2] Voting Age by Country 2025, World Population Rev., https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/voting-age-by-country (last visited Sept. 5, 2025).

[3] See, e.g., Complaint at 1, Dunn v. Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 2025CV002797 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Aug. 22, 2025); Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1–4, Lighthiser v. Trump, No. CV-25-54-BU-DLC (D. Mont. May 29, 2025).

[4] Held v. Montana, No. CDV-2020-307 (Mont. 1st Dist. Ct. Aug. 14, 2023).

[5] Complaint, Navahine F. v. Hawai‘i Dep’t of Transp., No. 1CCV-22-0000631 (1st Cir. Jun. 1, 2022).

[6] Complaint at 1–3, Held v. Montana, No. CDV-2020-307 (Mont. 1st Dist. Ct. Mar. 13, 2020); Complaint at 1–4, Navahine F. No. 1CCV-22-0000631.

[7] Mont. Const. art. II, § 3; id. art. IX, § 1; Haw. Const. art. XI, § 9.

[8] Complaint at 2, 35, Held No. CDV-2020-307; Complaint at 4, Navahine F. No. 1CCV-22-0000631.

[9] Complaint at 2, 35–36, Held No. CDV-2020-307.

[10] Held v. State, No. CDV-2020-307, 2023 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 2, at *129.

[11] Notice of Appeal of Governor Greg Gianforte, Mont. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, Mont. Dep’t of Nat. Res. and Conservation, and Mont. Dep’t of Transp., 2024 MT 312 (No. DA 23-0575).

[12] Held v. Montana, 2024 MT 312, ¶ 1.

[13] Id.

[14] A third bill, H.B. 229, was introduced. H.B 229, 69th Leg., 2025 Sess. (Mont. 2025). Based on the initial amendments it made to MEPA, it could have expanded, or at least not scaled back, environmental protections. However, H.B. 229 died in process. Id.

[15] H.B. 285, § 12 (amending § 75-1-201, MCA), 69th Leg., 2025 Session. (Mont. 2025).

[16] H.B. 285, § 12, 69th Leg., 2025 Sess. (Mont. 2025) (amending Mont. Code Ann. § 75-1-201(b)(ii)) (emphasis added).

[17] Mont. Code Ann. § 75-1-201(b)(ii) (emphasis added).

[18] Complaint at 3–4, Navahine F. v. Hawai‘i Dep’t of Transp., No. 1CCV-22-0000631 (1st Cir. June 1, 2022).

[19] Joint Stipulation and Order re: Settlement Ex. A: Settlement Agreement and Release 5, Navahine F. v. Hawai’i Dep’t of Transp., No. 1CCV-22-0000631 (June 20, 2024).

[20] Hawai’i Department of Transportation (HDOT) Energy Security and Waste Reduction Plan, State of Hawai’i Dep’t of Transp., https://highways.hidot.hawaii.gov/stories/s/h9gp-xxmt (last visited Sept. 19, 2025).

[21] Hawai’i Dep’t of Transp., Hawai’i Energy Security and Waste Reduction Plan DRAFT (June 27, 2025).

[22] Hawai’i Department of Transportation (HDOT) Energy Security and Waste Reduction Plan, supra note 20.

[23] Joint Stipulation and Order re: Settlement Ex. A: Settlement Agreement and Release 5, Navahine F., No. 1CCV-22-0000631.

[24] See Dana Drugmand, Advocates Nationwide Push for State-Level Green Constitutional Amendments (Mar. 28, 2024), https://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/advocates-nationwide-push-state-level-green-constitutional-amendments.

[25] Id.

[26] See, e.g., Complaint at 1, Dunn v. Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 2025CV002797 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Aug. 22, 2025); Complaint at 1–4; see also Natalie R. v. Utah, 2025 UT 5, 567 P.3d 550.

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